SDI 2010Aff Update

Kallmyer/Peterson

Aff Update

Aff Update......

AT: Bandow Indict......

2AC Hegemony Blocks (1/2)......

2AC Hegemony Blocks (2/2)......

2AC North Korea Block (1/4)......

2AC North Korea Block (2/4)......

2AC North Korea Block (3/4)......

2AC North Korea Block (4/4)......

2AC Asian Balancing Blocks......

AT: Hillman (1/5)......

AT: Hillman (2/5)......

AT: Hillman (3/5)......

AT: Hillman (4/5)......

AT: Hillman (5/5)......

2AC Security K [1/4]......

2AC Security K [2/4]......

2AC Security K [3/4]......

2AC Security K [4/4]......

2AC Security K [5/5]......

2AC China......

2AC China......

2AC Deterrence......

2AC Deterrence......

2AC Deterrence......

2AC Deterrence......

***1AR***......

1AR Extensions – North Korea (1/2)......

1AR Extensions – North Korea (2/2)......

1AR Extensions – Hegemony......

1AR Impact Calc – START Specific......

1AR Impact Calc - Heg......

1AR IR FEM......

1AR Cap and Trade......

1AR START......

AT: ADD ON: – Afghan Instability......

AT: ADD ON: – Israel Strikes......

AT: ADD ON: – Russia Economy......

1AR Midterms......

1AR Troop Shift......

1AR CMR......

1AR Conditionality......

1AR Consult NATO (LONG)......

1AR Consult NATO (SHORT)......

AT: Bandow Indict

This Indict has NO impact on the opbjectivity of his East Asian Lititure. Doug Bandow was hired by Citizen Outreach and Bandow still writes objectively without bias

US Newswire, 05 [“Doug Bandow Joins Citizen Outreach as New Vice President of Policy”, 12/28/2005, Contact: Chuck Muth of Citizen Outreach]

Citizen Outreach, a non-profit organization focused on limited-government public policies, announced today thatDoug Bandow, one of the nation's foremost libertarian thinkers, will be joining the organization as its new Vice President of Policy effective January 1, 2006. Bandow is a former senior fellow at the libertarian Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. He earned a J.D. degree at Stanford University and served as a special assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He is an author, lecturer and widely syndicated newspaper columnist. "I've been reading Doug's columns for many years now," said Citizen Outreach President Chuck Muth. "And even on the rare policy issue in which he and I might not agree 100 percent, I always know that Doug's reasoning is based on objective thought and not emotion. He's able to justify any public policy issue from a limited government standpoint in the best tradition of our Founding Fathers. I wish we had more public officials who think like Doug in elective office. Citizen Outreach couldn't be happier that he is joining our organization." Bandow will be based in the Washington, D.C., area and will focus on extending Citizen Outreach's public policy efforts on state and federal issues, as well as Capitol Hill outreach and coalition-building with other grassroots organizations who share the limited-government philosophy. "I'm excited to be joining Chuck in his efforts to energize the grassroots," said Bandow. "Only by getting average citizens across the country involved in politics will we be able to return government to its original limited role of protecting our liberties. The work of Citizen Outreach is particularly important at a time when politicians in both parties are pushing to expand government spending and regulation."

2AC Hegemony Blocks (1/2)

