Tug Tales #14 Feb 1, 2014

Army ST’s at Normandy:

Force Mulberry Details

Dan Friend

Commander Alfred Stanford was in charge of the US Army ST’s that were designated to help install the artificial harbor parts at D-Day Normandy. Please consider reading the book; it’s available for download on Amazon.com. But here are a few incidents and ST “tugboat” situations that caught my eye. At the very least DeLand’s ST 344 certainly was in this group of warboats…..and probably ST 479 and other as yet unidentified Beresford Boats as well.

EXCERPTS RELATING TO US ARMY SMALL TUGS “ST’S”

Force Mulberry - The Planning And Installation Of Artificial Harbor Off U.S. Normandy Beaches In World War II Commander USN Alfred Stanford -1946

……… In the middle of March (1944), seven of the YMS “towing vessels” which the U.S. had promised arrived. The number of ocean-going tugs had grown to eight. The U.S. Army had six small 85-foot harbor ST tugs it was willing to allocate to Mulberry. These tender ST’s, vessels of 750 hp., were manned by civilian crews, signed on in the States for non-combat duty. The tugs themselves were inadequately equipped. They had one 800-pound anchor, but no hawse pipe and no cable nor any windlass with which to weigh an anchor once down. They had no compasses and no charts. Most of the civilian crews had virtually no towing experience. Some of these same tugs later on, while under control of the Army, lost their way so completely as to fall into enemy hands off the Channel Islands, many miles off their course. (Wonder which boats these were? Is this when ST 75 was sunk? DF) But they were at least tugs. Three more U.S. Navy and six U.S. Army ocean tugs were supposed to be en route to the U.K. from the U.S. Thus twenty-four of a needed huge fleet of tugs were all that could be counted on for the present. Portland’s (England – DF) docking, fueling and repair space to handle the vessels now based there was already inadequate……….

………One influential member of British Administrative Staff had sought to dispose of the problem of a tug supply depot by creating a headquarters ship out of the old S.S. Aorangi, an idea beloved by the administrative captain whose fascination might be traced to the simple desire to be on a ship again. At this time thinking about tugs had changed from how many were required to how many could be secured. Estimates eventually ranged from 130 to 152 tugs assigned to Mulberry. A sea tug capable of towing large Mulberry elements was a reasonably large vessel with a crew of up to twenty people. Supply and maintenance of tugs in any such number as proposed for Mulberry with their needs for repair, fuel, water, spare crews, supplies, extra towing wire, were prodigious. How any such fleet could be served by coming alongside one merchant ship seemed to the USN personnel present hardly possible to propose to responsible officers. At the most six tugs might be so served; not fifty and certainly not one hundred and fifty. A shore depot of some sort would have to be established. Meanwhile to the consternation of some, the S.S. Aorangi was designated by C-in-C Portsmouth to act as tug supply depot. Diligent research by the U.S. Force Mulberry staff for a tug base continued, however. An abandoned signal tower on top of a cinema at Lee-on-Solent was discovered. It faced the outer harbor of Portsmouth and would be a strategic control point for the coming large fleet of tugs. While the blessed Aorangi idea could not be killed, assignment of this tower was fortunately affirmed by C-in-C. ………….

……….Even with the tug anchorage area off Lee-on-Solent, with signal facilities installed in the tower and the cinema theater used for storage, the actual water area involved could still not handle more than sixty tugs at one time and these on short stay. This meant scattering the fleet with attendant difficulty of control. To meet the tug refueling problems, the British offered facilities in Southampton. To envisage use of the thickly crowded narrow Southampton Water by tugs seeking to refuel in the heavy traffic near D-day was almost unthinkable, aside from the serious waste in tug hours incurred by bringing them all the way around from Selsey Bill, where their Phoenix tows would be. Supply, as could be seen from the proposal of Aorangi as a tug headquarters, had not been thought through. But the communication burden loomed as an even greater source of confusion and delay. The facilities assigned were utterly inadequate. As the U.S. report of a Portsmouth meeting observed: Communication has not been thought out at all. They seem not to have thought of telephone lines. Selsey must be able to talk to the tug base at Lee to call for tugs—and communication with Whale Bridging on Peel Bank must be established………

…….. The sea tugs could not bring the Phoenix and Whale units in close enough for siting in the shoal parking area at Selsey. Accordingly Lieutenant Fred Barton USNR had two U.S. Army ST harbor tugs standing by to relieve the sea tugs. Now in the middle of May tows were arriving night and day. Lieutenant Barton, who believed firmly in action, had taken over from his British superior. There was not a single dispatch boat or even rowboat on the beach for the British SNO to make the shore-to-ship trip…...

