A List of Some Main Issues in Moral Theory

A LIST OF SOME MAIN ISSUES IN MORAL THEORY

The following is an incomplete list of some main issues in moral theory. The first half of our first class will be devoted discussing big picture issues in moral theory in general. The point of the discussion is simply to give you a chance ask general questions about areas of moral theory with which you are not familiar. I will have no agenda. We’ll simply discuss the questions that students raise. (The second half of the first class will be devoted background issues specifically related to the topic of our course.)

1.Normativity

A normative viewpoint is one that classifies actions, etc. in terms of their permissibility (e.g., optional, obligatory, or impermissible) or in terms of their goodness (e.g., good, neutral, or bad). Normative viewpoints are concerned with how things should be, and not necessarily with how things are. There are many normative viewpoints: moral, prudential, legal, etiquette, club rules, etc.

Descriptive vs. Critical Normativity: The descriptive norms (moral, prudential, etc.) of a given individual or society consists of the norms reflected in the verbal and other behavior of that individual or society. It is an empirical matter and is part of what social science studies. The descriptive norms of a given individual or society (e.g., of Nazis) may be deeply defective. Critical normativity is not merely descriptive matter. It concerns the correct norms, and thus provides a basis for criticizing the prevailing descriptive norms of a given individual or society. We will be concerned with critical normativity.

Some main perspectives of critical normativity include morality, prudence (rational self-interest), and epistemic rationality (as opposed to club rules, etiquette, or the laws). How is morality distinguished from the other perspectives? There is no crisp answer, but here is a start: Morality is a normative viewpoint the concern of which is to impartially protect and/or promote the basic interests of all individuals. (Prudence is only concerned with the interests of the agent. Epistemic rationality is only concerned with a very specific set of interests.)

2.Metaethics:

What is the ontological nature of morality? How, if at all, do we have knowledge of morality? What are the semantics of our moral utterances/beliefs?

Semantics:

Non-cognitivism: Moral utterances do not express propositions. They express pro/con attitudes.

Naturalism: Moral utterances express propositions that have natural (e.g., empirical) truth conditions.

Non-Naturalism: Moral utterances express propositions that have non-natural truth conditions.

(These can be recast as positions about moral judgment as well.)

Metaphysics:

Moral realism (one version): There are true moral (natural or non-natural) propositions that have objective (mind-independent) truth conditions.

Moral constructivism (one version): There are true moral natural propositions that have mind-dependent truth conditions.

Moral nihilism: There are no true moral propositions.

Error theory (non-naturalism plus nihilism): Our moral utterancesexpress non-natural propositions, but they are all false (since there is not non-natural moral order).

3.Justification of moral judgments

Particularism: Only particular moral judgments (about specific cases) have justificatory force. General principles merely summarize and extend (where incomplete) these judgments. Note that particularism allows that the justificatory force of one particular judgment one might change after reflecting on another particular judgment.

Principlism (Generalism): Only judgments about general moral principles have justificatory force. Particular judgments are merely derived from these and empirical judgments.

Method of Reflective Equilibrium (an important method for justifying moral claims): We start with intuitions about the plausibility of both general moral principles and about moral judgments in particular cases. We gather more information and reflect upon our views. Given our background views, the totality is not consistent. Our views are almost always based on false assumptions, confused notions, and unforeseen implications. We then revise based on “minimum mutilation” (to plausibility) towards an equilibrium based on information and reflection (in which our background views, abstract moral views, and concrete moral views cohere). Sometimes this involves abandoning or revising an abstract view and sometimes modification of a concrete view. Each kind of view has some independent justificatory force (neither is merely derivative).

Particularistic Reflective Equilibrium: Particular judgments are deemed especially plausible relative to general judgments.

Principlist Reflective Equilibrium: Judgments about general moral principles are deemed especially plausible relative to particular judgments.

The method of reflective equilibrium can be understood merely as a useful methodology (and thus compatible with moral realism) or as constitutive of morality (and thus a form of moral constructivism).

4.The Role of Principles in Moral Theory

Pro tanto (prima facie) principles: These principles apply but can be outweighed or overridden, in a particular case, by other pro tanto principles. For example, there may be a pro tanto principle that killing innocent people is wrong, but it may, in a particular case, be overridden by the pro tanto principle that one is required to save a thousand people from death. It is only when all pro tanto principles are taken into account that one gets a conclusive judgment of permissibility in a particular case.

Conclusive principles: These principles apply conclusively whenever they apply. Thus, if there is a conclusive principle that killing innocent people is wrong, then, it is always wrong to kill innocent people.

Those who advocate pro tanto principles claim that there is no way of specifying with complete generality how the various pro tanto fit together (what outweighs what). Particularists claim that this is so as a matter of moral reality, but some may claim this merely as a matter of moral methodology or moral epistemology.

Those who advocate conclusive principles claim that pro tanto principles are merely implicitly highly qualified conclusive principles that, in principle, can be specified.

5.Normative Ethics and Political Morality

Two basic moral questions:

(1) What are the criteria for moral goodness (or betterness)?

(2) What are the criteria for moral permissibility (wrong = impermissible, optional = permissible and permissible not to, obligatory = permissible and not permissible not to)?

Entities that can be morally assessed: states of affairs, characters, actions, practices, rules, laws, constitutions.

Ethics is morality applied to individual conduct. Political morality is (something like) morality applied to the use of force (typically by the state).

