Form 3B (version 3)
UCPR 6.2
AMENDED STATEMENT OF LIQUIDATED CLAIM
COURT DETAILSCourt / SUPREME COURT
Division / COMMON LAW
Registry / SYDNEY
Case number / 2011/327194; former file number: 1443/64
TITLE OF PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff / DAVID GREGORY MURPHY
First Defendant / COUNCIL OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF STRATHFIELD
Second Defendant / AKZO NOBEL PTY LTD
Third Defendant / ORICA PTY LTD
Fourth Defendant / DOW CHEMICALS INC
Fifth Defendant / STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Sixth Defendant / THE BRITISH MONARCHY
Seventh Defendant / ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
FILING DETAILS
Filed for / DAVID GREGORY MURPHY
Contact name and phones / DAVID GREGORY MURPHY, 8214 8397, 0419 605 365
Contact email /
TYPE OF CLAIM
[Select type of claim from the list provided in section 6 of the Guide to preparing documents, available on the UCPR website at - 3 or at any NSW court registry.]
Mercantile Law – Other,
Torts – Other – Other
RELIEF CLAIMED
[If you are making a liquidated claim (ie claiming a specific amount of money), include the following information:]
Amount of claim / $9,852,280,333.29 as at 4.7.12 and increasing per Deed of 18.6.90 till final settlement
Interest / $ applicable rate as governed by Deed of 18.6.90
Filing fees / $ paid into Court 20.2.1964
Service fees / $ 0
Solicitors fees / $
TOTAL / $9,852,280,333.29as at 4.7.12
Notes:
1. The originating Statement of Claim in a liquidated amount was electronically filed and simultaneously and visibly served upon the defendant at 5 pm on 16th March 2012. That Statement of (Liquidated) Claim was filed pursuant to leave granted for the filing and serving of amended pleadings contained within a decision of Justice Schmidt arising from a Notice of Motion (motion, chronology, submissions, annexures and decision attached) filed and served upon 8th December 2011. That Statement of (Liquidated) Claim of 16th March was the originating Statement of Liquidated Claim in this renewed and reinvigorated matter now returning to Court due to the original June 1966 settlement having been caused to double as a 30 year well evidenced loan in lieu of a left alone settlement where recovery was contingent upon a breach of terms, (term 7) by me but in which I was not the one who perforce performed the requisite breach though various moneys were recovered with interest as if I had been the one who did leading to moneys outstanding with terms in a Deed later given me due to my not having been the one who did perform the requisite breach.
2. The fact, now in evidence, that the 1966 settlement doubled as a settlement loan whose recovery was contingent upon a to-be-secured breach of the Terms by me was doubtless a settlement requirement of the exposed parties, the respondents, such that a liability be converted into a potential windfall activated upon my breaching so that the 1966 settlement was not the end of the matter but the start of a new dual, either for me or for them, 30 year investment cycle concluding in financial year 1996/7.
3. The document of 16th March 2012 was a Statement of Claim in a liquidated amount, not an Amended Statement of Claim as the SLC was not being amended from anything, the original originating process in the matter having been a writ of 20th February 1964. Justice Schmidt concluded that it was appropriate that such a reactivation be commenced by way of “statement of claim” and leave was given so to do.
4. Although prior to the service on the said 16th March I had gone to great lengths on 23rd August 2010 to see the defendant, under its current management and directorship, was fully briefed as to what had transpired and the situation it, as having gone defendant, was now in, by way of email correspondence with the defendant’s legal representatives, I was prepared to accept that perhaps the defendant did indeed not know the whole story. Hence I gave the defendant the benefit of the doubt that the defendant was not the party who was the principal and intended beneficiary of a clearly in evidence 30-year investment loan of 9.5% p.a interest compounding designed to return a minimum 1,665% gain back to some party/ies, a return, which with the expertise of the so called Strathfield team sourced from within the defendant’s very own local business centre, achieved an in excess of 7,000% return to someone’s’ account. If it was not to the defendant’s account it certainly was to that of one or all of the respondents to the recent requests to admit who have today, again per part 17.3, admitted all.
