A chemical weapons atlas

ByE. J. Hogendoorn
September/October 1997 pp. 35-39 (vol. 53, no. 05)© 1997 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Few states admit that they possess chemical weapons. In recent years, only the United States, Russia, Iraq, and now India, have done so. The United States, which has started to destroy its chemical weapons, has a stockpile of about 30,000 tons. Russia has declared 40,000 tons. Iraq, which acknowledged after the Gulf War that it had such weapons, claims that its chemical agents and munitions were destroyed during and after the war. India recently admitted to having chemical weapons, but only for "defensive" purposes.

In any event, four nations make a short list indeed. And now that the Chemical Weapons Convention has entered into force, many people believe that the struggle to banish lethal chemical munitions has been won. But it is too early to celebrate.

Developing and dealing in chemical weapons has always been a back-alley business that nations have mainly conducted in secret. And it could continue in much the same way, unless members of the international community are willing to speak up in public about chemical-weapons activities.

Yet states largely refuse to do so. Even the new Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (which is implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention) keeps the mandatory declarations of past and present chemical weapons activities confidential.

Such secrecy, however, is misguided, because it keeps the public ignorant of the true extent of the proliferation problem and allows states that have or are developing chemical weapons to continue to manufacture and stockpile them.

In the United States, the discussion of the proliferation of chemical weapons is highly politicized. Typically, U.S. officials will only point their fingers at the current list of "rogue nations." For instance, in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence last February, CIA Director George Tenet said that some 20 countries, among them Iran, Iraq, and Syria, have or are actively developing chemical and biological weapons. By identifying only three states by name, Tenet chose, or was directed, to name one less state than his predecessor John Deutch had named the year before. He omitted North Korea. This omission is particularly troubling in light of the testimony--at the same Senate hearing--by the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lt. Gen. Patrick Hughes, that "a Korean war scenario remains our primary near-term military concern."

The public deserves to be fully informed about the proliferation of chemical weapons and should have the same on-the-record information U.S. policy makers use. Chemical weapons threaten not only soldiers, who may have protective gear, but also civilians.

Consider what happened when the United States failed to respond to Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the early 1980s. Recently declassified intelligence reports indicate that the United States knew by 1983 that Iraq had--and had used--lethal agents. It also knew that, with the help of foreign firms, Iraq was building a major new chemical weapons facility. Yet the United States and its allies continued to support Iraq with loans and other forms of assistance. Unrestrained, Iraq used chemical weapons repeatedly during the Iraq-Iran War. Later, it attacked Kurdish villagers in northern Iraq with mustard and nerve gas.

The failure of the international community to condemn Iraq for using chemical weapons and the failure to control the trade in chemicals had other unforeseen consequences. As a Defense Department report indicates, Iran initiated a chemical warfare program "in response to Iraq's use of mustard gas against Iranian troops." And, partially as a result of the U.S. government's earlier silence, American troops faced the prospect of Iraq's chemical and biological arsenal in the Gulf War.

This also encouraged other governments to believe they would not be censured if they initiated chemical weapons programs. As a 1992 DIA report concludes, Third World countries believed they were free to stockpile chemical weapons "without the fear of repercussions from the international community."

Perhaps this attitude will change as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons does its work, but the process might be speeded up if the U.S. government disclosed what it knows about chemical weapons activities throughout the world.

Meanwhile, how much can be known without more government disclosure? Through official documents released under the Freedom of Information Act and press reports citing U.S. government officials, it is possible to identify most of the states suspected of trading in or manufacturing chemical weapons.

There are two caveats about using these sources: Intelligence reports often characterize a state as having a "chemical warfare capability" without indicating whether that state is developing weapons or already has a stockpile of chemical munitions. Then, too, it is difficult or impossible to verify U.S. intelligence reports independently. Nonetheless, they are on-the-record assessments that U.S. policy makers use and often share with NATO partners and other allies.