Justice vs. moral permissibility: Justice is understood in many different ways, but two useful understandingsare (1) as interpersonal morality (the duties that we owe each other; excludes impersonal duties), and (2) as our enforceable duties (duties that someone is morally permitted to enforce).

Some theories of ethics or political morality: (1) Divine Command Theory, (2) Libertarianism, (3) Consequentialist (utilitarianism, prioritarianism, sufficientarianism, egalitarianism, desertism), (4) Contractarian (Hobbesian (e.g., Gauthier), Lockean, Kantian (e.g., Rawls and Scanlon), (5) Kantianism

Many of these theories can take a direct form and an indirect form. The direct form assesses actions direction in terms of the criterion (e.g., maximizes total wellbeing). The indirect form assesses actions on the basis of whether they comply with the set of rules that satisfies the criterion.

6.Assessing the person vs. assessing the action

Assessing character: A morally virtuous person is (roughly) a person whose character is morally desirable. A virtuous person who is not perfectly virtuous may occasionally perform actions that are morally impermissible.

A person’s choice (action) may be morally blameworthy even if it is morally permissible. For example, someone may kill another, believing her to be innocent, in order to steal her money. In fact, the other may be a horrible criminal about to commit another horrendous crime. The action may be morally permissible (because of its good effects), but the person may be blameworthy for her choice, given that she believed that she was wrongly killing an innocent.

A person’s choice (action) may be morally blameless even if it is morally impermissible. For example, someone may kill another, believing her to be a horrible criminal about to commit another horrendous crime. In fact, the other may be fully innocent. The choice may be morally blameless if the agent could not have known that the person was not a criminal about to commit another horrendous crime.

7.Some deontological distinctions

Deontologists (non-consequentialists) claim that moral constraints on action are highly sensitiveto one or more of the following distinctions.

Do (Bring About) vs. Allow: One does something, or brings about a result, very roughly speaking, when the result would not have come about had one “done nothing”. Thus one kills, or brings about his death, when one pushes a baby into shallow pond, but one merely allows his death, if one stands by and offers no help. Many deontologists believe that the moral constraint against harming (bringing about harm) is much stronger than that against merely allowing harm. (A refined analysis would distinguish between (1) doing something that initiates a causal process [the clear case of bringing about], (2) doing something that withdraws protection from an independent threat, and (3) doing something that redirects an independent threat. See Do/Allow and Intend/Foresee handout.)

Intend (as end or as means) vs. Merely Foresee: One intends a result as an end just in case one is aiming at the result for its own sake (e.g., to aim to kill you because I want you dead). One intends a result as a means just in case (very roughly) one is aiming at the result as way of achieving some further end (e.g., I aim to kill you as way of stopping you from killing me). One merely foresees a result if one does not intend it but is aware that it will accompany something one does aim at (e.g., I merely foresee that blood will be on the floor when I kill you; I am not aiming at this).

8.Exemptions, Justifications, and Excuses

An exemption is something that establishes that the individual did not exercise sufficiently autonomous choice for there to be moral (or legal) assessment of the permissibility of an action (e.g., because of age, insanity, being pushed or wind-blown, or temporary loss of autonomy).

A justification is, roughly, something that makes an otherwise impermissible action permissible. An undercutting justification nullifies an otherwise sufficient condition for impermissibility (e.g., the wrongness of killing another may be undercut when suitably done in self-defense). An overriding justification does not nullify the sufficient condition for impermissibility. Instead, it leaves it in place but outweigh is (e.g., wrongness of killing another may be overridden when necessary to save a million people).

An excuse reduces the blameworthiness of an action that is impermissible. (It is mitigating if only partial and exonerating if full.) There are three main kinds of considerations that can reduce (and sometimes eliminate) blameworthiness for acting wrong:

(1) reduced but not eliminated autonomous agency (reduced rationality): (e.g., because of age, cognitive impairment, intoxication, panic, or inner compulsion [e.g., almost irresistible impulses]);

(2) external compulsion (which make it rationally difficult to do otherwise): duress (i.e., threat of wrongful harm; coercion), provocation, necessity (lack of acceptable alternative due to dire natural circumstances);

(3) mistaken beliefs and ignorance (epistemic limitations on what the agent could have known).

Complete absence of autonomous agency is an exemption and entails that the behavior is not subject to moral evaluation. In particular, it is neither permissible nor impermissible. Thus, complete absence of autonomous agency is not an excuse (since excuses apply to impermissible actions). Thus, reduced autonomous agency functions as an excuse only when it is not too large (leaves enough autonomous agency for the action to be impermissible).

Note that duress and necessity function as justifications (rather than excuses) when the moral value of the consequences of doing otherwise is sufficiently bad (e.g., hit the child or I’ll kill a million people). They function as excuses when the moral value of the consequences of doing otherwise are not sufficiently bad to provide a justification, but the value for the agent of doing otherwise is sufficiently bad (making it difficult for her to do otherwise).

A defense in the narrow sense (e.g., insanity defense) establishes that the act was not impermissible. It is either a justification (establishing that act was permissible; e.g., killing in self-defense) or establishes lack of sufficient autonomous agency (establishing that act was neither permissible nor impermissible; e.g., insanity defense).

Defense in broad sense: establishes that the agent was not agent-responsible for acting wrongly (includes full excuses, justifications, and lack of autonomous agency).

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