  1. Off the 1NC #1, Stevens in 6, that USFK key to flexibility and deterrence:
  1. Extend O’Hanlon 04 from 1AC Heg. US presence in South sends a message to the rest of the region that we are tying down our long-term capability and decreasing our flexibility. Prefer our evidence, it assumes Stevens’ argument, and explains that analysts like him rely too much on ground forces. Withdrawal allows refocus on more strategic air and naval forces.
  2. Extend Bandow 10 from 1AC Heg. He postdates Stevens, and shows that on-site threat balancing is too expensive to maintain, and puts occupied countries at risk because they don’t feel a need to build up their own defenses.
  3. Extend Bandow 08 from 1AC Heg. China feels threatened by US troop presence, so they build up their own military, leading to increased risk of war among the countries in the region who feel threatened by a rising China.
  1. Off the 1NC #2, Blumenthal 09, that regional hegemony is key to soft power:
  1. The plan changes how China sees the US. If China sees that the US is no longer a threat, then they won’t avoid Taiwan. Even if we can’t negotiate with China post-plan, we solve the perception that we are aggressive; threat perceptions are the key Internal Link.
  2. Cross-apply Bandow 10 from the 1AC Asia Balancing Advantage. China’s frustration with Washington’s use of troops to be the regional superpower means that they are more likely to backlash against Taiwan and the US.
  1. Off the 1NC #3, Hwang 06, that Troop Presence is key to Asian stability and containing China:
  1. Withdrawal from South Korea causes regional countries to build up conventional defenses. A regional balance of power where friendly nations act to protect their own interests and constrain China would be most in America’s interests. Withdrawal would decrease US troop overstretch securing US hegemony. That’s the Bandow 8, National Security Advisory Group 6, and Spencer 2K evidence from the 1AC Heg.
  2. Cross Apply Bandow 10 from the 1AC Asia Balancing Advantage. China will inevitably become dominant-their economy and military are growing faster than any other nation. Bandow says that China is key to peace in the region-but if we keep troops there, China will backlash against the US and Taiwan. Prefer our evidence, it Post-dates theirs.

2AC Hegemony Blocks (2/2)

  1. Troops won’t deter China, and South Korea won’t support containment policies.

BANDOW, 8 [Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, Vice President of Policy for Citizen Outreach, the Bastiat Scholar in Free Enterprise at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Cobden Fellow in International Economics at the Institute for Policy Innovation, the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance, the Senior Fellow in International Religious Persecution at the Institute on Religion and Public Policy, former special assistant to President Reagan, former editor of Inquiry magazine, widely published in such periodicals as Foreign Policy, Harper's, National Interest, National Review, The New Republic, and Orbis, as well as leading newspapers, including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post; “Seoul Searching” Nov 11, d/a: 7/15/10,

Most American analysts, at least, also view the ROK as a member of anincipient anti-China coalition to contain Beijing. The only problem with this strategy is that virtually no one in South Korea will sign up. Forget the historic ties and present economic relationship between the PRC and ROK. The most obvious casus belli between the United States and China is Taiwan. Who in South Korea wants to makehis country a permanent enemy of theincipient superpower next door, let alone do so to save Taipei?Especially since U.S. bases in the South would be an equally obvious and easy target should Washington and Beijing start shooting at one another.

In short, while Seoul wants a continuing U.S. presence as a residual insurance policy against North Korea and perhaps China (and even Japan), it will not risk its security by backing U.S. geopolitical objectives. The alliance was one-way when it was created. It remains one-way today.

2AC North Korea Block (1/4)

1. Off the 1NC #1, Korean Central News Agency 6/15, Alt Causes

  1. The United Forces Korea are the problem. They symbolize America’s attempted containment and hostility.

B. Troop withdrawal is necessary to ease tensions and transition to reunification.

UPI ASIA, 9 [Peter Van Nguyen, freelance contributor who has written for Asia Time Online, OpEdnews and Foreign Policy Journal, “U.S. bases are obstacle to Korean reunification,” Oct 13, d/a: 7/16/10,

However, U.S. military bases in South Korea could pose the greatest obstacle to a peaceful reunification of the Koreas. Even a unified Korea might not want the U.S. military, as reunification would make the objective of providing deterrence against the North redundant. A U.S. military base in a united Korea would only strain ties with China, as it would be difficult to explain why it was required if the North Korean threat no longer exists. Also, millions of North Koreans have a deeply embedded resentment against the United States and are highly suspicious of its geopolitical moves in the region. Many believe that the South Korean government is a puppet of the United States. Stationing troops in Korea after reunification would only reinforce this belief. This would create a deep rift within the Koreas and threaten to derail the reunification process. The complete withdrawal of all U.S. military bases and personnel from the Korean peninsula should follow after a timetable has been set, allowing the new Korea to handle its own security.

