A Mini-Course in Taiwan S Undetermined Status, and an Examination of the Implications For

A Mini-course in Taiwan’s Undetermined Status, and an Examination of the Implications for a correct “Taiwan Defense Strategy”

More and more people are viewing China’s expansionist actions in the South China Sea with alarm, and are becoming increasingly concerned about the United States being pulled into a war with China in the near future. As a result, they are urging that the United States’ policy of “strategic ambiguity” toward the defense of Taiwan needs to change sooner rather than later. To date, the officials in Washington D.C. have been consistently hesitant to commit themselves to provide Taiwan with more technologically advanced defensive weapons or to make a pledge to actively come to the island’s defense in the event of a Chinese attack. Many claim that such a posture creates much doubt and confusion in Asian governmental circles. Additionally, it encourages China to continue the pursuit of all possible defensive and offensive strategies to keep the United States out of any potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. its anti-access, area denial strategy of deploying attack submarines and ballistic missiles to deter, delay, or defeat any U.S. intervention in a cross-Strait conflict.

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On Wed., April 1, 2015, two U.S. F-18 fighters landed at Tainan Air Force Base in southern Taiwan. Pro-KMT local Chinese-language dailies in Taiwan reported that the two fighter jets took off from a U.S. base in Okinawa, some 500 miles (800 km) away, and were conducting a routine patrol above waters north of Taiwan before one of the planes encountered a mechanical problem.

Insert: U.S. Airbases in Taiwan before 1979
Chiayi Air Base, Taiwan
Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, Taiwan
Lo Shan Radar Site, Taiwan
Makung Island, Taiwan
O Laun Pi, Taiwan
Shihmen Air Station, Taiwan
ShuLinkou Air Station, Taiwan
Sung Shan Air Base, Taiwan
Tainan Air Base, Taiwan
Taipei Air Station, Taiwan
Takangshan, Taiwan
Taoyuan Air Base, Taiwan
Hsinchu Air Base, Taiwan

Commentary in some of the non-KMT media, and on many online weblogs, asked the simple question: “Why don’t the U.S. fighters stay in Taiwan, and the U.S. take charge of Taiwan’s defensive needs directly?”

Such discussions were quite active in the Taiwan media for a week or more. In the view of many members of the Taiwan populace, the issues of the United States’ announced policy of “strategic ambiguity” toward the defense of Taiwan, and what commitments should be made in that regard, cannot be settled unless a consensus is reached on which country should bear the “final responsibility” for the “national defense” needs of Taiwan.

This problem is especially acute because, as all Taiwanese are aware, the United States does not consider the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan to be a sovereign nation. Is it merely a play on words, and some sort of “semantic squabbling” to suggest that the ROC on Taiwan cannot be responsible for the “national defense” of Taiwan because it is not a nation? Or are there other arguments which carry more weight, if we want to get into a thorough discussion of this “national defense” topic, and attempt to sort out the legal and historical fundamentals?

Interestingly, topics such as the legal responsibility for the defense of Taiwan, while frequently debated in various forums on the island, are almost totally absent from discussions about Taiwan in Washington D.C. Among think tanks, academic institutions, and research organizations in the United States, dialogue on the future of Taiwan is predominately centered on two possible envisioned “future outcomes” for the island‘s development: formal independence or annexation by China.

All matters relating to Taiwan’s current legal commitments are brushed aside with the convenient rejoinder that Taiwan’s international legal status is “undecided” or “unsettled.” The presumption then appears to be that this situation can only change when Taiwan achieves a condition of (as stated above) (1) formal independence, or (2) annexation by China.

Those persons who claim to support further democratic development on the island are generally supporters of Taiwan independence one way or the other, most likely under the KMT-preferred name of Republic of China, or the local Taiwan preference of “Republic of Taiwan.” But, if such an outcome cannot be achieved, due to pressure from China, then it may well be true that some sort of “unification with the PRC regime” is the only other alternative.

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S ENVISIONED RETURN TO LEGITIMACY

Many liberal observers in North America note that in the eyes of US officialdom, the Rep. of China on Taiwan was legitimate before 1979. In the election year of 2016, and the ensuing new U.S. Presidential administration, they therefore hold the view that the ideal scenario is that thenew President will formulate a new consensus with the US Executive Branch, andundertake a reversal of the pre-2016 policy on Taiwan. In this way, the US will quickly establish (or “re-establish) formal diplomatic relations with the ROC on Taiwan. At that point, the ROC will be quickly admitted (or “re-addmitted”) to the community of nations. The islanders can then move forward with all desired changes to the current democratic structure, under the authority of the ROC Constitution, at their own pace. In summary, if all necessary moves are made for the ROCto regain its previously legitimacy, discussions of “strategic ambiguity” and Taiwan’s “undetermined legal status” can be cast aside, and the ROC government leaders can manage their nation’s future development, in all areas, in a much more effective manner.