5. Consequently the said proceedings with other evidence and calculations indicated both the participation of and reasons for the involvement of other now canvassed parties who pursuant to my concluded requests to admit facts put to the defendant’s legal representatives on 30th March 2012 resolved in my favour leading to the formulation of a fully disclosive self executing Notice to Admit Facts put to and served upon all six parties all requests resolving in full in my favour on 6th June 2012, 46 years after the date of the Terms of Settlement. The requests to admit by their fashioning serve to bring the facts and circumstances and cases to be met by the respondents up to date and the pleadings speak for themselves just as did the earlier requests to admit upon the defendant and the three other parties in 2011.
6. Hence in this amended SLC the body of the previous SLC remains undisturbed and the case and claims brought against the new six defendants who have admitted all per part 17.3 process are appended as paras 89 - 99 and some fresh causes of action, paras 71 - 75, have been included.
7. The requests to admit facts of 23rd May 2012 serves to bring the case against the 6 new defendants into focus and comprises foundational material for the amended pleadings which remain otherwise unchanged.
8. Now with all admissions by all parties in I amend the originating 16.3.12 SLC so that liability can be found and submit that we next move on to assessment of quantum and submit that the matter be heard in two parts: determination of liability and then assessment of quantum.
9. In response to the previous Statement of Claim no defence was served but the defendant was notably unforthcoming in relation to what I had disclosed to it. With no defence served it was open to me to file for default judgment and then go on to assessment. The three 2011 Notices to Admit Facts opened the door to the new defendants who were closer to the action as the parties against whom my “moneys outstanding” accrued as liabilities owing to me per the Deed duly afforded me. Indeed, one of the respondents, Akzo Nobel, had gone so far as to confirmatively set up a mock garage rental business run by a Director with his mother to in effect recover moneys off me by way of a premature seizure of my possessions, for costs it had expended or was then expending as costs in 435/93 in the Parramatta District Court and presumably had expended as recovery costs in the Lance case in the Sydney District Court.
PLEADINGS AND PARTICULARS
1. Originating Statement of Liquidated Claim filed by leave pursuant to decision of Justice Schmidt of 17th February 2012 to allow filing of amended process. Initial filing process was a writ. Moneys since outstanding necessitate an SLC.
2. Narrative: (my paralleling affidavit which is also relied upon is to be found in support of my motion of 9.12.2011 on file)
3. On 23rd August 1963 the plaintiff suffered third degree burn injuries when walking upon public land known as Bressington Park Homebush Bay, a public reserve in the care, control, custody and ownership of the defendant. The plaintiff remained in hospital from 23rd August till 12th October 1963. (Affidavit in support of Terms of Settlement dated 6.6.66, in Court file).
4. On 20th February 1964 the plaintiff through his next friend, his father, filed suit in this matter against the defendant seeking damages in the amount of £15,000, viz. i.e. $30,000. (Writ of 20.2.1964, on file.)
5. On 6th June 1966 pursuant to an offer of settlement from the defendant to the plaintiff and accepted by the plaintiff himself, the plaintiff through his next friend and the defendant entered into a Terms of Settlement with Terms not to be disclosed whereby the defendant pursuant to the Damages, Infants and Persons of Unsound Mind Act 1927 pay to the account of the plaintiff damages of $9,000 plus $500 legal costs without admission as to liability giving rise to damages (Terms of Settlement of 6.6.66 on file).
6. On 8th June 1966 the defendant consented by way of a Consent Order Approving of Settlement and Ordering Payment in and Investment on behalf of the infant to pay the net amount of $7,931 into the Supreme Court for remittance to the Public Trustee into an account, to be held until the plaintiff came of age. (order of 8.6.66 on file).
7. On 20th June 1966 pursuant to the Terms and Consent Order the defendant’s insurer, GIO, the Government Insurance Office, deposited the amount of $7,931 into the Supreme Court by way of cheque no 7544 (settlement letter dated 20.6.66, on file).
8. Upon becoming of age the plaintiff obtained his moneys of the public trustee and invested for a few years in residential mortgages and thereafter in 1978 the money went in two directions, some into some silver bullion bars, grain and flake as an investment but the majority into the deposit for the purchase of a residence at 16 Mitchell St, St Leonards which in time became an unencumbered property.
9. Throughout the 1980’s the plaintiff was approached as an investor to invest in schemes which all had within them the seeds of failure and which each failed leaving moneys outstanding or he was relieved of moneys by other means put to him leading again to moneys outstanding.
