A Review of the Research by Robert A

ECON 467Owen 1

A Review of the Research by Robert A. McGuire and Robert L. Ohsfeldt: An Economic Model of Voting Behavior over Specific Issues at the Constitutional Convention of 1787

February 1, 2008

ECON 467

B. Strow

WesternKentuckyUniversity

Lorie B. Owen

Robert McGuire and Robert Ohsfeldt’s study of the voting behavior, from an economic perspective at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, explores a very interesting area of economics. Prior to the signing of the constitution, the reigning governmental force was the Articles of Confederation. Because this governmental forum was very weak, the Founding Fathers attempted to create a new superior law. McGuire and Ohsfedlt looked into the economic reasoning behind the delegates’ decisions when participating in voting.

Seven states were represented, with 74 delegates appointed. However, 55 delegates actually attended the convention. Because the convention was held over such a long period of time, no more than 11 states or 45 members, were ever present at one time. Of the delegates in attendance were 24 lawyers, 6 planters, 8 merchants, 8 politicians, 4 farmers, 3 physicians, 1 minister and 1 printer, along with 30 Continental Congress veterans and 22 officers of the Revolutionary War. A large majority of individuals were those of wealth and rank mainly from coastal areas. Because delegates represented a wide area, each delegate held certain inclinations about specific issues. Merchants for example favored prohibition, and slave-owners feared northern majority control.

Many scholars throughout history have attempted to analyze this behavior from different viewpoints. Although no one concluded the same findings, all contributed a useful aspect. Charles Beard implied that personality interests were the greatest factor in decisions. Robert Brown and Forrest McDonald used qualitative data to interpret voting-rights data. However, no experimental study was ever performed that found the same results.

The issues on hand to be decided by the convention were centered on deciding between either a central powerful government, a federal system or a nationalistic central government, a national system. Although there was one main purpose, several issues must be decided on within those issues. Sixteen issues were analyzed in relation to the delegates voting behavior (See Table 1.)

Making the assumption that all delegates were maximizing their own personal utility, a formula was derived to determine utility maximizing behavior. [Pi = ƒ (PE, PI, CE, CI) where PE = personal economic interest, PI = personal economic ideology, CE = constituents economic interests, CI = constituents economic ideology] On several issues personal interests were in conflict with constituents’ interest. In these cases, McGuire and Ohsfeldt determined the effect on voting behavior by analyzing the overall effect, instead of the partial effects. However, a single partial effect does not predict the delegate’s actual vote.

The delegates therefore, could not be oblivious to their constituents’ interests. If they completely opposed, other individuals’ views, they ran the risk of jeopardizing their future political careers. Also the constitution must be ratified by all states. In order to ensure passage, the constitution must not be completely conflicting to any state’s interest.

Voting behavior was greatly affected by two phenomenons, compromise votes and logrolling. Comprising of votes or trading votes was included in their model, but they conclude that the effect on the overall behavior was not significant enough to be calculated. Logrolling is difficult to measure quantitatively. Without qualitative evidence, it is hard to draw a correlation between vote trading and logrolling. Both are included in the model, but do not greatly affect the overall result.

In the early 1780’s the overall economy faced serious issues. The Revolutionary War placed a tremendous strain on the national economy. Many individuals lost faith in the paper-money, especially when inflation rates soared. State debt moratoria were responsible for measuring and monitoring the currency issues. Western land owners became irritated with the government, and wanted to immediately develop the western frontier.

McGuire and Ohsfeldt categorized the sixteen sub issues. Six of the 16 votes (1,2,3,6,8 and15) were fundamental. Five votes (9,10,11,12 and 13) were prohibitions. Three votes (5,7 and 14) were economic. Two were categorized in specific regard to the constitution. 301 of 569 votes recorded were categorized as minor, and 248 of the 569 were important.

The empirical model for determining voting patterns were estimated using Vijk = g (PEj, PIj, CEk, CIk) where Vijk = a dummy variable representing the delegates’ vote, PEj = set of the delegate’s personal economic interest, PIj = set of personal characteristics serving as proxies for the delegate’s ideology, CEk = set of variables measuring the economic interests of the delegate’s constituents, CIk = set of variables measuring the economic interest of the delegate’s constituents’ ideology. Table 2 explains the differences calculated within each variable.

Their findings concluded that personal and constituents’ interest variables did not have a large statistical impact on the actual voting behavior. Some interest did have a direct correlation with several issues. But on the majority the correlation was not significant enough to hold the theory accountable.

Their results showed that delegates from coastal areas were more likely to favor the national government. Delegates who represented slave-owners were not as likely to vote for the national system. Delegates who were previously officers in the Revolutionary War had a higher probability of voting for the strong national government. Most of their findings were overall consistent with similar previous studies.

Their research concluded that the voting behavior of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention delegates were related to interest and ideologies, and significant patterns do exist, however the actual behavior of each individual can not be determined simply from these conclusions. Overall their research shows that the convention could have seen a much different outcome if the delegates had been more representative instead of appointed.

Bibliography

McGuire, Author's first name initialR. A., & Ohsfeldt, R. L. (1986). An economic model of

voting behavior over specific issues at the constitutional convention of 1787. Journal of Economic History. XLVI, 79-111.