At that point there will be no doubt in anyone’s mind that the Republic of China on Taiwan bears the final responsibility for the “national defense” needs of Taiwan.

At this juncture, it would be most desirable to debate the pros and cons of such an“REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S ENVISIONED RETURN TO LEGITIMACY” scenario. However, members of the public who have read this far in this REPORT no doubt already have a number of “entrenched views” on this topic. Direct acquiescence to and approval of such views will come as no surprise to them, since they already consider their points of view to be correct. On the other hand, direct assault or aggression against such views will quickly turn them off, and they will refuse to follow the author’s discourse and analysis any further.

Hence, at this point, we will introduce a “thought experiment,” which we have loosely adapted from a chronicle of certain events which occurred in Belgium during recent memory. Of course, the author has modified these events, and embellished them to a certain degree, to serve the purpose of this narrative. After this thought experiement, we will return to a discussion of more fundamental “legitimacy” issues for Taiwan, and examine the degrees of truth and falsity of some multiple choice questions. Although the reader may not immediately see the relevance or applicability of the situation expounded upon in the Belgian Thought Experiment to the situation in Taiwan, please bear with us, and give it some thought.

QUESTIONS OF LEGITIMACY: A BELGIAN “THOUGHT EXPERIMENT”

Let’s imagine the situation where Sabena (the national airline of Belgium from 1923 to 2001), had been allowed to continue to exist even after its bankruptcy, and to slowly expand into other areas of commercial activity in order to maintain a minimum level of income. As a result, in the present era the Sabena company officers continue to challenge thelegality, authority, and authenticityof the currently designated flag carrier, Brussels Airlines. Indeed, we could imagine that officials of the major European and world governments also have vigorous debates on this issue from time to time. Does Belgium really have two “national carriers”?
We could further hypothesize that in 2001 Sabena's original headquarters was rather hastily moved from its location in Brussels to a previously abandoned series of warehouse buildings and nearby grounds. This is near the Ursel airport, in the Belgian province of East Flanders. Of course, the company has not paid rent on the facilities for many years, although it has established its own electrical power supply, irrigation network, training center, etc.
So, we have the headquarters of Sabena in a new location, BUT WHAT IS THE POINT? Or, to put this another way –
What is being accomplished with this entire scenario?
Our answer is simple – In our thought experiment, the continuing "debate" over the designation of a Belgian national carrier (should it be Sabena? Or Brussels Airlines?), which should have been settled long ago, serves as a convenient "smokescreen" for avoiding any discussion of the crucial issues of when Sabena, a derecognized, dechartered, and essentially illegitimate airline should be formally renamed, reorganized, and its assets liquidated for the benefit of outstanding creditors and employees.

WAITING FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S RETURN TO LEGITIMACY

Due to the prevalence of this type of thinking, a large number of other important considerations and topics regarding the Republic of China in Taiwan are never discussed.

To put this another way –

What if the US State Dept’s pronouncements regarding the Republic of China on Taiwan are correct?

It is not sovereign

It is not independent

It is not qualified to join organizations whose requirements for admittance are sovereignty

It is not qualified to join the United Nations

We will call these the “five defranchisements.”

If indeed these “pronouncements” are true, then their implications need to be thoroughly examined and discussed. But, we notice that up to the present time, the Executive Branch officials are not doing this type of investigation, coordination, or any related research.

In our Belgian though experiment, it would certainly have been considered quite rash, rude, and boorish for anyone to come forward in the years after 2001 and say outright that Sebena was not a legitimate enterprise. This is despite the reality that, according to a cursory examination of the facts on the ground, it was clear that Sebena had lost all its routes, been declared bankrupt, and even that the continued legal occupancy of its current “headquarters” was extremely questionable.
In response to such charges, the top officers of Sebena would of course ceremoniously produce copies of the company charter, and other official incorporation documents, which authorized the company to begin operations on May 23, 1923. Additionally, they could bring out bound copies of all the minutes of the Board Meetings which have been held up to the present day.
Moreover, they would stress that those who pledged allegiance to the enterprise were issued ID cards, and these were considered “acceptable” by most international organizations, even those of which Sebena was no longer a formal member. This fact, it would be argued, showed that Sebena still retained a large measure of legitimacy.

xxThe Board Members (who are now predominately retired volunteers serving in these “honorary positions”) have continued the least of which is the legitimacy of the entire legal structure of the “Republic of China” in Taiwan

In relation to the Republic of China on Taiwan, the five defranchisements are not actively discussed, because, as pointed out previously, the majority of scholars are convinced that only two outcomes for the Taiwan question are possible.