………Another signal from Portsmouth promised him up to ten ST tugs. After the civilian tug personnel had worked four days and nights, it had become very hard to induce them to return from Southampton fueling trips promptly. The extra tugs could fill in for the runaways…….

……… An unattached destroyer man, Lieutenant Commander Fintel, USNR, had been discovered by old friends in London and shipped to the Portsmouth Mulberry headquarters for duty. He took over the “operations room” in the Lee-on-Solent signal tower, and with one signal lamp and one telephone discovered to his dismay that this was a different war from the one he was accustomed to as he tried to route and control the growing fleet of sea tugs. It was difficult enough to decide what to do in this highly assorted tug fleet, with each tugmaster an individualist of the first water, and with Dutch, British, USN, U.S. Army and civilian tugs each having their own peculiar methods…….

………. Lieutenant Barton’s exploits at Selsey were in a class by themselves. So Commander Dennen was assigned to Lieutenant Hoague’s Corn Cob Operation up north in Oban with the blockships. This was further made practical by a ComNavEu signal dated 16 May, to the effect that the long-sought services of Capt. Ed Moran, USNR, were now available to take over tug operation. This signal placed all USN, RN, Ministry of War Transport, U.S. Army and WSA tugs engaged in Mulberry operations under his control. Along with his assignment came news of seven new ocean-going WSA tugs released from duty in the States for Mulberry. Captain Moran’s assignment as the overall tug controller was initially felt to be a blow to Force Mulberry, which so desperately needed technical towing experience. While it was an exalted job, with high honor for Captain Moran, real help was needed on the waterfront. Captain Moran met Captain Clark’s urgent plea by suggesting the outstanding New York harbor tugmaster come over, one Lieutenant Commander Bassett. Captain Moran indicated Lieutenant Commander Bassett’s limited knowledge of naval procedure, but placed his skill second to none in the world in handling heavy dead-weight objects with tow-boats. Captain Clark readily agreed, and Lieutenant Commander Bassett was in Portsmouth the next week. Later on this contribution of Captain Moran’s was to rank second only to his miraculous ability to produce large sea tugs from his former colleagues in the War Shipping Administration. There was some natural resentment at Captain Moran’s late arrival. Had he been on hand during all the experimental work of the assembly period, much time could have been saved and technique vastly improved. However, in one day’s visit in Portsmouth, as he nimbly scrambled over the structures and talked to the men on tugs, his trained mind and seaman’s eye caught many vital defects in the towing gear and brought forth suggestions that were highly practical and eminently useful. With the heavy responsibility of all tug allocation, Captain Moran had only brief hours for consultation on the actual waterfront. London and the headquarters of ANCXF at Fort Southwick claimed him until after the D-day tows were under way. What time he had for actual operations went to the tug operations center at Lee-on-Solent, where his experience and quick intelligence proved invaluable to Lieutenant Commander Fintel. By now Lieutenant Commander Fintel had wished good-naturedly a thousand times that he had never been shanghaied into this strange operation. A co-operative U.S. tugmaster, Major Scott, and a very knowing U.S. civilian towing authority, Mr. Samuel Love-land, were of immense value in assigning tugs in terms of their capabilities……..

……….Out on Selsey Bill, Lieutenant Barton was struggling to get ammunition hoisted aboard the parked Phoenix units out in the harbor. He had to fight desertion among the tugs stationed in the outer area every night. All available dispatch boats were pressed into use to prevent escape of the unwilling exhausted army tugboat crews at night, while by day they were engaged in ferrying stores out to the army AA gun crews now stationed aboard each Phoenix…...

……….In the midst of this confusion and turmoil of the last days of preparation, Captain Clark arrived in the miniature Portsmouth headquarters, dust-stained and weary, on 1 June, with the news that D-day was at last set for 5 June. He also brought the news that Force Mulberry survey craft, boom and mooring vessels, command craft—the two SC’s—and six tugs would sail D-day from St. Helen’s Roads off the Isle of Wight at 0700. To put a humorous twist on the matter it also turned out that the two Mulberry SC’s, whose size and armament were obviously unknown to the British Naval authorities, were designated as additional duty to act as convoy escort to the group of coasters loaded with ammunition for the follow-up assault wave, Convoy EWC1A. H.M.S. Minster, Brittany, Nerwell, Laverock, Barcombe, Barbain, Barthorpe, Dragonet, Coronatia, Plantaganet and Fossbeck, British bar vessels, were to be used in setting out and laying moorings and coupling bridge trains as required by the plan……. (This group was also known as Task Force 128 DF)

