Assignment 3: Research Outline: Example

Assignment 3: Research Outline: Example

Part I: Revised Introduction:

(Topic) The power and influence of lobbying, particularly at the federal level in the US has been widely reported on. In 2013, more than 12,000 registered lobbyists spent over three billion dollars attempting to influence the policies of the federal government (Center for Responsive Politics 2013). Scholars have noted a similar trend in the states, where both the number and importance of lobbying has increased sharply since the late 1980s (Rosenthal 2001; Nownes and DeAlejandro 2009; Nownes and Freeman 1998; Gray and Lowery 1995). However, despite the growth of lobbying at both levels, and the corresponding advance in our scholarly understanding of the topic, important questions remain about exactly how lobbying influences legislative outcomes. If influencing legislative outcomes is central to the task of lobbying, and success often entails one interest group winning over another, how such influence and thus success is achieved remains a subject of considerable uncertainty. In a modest way, this study aims to examine the effects of lobbying on legislative outcomes at the state level in the US by analyzing the results of a particular legislative contest over the regulation of electronic waste disposal. (Research Question)In particular, we ask what role does lobbyist-proposed legislative language have on the ability of a lobbying interest to influence legislative outcomes, and thus win in competition with other interest groups?

(Introductory Literature Review) Although central to what lobbyists do, most contemporary scholarship on lobbying avoids the question of influence (Dur and De Bievre 2007; Mahoney 2007). “In both the United States and the European Union (EU), scholars have focused on a whole host of lobbying-related phenomena –formation, organization, access, activity – but not influence,” writes Mahoney (2007, 35). This is true despite the fact that the scholarly literature is, for the most part, divided between two distinct theories of lobbying -exchange and persuasion accounts- that are both predicated on explaining how interactions between lobbyists and legislators influence legislative outcomes (Naoi and Krauss 2009; Lohmann 1995; Austen-Smith 1993; Wright 2003; Bennedsen and Feldmann 2006). Lobbying is thought to influence legislative action either through an exchange of contributions, financial and otherwise for votes, or, more recently, by way of information-based strategic persuasion. Both theories purport to account for how various forms of “access” to legislators translate into specific legislative outcomes. Nonetheless, scholars have generally refrained from attempting to analyze or measure the influence of lobbying. They have done so for a simple and valid reason: there is an inherent difficulty in operationalizing “influence” as a concept (Mahoney 2007). (Thesis/Argument) Although lobbyists frequently use both strategies, constructive lobbying, we argue, when used as a form of informational signaling is as likely, under certain circumstances to influence legislative outcomes than attempts to kill proposed legislation.

Part II: Outline:

Title: Trashy Language: Assessing the Impact of Lobbyist-Proposed Legislative Language on State E-Waste Policy

I. Introduction

Topic:The Impact of Lobbyist-Proposed Legislative Language on State Electronic-Waste Policy

Question:What role does lobbyist-proposed legislative language have on the ability of a lobbying interest to influence legislative outcomes, and thus win in competition with other interest groups?

Introductory Literature Review: (Introduce Schools of Thought)

Exchange Theory: Lobbying influences legislative action either through an exchange of contributions, financial or otherwise for votes.

Persuasion Theory: Lobbying influences legislative action by way of information-based strategic persuasion.

Limitations: The role of lobbyist-proposed legislative language, as a form of persuasion has not been systematically analyzed.

Thesis: (Argument):

The use of specific legislative language by lobbyists does have a significant influence on legislative outcomes.

Hypothesis:

It is my contention that lobbyists who provide legislators with language that a lawmaker see as “constructive,” or more or less trustworthy and intended to further rather than destroy filed legislation are more likely to influence legislators and thus win in competition with other interest groups.

Roadmap:

Outline Paper: Review Different Schools of Thought (Exchange and Persuasion)

Statement of Sources

II. Literature Review

School of Thought One: Exchange Theory

Scholars: (Denzau and Munger 1986; Synder 1992; Hall and Deardorff 2006)

Summary: According to exchange theories of interest group advocacy, lobbying involves a form of barter or trade between lobbyists and legislators.

Critique: There are clear limits to exchange theories of lobbying, including questionsrelating to how implied contracts are enforced, and the frequency with lobbyists focus their attention on sympathetic rather than undecided legislators.

School of Thought Two: Persuasion Theory

Scholars: (Hansen 1991; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Evans 1989)

Summary: In persuasion models, lobbyists provide informational signaling in order to gain access to legislators and persuade them of the benefits of a particular policy course.

Critique: (Optional)

Support: Persuasion arguments have helped account for not only how, but why influence does or does not occur.

Transitional Paragraph:

III: Argument/Analysis

Research Design: Panel Study

To measure the comparative impact of a language-based strategy, I conducted a pre and post-test/panel study of filed and finalized, passed and amended e-waste legislation in each of the states (19 in total)that have passed such laws that include TVs since 2003.

Scoring:

To measure the before and after effects of a language strategy in each state, I scored the favorability of all e-waste legislation on a five point scale based on both its similarity to market share requirements, and the stated preferences of legacy TV lobby.

(Best: Success) (Worst: Failure)

Market share Placeholder Bills Flat Fees Weight of Product Return Share

12 3 4 5

IV: Conclusion: Review/Restate Overall Argument

Part III: List of Sources

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