10. On 20th April by phone and then on 23rd April 1990 in person the plaintiff was approached by finance professionals Martin Comer and Judy Joseph of the so called Strathfield team who, in an alleged operation to evidence and engineer a breach of the Terms of Settlement obtained a not to be repeated nominated amount equivalent to the amount under the terms $9,500, term 3, as the first of many investment loans by way of the plaintiff’s cash cheque for $9,500, (annexure K, also numbered as 9, or “2” in Notices to Admit and Perform documentation served 9.8.11 and filed 13.10.11) an amount on a date it is alleged Comer had been pre-advised as to in order to effect his duties and provide duly disclosive evidence of agency and outstandingness to the Court.
11. The plaintiff did not breach the Terms as in 1990 he was not aware that there were terms, (Supreme Court judgment (J, not T of S) purchase application receipt of 14.5.99 in Notices to Admit and Perform documentation served 9.8.11 and filed 13.10.11, variously numbered as 24-2 or annexure AH), nor what the terms were nor know the original quantum amounts of 6th and 8th June 1966 nor know that the Strathfield team’s approach related to the Terms of Settlement. The plaintiff did not become familiar with the concept of Terms of Settlement until he encountered piles of Directions Notices relating to Terms of Settlement procedure left out for all to take in the District Court during his matter 8149/98.
12. The cash cheque #368 for $9,500 was presented that same day and duly honoured, (annexure N1/9, also 12-1, “1”, in Notices to Admit and Perform documentation served 9.8.11 and filed 13.10.11), drawing upon the plaintiff’s credit facility with Chase AMP Bank and paid into the account of roper Judy Joseph, who had visited upon that day.
13. Comer continued to raise investment loans of the plaintiff, and also the next friend, and early on by way of back of cheque handwritten setting out of moneys due for return, (annexures L/1+2, (10-1) + M (11), “3” + “4” + 6, in Notices to Admit and Perform documentation served 9.8.11 and filed 13.10.11), Comer evidenced that the amount of $9,500 was not to be seen to be disclosed by him by separating that amount into two components, $6,000 and $3,500 returning $7,000 and $4,000 respectively within a matter of weeks.
14. In recognition that the plaintiff had not breached the Terms and as an ostensible opportunity to reduce Comer’s amounts outstanding, (annexure M (11), 6, in the Notices documentation served 9.8.11 and filed 13.10.11), the plaintiff was presented and entered by Comer into a Deed of Agreement with one aptly named James Warren Byrnes, another recovery agent also of or associated with the Strathfield team also privily advised as to dates and amounts which Deed amongst other things provided for the investment management and return of “all moneys outstanding (t)hereunder” accruing at 40% per annum at quarterly rests (the precedent rate where a settlement creditor so approached is not the one who has breached his Terms but is nevertheless being more than recovered from), (annexures P/1,2,3 (13/1-3) in Notices to Admit and Perform documentation served 9.8.11 and filed 13.10.11).
15. Byrnes, as a settlement recovery agent was duly authorized, as evidenced by his privy status of also, like Comer, knowing requisite amounts and dates and interest rates, to secure the plaintiff for recovery of the settlement loan covering 30 years from 20.6.66 to 20.6.96, (annexure R, (15)), Notices to Admit and Perform documentation served 9.8.11 and filed 13.10.11 and annexure marked A in affidavit filed and served 8.12.11), and his actions and the Deed and hence the “all moneys outstanding” being raised by Comer reflected in the accounts which would arise t“hereunder” were guaranteed by a corporation, being the Australian Guarantee Corporation, AGC, the guarantor in this matter, linked in this 7931/gica recovery transaction with the defendant’s insurer (GIO), whose purpose, function and business it then was in instances such as this, was, as an investment management entity, to give guarantees as to moneys outstanding, who on the date of the signing of the Deed, 18th June 1990, upon receipt of its copy of the completed Deed, entered a guarantee, for the “all moneys outstanding” upon the plaintiff’s CRA, Credit Reference Association, report, (annexure Q (14) in Notices to Admit and Perform documentation served 9.8.11 and filed 13.10.11).