“Four U.S. Army ST tugs now assigned to you for receiving inbound units. Two additional will report 13 May to relieve tugs for fuel or stores. Further ST tugs up to ten will be assigned to you as soon as available.” (Message to Captain Clark……DF)

……….It was 1230 on June 6 by the time the coasters and nine army ST tugs were lined up in two-column formation. SC 1329 took the port forward position and SC 1352 the starboard, while H.M.S. Keppel, a destroyer, and two British motor torpedo boats completed the thin escort force. As the SW Shingles buoy passed abeam at 1447, the sun broke through, and the water looked bright and dancing for the first time in days. The traffic rounding the Isle of Wight was so dense and the old coasters had so much trouble holding speed or understanding the American instructions bawled at them over the bull horns of the two SC’s, that it was 1825 before the convoy made the entrance to Channel No. 6 off Selsey and turned south for the Far Shore. From the flagship SC 1329 to SC 1352 now came a visual signal. Captain Clark had been counting his chicks, eyes glued to his binoculars. “You have one too many tugs,” read the signal. After frantic flashing of the signal lamp Lieutenant Barton’s MFV was induced to draw alongside SC 1352 and Lieutenant Barton made his confession over the bull horn. “I painted the numbers out on her bow and put some new ones in place. The Army will never be able to figure out which tug it really is. These boys just wanted to come along.” (! DF) This news was duly relayed to Captain Clark while Lieutenant Barton retreated into his wheelhouse and let his bulky MFV slowly slink to the rear portion of the convoy. There was no commendation or appreciation of this neat bit of thievery from the flagship; merely a curt “Signal received.” ……..

The small army tugs, swept fore and aft with each wave, found some comfort in watching the white of Minster’s wake as the big, rounded stern lifted over the seas. The flares and bursts of light came at frequent enough intervals to reveal floating debris. Once the watch thought they had picked up a surfaced submarine. It turned out to be a rudderless landing craft drifting in the channel. The SC swung just in time to miss another landing craft with engine breakdown, lying dark in the water. Each such derelict had to be watched till the whole convoy was safely past. Pathetic yells to be taken off had to be answered with nothing better than a message to keep cheerful—daylight would doubtless bring rescue craft to them. Firm orders forbade any of the convoys to stop for rescue……..

……….Captain Clark was having difficulties too. As a task force commander he had, of course, reported arrival of his force to the assault area commander, Admiral Hall. His repeated message, however, was ignored. Admiral Hall never acknowledged the presence of Task Force 128. Several of the ST tugs in his section of the Mulberry group were promptly commandeered by assault commanders to rescue landing craft. Before he could intervene, one ST tug was sunk in a salvage effort and another badly damaged………... (possibly ST 778 was the damaged boat…or DeLand’s ST 479…….however ,no known ST is recorded as being sunk at Normandy? This is news! DF ).

(THE STORM THAT DESTROYED THE MULBERRY HARBOR AT OMAHA June 19 – June 22 DF)

………Captain Clark threatened court-martial and gunfire over the bull horn of the LCI 414, still tied up at the eastern edge of the Lobnitz pier. By afternoon his voice was hoarse and cracking. He had discarded his cap and his helmet. The gale tore through his now completely white hair. When not screaming at approaching craft, he would curse the efforts of his men and urge them on with bitter reproach. By 1900 that day, once more all vessels had been cleared from the pier and the bridging. But only one ST tug was left operational. Others had been driven aground or had bent their propellers……….

……….The Phoenix continued to disintegrate. The waves inside the harbor rose. The Lobnitz pierhead with its burden of the dead that had been pulled out of the water and its sleeping men survived the night and the following day. There were no tugs operational, no launches. Nothing could be done except let the storm take over…….

* * * * * *

US Army LT’s (large tugs) at Normandy: LT-2,4,5,22,23, & 130

ST WORK ASSIGNMENTS AT NORMANDY D-DAY +1 through+12:

Dungeness: 2 ST’s

To work Gooseberries: 10 ST’s

To work Mulberries: 8 ST’s

Handling at Selsey and Peel Bank: 8 ST’s

To tow Phoenix and Whale Units: 42 ST’s

Portland Area Bombardons: 2 ST’s

(This gives a total of 72 assigned ST’s at D-Day +1 - 12, some of which worked in a support role in England; but some possibly may have had duplicate assignments, and certainly this may not be a complete list. It may be close, however, as the US Army Transportation Museum indicates 74 ST’s were at Normandy. Sadly, no individual ST boat numbers are mentioned in the entire book. ) DF

Stanford, Alfred “Force Mulberry - The Planning And Installation Of Artificial Harbor Off U.S. Normandy Beaches In World War II “