Anti-Apartheid Protest vs Real Politik
The Anti-Apartheid Movement and British
policy towards South Africa during the Rivonia trial
Arianna Lissoni
(History Department, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London)
Introduction
Britain, in her unique position as the former colonial power and the major investing country in South Africa, had been one of the main targets of Black South Africans’ diplomatic efforts since the establishment of the Union in 1910. By the end of the Second World War and following the election of the National Party in 1948, most of the hopes for British support for the predicament of Black South Africans shifted to the United Nations (UN) and the newly independent colonial states. Nevertheless, because of her economic and historic links Britain, and London in particular, continued to hold a special relationship with South Africa. From the 1950’s, British support did eventually start to come, not from the Government though, but from anti-apartheid and church groups, the Communist Party and sections of the Labour and Liberal Parties. Moreover, ever since the late 1940’s, a growing number of South Africans had been arriving in London, which, after Sharpeville and the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), became a centre for the exiled liberation movements to continue their struggle from abroad.[1]
In June 1959, following a call for the boycott of nationalist goods by the ANC in South Africa, the Boycott Movement was started in London. In March of the following year, as the emergency situation in South Africa intensified, the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) was formed to co-ordinate all anti-apartheid work and to keep South Africa’s apartheid policy in the forefront of British politics. From the onset, the Movement, which “operated […] as an instrument of solidarity with the people of South Africa”, was characterised by an “umbilical cord relationship with the [liberation] struggle”.[2] For the next forty years the AAM campaigned for a sports, cultural, academic, consumer, arms and economic boycott of South Africa to help bring apartheid to an end.
This paper will concentrate on two crucial campaigns launched by the AAM in 1963-4 and assess the extent of their influence on British policy towards South Africa: the World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners (WCRSAPP), and the campaign for economic sanctions against South Africa. Although the main the impetus for the starting of these campaigns came from the Rivonia trial, they soon developed into long-standing crusades concerning two key areas of solidarity work: protesting against all political trials and executions and exposing the conditions under which opponents of apartheid were imprisoned or held without trial, and petitioning for the imposition of economic sanctions through collective action at the UN.
II. Rivonia
After Sharpeville, the ineffectiveness of non-violent methods had led the South African liberation movements to embark on a path of violence. In December 1961, the birth of Umkonto We Sizwe was announced as “an independent body […] under the overall political guidance” of the “national liberation movement”.[3] The turn to violence was explained as a strategic necessity:
“The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom”.[4]
On July 11, 1963, the South African police raided the headquarters of Umkonto We Sizwe at Lilliesfam in Rivonia (Daily Mail picture). Three months later, eight men, representing virtually the whole of Umkonto’s High Command, were on trial in Pretoria. The accused, Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, Dennis Goldberg, Ahmed Kathrada, Rusty Bernstein, Elias Motsoaledi and Raymond Mhlaba, were charged with 222 acts of sabotage and of inciting to commit sabotage in preparation of guerrilla warfare, armed invasion of the country and violent revolution. Under the 1962 Sabotage Act, the accused faced the death penalty. (Picture of the accused)
On October 8, 1963 (the day the Rivonia trial began), Oliver Tambo addressed the UN General Assembly with these words: “I cannot believe that the United Nations can stand by calmly watching what I submit is genocide masquerading under the guise of a civilised dispensation of justice”.[5] Three days later, the General Assembly passed a resolution, by a vote of 106 to 1 (South Africa), condemning the South African Government’s apartheid policy and calling for the end of all political trials and the unconditional release of political prisoners. Britain, the US, France and Australia, however, abstained on the operative paragraph requesting the abandonment of the “arbitrary trial now in progress”.[6]
III. “A Rope of Strength”
In November 1963, the World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners was set up in London under the auspices of the AAM as a separate but attached committee. Its purpose was “to organise support for the implementation of the [October] UN resolution”.[7] Jeremy Thorpe (Liberal MP) was Secretary, Humphrey Berkeley MP (a Conservative who had been involved in the campaign for the abolition of capital punishment in the UK) was Chairman, and Dick Taverne (Labour MP) was Treasurer. The World Campaign Committee included representatives (as well as from the AAM) from the Africa Bureau, the Defence and Aid Fund, the Movement for Colonial Freedom, Christian Action, the Society of Friends, and the United Nations Association; Amnesty International, two South African refugees (Sonia Bunting and Harold Wolpe), the SAIC and the ANC also participated as observers. Similar committees were established abroad.
At a time when the internal opposition in South Africa had been severely hampered, the AAM played a crucial role in publicising the trial in progress and in organising international pressure. The Rivonia campaign represented, as Ruth First (Picture of Ruth First) told the AAM National Committee on her arrival in London, “a rope of strength to people in South Africa”.[8] Throughout the winter and spring of 1964, the AAM and the WCRSAPP worked to ensure that the Rivonia trial received the widest possible publicity. 197,387 signatures were collected for a world-wide petition demanding the release of political prisoners and submitted to the UN. Solidarity messages were sent to the accused and their families by British MPs and other personalities. Lobbies of Parliament and Early Day Petitions were organised so that the matter would be debated in the House of Commons.
