3
Submission for the 32nd Annual International Hume Society Conference
University of Toronto
Toronto, Canada
19-23 July 2005
ABSTRACT
In Defense of a “Natural-Belief” Interpretation of Dialogues 12: A Reply to Richard Dees
In a recent study of Hume’s philosophy of religion,[1] Richard Dees argues that Philo’s apparent profession of belief in some version of the design argument in part 12 of the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion is best understood as Philo’s attempt to preserve his friendship with Cleanthes. Dees claims that his interpretation, which he labels “morality above metaphysics,” is preferable to its two main alternatives. One alternative is the interpretation according to which Philo’s apparent profession of belief in an intelligent designer of the universe is disingenuous, and is simply a prudential device intended to keep Hume clear of charges of religious infidelity. The other alternative is the interpretation according to which Philo’s remarks are in fact sincere, and suggest that Hume regards belief in an intelligent designer as what commentators term a “natural belief” – a belief based on a “permanent, irresistible, and universal” principle of belief formation, such as those that generate our beliefs in causation and external bodies.
In my paper I begin by raising two objections to Dees’ view. I conclude by defending the view, rejected by Dees, according to which Philo’s apparent profession of belief in some version of the design argument in part 12 should be taken at face value, and suggests that Hume thinks that belief in an intelligent designer ranks among what may be called natural beliefs. And I argue that Dees’ rejection of such an interpretation stems both from his conflating principles of natural belief formation with the beliefs they generate, and his misunderstanding what Hume takes to be the role that so-called natural beliefs play in common life.
In Defense of a Natural-Belief Interpretation of Dialogues 12: A Reply to Richard Dees
In a recent issue of Hume Studies,[1] Richard Dees argues that Philo’s apparent confession of belief in some version of the design argument in part 12 of the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion[2] is best understood as Philo’s attempt to preserve his friendship with Cleanthes. According to Dees, Philo recognizes that the duties of friendship are an important part of the Humean morality that both he and Cleanthes share, and Philo’s apparent confession of belief in an intelligent designer of the universe is meant to repair the damage caused to their friendship by the objections to the design argument that Philo had raised in parts 2-11. Dees maintains, moreover, that it is only after Philo offends Demea at the close of part 11 that Philo realizes his friendship with Cleanthes might be at risk. As Dees puts it:
Philo backs away from his hard-hitting arguments in the earlier parts of the Dialogues because [after he offends Demea at the close of part 11] he realizes that his enthusiasm for those arguments could seriously damage his relationship with his good friend, Cleanthes. By de-emphasizing his differences with Cleanthes in declaring that the argument from design is partially correct and in declaring the dispute to be merely verbal, Philo hopes to repair the potential damage he has done in his relationship with Cleanthes. (144)
Dees argues that his interpretation, which he labels “morality above metaphysics,” has two distinct advantages. First, he claims that it allows us “to explain why Philo suddenly seems to reverse his position, without supposing that he has retracted his previous objections” to the design argument. Second, he holds that his interpretation enables us “to explain Philo’s apparent reversal within the literary context of the Dialogues themselves” (140). Dees claims, furthermore, that his interpretation of part 12 is preferable to its two main alternatives. One alternative is the interpretation according to which Philo’s apparent confession of belief in an intelligent designer is disingenuous, and is simply a prudential device intended to keep Hume clear of charges of religious infidelity.[3] The other alternative is the interpretation according to which Philo’s remarks are in fact sincere, and suggest that Hume regards belief in an intelligent designer as what commentators term a “natural belief” – a belief based on a “permanent, irresistible, and universal” principle of belief formation, such as those that generate our beliefs in causation and external bodies.[4]
In this paper I begin by raising two objections to Dees’ view. First, I argue that Dees is wrong to claim that Philo “suddenly seems to reverse his position” when he apparently assents to the design argument in part 12. Indeed, it is inconsistent with the text to suppose that Philo’s reversal is as sudden as Dees suggests. Second, and related to the previous objection, I argue that though Dees insists that his interpretation is based on close attention to the conversational context of the Dialogues, he fails to see that close attention to the conversational context of the Dialogues in fact undermines his interpretation. I conclude by defending the view, rejected by Dees, according to which Philo’s apparent confession of belief in some version of the design argument in part 12 should be taken at face value, and suggests that Hume thinks that belief in an intelligent designer of the universe ranks among what may be called natural beliefs. And I argue that Dees’ rejection of such an interpretation stems both from his conflating principles of natural belief formation with the beliefs they generate, and his misunderstanding what Hume takes to be the role that so-called natural beliefs play in common life.
