THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF MALADAPTIVE COGNITIONS: PART 1.
A HEDONIC HOMEOSTATIC MODEL OF MALADAPTIVE BEHAVIOUR AND COGNITION
MERCURIO CICCHINI
1986 a
SUMMARY
An aetiological theory of maladaptive cognitions and behaviour is presented which highlights the role of hedonic affective processes in normal and dysfunctional adaptation. The paper traces the affective consequences of psychological need-frustration during childhood development and introduces the concept of negative affective suppositions. These are dual-component (affective/cognitive) structures arising from need-frustration or other affect-producing trauma which persist over time and which can be re-activated by environmental or covert stimuli. The content and motivational effects of negative affective suppositions are viewed as the building blocks of other psychological phenomena. These structures and their contents have predictable effects on motivation and perception hence they make comprehensible a variety of clinical phenomena including maladaptive cognitions, personality traits, and anti-social acting out. The interconnectedness of affect, cognition and behaviour in human motivation is emphasised.
THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF MALADAPTIVE COGNITIONS: PART 1.
A HEDONIC HOMEOSTATIC MODEL OF MALADAPTIVE BEHAVIOUR AND COGNITION
MERCURIO CICCHINI
Recent cognitive theories (eg. Ellis, 1962; Beck, 1967; 1974), have played a significant part in drawing attention to the phenomenological world of thought in clients seeking therapy. These theories have emphasized cognitive factors in the manifestation of emotional and behavioural disorder, and indicated that cognitive change is a desirable therapeutic goal. As Marzillier (1980) has noted, since Beck (1970) introduced the cognitive framework to the field of behaviour therapy, a "cognitive revolution" has occurred in the latter. The two systems have merged, giving birth to the cognitive-behavioural approach (eg. Meichenbaum, 1977; Kendall and Hollon, 1979; 1981).
Despite it's influence, the cognitive approach is not without it's deficiencies. For example, Marzillier (1980) points out that whilst cognitive therapy touches on three broad areas - "cognitive events", "cognitive processes" and "cognitive structures" - the latter term "as yet lacks precise meaning" (p. 256). A further issue is "whether cognitive constructs add anything to the prediction or control of behaviour" (Marzillier, 1980, p. 256). Of even greater concern are the theoretical foundations upon which the cognitive approach rests. A critical view of current cognitive theories suggests that they are incomplete or over-simplistic. For example, Eschenroeder (1982) suggests that Ellis' Rational Emotive Therapy is "one sidedly concerned with the influence of cognitive processes on human emotions and behaviour. It does not take systematically into account how environmental influences contribute to the development and maintenance of irrational beliefs" (p. 384). Coyne (1982) has also criticised the common assumption "that cognitions are the linearly causal antecedents of other psychological phenomena" (p. 4). Similarly Sarason (1979) points out that, as a result of cognitive theories' concern with current cognitions and their effects, a number of important issues have yet to be addressed. Of these, "one concerns the histories of our cognitions and the variables that shape them. A second, concerns the need for some concept of motivation reflecting the fact that some thoughts seem more energized than others" (Sarason, 1979, p. 234).
The need for a motivational aetiological theory within the cognitive perspective is demonstrated by the following quotations from Beck in which he describes the developmental antecedents and cognitive underpinnings of depression:
"In the course of his development, the depression-prone person may become sensitized by certain unfavourable types of life situations such as the loss of a parent or chronic rejection by his peers. Other unfavourable conditions of a more insidious nature may similarly produce vulnerability to depression. These traumatic experiences predispose the individual to overreact to analogous conditions later in life. He has a tendency to make extreme, absolute judgments when such situations occur." (Beck, 1974 (a)).
"The vulnerability of the depression-prone person is attributable to the constellation of enduring negative attitudes about himself, about the world, and about his future. Even though these attitudes (or concepts) may not be prominent or even discernible at a given time, they persist in a latent state like an explosive charge ready to be detonated by an appropriate set of conditions. Once activated, these concepts dominate the person's thinking and lead to the typical depressive symptomatology" (Beck, 1967, p277).
These quotations lead to questions such as "by what processes does the person become sensitised to adverse experiences?", "how and why does the individual acquire his idiosyncratic concepts?", "what are the processes by which these concepts are maintained over time?", "how are they activated?", what properties do they have?", "how are they related to other psychological processes?", and so on.