No. 1, as discussed above, would be –

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S RETURN TO LEGITIMACY

No. 2, as frequently discussed in the world press, would be

THE ANNEXATION OF TAIWAN BY THE PRC

The background for this dichotomy of thinking is very simple. Most persons educated in schools in North America or Europe are pre-disposed to the democratic development of society. They view the ROC on Taiwan as being a functioning democracy, and thus would like to see it accepted as a member of the world community of nations.

Yet, there seems to be strong structural impediments to this kind of outcome. Not the least of these is the fact that the PRC is a member of the UN Security Council, and can veto any application for a new member under the name of “Taiwan,” or anything similar.

Hence, the facts on the ground may actually lead to the undesirable, yet somehow inevitable, result that Taiwan will be annexed by the PRC.

The scholars who support Taiwan developing further along the democratic path are further frustrated because they hold to the view that –

Most of the major components of the United States’ Taiwan policy are based on elaborate fictions. According to their observation and analysis, the most prominent of these is –

the“One China Policy.”

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The questions asked at the beginning of this report were –

Should Taiwan be completely combined with the United States western Pacific defensive perimeter, with the DOD assuming full responsibility for the “defensive needs” of Taiwan, both personnel and equipment?

(We disregard the issues of “budget” for the time being, since if large enough numbers of Congresspeople support such a scenario, the budget would be expected to materialize.)

Before we can give an answer to this question, we will have to examine all relevant assumptions which underlie the present arrangements for Taiwan’s defense.

Hopefully, in the course of this examination, some clear conclusion will be obtained as to whether the United States should maintain a One China Policy, or switch to a Two China Policy.

The Republic of China is commonly praised as a multi-party democracy with an established constitutional structure. The MND is a cabinet-level agency under the Executive Yuan of the Republic of China responsible for all defense affairs of Taiwan.

The MND was originally established as Ministry of War in 1912 at the creation of the Republic of China. It was changed to the Ministry of National Defense in 1946.

In the United States the organization of the DOD is specified in ______, under the overall authority of the US Constitution.
The Constitution was formulated in the following manner:

Hence, in order to gain a better understanding of the organizational premises and authority for the functioning of the MND, we can overview its organizational parameters.

The Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China, specifies as follows:

Article 1The Executive Yuan shall establish the Ministry of National Defense (“MND”) to administer the nation’s defense.

The Organization Act of the Executive Yuan of the Republic of China stipulates as follows:

Article 1The Act is established in accordance with Article 61 of the Constitution.

The relevant Article of the Republic of China Constitution is as follows:

Article 61The organization of the Executive Yuan shall be prescribed by law.

The following additional Articles are relevant to discussing the geographical scope of application of the ROCConstitution as well as the implementation of military conscription policies over the “local populace.”

Article 3Persons possessing the nationality of the Republic of China shall be citizens of the Republic of China.

Article 4The territory of the Republic of China according to its existing national boundaries shall not be altered except by resolution of the National Assembly.

About MND http://www.mnd.gov.tw/English/Publish.aspx?cnid=39&p=725

Based on this brief legal investigation, we see that the authority for the establishment of the ROC’s Ministry of National Defense must be traced back to the authority of the ROC Constitution, which is currently used in the Taiwan area.

The Legitimacy of the Republic of China Constitution in Taiwan

In regard to Taiwan, the most recent “Country Report on Human Rights Practices” by the U.S. State Dept. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor mentions the word constitution twelve times, but does not discuss the issue of how the ROC Constitution came to be regarded as the organic law of Taiwan.

Historical Notes: As we know, Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895, and became a part of the Japanese Empire. After many years of fighting, the Japanese were defeated in WWII in the Pacific. The San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) came into force in late April 1952.In the treaty, Japan renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan.

()____?____ 1945.10.25 ()____?____ 1952.04.28 ()____?____

(A)The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China was drawn up in March 1912 and formed the basic government document of the Republic of China until 1928. The Taiwanese were considered ethnically Chinese, hence Sun Yat-sen and other Chinese leaders considered Taiwan to be a part of the mother country. Taiwan was therefore specifically mentioned as being part of the geographical scope covered by this Constitution.

[ No, part of Japan, In 1935, delegates from the Rep. of China visited Taiwan to participate in the celebrations marking the 40th Anniversary of Japanese rule. ] Argument: ethnically Chinese so-called irredentism

(B) The Nationalist Government under Chiang Kai-shek promulgated the Provisional Constitution of the Political Tutelage Period in 1931, effective for all of China, and providing for a one-party system with supreme power held by the National Congress of the Kuomintang. Taiwan, having been ceded to Japan in (what was regarded as) an “unequal treaty” in 1895, was still considered by Sun Yat-sen and other Chinese leaders as part of China’s national territory, was included within territory of “China” as specified in this Constitution.