16. On 19th and 20th June 1990 and thereafter the plaintiff duly executed requirements of the Deed and did not breach and entered into two capture leases, one with an aptly named Lance Finance, on 19th June, and one with the said Australian Guarantee Corporation, on 20th June, by means of which capture leases moneys were to be obtained of the plaintiff for no ultimate benefit to the plaintiff but for the provisioning and guarantee of all said “monies outstanding” given to him due, unlike Comer, to his not being the party who had breached the Terms with the defendant.
17. In October, November 1990 Comer secured the majority of $250,000 from the proceeds of the sale of the alleged and admitted security for the 30 year loan as moneys to himself and as investment loan moneys to his nominees which moneys were not forthcoming and were made not recoverable of them for their part due to the operation of the Credit (Administration) Act 1984 rendering the investment loan moneys, as intended, to identify as “moneys outstanding” as provisioned for under the said Deed.
18. In about March 1991 the plaintiff, then understanding that he had received no benefit from the leases, ceased allowing deductions from his account to the finance companies and in 1992 sued AGC who under garnishee order paid him $ 20,076.16 from its Westpac account, details of which were given to him for that purpose.
19. In October 1991, due to having been introduced into the capture leases effectively designed in the short term to recover large amounts of money of the plaintiff, the plaintiff liquidated his properties and settled his mortgage and was relieved of the remaining proceeds in similar timely fashion as the money recovery processes in the 1980’s so as to have nothing left over from the liquidation exercise resulting in net moneys from the sale of the properties being “outstanding”.
20. In 1991, in this medieval style and of great antiquity theatrically staged 7931/gica/caIg/fraim up settlement recovery lego-comedy/tragedy play, the appropriately and tellingly named Lance Finance jousted forth first and sued the plaintiff and succeeded and later admitted to there having been “fraud” and withdrew. In 1992 the plaintiff sued AGC in the Ryde Local Court leading to a said settlement to the plaintiff after which AGC sued the plaintiff in Parramatta District Court and succeeded and obtained a Certificate of Judgment dated 20th June 1996 as a well timed tellingly decisive instrument capping off the termination of the 30 year 9.5% p.a. compounding interest settlement investment loan, account (annexure R, (15), in Notices to Admit and Perform documentation served 9.8.11, filed 13.10.11 and annexure marked A in affidavit filed and served 8.12.11), commenced in proceedings with defendant.
21. Immediately following the AGC proceedings in 1995 the plaintiff suffered the loss of his personal possessions pursuant to renting a storage garage and storing his possessions therein which loss would never have taken place were there to have been no approach by Comer/the Strathfield team and the finance companies resulting in the loss of his properties, wherein the possessions (“goods”) had been stored, by virtue of the capture leases. The loss was a direct result of the approach of the financiers and led to a sale of the goods to those who absconded with his possessions, and certain account evidence, which moneys remain “outstanding” in matter 8149/98 in the Sydney District Court.
22. In 1997, on 20th June 1997 (annexure AD, (21), in Notices to Admit and Perform documentation served 9.8.11 and filed 13.10.11), the plaintiff was pursued into the Federal Court with a creditor’s petition arising from the fraudulently obtained determinative Certificate of Judgment by the guarantor AGC seeking to bluff its way to his bankruptcy. On 1st September, in the absence of the plaintiff who did not attend, AGC abandoned its action and the bankruptcy proceedings were dismissed on the 1st of September as the plaintiff’s birthday present on the 2nd September upon which date the dismissal entry was made in the Federal Court register (annexures AF, (22), and AG, (23), in Notices to Admit and Perform documentation served 9.8.11 and filed 13.10.11). The plaintiff, not knowing this, filed a debtor’s petition on 4th September due to the intimidatory pressures caused by AGC and the anticipated inability to be able to conduct his business and so pay his debts despite increasing sales due to no longer having his spreadsheet managed “superaccount” facility of 10 credit cards required to instantly be able to buy stock to fill increasing demand. After the 8th September the plaintiff received a letter, (annexure AG, (23), in Notices to Admit and Perform documentation served 9.8.11 and filed 13.10.11), advising that the creditor’s petition had been dismissed. After acceptance of a settlement offer to his creditors made with his money his bankruptcy was later annulled leaving him free, as he was advised by his receiver in bankruptcy, to pursue amounts outstanding and owing to him.