It is intended to begin an exploration of these questions in two papers which outline the acquisition, maintenance and activation of maladaptive cognitions, as well as their motivational propensities.
The first article provides a theoretical overview of the aetiology of maladaptive cognitions in the context of a broader model of psychopathology. The model deviates from the dominant cognitive emphasis of cognitions as determinants of emotion, and highlights the role of negative affect (in particular, augmented negative feeling states), in the development of psychopathology – including maladaptive cognitions. The model acknowledges reciprocal influences between cognition, affect and behaviour, and attempts to provide a global view, and hence understanding, of a variety of phenomena encountered in clinical practice.
The second paper examines in more detail the influence of certain maladaptive cognitions (which we term "negative affective suppositions") on perception and behaviour.
Section A. The nature of maladaptive cognitions: an hypothesis
It is proposed that the attitudes and concepts ("schemas") which Beck has identified in depressed individuals, and which Ellis has conceptualized as irrational beliefs to which neurotics subscribe, are manifestations of a unique type of structure within memory. These structures will be called "negative affective suppositions"*.
A negative affective supposition is comprised of two components or elements, one involving the affective (emotional) system, and the other the cognitive system. The affective component is a somatic/physiological hedonic response represented centrally and accessible to awareness. This component could be considered an unconditioned response in the classical conditioning paradigm, but its intensity might be a conditioned phenomena.# (In these articles this affective component - the origins of which will be described later - will be referred to as a "negative feeling state" or "augmented negative feeling state").
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* The word "supposition" is taken to mean a subjective belief, or hypothesis. The term "negative affective supposition" is employed to denote a memory structure incorporating both negative affect and a cognitive belief.
# For a possible mechanism in the conditioning of distress states see Gilbert (1984, pp 123-124).
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The cognitive component is an assumption or belief - a type of attribution or predictive hypothesis which explains, or accounts for, the occurrence of the affective response. In other words, the cognitive component is a sequel to the affective response - a type of "theory" about the negative feeling state. This attribution or theory may be held in awareness, or may be held tacitly (unconsciously). Negative affective suppositions are normally established during childhood development as a result of the frustration of psychological needs, but may be acquired subsequently in response to trauma or other events which stimulate intense affective reactions.
The great majority of so-called maladaptive cognitions are, or stem from, affective suppositions which are invalid or dysfunctional in the context of current environment in which the individual is living and responding. (The second paper illustrates how once activated these structures may have unproductive perceptual and motivational influences - including mis-perceptions, avoidance, and other pseudo-adaptive responses which are not actually necessary for current survival).
The sections to follow highlight the inter-relationship between affective, behavioural and cognitive systems in facilitating biological survival. The role of the affective system in the motivation of survival-relevant responses is especially singled out for attention because this role is crucial to the development of maladaptive cognitions and behaviour, and to the understanding of a variety of clinical conditions.
Section B: Interaction of Affective, Behavioural and Cognitive Systems in Mediating Survival
The origin and function of negative affective suppositions can most clearly be understood by reference to the basic mechanisms which enable animals, including humans, to survive. In particular the individual's dependence upon the external environment, and the collaborative interplay between affective, behavioural, and cognitive systems in optimally exploiting this dependence, has to be appreciated. The interplay between the systems can be summarised via Figure 1 below:
FIGURE 1
THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF AFFECT, COGNITION, AND BEHAVIOUR (DIRECTION OF INFLUENCE IS DENOTED BY ARROWHEADS)
The curved arrows in Figure 1 show that affect influences, and is influenced by, both behaviour and cognition; that cognition influences, and is influenced by, both behaviour and affect; and that behaviour influences, and is influenced by, both affect and cognition. Further, the arrows along the interior demonstrate that each system may be influenced by the conjoint influences of the other two systems in interaction i.e. affect and cognition may jointly influence behaviour, affect and behaviour may jointly influence cognition, and behaviour and cognition may jointly influence affect.
It is not within the scope of this paper to explore the above interrelationships, other than to note them. We will focus instead on the basic affective/behavioural/cognitive processes by which physiological homeostasis (which facilitates survival) is maintained.