The Middle East

The Middle East and North Africa are enmeshed in a destabilizing arms race. Here the belief that one state possessed weapons of mass destruction prompted another to establish its own program, which led to another state acquiring chemical weapons, that led another state, and so on.

The race has gone on in earnest since the 1960s, and currently more than half of the states in the region have, or are suspected of having, offensive chemical weapons.

Egypt. According to a Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Implications on Soviet Use of Chemical and Toxin Weapons for U.S. Security Interests," a 1983 report representing the judgment of the CIA, the DIA, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence arms of the State and Treasury Departments, Egypt was "the first country in the Middle East to obtain chemical weapons training, indoctrination, and matériel." (Egypt may or may not have been motivated by Israel's construction of the Dimona nuclear reactor in 1958.)

Egypt was also the first Middle Eastern country to use chemical weapons. It employed phosgene and mustard agent against Yemeni Royalist forces in the mid-1960s, and some reports claim that it also used an organophosphate nerve agent.

A 1990 DIA study, "Offensive Chemical Warfare Programs in the Middle East," concluded that Egypt was continuing to conduct research related to chemical agents. The report identified a production facility, but details were deleted.

Israel. According to the same DIA study, Israel developed its own offensive chemical weapons program in response to a perceived Arab chemical-weapon threat. In 1974, Lt. Gen. E. H. Almquist told a Senate Armed Forces Committee that the Israeli program was operational. The 1990 DIA study reports that Israel maintains a chemical warfare testing facility. Newspaper reports suggest the facility is in the Negev desert.

Syria. Syria began developing chemical weapons in the 1970s, in response to the Israeli threat, according to a 1993 DIA report, "Chemical Warfare Assessments Syria." The 1990 DIA survey reports that Syria received chemical weapons from Egypt in the 1970s, and indigenous production began in the 1980s.

Today, Syria is believed to have a large stockpile of chemical munitions. It allegedly has two means of delivery: a 500-kilogram aerial bomb, and chemical warheads for Scud-B missiles. The 1990 DIA report named two chemical munitions storage depots, at Khan Abu Shamat and Furqlus, and indicated that the Centre D'Etude et Recherche Scientifique, near Damascus, was the primary research facility. Recent newspaper articles, citing U.S. reconnaissance, report that Syria is building a new chemical-weapons factory near the city of Aleppo.

Iran. According to the 1990 DIA report, Iran's program was developed in response to the Iraqi use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. The DIA concluded that by the end of the war the Iranian military had been able to field mustard and phosgene, although it reportedly used them in limited quantities only.

The same report stated that Iran had artillery shells and bombs filled with chemical agents. A 1992 DIA report, "Weapons Acquisition Strategy Iran," added that Iran was developing ballistic missiles with the assistance of China and North Korea, both of which are reported to have chemical-agent warheads for their surface-to-surface missiles.

Iraq. Since the end of the Gulf War, U.N. specialists have destroyed more than 480,000 litres of Iraq's chemical agents and 1.8 million litres of precursor chemicals. But this may not be the full extent of that country's large and sophisticated chemical weapons program. Iraq is believed to have a number of secret depots where agents or precursors are stored.

Rolf Ekeus, the former head of the U.N. Special Commission charged with eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, said in a June 24 interview with the New York Times that he doubts the entire stockpile has been found. Iraq has made repeated attempts to import proscribed equipment and attempted to hide chemicals, munitions, and equipment from U.N. inspectors. "We have documentary evidence about orders from the leadership to preserve a strategic capability," Ekeus said. He believes that Iraq wants "to keep the production equipment ready to produce at any given moment." A 1995 DIA assessment concluded that Iraq was still conducting research and development.

Libya. According to a publicly released Defense Department survey, "Proliferation: Threat and Response," Libya obtained its first chemical agents from Iran, using them against Chad in 1987.

Libya opened its own production facility in Rabta in 1988. The report concludes that the Rabta facility may have produced as much as 100 tons of blister and nerve agent before a suspicious fire closed it down in 1990. Many newspaper reports, citing U.S. intelligence sources, indicate that Libya is building a second facility in an underground location at Tarhunah.

