ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION PANEL PRESENTATION, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
9:30 AM, JANUARY 19, 2007
JACK MENDELSOHN
There follows, in the format of a letter to the next President, a list of actions he/she might undertake to improve US national security and reinforce the international non-proliferation and arms control regimes now in place.
Mr/Madam President:
The network of policy statements designed over the years to reassure other states about the obligations and intentions of the US has been seriously frayed by this administration.
The intent of these policy statementshad been to reassure other nationsthat the US is serious about restraining both the vertical and horizontal spread of nuclear weapons as well as the use of nuclear weaponsas instruments of war or intimidation.
If, as even this administration admits, nuclear weapons are the gravest threat this nation faces, then it behooves the US to seek to “delegitimize” nuclear weapons as instruments of war, and to reassure nationsthat they do not have to fear attack by USnuclear forces.
DECLARATORY POLICIES
To this end, a new President should declare at the outset of his/her administration that, comparable to the international consensus on banning the use of cw/bw,the US does not consider nuclear weapons to be legitimate weapons of war and will not use them in combat except under a very special and/or narrow set of conditions.
As a further part of the “delegitimization” process, the President should also:
recommit the US (as it is in the NPT) to the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, a goal which the current administration has not addressed;
move the US away from pre-emption and preventative war as a explicit policy. By adopting thispolicy, the Bush administration has heightened concern among foe and friend alike that the US will use nuclear weapons hastily, unjustifiably or irrationally in a crisis or pre-crisis situation. As a result, the policy has been much more provocative than protective and should be disavowed. In this connection, some of you may have seen the “sense of the House resolution recently submitted by Rep Lee “disavowing the doctrine of preemption;”
abandon the policy of threatening the use of nuclear weapons against any potential threat – be it Conventional, Terrorist, CW or BW. Following up on his/her basic statement on the delegitimization of nuclear weapons use , the President should announce that the US is retainingnuclear weapons as deterrent forces and will consider them for use only in retaliation for a nuclear attackor as a last resort when the survival of the nation is at risk. The President could invite the other nuclear nations to join in this declaration, perhaps in connection with the NPT review conference in 2010;
restate the existing Negative Security Assurancesand perhaps put them into legal, treaty form, again in connection with the NPT review conference. The assurances are virtually worthless as they now stand as the US (and other nuke nations) have taken so many exceptions to them (i.e., use against CW/BW, “all options on the table” vis-à-vis terrorists, etc.). ThePresident should make it clear that the US would use nuclear weapons only against other nuke possessors;
make explicit as early as possible that the US does not intend to resume nuclear testing. If the Congress seems politically amenable, the next administration should re-submit the CTBT for ratification. (This “no testing” declaration could help constrain the RRW “to design parameters that have a pedigree” but will not eliminate inevitable pressure for testing in the future if the new warhead program goes ahead.);
make clear early on that the new administration, if it doesn’t actually cut back the strategic BMD program, doesnot intend to prioritize or expand it.
To Recap: Your administration should make explicit, early in its term, that the US:
does not consider nuclear weapons to be legitimate instruments of warfare
reaffirms its commitment to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons as called for under the npt
does not endorse preventative or preemptive attacks on states, nations or territories
does not reserve the right to use nuclear weapons first in non-nuclear conflicts or as a counter to cw/bw
does not intend to use nuclear weapons against nnws members of the npt (the NSA)
does not intend to resume the underground testing of nuclear weapons (and will restrict and RRW to the use of proven technologies), and
does not intend to prioritize or expand the strategic bmd program
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
In addition to jump-starting US security policy with a set of basic declaratory policy statements on US obligations and intentions as regards nuclear weapons use, the next President will have to deal with some specific arms control issues early in his/her administration. :
the Start treaty expires on December 5, 2009;
the Moscow treaty expires on December 31, 2012.
This combination of events, both falling within the next presidential term, raises a number of issues, key among them being:
what warheads are actually to be counted under the Moscow Treaty?
The Treaty says that “strategic nuclear warheads”
Are to be limited to 1700-2200. The US position, however, is that only “operationally deployed” warheads are included, meaning that 4 converted ssbns, 2 ssbns in overall, empty MX silos, nuclear capable heavy bombers assigned to conventional units, spares and trainers, as well as any empty, down-loaded spaces on mirved missile platforms, are not accountable. Given the US interpretation, its warhead levels under the Moscow Treaty are currently something under 3878, basically the target figure indicated in the administration’s first nuclear posture review.
how is the warhead count to be verified?