2. Off the 1NC #2, Niksch 10, that there’s no threat of attack:

  1. Extend Carpenter 6 from 1AC North Korea, Even if Kim is rational other country’s responses will be irrational and dangerous. North Korea is proliferating now, this causes Japan and South Korea to scramble for nukes which leads to preemptive war.
  2. Extend Bandow 10 from 1AC North Korea, In the status quo North Korea is more aggressive and North Korean irresponsibility can trigger a war

2AC North Korea Block (2/4)

  1. N. Korea has a multitude of reasons to attack-yellow sea contention, S. Korea intimidation, rogue action, impunity, military rewards, and disruption

Bandow, 10. Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Tripwire: Korea and U.S Foreign Policy in a Changed World. “The U.S-South Korea Alliance-Outdated, Unnecessary and Dangerous”. July 14, d/a: 7/15/10.

And yet, while officials in Seoul have been planning to exercise greater global influence, Pyongyang apparently remains willing and able to threaten war. The sinking of the Cheonan, a 1,200-ton corvette, on March 26 demonstrated that South Korea’s most serious security challenges remain closer to home. After considering the possibilities that the Cheonan suffered from an accident or hit a mine, the ROK, in consultation with international experts, concluded that the cause was a Chinese-made torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine.4 Why would the North sink a South Korean ship now? It could be part of a campaign to redraw the contested boundary in the Yellow Sea.5 It might be Kim-sanctioned retaliation for a naval clash last November in which a North Korean vessel apparently was damaged.6 It could be an unauthorized military action, carried out by either rogue elements within or an increasingly influential leadership of the DPRK military, intended to prevent resumption of negotiations over Pyongyang’s nuclear program. It might be an attempt by Kim Jongil to frighten Seoul into renewing economic ties and aid reduced by the government of Lee Myung-bak.7 It could be intended to demonstrate that North Korea can strike with impunity. It might be a reward from Kim for the North Korean military, allowing embarrassed naval leaders to 2 The sinking of the Cheonan, a 1,200-ton corvette, on March 26 demonstrated that South Korea’s most serious security challenges remain close to home. avenge their loss last November, as he attempts to install his young son as his successor.8 It could be an attempt to disrupt the South’s economy and interfere with upcoming South Korean elections. Perhaps Pyongyang hoped to achieve several of these objectives.

3. Off the 1NC #3, Klingner 08, Turn – Turn-US commitment key to stability and deterrence

  1. Extend Bandow 8 from 1AC North Korea, U.S presence gives North Korea an incentive to attack which will destroy stability and deterrence with they attack
  2. Extend Feffer 10 from 1AC North Korea, U.S presence prevents South Korea from developing regional security systems for itself which ultimately is more damaging to stability and deterrence

2AC North Korea Block (3/4)

C. Troops aren’t effective, but they will be replaced with better technology that deters.

BROOKES, 4 [Peter, Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs and Director, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation, “THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM KOREA,” Testimony before Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, [H.A.S.C. No. 108–31], 6/15, d/a: 7/15/10,

In fact, despite the upcoming decrease in American soldiers in the Republic of Korea, according to the Pentagon, U.S. firepower will actually increase due to expected improvements in American force structure over the next several years. Although technology cannot replace soldiers in some missions, today's high-tech equipment can provide significant firepower advantages over the common foot soldier. Therefore, the United States can withdraw some of its Korean-based troops for other soldier-intensive missions, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and the war on terrorism, while actually improving the lethality and deterrence of its forces in the ROK.Improving a defense capability of U.S. Forces Korea can be accomplished by bringing to bear such systems as Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) surface-to-air missiles for air defense, the Army's new Stryker brigade, the Navy's High-Speed Vesseland the forward deployment of addition air and naval assets to Hawaii and Guam. Washington is planning an $11 billion investment and some additional 150 military capabilities over the next 4 years that will enhance defense against any North Korean attack, according to the Department of Defense.

