ACTION AS WILL-POWER
Abstract
The concept of power, as commonly formulated in contemporary sociology, is noted to lack any reference to the critical dimension of personal conative striving, or will-power. This deficiency is shown to stem from an overly cognitive conception of action, one in which acts are seen to embody choice and meaning but not emotion or effort, a view that has been reinforced by the use of trivial, easily-accomplished acts as examples to illustrate the nature of action. A perspective is advocated that redresses this imbalance; one that accepts that the immediate cause of all true actions is an act of will and that action is best conceived of as behaviour that individuals allow to happen to them. Power is then defined as an individual's ability to initiate and maintain action despite behaviourial resistance, a conceptualization that closely links it to the concept of `character'. This perspective on human conduct is then shown to be identical to that adopted by Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.
Introduction
Power is the term conventionally used to refer to the ability of someone or some group to carry out their will, especially despite opposition. 1 Viewed in this way, most sociologists have followed the lead of Marx in treating power as an aspect of a social relationships - or indeed as a social relationship. Hence the `opposition' mentioned is usually taken to refer to other people, such that power becomes a key feature of a system of social stratification and hence of society more generally. Yet power cannot simply, or even primarily, be regarded as just an aspect of social structure. For it is, in the first place, a feature of agency, and as such refers to the general ability to `get things done', that is to say, to achieve desired goals. Thus what power is in essence, to use Giddens' term, is `transformational capacity', that is, `the capacity to intervene in a given set of events so as in some way to alter them' (Giddens 1985; cited in Jary and Jary 1991, `power' q.v.). This usage resembles that of Talcott Parsons, who also used the term to refer to the `generalised capacity ... to get things done' (1955: 181). However, if power refers to the ability to get things done, then its primary referent cannot be to a social relationship, but must be to the role that individuals occupy as agents. For a generalised ability to `get things done' is, when viewed from the perspective of the individual, equivalent to agency. Individuals possess `transformational capacity' as actors and hence power - in its most basic aspect - must refer to that force drawn upon by individuals when performing actions.
This conclusion seems obvious enough and is recognised in everyday speech, where the terms `will' and, interestingly, `will-power', are commonly used to refer to this aspect of agency. In addition, there are others terms that refer directly, or indirectly, to the fact that there is a such a force or energy dimension to people's voluntary conduct and that individuals may vary in their ability to manipulate it. These would include `self control', `self-discipline',`self-regulation', and `self-command' or `mastery'. In addition, this phenomenon is recognised and studied in psychology, the key concepts being those of `ego strength' and `internal control' (see Drever 1952). However, it is very hard to find much recognition among sociologists that human conduct is characterised by such a feature. Why, one wonders, should this be the case?
The Traditional View of Action
A key part of the answer would appear to lie in the conventional view of action and agency that has developed within the discipline over the post-war years. The usual way of defining action is to see it as distinguished from non-action or `mere behaviour' because it possesses `meaning', a term that is usually identified with intentionality, or such cognate terms as goal-directedness or purposiveness. Thus Jary and Jary's definition refers to `any unit or sequence of individual social activity which is intentional or purposive and involves conscious deliberation' (1991 q.v.`action'). Regarded in this light, the `intention', `purpose' or `goal' that is assumed to be embodied in the action is then taken to constitute its `meaning', for as Abercrombie et al. put it, `action is distinguished from behaviour in that it involves meaning or intention' (1985 q.v. `action').
The problem with this approach to defining action is that it constitutes an overwhelmingly cognitive, not to say ratiocinative, perspective. Action is identified solely with the processes of thinking, anticipating, planning, deliberating, and calculating, while the norm of rationality is forever being invoked as the standard by which to judge all these mental activities. Consequently there is little or no recognition that action might require emotion, imagination, or even, crucially, effort. The concern is exclusively with meaning, whether the focus is upon the fact that this is itself a construct - as with phenomenology - or upon the processes of deliberation, calculation and choice - as in the case of rational actor and rational choice theories, game theory, and neo-classical economics. This rather one-sided view of the nature of human action would appear to have developed for two related reasons. Firstly, because of the strange history of the concept of motive in sociology, and secondly, because of the treatment accorded the nature of volition.
