About Differences of Military and Civilian Technology – A systematic Approach

Sakari Ahvenainen

National Defence College

Finnish Defence Forces (Ret.)

and Yleisradio Oy

Abstract

Warfare is a special environment and its general features dominate all its sub-elements, including its technology. Warfare as the most simple system has to have enemy as its element. Enemy creates some basic phenomena to the warfare and to its technology. These basic phenomena and their influence to the military technology are presented.

It is found in the study that the free will of the enemy, relative advantage, paradoxical logic, surprise, deception, operational security, learning and change are elements of military technology or affect centrally to the military technology. Civilian technology with a rival has some of the consequences of the above phenomena, the more the fiercer the competition is.

Keywords

Warfare, enemy, military technology, civilian technology, system thinking

1. Introduction

In this paper some basic differences of military [7] and civilian technology are studied through elementary system concepts [5] and through principal features of warfare [6] [8].

First we will look at some very elementary systems and what these systems mean when applied to warfare, then some principal features of warfare and their applications to the military technology.

It is argued that it is a very basic and fatal error to look at any open system without looking at the same time at its environment and their interactions [4, 238, 286 – 88, 413, 459 and 461]. Ultimately this means that there is no such thing as military or civilian technology alone, but there is something of a kind only with their environment.

2. What are military and civilian technology?

The word “military” is something relating to soldiers, arms, war and armed forces [10]. The word “civilian” means not in active duty in a military, police or firefighting force [11]. The word “technology” was first used in 1829 in America and it meant technics in a broad and general sense: planing, building, using and studying of technical artefacts and systems [3, 11, 17 and 18].

So military technology is the broad use of technical artefacts and systems in warfare and civilian technology the broad use of technical artefacts and systems in a non-warfare like situation. From this point on we mean by “military technology” a technology that has an opponent that tries to destroy the technology of the other side by all available means. By “civilian technology” we mean a technology that has no hostile human component.

One cannot understand an open system without its environment [5, 39 and 96]. There is no technical system without all others [3, 328 and 348]. In a “pure” technology, we use g = 9,81 m/s2. This means that we don’t have “pure” technology, because this gravity constant is the constant on the surface of the planet Earth, not “pure” gravity constant.

The environment of military technology is war, a bloody and a deadly struggle between (at least) two parties. The environment of civilian technology is co-operation, maybe rivalry in society consisting even of millions of parties. According to general system theory, the more there are units, the less violent the contest is [5, 38].

3. Warfare as a simple system

3.1.Most simple military systems

A system is a set of elements standing in interrelation between themselves and with the environment [5, 38] [6, 15]. A system and its environment (the rest of the universe) is the most simple system that we can say something about: The system influences its environment and the environment of the system influences the system, they interact, shape each other [9, 102]. An open system has inflows and outflows [5, 39 – 41 and 124 – 134]. Warfare has these flows – e.g. logistics, troops, energy (food, fuel and electricity), information, intelligence, material, ammunition and reserves going to battles and evacuations, wounded, dead, prisoners, broken material, heat and reports going out of battles – so warfare is an open system.

One cannot say anything about a single Unit that contains all that there is as a single unit. Except that it is. This simple system of two parts and two relationships has multiple principal applications.

What is the most simple system that can describe warfare? According to the previous paragraph it is warfare and its environment. This system is actually any kind of system, so it does not describe warfare in particular. We need at least one more element to describe warfare. These elements are according to the previous chapter:

-Part 1 (e.g. our side)

-Part 2 that opposes the part 1 (e.g. our enemy) and

-the common environment (terrain, weather, neighbours, E.M.- spectrum…).

This is the most simple system that has two opposing parts. It has “milder” application in society (business, love, team sports) and “stronger” applications in warfare. To have a system that includes military technology we need a five-part system:

-our side excluding our military technology (people, logistics, doctrine…)

-our military technology

-our enemy excluding its military technology (people, logistics, doctrine …)

-our enemy’s technology

-the common environment (terrain, weather, neighbours, E.M.- spectrum…).

To look at any military technology, one must look at all these five parts or one is not actually looking at the real sum effects of military technology in its environment, in a battle.

3.2 Systems, control of parts and means of competition

Top-level of selforganising systems controls its parts to form up a synergic system that is bigger than its parts alone. The better formed and the more powerful the top level is the more control it has to its parts. A (western) state is well-formed, so it has clear control to its parts, e.g. firmas and peoples. Levels above states have not (yet) well formed and powerful organisations, so these levels - multinational, cultural or global - have not strict control of the state level.