A Sudden Reversal?
Dees takes for granted that in part 12 of the Dialogues, Philo seems abruptly to reverse his position with respect to the design argument. As Dees puts it:
In part 12…Philo famously appears to reverse his course. After slicing the Argument from Design into small pieces throughout most of the first eleven parts of the Dialogues, he suddenly seems to endorse a version of it. (131)
Now, Dees’ calling Philo’s apparent reversal in part 12 “sudden” makes it sound as though Philo’s profession of belief in an intelligent designer is found only in part 12; it makes it sound as though Philo’s apparent concession is not anticipated by similar remarks that he makes in any of the first eleven parts of the Dialogues. After all, this apparent reversal could not properly be termed “sudden” were it anticipated by similar professions of belief earlier in the Dialogues. Having assumed that Philo’s concession in part 12 is an isolated occurrence, Dees then sets as his task explaining this supposedly sudden change in Philo’s position. But Dees is mistaken, I think, in proceeding as if Philo’s apparent reversal in part 12 is an anomalous remark in need of explanation. This is because, as numerous commentators have pointed out, Philo’s reversal there is not this sudden.[5] Instead, far from being an anomalous remark, Philo’s apparent endorsement of a version of the design argument in part 12 is anticipated by two similar remarks that he makes in part 10.[6] First, Philo tells Cleanthes:
You ascribe…(and I believe justly) a purpose and intention to nature. (DNR 10.26; 63)
Second, he closes part 10 with these remarks:
Formerly, when we argued concerning the natural attributes of intelligence and design, I needed all of my metaphysical subtilty to elude your grasp. In many views of the universe and its parts, the beauty and fitness of final causes strike us with such irresistible force that all objections appear (what I believe they really are) mere cavils and sophisms; nor can we then imagine how it was ever possible for us to repose any weight upon them. (DNR 10.36; 66)
Dees makes no mention of these earlier apparent concessions that Philo makes to the design argument. And this neglect of these earlier apparent concessions leads him, I think, to offer an erroneous account of the motivation for Philo’s apparent concession in part 12. To see why, let us reconsider what Dees takes to be the conversational context in which Philo’s concession in part 12 occurs.
The Conversational Context Reconsidered
Dees regards his interpretation as noteworthy for its sensitivity to the conversational context in which Philo’s apparent concession in part 12 is made. Yet Dees’ failure to acknowledge either of Philo’s earlier apparent concessions to the design argument in part 10 belies his claim that his interpretation is sufficiently sensitive to the conversational context in which Philo’s apparent reversal in part 12 takes place. Close attention to the conversational context ought to require acknowledgement of Philo’s earlier apparent concessions in part 10. Now, perhaps Dees thinks that Philo’s concessions in part 10 are in some important respect different from his concession in part 12. There does not, however, seem to be any relevant difference between the concessions of part 10 and part 12. At the very least, Dees would seem to owe us an explanation for why Philo’s earlier apparent concessions may be justifiably ignored.