The closest that traditional action theory has ever come to acknowledging that there are non-cognitive aspects to the phenomenon of action has been via the concept of motive. Unfortunately, Weber's original emphasis on the importance of motivational understanding has become rather lost over the years, in part because Weber's treatment of this term was somewhat confused (that is, the idea of motive as an impetus or force was not adequately distinguished from the idea of motive as a goal or end-in-view), and in part because sociologists have tended to follow C. Wright Mills' lead in assuming that all talk of motives as forces involves a capitulation to behaviourism and an abandonment of voluntarism. 2 Had the original emphasis on motive as force - which can clearly be detected in Weber's work - not been subsequently abandoned then the power-dimension of action might not have been so completely overlooked.
It has long been recognised that action is to be distinguished from behaviour by the fact that it is voluntary, (or perhaps, more accurately, behaviour is distinguished from action by being involuntary). This fact is most clearly acknowledged in the description of Parsons' famous action schema as `voluntaristic'. However, an examination of Parsons' schema reveals that essentially this term is taken to refer to the matter of choice (see Alexander 1978), with the result that to this day this is how the concept of voluntarism has consistently been interpreted. However, although the term `voluntary' derives from `volition', the latter clearly refers to the exercise of will and not simply to the exercise of choice. Now, admittedly, choice and will are closely connected. However, if anything it is the former that is dependent on the latter and not the other way round. `Volition', which is the term that encapsulates both choice and will, refers to the faculty of making - that is carrying out - conscious choices, of implementing one's intentions, and as such it necessarily implies effort and the expenditure of energy.
The preoccupation with the cognitive appears to be the primary reason why this power dimension of action is so often overlooked, yet the consequence of this is that the agent tends to be regarded as someone who has almost magical powers, that is to say, as someone who only has to decide on an action in order to be able to perform it. Thus individuals are assumed to be able to use their power of agency when and where they wish, effectively without restriction. There is an almost complete absence in action theories of any discussion of the possibility that individuals may fail to attain their goals because they lack the ability - in the sense of personal will-power or agency capacity - to attain them. The fact that individuals sometimes do fail to attain their goals is more commonly attributed to a lack of material resources, to ignorance, or to the opposition of others. What is rarely considered is the possibility that failure might be due to an insufficiency of the power of agency itself; in other words, that individuals might not succeed in their aims because their power of agency is limited, or simply insufficient for the task in hand. Or indeed, that on occasions this ability may actually desert them altogether.
But then the examples that social theorists typically chose to illustrate `action', all tend to refer to rather simple, indeed trivial, acts, usually of a very short duration; ones that most normal socialised adults can be expected to accomplish with little difficulty, such as posting a letter, for example, or getting a cup of coffee, opening a door, and the like. 3 The problem here is that these examples do not resemble conduct of the kind that most people would regard as particularly meaningful, mainly because such actions are performed routinely and require little effort. Weber's woodcutter is possibly an interesting exception (Weber 1964:95), for some people might well find that indeed they were unable to complete the task of chopping the whole pile of logs that was in front of them; that their `will-power' was insufficient to the task.
This discussion suggests the importance of stressing two points. First, that if actions were simply equatable with cognitive processes then no acts would ever be performed. Individuals might calculate or plan (although whether they would have any reason to do so is another matter) but, in the absence of motive forces, they would not act. It is for this reason that so-called `rational actor' and `rational choice' theories are not actually theories of action at all, but merely theories of decision-making. After all, to plan to do something is one thing: doing it is quite another. Second, the basic reason why individuals perform any true action is not because they have a good reason to do so (in the sense of an end or goal in view), nor because they are motivated to do so, nor even because they feel constrained to do so, but because they will it. Responsible human action is, by definition, action that is willed into existence. This means that the immediate `cause' of such actions is necessarily an act of will. This truth, although self-evident, is often forgotten by action theorists, who proceed to treat motives as if they were the real `causes' of action. Yet a motive cannot be the cause of a voluntary act, only the cause of an involuntary one. For as Farber observes, `a motive cannot be responsible for an action of will, even though it may provoke or prompt such action' (Farber 1976: 18). He continues, `If, out of envy, I will to disparage, I still have the option of willing not to disparage.' This means that - unlike the impression given by Weber in his discussion of motive - (1964: 95-6) although an emotion may prompt an action this does not mean that it is not willed. If an individual is so `beside herself' with rage that she proves incapable of `controlling herself' then what she is doing is not action but behaviour. If, however she is capable of controlling herself but does not, then her act is willed. Consequently what precedes all true action is necessarily an act of will.
