A plane crash November 4 in Mexico City killed 2 high level government officials connected to Mexico’s war on organized crime. While all indications point towards human error as a cause for the crash, the loss of these two men emphasizes the Mexican government’s struggle to stay ahead of organized crime. Factors like geography, corruption and violence work against the government, which is forced to rely on its military as its only truly stable institution as it is faced with huge losses among police ranks, in the intelligence community and, as seen November 4, even the president’s cabinet.
Geography
Mexico’s most basic endowment – it’s geography – has been the country’s primary source of instability in the past and during the recent campaign against organized crime. The country’s north is made up of desert, which isolates it from Mexico’s ruling and population center of Mexico City. The distance and inhospitable terrain that separates Mexico’s north from Mexico’s center means that exerting political control there is challenging. Think of the Wild West in the US – Mexico’s north is essentially a frontier where laws written in Mexico City are much harder to enforce. The north is in many ways more connected to the US: economically due to trade and politically, due to the immigration and drug issues. But ultimately the territory comes under the jurisdiction of Mexico.
The South, on the other hand, is nearer to Mexico City, but also much poorer and much more fragmented. Southern Mexican states like Chiapas even have their own indigenous separatist movements like the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) that is waging a low-level campaign for more sovereignty. The central Mexican government does not have a deep reach into the south, which is a haven for drug traffickers who take advantage of the terrain to move cocaine from the producing regions of the Andean countries to the consumers in the United States.
The extreme geographies of Mexico’s north and south mean that, while the government in Mexico City has de jure control over the territories, enforcing de facto control is another story. The absence of natural, geographic connections means that the government must overcome barriers to exert control over these regions which means that controlling these regions is much more expensive. As seen in 2006, newly elected president Felipe Calderon made the decision that many of the states on Mexico’s periphery had fallen into de facto control of the cartels and that the only way to reign the territory back in would be to deploy the military.
Using the military to enforce control over domestic territories is in many ways a very desperate move. Ideally, a standing military is reserved for facing down foreign threats or assisting the country in times of emergency. But relying on the military for enforcing ones political will on his own people is not a sustainable position. So far, the Mexican military has proven to be moderately effective at countering organized criminal activities along Mexico’s periphery, but in the two years since its deployment, the military has not established complete control over the area. Compared to other military deployments in the face of organized criminal, like Italy, where military contingents deployed to Sicily in the early 1990s to establish immediate control so that the police could work to capture and convict organized criminals, Mexico’s has neither been short nor totally effective.
A risk associated with maintaining long-term military presence along the periphery is that the center is left vulnerable >. As evidenced by the attacks on Edgar Millan Igor Labastida and other federal police officials in Mexico City, organized crime has shown that it can strike at Mexico’s center as Mexico City attacks it along the periphery. While the level of police violence in the capital certainly hasn’t gotten anywhere near the level of violence along its periphery, cartel violence there sent a reminder that they could strike targets in Mexico City. Strategically, the government must protect the center as it is the base of power for the whole country. It does Mexico little good to have the military fighting cartels along the periphery if Mexico City is insecure. The Calderon government is charged with striking a balance between staying on the offensive against the cartels on the periphery but also maintaining adequate defense (or avoiding cartel provocation) in Mexico City to ensure that public servants survive.
The targeted assassinations of Edgar Millan and his fellow federal police colleagues in Mexico City point to a further Mexican weakness – that of turn over in within the ranks of Mexico’s government. Turnover comes in the form of personnel deaths and losses due to corruption charges. As drug related violence has climbed, hundreds of police officers and regional government leaders have been targeted in organized crime violence across the country. The death of a high level government official (whether involved in law enforcement or politics) both disrupts the state tactically, as those charged with chasing down organized criminals are physically removed, and is also an effective strategic move, as killing those that are supposed to be keeping order strikes a psychological blow to those fighting organized crime.
Many more police officers, intelligence officials and government leaders have been removed from their office on charges of corruption – most involving collusion with organized crime. In these situations, the government is forced to get rid of these people because keeping them on would do more damage than letting go of them. Nonetheless, losing large groups of employees due to corruption leaves holes in the government and creates institutional instability. The October 27announcement that 35 SIEDO employees (an organization critical to fighting the cartels) had been arrested due to corruption charges drives home the fact that virtually no government office is safe from infiltration.
Money is a huge reason for Mexico’s endemic corruption. Organized crime brings in somewhere between $40 – 100 Billion per year in a country that is relatively poor. In the SIEDO example cited above, top officials were paid up to $400,000 per month to pass information along to a cartel involved in cocaine trafficking. This kind of money is a huge temptation in a country where public servant salaries were recently cut and don’t add up to this amount even over a full year. Organized crime can target sensitive individuals in the Mexican government and has the resources to convince them to provide information with a combination of lucrative offers and physical threats if they do not comply.
Even the constitution is a source of this problem of turnover as presidential and senatorial time in office is limited to one term. While this clause does prevent the entrenchment of leaders in positions of power, it also restricts elected leaders from establishing themselves in office due to time constraints. It also, ironically, leads to perhaps more corruption because leaders do not face the challenge of seeking re-election in the face of voter scrutiny. Many of Mexico’s politicians are then lame-ducks upon entering office, meaning that any political favors or personal matters can be settled without having to worry about explaining it to the voters come election day.
The constant loss of local, regional and federal officials makes it difficult for drug traffickers to be dealt with in a comprehensive and uniform manner. The constant loss of people means that those filling their spots are increasingly less qualified and less vetted, meaning that the risk of losing that person to death or corruption is even greater – creating a vicious cycle of brain drain.