Saudi Arabia. U.S. analysts suspect that Saudi Arabia has a limited chemical warfare capability in part because it acquired 50 CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China. These highly inaccurate missiles are thought to be suitable only for delivering chemical agents.

The sections on Saudi Arabia in the declassified portions of the 1992 and 1993 editions of the DIA's annual assessment of weapons of mass destruction (prepared for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence) are heavily deleted. In addition, Gulf War-related documents recently released by the Defense Department indicate that the United States suspected at that time that Saudi Arabia had chemical agents.

Asia

There are many chemical-weapon suspects in Asia. China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Taiwan appear to have developed chemical weapons in response to regional tensions. Burma, on the other hand, apparently wanted chemical weapons for domestic use.

North Korea. North Korea's chemical weapons stockpile is probably the largest in the region. According to a 1995 DIA assessment, "Worldwide Chemical Warfare Threat Current and Projected," North Korea has had a chemical weapons program since the 1960s. The 1996 Defense Department survey concludes that North Korea can produce "large quantities" of blister, blood, and nerve agents.

North Korea could deliver these agents by artillery, rocket launcher, mortar, and spray tank. The Defense Department notes that the North Korean military has been trained to operate in a chemical environment and North Korean civilians have been trained in chemical defense.

South Korea. South Korea is also suspected by U.S. intelligence of having chemical weapons. South Korea has the chemical infrastructure and technical capability to produce chemical agents, and newspaper reports from the late 1980s cite U.S. government sources claiming that South Korea had a chemical weapons program. A 1986 U.S. Army Scientific and Technical Intelligence Bulletin, "Expanding Chemical Warfare Capability: A Cause for Concern," included a heavily edited section on South Korea. South Korea is regularly included in the annual DIA assessments of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but details are deleted. (U.S. chemical munitions may also be stockpiled in South Korea.)

India. According to a 1991 DIA assessment, India has the technical capability and industrial base needed to produce precursors and chemical agents, and it is expected to acquire chemical weapons over the next two decades. Development is expected to be "paced by the parallel Pakistani program." As required of a party to the chemical weapons treaty, India admitted this year that it had produced and stockpiled chemical munitions for "defensive purposes."

Several Indian companies have been implicated in highly suspicious chemicals shipments and are involved in the construction of chemical plants in states that are developing chemical weapons. The United States has sanctioned some Indian companies for these activities.

Pakistan. The 1996 Defense Department report indicates that Pakistan can produce chemical agents and munitions with dual-use chemical precursors procured from foreign sources. Its goal now is to achieve self-sufficiency in producing precursors. According to a 1993 DIA report, "Weapons Acquisition Strategy Pakistan," Pakistan has artillery projectiles and rockets that can be made chemical-capable.

China. China has a mature chemical warfare capability, according to the 1996 Defense Department report on proliferation. Given China's advanced technical know-how, it must also be assumed that China can field its chemical agents in a wide variety of munitions, including ballistic missiles. China is also a serious proliferation concern, and a number of Chinese companies and individuals have been sanctioned by the U.S. government for their proliferation activities.

Taiwan. The 1983 Special National Intelligence Estimate, cited in the Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, reported that Taiwan had "an aggressive high-priority program to develop both offensive and defensive capabilities"--but that information was deleted from the declassified version. In 1988, the director of naval intelligence told a congressional committee that Taiwan was developing a chemical weapons capability, and in 1989, he reported that it may be operational.

Burma. Another Asian state thought to produce chemical weapons is Burma (Myanmar). Its program, under development in 1983, may or may not be active today. U.S. officials told Congress in 1988 and 1991 that Burma was developing or had developed chemical weapons. According to the 1992 DIA survey produced for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Burma has "chemical weapons and artillery for delivering chemical agents." On the other hand, the 1993 edition of the DIA report indicates that Burma is no longer developing chemical weapons. There have been many reports that Burma used chemical agents against insurgents.