Although there are some problems with Weber's conceptualisation of action and agency he did not make the mistake of equating action just with the cognitive processes of thinking, anticipating and calculating. Nor did Weber take the ability of human beings to act for granted. That is to say he does not presume that they possess the capacity as agents to implement their will whenever they wish. On the contrary, two of his types of `action' - traditional and affective - actually come close to corresponding to forms of unwilled behaviour. Thus although Weber defined action as behaviour that has subjective meaning, he also described behaviour as `reactive' or `uncontrolled' (1964:95). It follows from this that action is distinguished from behaviour not simply by the fact that it is meaningful but also by the fact that it is controlled or willed. To the extent therefore that conduct approximates to action it must do so to the extent that it is willed and not merely to the extent that it is planned (or chosen). This suggests that the crucial element missing from the traditional formulations of action and agency is the recognition that action involves the expenditure of energy, and that this energy is necessary in order to overcome resistance. Weber clearly recognised - what few action theorists since have acknowledged - which is that individuals achieve their actions despite the inertia, resistance or distraction which stems from their status as biological organisms.
The Nature of Action and Agency
If the concept of agency is to be modified so as to include the dimension of power then the traditional manner in which action is conceived must be re-formulated along these lines. Instead of focusing on meaning and hence emphasising the contrast between behaviour and action it becomes necessary to stress that all conduct - action as well as behaviour - consists of responses to stimuli. This statement is as true of action as it is of behaviour, the only difference being that in the former case individuals have the power to inhibit the responses but choose not to. In the case of respondent behaviour (such as the knee jerk or salivation) individuals do not select the stimulus or the response (one could say that the latter is programmed) and consequently do not possess the power of inhibition. Since all other forms of behaviour are learnt then, in theory at least, these lie within the power of individuals to inhibit. It is this power to inhibit the `natural' response to a stimulus that is the essence of will, and it brings with it the power to act voluntarily rather than involuntarily and hence exercise choice. 4 For example, if while playing an important game of chess a player suddenly hear a loud noise behind him but manages to resist the temptation to turn round then he has exercised his will over the "natural tendency" to attend to the sound, thereby choosing to attend to the board and his opponent's move. Willpower is thus the power to decide which stimuli- from all of those of which the agent is aware - shall have the predominant influence over his behaviour. In this way action follows from the successful exercise of will such that the individual's behaviour can be said to be controlled, and hence ordered, in the manner desired.
Action is thus best conceived of as behaviour that individuals allow to happen to them, while a voluntary act is simply one that individuals can voluntarily inhibit. Will is therefore the faculty through which individuals strive to impose order on their behaviour by inhibiting unwanted reactions; it is the ability to consciously control behaviour. If therefore the convention of defining power not just in terms of achieving goals, but of doing so against resistance is accepted, then will-power can be defined as an individual's ability to initiate and maintain action despite behaviourial resistance.
Will-power is thus exercised in every action - that is to say every genuine action - that individuals perform, even though most of the time they may not be fully aware that this is what they are doing. However a little reflection may reveal that people do indeed exercise what is commonly referred to as will-power on a daily basis. They may encounter it in the effort required just to get out of bed in the morning and go to work; or perhaps in controlling their temper or irritation in the morning rush-hour traffic; or at work when they have to `steel themselves' in order to face an unpleasant task, or `motivate themselves' to start an especially tedious one. Then perhaps at lunch time they may have to struggle to keep to their chosen low-fat, low-calorie diet and resist the more tempting dishes on offer; whilst in the afternoon they may have to `fight against' the distracting noise made by the workmen on the building site next door in order to concentrate successfully on the task in hand. In all these instances individuals only succeed in doing those things they intend to do (if indeed that is the case) though the exercise of will-power.
Anyone who has witnessed a child's first faltering attempts to walk will understand exactly what it means to refer to power as the ability to control one's behaviour, in this case to make one's limbs do precisely what you want them to do. However, although the difficulty of successfully employing will-power to bring a desired order to one's behaviour is most apparent in childhood it would be a serious mistake to assume that successfully exercising agency-power is mainly associated with socialisation and has comparatively little relevance to the understanding of adult behaviour. For, as the above examples suggest, imposing willed control over one's own behaviour is not a once and for all process, mainly accomplished when the transition to mature adulthood is complete. One only has to think of a drunk's efforts to walk in a straight line to realise that adults may sometimes need to make much the same effort to impose control over wayward limbs as a toddler learning to walk; while alcohol is merely one of many ways in which an adult's ability to act - that is to impose order on behaviour - can be threatened.