Homeostasis, of course refers to the regulatory mechanisms which ensure than an organism's internal state remains constant or balanced. Homeostatic processes facilitate adaptation of the individual to changes in the external environment, ensure that needs are met, and enable survival - relevant responses and habits to be acquired.
Affect (feelings and emotions) play a crucial role in the homeostatic processes involved in the motivation of behaviour and the acquisition of adaptive response patterns - including maladaptive cognitions which are of interest to us. We will describe this role in detail because cognitive theory in the main has neglected this area.
Section C: The role of affect (feelings) in homeostasis, in the motivation of behaviour, and in the development of maladaptive cognitions
An animal’s survival is dependent upon ongoing processes of interaction between itself and the external environment. The animal must extract from the external environment the raw materials needed for maintaining bodily functions as well as avoid destructive or harmful stimuli. Survival thus requires the capacity to perceive and respond to the internal environment, the capacity to perceive and respond to the external environment, and the existence of mechanisms within the organism which link the interactions between the two in a biologically useful manner.
a) The role of feelings in the mechanisms which link the internal and external environments
Feelings may be considered to be somatic hedonic sensations represented centrally and of which the animal has awareness. They are subjective indices of the animal's physiological state of homeostatic equilibrium. As a rule, negative (unpleasant) feelings indicate an imbalance requiring to be rectified, while positive (pleasant) feelings indicate that a desirable state of equilibrium has been realised, or is in the process or realisation.
Let us take as an example the animal's need for food. Without food the animal would eventually perish. Food-related maintenance behaviour is facilitated by the animal possessing neural mechanisms (sensors) within it's brain which register both the need for food, and whether environmental stimuli meet that need (Evidence suggests that in the case of food, these sensors are located in the hypothalamus, which incidentally is also known to be a "pleasure" centre - Rolls, 1975.)
The chemical and electrical changes within these sensors are experienced (felt) by the animal (human) as subjective somatic sensations along a continuum of pleasantness - unpleasantness. Specifically, need for food is experienced as a sensation of bodily discomfort (feeling of hunger), and fulfilment of that need by appropriate stimuli is experienced as a feeling of pleasure. That is, eating and drinking behaviour are maintained by sensory stimuli (such as the smell or taste of food) which have a reward effect on the hypothalamic cells gated by need (hunger and thirst).
Hence feelings perform a vitally important function in motivating behaviour which ensures the biological survival of the individual, and thus the species. Feelings of discomfort (e.g. hunger, pain) serve to energise the animal to seek stimuli which will reduce the discomfort, whilst positive feelings function mainly as reinforcers of behaviour (including attentional processes) which brought them about. Hence over time, patterns of behaviour emerge (or are learnt) which ensure the ongoing fulfilment of needs and the survival of the animal.
In daily living the animal will respond first to those needs which are experienced as most distressing or uncomfortable; the more distressing the affect, the more it will be at the fore of awareness. When a felt need (negative feeling) is displaced by a more intense one before it is satisfied, the lesser need will normally return to the fore of awareness when the greater need has been dealt with and the negative affect associated with it dissipates. These processes ensure that the important business of restoring homeostatic equilibrium is not neglected.
To summarise, the above analysis attempts to show that feelings serve a multiplicity of functions that have biological survival value. Feelings provide a feedback channel to the animal about it's needs. They supply information about the value of external stimuli to the animal's survival needs. Feelings also indicate to the animal the appropriateness (or value) of it's behaviour in the task of survival. (The aversive or pleasant attributes of feelings arising from contact with the environment provide the reinforcement or punishing effects required to consolidate some forms of learning.*) Finally, feelings provide the impetus which mobilises the animal to respond when it is not in homeostatic balance and its needs are threatened.
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* After Gagne' (1970), it is noted that in humans there may be as many as eight distinct types of learning processes.
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The above considerations lead us to present a hedonic-homeostatic model of motivation which highlights the importance of the affective system in the motivation of behaviour and the survival of the species. Implicit in this model is the assumption that the basic processes and principles which facilitate biological survival also underlie and explain clinical psychological phenomena. In the words of Stagner (1977, p 130) "Whether man seeks food, sex, power, or salvation, the mechanisms employed are biological".