A Phenomenological Argument for Objectivity of Knowledge
Matjaž Potrč,
An argument for objectivity of knowledge is construed. First, the characteristics applying to the phenomenology of belief are given. Then, it is argued that characteristics of phenomenology of belief apply to the phenomenology of epistemic judgments. Some differences with the case of moral beliefs are marked. Phenomenology proper to the epistemic beliefs shows that they aim at an objective, realist and judger independent area.
Characteristics proper to the phenomenology of belief
The phenomenology of beliefs aims at their subjective, qualitatively experiential what-it’s-like angle. This accords well with the understanding of the term phenomenology as it is used here, referring to the conscious qualitative or what-it’s-like side of experiences. There is a specific phenomenology or qualitative conscious experience, a specific what-it’s-like of smelling an apple, or again of biting into an apple, quite different to the qualitative feel experienced while one chews the cabbage. The what-it’s-like proper to each of the two experiences is quite specific and unlike the other.
Talking about occurrent beliefs, we abstract from the specific qualitative experiences and we ask ourselves what are the basic phenomenological characteristics of such beliefs. Here are five of these (Strahovnik, forthcoming; Horgan-Timmons, forthcoming). While entertaining a belief there is a specific phenomenologically experienced quality or feeling about
(1) Coming down at the matter in question.
(2) Categorizing the matter in question, putting it into certain categories.
(3) Involuntariness of this experience.
(4) Cognitive reaction to the reasons understood as being sufficient reasons for categorization.
(5) Linguistic expressibility of the belief in form of affirmatory sentences.
All of these enumerated matters thus characterize the quality or what-it’s-like experience of entertaining a belief. For the sake of illustration let us apply this to the belief that p, where p goes for belief that the apple is on the table. If I entertain the belief that p, I first experience the qualitative feeling that I am coming down at the fact that p, normally related to the judgment to this effect. Now I believe that the apple is on the table, not that the cat is on the table or that nothing is. I can subsequently act in accordance with this belief of mine: I can go and take the apple and eat it if I’m hungry. There is also a qualitative feeling that I have categorized the matter in question, to the effect that I talk about the apple and not about a pear. Next, the experience of mine while entertaining the belief in question is involuntary, which means that it is experienced as an objective fact that I have to count with, and not as something, say, that is the construct of my wishful thinking. I further experience the belief that p as being a cognitive reaction to the sufficient reasons for categorization, say I experience my belief that p as following my visual experience of seeing an apple upon the table. And finally, there is the qualitative feeling that I can express my belief that p in a linguistically formed affirmatory sentence, such as that the apple is on the table – which I just did.
Notice that we talk here about the phenomenology, i.e. about the qualitative or what-it’s-like experiences of mine related to my entertaining of belief, the belief that p in the just discussed case. So, while entertaining the belief that p, I have this distinctive qualitative feeling that I came down to a certain fact. I also have the what-it’s-like experience that I have just categorized the fact that p. Besides to this, I have the qualitative experiential feel that my belief was formed without my voluntary involvement, that believing that p follows cognitive reaction figuring a sufficient reason for my categorizing. And then there is this qualitative experience of myself being able to express the fact that p in the affirmatory linguistic form, as I just did when I remarked that my belief conforms to the fact that the apple is on the table.
Next, notice that all of the mentioned characteristics of the phenomenology involved into my occurrent belief are not just experienced as qualitative and proper to me. With each of them there also comes a phenomenological quality that shows its objective nature. Which means that, well, I experience each of the mentioned characteristics as something that is experienced subjectively and qualitatively by me, and that besides to this, I experience them as something coming in an objective way. I.e., my experience shows the characteristics of my qualitative beliefs to point at a certain objective reality. I thus experience phenomenologically each of the mentioned characteristics as something coming in an objective manner.
So (1) coming down at something while entertaining belief is phenomenologically experienced as something objective, quite independent from me. Similarly is (2) the categorizing role of belief experienced as objective. Objectivity is also the feeling of my phenomenological experience of (3) involuntariness while entertaining the belief, and of (4) cognitive reaction to sufficient reasons from which the belief in question follows. Finally, it is not difficult to understand that the phenomenological what-it’-like feeling coming with my perceived ability of (5) formulating my belief in affirmatory linguistic sentences is also experienced qualitatively as something objective.
These are thus some characteristics proper to the phenomenology of belief that go along with a quite simple and uncontroversial case of my belief that the apple is on the table.
Application to epistemic judgments
The next stage is application of the characteristics proper to the phenomenology of belief to epistemic judgments. For the simplicity of exposition, we may stay with the already discussed content of the belief that p. Just that now I do not just believe that the apple is on the table, but that I actually judge to know that p, i.e. that the apple is on the table.
The difference between just believing and knowing may be illustrated with the help of the following easy scenario. I have been in the kitchen and after I took a look at the situation I formed the belief that p, that the apple is on the table. Now someone asks me: “Are you sure that the apple is on the table?” And then they add the following proviso: “If the apple is on the table indeed, you will earn a big fortune. But if the apple is not on the table you will be put into jail without possibility of parole.” In such a case, I guess, you would not be just happy with your belief that p; you would rather provide yourself an assurance in the direction of your knowledge that p. You will wish and aim to form a reliable judgment as to your knowledge that p. What will you do? If you are able to do so, you will go back to the kitchen and verify the situation. After seeing and double-checking the relevant things, you will form a judgment as to your knowledge that p.