In March, Tambo appealed to the UN Special Committee on Apartheid (which had been established in November 1962) to express the “feeling that not enough is being done at the international level to challenge […] the South African Government”.[9] His appeal was followed by a WARSAPP memorandum to all the major Western governments and the Special Committee, who were asked “to consider how best, by diplomatic, political, economic and other pressures” they may exert their “influence to save the lives of […] brave opponents to apartheid”. In particular, the UK and US governments, “whose pressures would be felt most strongly in South Africa”, were pleaded “to use their great influence and prestige”.[10]
In May, the AAM wrote a letter to the British Prime Minister, and a delegation led by AAM President Barbara Castle MP (and including Lord Gardiner QC, Eric Lubbock MP, Abdul Minty, and Raymond Kunene of the ANC), met the Minister of State at the Foreign Office on May 19 to present yet another memorandum. This called on the Government to take action by making clear to South Africa that the passing of death sentences “would seriously imperil the relations between the two governments”, by requesting “the cancellation of all the death sentences imposed on political prisoners and the release of political detainees”, and by offering asylum to the Rivonia accused and all other political prisoners.[11]
As the trial drew to a close, the campaign was stepped up (Slovo-Dadoo picture). Fifty British MPs, led by Berkeley, marched from the House to the South African Embassy to present a petition signed by over 100 MPs. A three-day vigil was held outside South Africa House during the days preceding the sentence. On June 11, seven of the defendants were found guilty and the following day they were sentenced to life imprisonment. (picture of the Star)
When he pronounced his verdict, the South African judge referred to the unprecedented international action around the trial. Indeed, the AAM had succeeded in activating a mass national and international campaign so that it could “with justification claim that the world-wide support for the men on trial contributed to the fact that they were not given the death sentence”.[12] Moreover, for the first time, thousands of people had become involved in the activities of the AAM, whose work had been “internationally recognised by the press and speeches in the UN Security Council as a major factor in the outcome of the trial”.[13] But as far as the British Government was concerned, the Rivonia Campaign had failed, at least on the surface, to break its “ignoble silence”.[14] Before turning to the Government’s behaviour during the trial, the reasons underlying this silence will be examined.
IV. Britain’s “special interests”
The British Government’s strong concern with South Africa’s stability stemmed from what the British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas Home, called “our special interests”[15] in the Republic. In economic terms, they consisted of over 900 million pounds worth of investment and of an annual volume of export trade of some 250 million pounds, including “invisibles”.[16] Britain was also “mindful of the intimate relationship to the Republic of the High Commission Territories”, which depended “to a great extent upon South Africa for their economic life”,[17] and which represented a potential area of conflict because of their strategic position - being outside South Africa’s political and police control and within the area of Greater Southern Africa at the same time. Strategically, South Africa was important to Britain’s defence requirements because of the facilities she enjoyed at the Simonstown naval base. The 1957 Simonstown military treaty gave Britain overflying and staging rights in peacetime and war, even when South Africa was not belligerent. Moreover, the sea route around the Cape represented a key communication link with the Middle East and the Far East to Western defences against Communism.[18] Under the Simonstown agreement Britain was also supplying weapons to South Africa, although pledging at the UN not to provide weapons which could be used for internal repression. Finally, the perennial “kith and kin” feeling represented a further factor binding Britain and South Africa together.
British policy accordingly had to balance Britain’s short against her long-term interests. Britain’s economic stake, strategic interests, and her position in the High Commission Territories meant that she could not afford to break off relations with South Africa. At the same time, Britain should try not to convey the impression that her “association with Dr Verwoerd’s Government is particularly warm or close” because of the harmful consequences it would have on Black African opinion and of the possibility that, in a not too distant future, political power might pass to the African majority of the population.[19]
V. “A Safety Net”
Throughout the Rivonia trial, demands for the intervention of the British Government were dismissed on the grounds that representations would be negatively received, thus prejudicing the chances of commuting the sentences once the verdict was reached.[20] What was holding back the British Government, however, was most likely the fear of South African retaliation on Britain’s “special interests”.[21] As domestic and international pressure around the trial mounted and South Africa’s isolation increased, Britain’s position became more and more uncomfortable.
Following Tambo’s second appeal to the UN and the WCRSAPP memorandum, the Special Committee on Apartheid presented its report to the Security Council in April. The report suggested that the Security Council should require the South African Government to desist from all measures against persons who opposed their radical policies within a brief time limit, or else new mandatory steps should be taken. The Special Committee also urged all Heads of State to intervene with the South African Government to prevent the death sentences from being passed on the accused in the Rivonia and other political trials.
The debate about sanctions against South Africa at the UN centred around the contention that South Africa represented a threat to international peace. If so designated, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, international action would no longer be regarded as interference with the internal affairs of a country and the Security Council could order mandatory measures.
On June 9, just two days before the final verdict was reached, the Security Council passed a resolution urging the South African Government to end the trial in progress and grant amnesty to the defendants and all other political prisoners already sentenced to death. Britain, together with the US, France and Brazil, abstained.
Commenting on Britain’s abstention at the UN, The Guardian wrote:
“Wherever plans are discussed to end the subjection of Black South Africans, Britain counsels delay, restraint, vacillation. To the rest of the world, and doubtless to the South African Government as well, Britain appears to be engaged in a prolonged fighting defence of South African interests, with never a point conceded until it has been overrun”.[22]