Of course, treating as unique Philo’s apparent concession in part 12 eases Dees’ task of advancing his interpretation; indeed, it is essential to his interpretation that he do so. This is because Dees’ interpretation hinges on the claim that it is only after Philo has offended Demea at the close of part 11 that Philo realizes that his earlier criticisms of the design argument could damage his friendship with Cleanthes. This realization, according to Dees, prompts Philo to affirm his belief in some version of the design argument, in an attempt to repair the damage he may have done to his friendship with Cleanthes. As Dees puts it,
Philo’s apparent concession follows the dramatic height of the Dialogues, in which one of the participants has been so offended by Philo that he feels he must leave the conversation. (134)
He adds:
Thus, the context of [the] concession is that Philo has violated the standards of morality that he fervently hopes to support. As such, he needs to make amends for his behavior, and he needs to repair the tear in his friendship with Cleanthes…. For that reason…he professes to believe a version of the design argument. (137)
It is important to understand the significance of these passages for Dees’ interpretation. Dees holds that prior to his offending Demea at the close of part 11, Philo is unaware that his hard-hitting criticisms of the design argument might endanger his friendship with Cleanthes. This means that if Dees’ interpretation is correct, Philo’s motivation for conceding belief in the design argument in part 10 cannot be his realizing that his attacks on the design argument have put at risk his friendship with Cleanthes. But unless we hold, implausibly, that Philo’s apparent concessions in part 10 can simply be ignored, we are left with the task of accounting for them.
Of course, one might attempt to defend Dees’ interpretation of Philo’s apparent concession in part 12 by arguing that Philo’s apparent concessions in part 10 are mere irony, intended to keep Hume clear of charges of religious infidelity, while his apparent concession in part 12 is, as Dees suggests, meant to repair the tear to his friendship with Cleanthes -- a tear he has recognized only after the close of part 11. It is my contention, however, that Dees’ own conception of interpretative propriety renders this view unacceptable. To see why, it is important to note that Dees regards his interpretation as an improvement over the interpretation according to which Philo’s apparent concession in part 12 is simply a prudential device intended to keep Hume clear of charges of religious infidelity. Dees argues that such a view, which may be called the “ironical interpretation,” contains two shortcomings. First, he claims that its proponents are left with the burden of explaining “what exactly Hume feared once he had decided to publish the [Dialogues] posthumously” (132).[7] Second, such an interpretation commits what Dees regards as the sin of relying “on motivations outside the Dialogues to explain Philo’s claims, and so it concedes that the reversal does not fit within the dramatic logic of the work” (132).
According to Dees, his “morality above metaphysics” interpretation, by contrast, escapes the difficulties that he thinks attend the ironical interpretation. Thus, in contradistinction to the ironical interpretation, Dees claims that, on his view,
Philo himself has good reason to say what he does [in part 12]. So, we do not need to suppose that Hume puts these views into Philo’s mouth merely to quiet the criticisms that might be lodged against the Dialogues. We only need to suppose that Philo wants to maintain his friendship with Cleanthes and that the demands of Philo’s friendship – and not of Hume’s prudence – require a respectful silence about their continuing points of disagreement. (140)
Now, given that Dees sees his interpretation of Philo’s apparent reversal in part 12 as superior to an ironical interpretation, it would seem that he would want to account for Philo’s apparent reversals in part 10 in the same non-ironical way. Yet, as I noted above, Dees’ own insistence on Philo’s insensitivity prior to the close of part 11 precludes such a non-ironical explanation of Philo’s apparent concessions in part 10. Dees is left, then, with what he would have to regard as the unacceptable alternative of supposing that Philo’s apparent concessions in part 10 are ironical, while those in part 12 are motivated by his desire to preserve his friendship with Cleanthes.
I say that this interpretation would be unacceptable to Dees for two reasons. First, because it posits two different explanations for similar remarks, it seems to violate a general principle of interpretative consistency, according to which similar remarks warrant similar explanations. Second, given Dees’ antipathy to the ironical interpretation, he would seem to be committed to avoiding explaining any of Philo’s apparent confessions – whether they occur in part 10 or part 12 – by appeal to irony.