Now consider that, from one point of view, an epistemic judgment is still basically a belief, just that it is a verified and double-checked, a certain and secure belief. This is why it seems legitimate to ask about the characteristics of the phenomenology of judgment as applied to the judgment of knowledge, in its relation to the characteristics of phenomenology of the just studied case of belief. What does the phenomenology or what-it’s-like quality proper to epistemic judgments show?
First, the judgment in respect to my knowledge that p is certainly characterized by the qualitative phenomenological feeling of my experience of (1) coming down at the fact that p. I also have phenomenological experiences of (2) categorizing the fact, in an (3) involuntary manner, based on the (4) sufficient grounds of categorization for my cognitive reaction as to this matter. And of course I have this qualitative experience that I am able to (5) express my judgment of knowledge in an affirmative sentence.
If this is correct, then the phenomenological characteristics coming with my judgment to know that p are not different at all from my mere entertaining of belief that p. But cases of belief and judgment have to be different. So where does the difference reside?
In a way, knowledge that p is also a species of belief that p, just that this belief is double-checked and justified. So in a way it is to be expected that phenomenological characteristics of belief will be inherited by the phenomenological characteristics of knowledge. Just that it should also be expected that the phenomenology of knowing will exhibit a firmer commitment, a certainty, where there will be a slack of possible doubt staying in the case of belief.
Adding the qualitative feel of certainty to the phenomenological experience of characteristics (1)-(5) will thus turn doxatic quality into the epistemic qualitative experiences.
As far as the objectivity of phenomenological experiences of (1)-(5) goes, these will naturally be preserved and enhanced in the case of somebody judging to know that p. In my knowledge that p I surely entertain the qualitative feelings of (1) coming down at the fact that p with certainty, (2) categorizing it in an (3) involuntary manner as based on the (4) sufficient ground of my cognitive justified reaction, being able to (5) express p in a certain and firm way by linguistic affirmative means. I have phenomenological qualitative experiences related to each of these, just that they are enhanced by the qualitative feeing of certainty and actually of infallibility for each case, when I judge to know that p. And this goes well with the fact that epistemic judgments are objective.
Now, the content of p does not vary in the case of belief and of knowledge. So, one has to look for a difference between the mere belief and knowledge in a manner that is independent of content, by hooking the content to an independent reality in objective ways. What is the testimony of phenomenology in respect to knowledge? Knowledge narrows the area under question, and supports it by realist and independent objective means. The qualitative phenomenological what-it’s-like feeling is that there has to be some realist and belief independent additional support for knowledge. If somebody entertaining knowledge that p would be asked about it, she might express her phenomenological feeling in the following manner:
“What-it’s-like to know that p, the qualitative phenomenological feeling to know that p, distinctively shows that there has to be an objective, realist and independent of my just-belief support. I can express this by saying that it phenomenologically feels that there has to be a perceptual or other kind of causal relation here, real and objective. To know that p just qualitatively feels like there is such a relation out there.”
If this is true then the realist support for epistemic relation, in opposition to the doxatic relation, the common sense induced support for such relation, is the product of the phenomenological what-it’s-like quality coming with someone’s claim to the effect of knowledge. Arguing that there is such a realist and independent relation supporting the judgment to the effect of somebody knowing is thus the product of phenomenological feel. In fact, the requirements proper to the quality of phenomenological experiences are satisfied in the perceptual or in the causal support of justification figuring in the judgment of knowledge. If I visually perceive the cat, I objectively and realistically (1) come down at the matter in question, (2) categorizing it (3) involuntarily following the (4) cognitive reaction based upon sufficient reasons for categorization, (5) and I can express the situation by an objectively accessible affirmative sentence. A similar phenomenological experience of quality, following the above (1)-(5) is to be found in the causal underpinning of the epistemic justification of the belief that p.
Does this mean that there have to exist such realist and independent perceptual, causal, or otherwise similarly coming additional supports of belief in the case of knowledge? Perhaps they have to. This is certainly a question that was fiddled about to a sufficient extent in epistemology. What we try to stress here is the important and quite overlooked fact that the thrive to find such justificatory externalist and objective support for knowledge is a mixture of common sense and of the phenomenological what-it’s-like quality coming with judgments of knowledge. This confirms another important overlooked fact, namely that the relation of knowledge is a genuinely intentional relation (Potrč, forthcoming b), comprising phenomenology as its constitutive part. It may then be that phenomenology of epistemic judgments delivers testimony of a distinctive realist quality. But the intentional relation, at the same time, does in no way commit it self to the empirical existence of a realist relation (although it may commit itself to the realist relation). Intentional directedness and its phenomenology namely come at the scene even in the absence of the ultimate existence of the relatum.
Once as in this manner we got rid of the ultimate commitment to the empirical support of epistemic justification, we may ask about the additional data provided by phenomenology of knowing. First, there is a phenomenological what-it’s-like feeling, in the case of knowledge that p, as opposed to the case of just a mere belief that p, that there is a (A) narrowing of ground touched here. And second, this narrowing of ground for cases of knowledge succeeds in a (B) particularist and relevance providing pattern that is proper to knowledge – i.e., the phenomenology of knowing provides testimony in respect to the existence of such a pattern. Let us say something more about these.