One concequnece of this is, that firmas and peoples have restricted means to compete but states have very few restrictions and can, e.g. go to war. The more there is global activity, e.g. laws, organisations and media, the more restrictions there will be for states.

4. Common features of warfare

As we can see above the most principal thing about warfare is the opponent, adversary, enemy. Warfare is an enlarged duel [6, 15]. The enemy creates or has following interlinked things:

  1. Free will that is mainly outside our control. If we have total control of the will of our enemy, there is no need for war. Warfare is a violent act. Its purpose is to subdue the enemy to follow our will [6, 15].
  2. Paradoxical logic [8, 7 – 17]: what seems reasonable without an enemy is not reasonable when the free will of our enemy is in action. Example: It is normal to use the shortest and easiest road from A to B. However, in warfare, when the free will of our enemy is in action, this is not the case, because the enemy has also seen what is the shortest road from A to B and has, e.g. put best troops there to slow us down (ref. Maginot- line).
  3. Relative advantage [1, 19 – 24], since absolute performance is not important in warfare but the difference in performance with the enemy.
  4. The logic of action – counteraction – counter-counteraction (etc.) [8, 27 – 31]: If we do something important and effective, we can be sure that our enemy, if he wants to survive and win, reacts. He makes a counteraction (attack). And if our enemy has effective counteraction, we are sure to have a counter-counteraction (defence) etc.
  5. The importance of learning, evolution and change: As a human being, our enemy is capable of learning. With learning, nothing stays the same for long [13, 108].
  6. The importance of surprise [6, 118] [13, 76 – 79]: To surprise the enemy is a general aim in warfare. If pressed to learn quickly (if surprised), our enemy has a disadvantage to compensate. The larger the unit of learning the longer the learning (communication) takes [5, 48].
  7. The importance of deception and operational security: All warfare is based on deception [13, 76]. The enemy cannot act effectively if he does not know your technology because of deception or operational security.

5. Common military features of military technology

The previous features of warfare were created through the most simple model of warfare, through the existence of the enemy. This means that all parts or systems of warfare have as a quality these features. Next we will examine what these common features of warfare mean as common features of the military technology, as a part of war and what kind of differences they create compared to the civilian technology.

5.1 Free will and military technology

The ”enemy” of civilian technology are unchangeable laws of nature. In military technology the real enemy is combination of the free will of our enemy and his technology. [8, 30 – 31]

Because the laws of nature are fixed and (mostly) simple (compared to humans and societies) they are predictable and so are the technical systems that are based on these laws. The predictability of civilian technology makes tools possible. In principle, the effect of the hammer is always the same to the nail [7, 315]. In civilian technology, a measure is always repeatable as the same, with the same certainty and at the end, with the same effectiveness [7, 315].

Because enemies (people) are complex, capable of learning and have a free will, enemies (people) are not predictable.

This means that civilian technology is predictable, has certain and well known effects and military technology or its effect is unpredictable, has no certain effects and previous effects do not predict the next effect. The predictability of technology is more complex through the historical prosess [7, Contents] of tools, machines, systems and systems of systems (automation).

On the other hand, when technology has greater effect compared to people in warfare, the outcome of the warfare is more predictable, at least in principle (ref. Computer program and certainty below).

5.2 Paradoxical logic and military technology

According to Martin van Creveld, the logic of civilian technology is linear, one-way and has no built-in learning mechanisms. The logic of military technology is paradoxical, two-way and has a built-in learning mechanism (the enemy) [7, 314 – 16].

Same action does not have always the same effect in warfare, more the opposite; action does not succeed just because it has succeeded already once. [7, 316]

If some solution is the best in civilian technology, it remains the best if the environment does not change. In warfare the best technology is the target of the most effective countermeasures of the enemy. From this logic follows that in warfare the “best” technology is not always the best.

So the logic of a soldier and that of an engineer are different. The soldier is under the influence of two-way paradoxical logic and the engineer works under the one-way logic of science and engineering. [8, 77]

Paradoxical logic has the same endlessly new levels as relative advantage in the next chapter. We can to some extent surprise our wise enemy by using the same method again if he presumes we won’t use it again.

