Ari Santas' Notes on C.S. Peirce's
Ari Santas' Notes on C.S. Peirce's
"Critical Common-Sensism"
*Page references are from Justice Buchler's Philosophical Writings of Peirce
(New York: Dover, 1955)
A. Pragmatism as Two Doctrines
-pragmaticism was originally formulated as the following maxim:
"Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the object of your conception to have. Then your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object." (p. 290)
-Peirce presently restates it thus:
"The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol." (p. 290)
-There are, according to Peirce, two doctrines that are a consequence of the latter formulation:
-Doctrine I is called Critical Common-Sensism, a doctrine with six identifiable characters (outlined below)
-Doctrine II is the doctrine of Realism
B. Doctrine I: Critical Common-Sensism, Character I
-the 1st character of Critical Common-Sensism (CCS) is that there are indubitable beliefs and indubitable inferences
-this seems strange given P's fallibilism, but what he means by indubitable is simply acritical-- not doubted.
-original beliefs are unconscious and out of our control, until something external comes along and shakes us into reflection and a struggle to control the future.
-to understand what is an acritical (indubitable) inference, Peirce makes a threefold distinction:
-reasoning is the conscious movement from one belief to another, while being aware of the principle of connection;
-acritical inference is the conscious movement from one belief to another, while not being aware of the principle of connection;
-associational suggestions of belief is the same process without any consciousness of it.
-an indubitable inference, then, is nothing more than an inference whose source you have no means of doubting.
C. Characters II & III
-the 2nd & 3rd characters of CCS are that:
II) these original beliefs are generally true;
III) but they are true only in a limited application.
-he holds the former because observation shows that such beliefs rarely change from generation to generation, and any changes that do occur are incremental.
-such beliefs, however, are only trustworthy while we remain in a primitive mode of life:
-the behavior of everything in ordinary existence is best modelled by Euclidean Geometry, but electrons and other such entities require less intuitive models;
-we must further keep in mind that not all such beliefs are instinctive (though we may take them to be);
-e.g., the criminality of incest;
-and, in some cases, "original" beliefs are so only owing to authority (not even considered instinctive);
-e.g., suicide as murder.
D. Character IV
-a major character of CCS (#IV) is the insistence that the acritically indubitable is invariably vague.
-having said that, P endeavors to explain what he means by vague:
-vagueness is the antithetical analogue of generality;
-for a sign to be general is for it to be unsubject to the law of excluded middle;
-e.g., 'man', in general, neither tall nor short;
-in contrast, for a sign to be vague is for it to be unsubject to the law of contradiction;
-e.g., 'animal', in vague sense, not male, not female.
-all communication, says P, is at least partly vague.
-here's the kicker: while our ideas are vague, they are less dubitable, but as they get more precise, them become subject to doubt.
E. Characters V & VI
-the 5th & 6th characters of CCS is that there is a high esteem for doubt (V); and yet it does not suppose that we can doubt at will (VI).
-doubt is important since original beliefs are fallible but because of their nature (as yet) undoubted:
-it is the only means by which we can escape a faulty original belief (or one that is inapplicable to our artificial existence);
-doubt forces our acritical beliefs and inferences into reflective judgments and reasonings, and with this comes control.
-and yet we cannot make ourselves doubt; we can only continue to investigate things and let experience bring it to us;
-remember, belief is a habit, and it remains as long as nothing breaks it (e.g., a big surprise!).
-Kant's exaggeration (the confused pragmatist p. 299)
F. Doctrine II: Realism
-the second doctrine of Pragmatism is (Scholastic) Realism.
-it states the following:
"there are real objects that are general, among the number being the modes of determination of existent singulars, if, indeed these be not the only such objects... [and] there are, besides, real vagues, and especially real possibilities." (p. 300)
-keep in mind what he means by real:
"that which is such as it is regardless of how it is, at any time, thought to be." (p. 301)
-generals, vagues, and possibilities are real for the simple reason that they are as they are regardless of our thinking them as such or not.
-cf Descartes on the independence of innate ideas.
-the diamond example revisited (pp. 300-1).