On a tactical, day by day basis, these inherent weaknesses in the system create obstacles to Mexico’s law enforcement agents and military trying to curb the power of organized crime. The rugged, isolated terrain, the balance between periphery and the center and the constant turnover of personnel all have practical applications in Mexico’s drug war.
On the geography front, drug traffickers have a tremendous amount of barren land at their disposal for where they can establish routes and safe-houses. The total land area of the 6 northern Mexicoborder states is nearly 250,000 square miles – a huge area of land comparable to XXXX and very sparsely inhabited. Such a geographic feature is an asset to bands of smugglers transporting illicit goods and a huge headache for any law enforcement entity that tries to stop them. Essentially what happens is that traffickers establish a route, authorities discover it and deploy an adequate amount of resources to shut down the route, but the traffickers simply shift to the east or west and go around the blockade. This has happened all along the 2000 mile border: when Mexico deploys troops to the eastern state of Tamaulipas, drug flows may slow down there, but increase in Chihuahua state. If troops are deployed in Juarez, then drug flow shifts to Sonora state. There are simply too many holes along the US/Mexico border and not enough fingers to plug them. No matter how many troops Mexico deploys to northern Mexico, they are battling the geography just as much as the drug traffickers.
This idea is only emphasized by the need to balance between reasserting control over Mexico’s periphery and maintaining order in the center. Mexico is a big country, at nearly ¾ of a million square miles, there is a lot of territory to protect and the military has already proven that it is stretched with its given assignment. Facing limited resources and an interest in keeping key government figures alive forces authorities to weigh the consequences of raiding a narcotics shipment or chasing down key cartel figures. If there is a big enough perceived risk that the cartels will seek revenge (and they have proven that they can), then police may be more wary about carrying out tactical strikes to save their own skin.
Finally, the constant turnover of government employees and even elected leaders also plays a role in how the government fights its war on the cartels. Government stability and continuity requires individuals (especially the high ranking ones) to hold their office for longer periods of time. However, with local police chiefs, mayors, state police chiefs, federal police chiefs and even cabinet members dying, quitting or facing charges of corruption, stability and predictability on the operational level is impossible. Juarez has been without a police chief since mid-summer after the previous chiefs were either killed or fled to the United States. Similar fates have befallen police chiefs and mayors throughout Sinaloa, Tamaulipas and Chihuahua. The military has actually been charged with taking over police departments along the border in order to combat the high rate of corruption and death that police officers are prone to, but this responsibility only adds to the load carried by Mexico’s military, further limiting their ability to perform patrols and raid cartel safe houses.
High turnover rates also hurt intelligence gathering capabilities and institutional knowledge of the situation on the ground. Having trusted sources in the field is an important aspect in any war, but those sources require handlers and are not as effective if they are being passed from handler to handler; as in the case of SIEDO (Mexico’s domestic intelligence agency) losing 35 members due to corruption charges. In fact, corruption often drives intelligence capabilities backwards, as information is leaked from the government to the cartels instead of the other way around.
Going after cartels also disrupts the status quo. Before Calderon sent troops to address the cartel problem in 2006, drug smuggling was rampant, but violence was under control. Corruption reigned and the cartels virtually controlled the territories, but there was relative peace and stability. Sending in troops to combat the cartels disrupted this peace and has sparked a huge battle where the army fight the cartels who also combat each other. As a result, drug related murders have sky-rocketed to nearly 4,000 this year alone and it are on track to surpass the total death toll for US forces in Iraq since operations started there in 2003. The level of disruption that government intervention has caused in northern Mexico is huge and, while Mexican citizens still by and large support the government’s mission, eventually fatigue will set in and the tolerance for violence will is prone to waver. If public support dies down, the government’s war on organized crime will gain yet another enemy.
With all of these challenges to consider, Mexico appears hardly to be able to handle the cartel war on its own. One obvious form of assistance is its neighbor to the north: the US. US capabilities could help Mexico fill the gaps in terms of providing cross-border coordination to ensure that bad guys don’t just hop the border into the US when Mexican troops carry out an operation on the Mexico side. The US also has significant intelligence collection capabilities that would help to bring some semblance of stability in surveillance of key cartel members – which would lead to arrests and a decrease in cartel power.
In the past, Mexican presidents have been reluctant to be seen as working too closely with the US or relying too much on its support. Many in Mexico see the US as a kind of imperial power that should not be overly trusted nor allowed to get too involved in domestic Mexican affairs. But given Mexico’s choices, accepting deeper US assistance must already be on the list in Mexico City. There are indications that Mexico has already warmed to this idea, with its acceptance of the Merida initiative and allowing the US National Travel Safety Board to investigate the November 4 plane crash.
American backing, while politically contentious for Mexican elected leaders, could help to shore up confidence amongst Mexican law enforcement. Right now, police officers from the local to the federal level are facing an uphill battle with colleagues dropping left and right. The situation is a demoralizing one and low morale is a good segue into corruption and working for organized crime. American support could restore confidence in Mexico’s ability to fight crime by providing much needed equipment, training, expertise and funding.
However, US support can only be effective in specific theaters. For example, it can be very effective in knocking down doors and arresting cartel members; it can be effective at training Mexican police so that they can step up and take more control instead of relying on the Mexican military. US assistance can work to lessen the disadvantage that Mexico has in the face of an inhospitable geography, over-reliance on the military and high rates of turnover among the officials charged with carrying out the campaign against organized crime with more and better equipment. Ultimately though, Mexico is Mexico, and as long as there is a high demand for illicit drugs like Cocaine, Marijuana and Methamphetamines in the US, there will be a supply chain connecting the producers with consumers. For the foreseeable future, Mexico will be the primary trafficking route for these substances.