Until the end of 2009, the US and Russia are relying on the START verification provisions to monitor the Moscow Treaty. Over the year (2009) in which START ends, the sides can agree to extend its verification provisions and/or design new or additional ones for the Moscow Treaty.
It is possible that the sides could agree to the US formulation of “operationally deployed” if there is a mutually satisfactory way of verifying compliance (i.e., ssbns in drydock overhaul are emptied of missiles, mirved missile platforms are replaced by ones with fewer spaces, etc.) In any case, what is counted and how it is verified are related issues that need to be resolved early in the next president’s term.
how quickly can/should the treaty levels be reached?
If, as the US intends, the low levels of warheads established by the Moscow Treaty are to be obtained primarily by downloading missiles and bombers (and not by destroying launch vehicles) then there is little reason why the 1700-2200 limit cannot be reached prior to the 2012 date (say by the 2010 NPT review conference).
A useful indication of US commitment to strategic nuclear arms control would be an announcement by the President that the US intended to reach the 2200 warhead level well ahead of midnight on the 31st of December 2012.
what will the follow-on agreement to the Moscow Treaty look like?
The Moscow Treaty expires before the next President leaves office, so some sort of provision needs to be made for a follow-on. The simplest arrangement would be to extend the Treaty for another five years. But that presents two problems:
1) the general expectation that the nuclear warhead reduction process will continue (after all, even your predecessor, who banned the term “arms control” from his political vocabulary, agreed to some reductions), and
2) that your administration may not have left any other mark on the arms control process other than in the strategic nuclear area (the conclusion and/or ratification during your term of the CTBT, BW monitoring, FMCT, Space Weapons, etc. are all of unknown or uncertain outcome).
Another simple, quick fix would be to announce that the US intends to consider 1700 warheads, the lower end of the permitted band under the Moscow Treaty, as a ceiling not a floor. Of course, this will not satisfy members of the ACA, who will argue that even that number (which incidentally coincides with the number –1710 -- of ICBM silos and SLBM launch tubes we limited in SALT I in 1972, a nice point to make in 2012, 40 years later) is way too high. The Russians would almost certainly agree to an even lower figure (1500 is the one they have most frequently used), and if you had a cooperative Congress that might be a good target for you.
Another issue that you should address early in your administration, and that treats in another fashion with the unnecessarily large US and Russian nuclear arsenals, is the question of non-deployed weapons. The public is generally unaware of the large numbers of nuclear weapons around the world. About 27,000 are believed to exist in nine countries. Most of these weapons (26,000) are in US or Russian arsenals.
It would be in the security interests of the US to begin to deal with the non-deployed warhead overhang (i.e. limiting the residual number permitted and destroying the excess). This, too, could be considered a continuation in the reduction process as well as a significant increase in national security. Paradoxically, weapons that are deployed are generally secure from theft or diversion. But security problems, particularly in Russia, continue to exist with those weapons that are kept in storage or reserve. Reducing their number and continuing to assist Russia in securing the remainder works to the advantage of both parties.
NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
Finally, Mr. President, you should move briskly and forthrightly to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from abroad (NATO) and engageRussia on limiting non-strategic nuclear weapons
In the early years of the Clinton administration, the Pentagon concluded that there was no longer any military requirement for these weapons in Europe. The allies, however, were loath to break completely the nuclear umbilical cord, and the weapons remain as a symbol in the European mind of U.S. commitment to continental security.
The European allies of the United States can be helpful in this regard. We need to convince them to abandon their attachment to European-based U.S. tactical nuclear weapons: the +/- 400 bombs deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, which constitutethe last remnants of the Cold War flexible response policy.
If you can wean the Euros from this perverse sign of solidarity, which task might have been made easier by erratic andbellicose U.S. behavior in this decade, a half-dozen NATO allies might finally be cleared of nuclear weaponry. In turn, this move might encourage Russia to reciprocate by agreeing to reduce and/or constrainits tactical nuclear weapons stockpile.
Well, Mr/Madam President, you may not be able to do all this as rapidly as Nancy Pelosi in your first 100 hours. But there’s little reason why it can’t be done in the 48 months you’ve been allotted.
Cheers,
Jack Mendelsohn
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