4. Off the 1NC #4, Bandow 08, that there’s no impact

  1. We don’t say Russia and China will back North Korea. Our argument is that North Korean proliferation leads to Japanese and South Korean prolif and region-wide instability and war, that’s Carpenter and Cimbala.

2AC North Korea Block (4/4)

  1. OTHER NEG ARGUMENTS!!

Feffer reverse causal: They mishandle our first Feffer evidence, it is a uniqueness claim to say that South Korea is willing to form a security alliance but will not because of US presence. This card isn’t solvency for our North Korea Advantage.

Prolif Double Turn:

They say prolif double turn—WRONG—The plan causes South Korea and Japan transparent prolif—that’s stable and prevents North Korean destabilizing prolif. Absent the plan, North Korea prolif will cause pre-emptive nuclear strikes—that’s Cimballa

Japan/ China Alliance: They say that China and Japan will not work together but even if the neg is right, it proves our argument because china will seek to stop japan from proliferating while working on North Korea to stop making weapons. In a world when we abandon South Korea, Japan will perceive our abandonment and not let South Korea be the only one who proliferates. We only need to prove the threat that South Korea will proliferate to cause North Korea to back down.

2AC Asian Balancing Blocks

  1. Off the 1NC 1#, Stevens 06: cross apply the Bandow 08 card from the hege advantage. It specifically addresses how for South Korea to have a legitimate domestic military force, the United States needs to withdraw, otherwise the incentive to develop for themselves is absent.
  1. Off the 1NC #2, UPI Asia 09: Also refer to the Bandow in 8 card from the hege flow. When there is a regional balance of power, countries will work together to deter china instead of the US only. And American’s presence forces China to upgrade its military because it sees us as a threat.
  1. Group 1NC #3 and 4, Carpenter 10 and Thai Press Reports 10:

Obama is already engaging China over North Korea, but can’t succeeded because of Chinese threat perceptions.

Ted GalenCarpenter, Cato Institute Foreign Policy and Defense VP, 3/11/2010, “False Hopes,” da: 7/14/10

American leaders have experienced repeated frustration in their efforts to enlist China in the campaign to impose robust economic penalties againstthe newest nuclear proliferators: North Koreaand Iran.In the various rounds of multilateral sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council, Beijing has sought to delay such measures and weaken their provisions. Chinese officials also have complained loudly about unilateral U.S. measures — so much so that the Obama administration has reportedly sought to carve out "exceptions" for Chinese firms with respect to legislation now pending in Congress that would tighten sanctions on companies doing business with Iran.Washington's patience at what American officials regard as obstructionism is fraying, though, and the differing agendas threaten to exacerbate tensions that are already at a high levelbecause of the recent U.S. arms sale to Taiwan and other disputes.The Obama administration is clearly trying to prod China to be more cooperative on the sanctions issue — especially with respect to Iran. During his summit meeting in Beijing in November 2009, President Obama reportedly warned Chinese President Hu Jintao that if China continued to block meaningful sanctions against that country, Israel might ignite a crisis by taking military action to damage Tehran's nuclear program. For a few weeks, the Chinese government seemed more receptive to having the UN impose a new round of penalties. But that momentary flirtation with a more hard-line policy has receded. And there is no apparent willingness at all in Beijing to consider strengthening the rather modest sanctions in place against North Korea. Americans are increasingly irritated and perplexed at Beijing's posture regarding the nuclear proliferation problem. China would seem to have ample reasons to want to preventIran andNorth Korea(especially the latter)from acquiring nuclear weapons. China ought to worry about North Korea building an arsenal on its doorstep and perhaps triggering a nuclear-arms race in Northeast Asia. That is especially true since a nuclear North Korea would create an incentive for China's long-time rival, Japan, to build a deterrent in response.