5.3 Relative advantage and military technology

The enemy is the main feature of warfare. From this follows that absolute performance is not important in warfare. Performance makes sense only compared to the performance of one’s enemy. This means that the same method or technology has not always the same effect against different enemies. This difference in performances is the relative advantage. It has many shapes, at least 20 – 30 different kinds [1, 24].

There are four principal ways to have relative advantage: through better actions, through better attack, through better defence and through better performance in the environment [1, 19 – 24]. All these ways apply to the military technology. These are discussed in the next chapter.

What relative advantage means in military technology? The performance of our used military technology is a function of:

  1. Used technology: Ours and the enemy’s
  2. Used countermeasures, technical or other: Ours and the enemy’s
  3. Used counter-countermeasures (etc.), technical or other: Ours and the enemy’s
  4. The common environment.

These seven factors influence the relative advantage of military technology. One could argue that if this is true, warfare and its technology are too complex to be possible at all. However, then the missed point is that it is not necessary to be perfect in war, just enough better than the enemy.

5.4 Four uses of military technology

Based on the logic of action – counteraction (attack) – counter-counteraction (defence) there are three different uses of military technology:

  1. To use technology as a tool to have better performance in our actions, e.g. trucks to move troops.
  2. To use technology as a tool to attack the enemy to reduce its performance in its actions, e.g. mines to cut off roads. The more effective the technology is, the more counter technology it will have [8, 27 – 28].
  3. To use technology as a tool to defend our systems in order to prevent the enemy from reducing our performance in our actions, e.g. mine clearing equipment to open roads to our trucks.
  4. Of course one can still use something against mine clearing equipment (special mines) etc.

Based on the common environment with our enemy the fourth way to use technology is to have better performance through environment, for instance to be able to stay alive in the wilderness in winter (warm tents and winter clothing) or to move and operate in snow terrain (skies and sleighs).

Of these four uses of military technology only two apply to civilian technology. The use of civilian technology as a tool to have better performance in our actions and the use of technology as a tool to overcome the effects of our environment (snow, frost).

5.5 Learning and military technology

The human element, the enemy, is principal in warfare. This human element is capable of learning. As a consequence, military technology has some elementary features that are not features of civilian technology:

  1. The more you use it, the less effective it will be. This means decreased effect through time.
  2. The more effective your technology is, the faster its effect decreases.

The usefulness of military technology changes very much depending on its phase of use. Technical systems can be highly effective, totally useless or positively dangerous within a matter of months during a war. [8, 28 – 29]

The usefulness of civilian technology changes also, but contrary to the military technology. At first new civilian technology can be difficult, even dangerous, but during its life it matures and becomes in the end unnoticed and works at the background. The most recent example of this development is the ubiquitous society, where the information technology will be present everywhere but is unnoticed.

5.6 Surprise and military technology

The performance of military technology is a function of the enemy and its familiarity to the military technology that we use. If our enemy is totally unfamiliar of our military technology (it is: if surprised), our military technology has the biggest effect. The best effects of military technology should not be used in a standard situation [8, 28].

To surprise with a new military technology is hard, because you have not studied, trained or integrated it a lot with your other systems. If you have, the enemy has greater chances to notice your new approach. Technology may change this in the future. By studying and training the new technology in closed simulating institutions, battle labs, one has more chances to surprise the enemy.

One should keep some elements of one’s technology in reserve and not to use the best qualities of one’s technology on ”small” wars. One should also be able to change the characteristics of one’s technology when needed to surprise one’s enemy at the moment of need. In electronic warfare systems we speak about “War Modes”.

One example of this feature is the German Enigma- encryption system and its use before the WW II. The Germans made modification to their Enigma system constantly and the Polish, who were the only ones able to break the Enigma- systems, were constantly in trouble. Just before the WW II the Germans made a change in their Enigma-systems that forced the Polish to tenfold their capacity in the code breaking business, but they were not able to do it. So they told everything they knew about the breaking of the Enigma-system to the British and French intelligence in August 1939. [2, 15]

The surprise has no role in civilian technology. The more familiar civilian technology is, the better.

5.7 Deception and operational security of military technology

The deception works like the surprise. When the enemy has no real knowledge of the real use and significance of our technology, he will be surprised and our technology has extra power for a while. To work, deception has to be based on your knowledge of your enemy’s knowledge of your military technology. So besides of your knoledge of your own military technology, you have to know what your enemy knows about your military technology. And the less the enemy knows about your knowledge of his military technology and your military technology, the better for you. Hence operational security.