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Ideational Competition brokered by Material/International forces

Or: How are ideational debates brokered by the material environment

US Grand Strategy during the Cold War: The “Four Policemen,” “Roll-back,” Balancing/Spheres of influence or Superiority?

Benjamin Miller

University of Haifa

Paper Prepared for Presentation at the Millennium Conference, LSE, London 2012


ABSTRACT

The International System as the Broker of Competing Ideas on National Security:

the Case of US Grand Strategy in the early Cold War

Which type of factors shape the grand strategy of the state: ideational/cultural or material/rationalist? While addressing the material-ideational debate in IR, this paper argues that the material environment selects which idea—out of autonomous competing ideas- is going to dominate the state’s grand strategy.

The material-ideational debate is an important theoretical and empirical debate in the Social Sciences, notably among the key theories in IR. While realists highlight the effects of material factors, constructivists focus on ideational factors, and liberals are divided between some who advance material factors and others who subscribe to ideational explanations.

The present study addresses this major debate through a three-step process: First, in contrast to purely materialist/rationalist approaches, which minimize the role and importance of ideas, I suggest that competing ideas are autonomous of material factors and there is a vigorous debate in the “marketplace of ideas” on which idea should guide the state’s grand strategy. I distinguish among four key ideas, which competed for dominating US grand strategy with the end of WWII and the beginning of the Cold War: the “four policemen,” ”roll-back,” balance of power/spheres of influence, and preventive war. Secondly, in order to deepen the theoretical sources and our understanding of these competing ideas and to link them to IR theory, I will relate them to a recently developed distinction among four ideational approaches in IR: offensive realism (OR), defensive realism (DR), offensive liberalism (OL) and defensive liberalism (DL). More specifically, the “four policemen” is a defensive liberal idea, “roll-back”—an offensive liberal idea, balance of power (BOP)—a defensive realist idea and preventive war— an offensive realist idea, while offensive realism also advances the general idea of material/military superiority as the key to national security.

The third step is the key one: under which conditions each one of these ideas is going to dominate the state’s grand strategy? I argue that the international system serves as the broker of which idea is selected as the grand strategy, more specifically, two key variables associated with the international system serve as the brokers: the distribution of capabilities in the international system and the level of threat facing the state. Indeed, the grand strategy, which was selected, did not fully fit with any one of these ideas advocated by leading spokesmen in the domestic debate on foreign policy.

In the case of the US grand strategy, the combined effect of the systemic factors at the height of the Cold War—bipolarity and high threat—brought about the rejection of these four ideas and instead the combined effect of these two systemic factors led to the dominance of a milder version of Offensive Realism—the search for US superiority expressed in a major military build-up— not to balance Soviet power, but rather to surpass it in a major way— and the related steps of forming world-wide alliances and global forward deployment of US forces.

Outline:

I.  The Puzzle: why did US Policy toward the Soviet Union (SU) change twice in the Five Years following the end of WWII?

II.  The argument

III. Lit. Review—Alternative explanations: Mearsheimer, Ikenberry, Dueck, Layne

VI.  Problems with the lit.:

A. regarding which grand strategy (GS) the US followed

B. regarding the explanation of the selected GS

V. Typology of Potential DVs: The 4 Competing Ideas and their relations with the types of Grand Strategies

A.  DL—the 4 Policemen

B.  DR--- BOP/spheres of influence (Kennan-containment)

C.  OL—Roll-back/liberation/ Regime Change

D.  OR—superiority (NSC-68), preventive war

IVI. DV: the Evolution of the GS:

E.  1945-6-- DL

F.  1947-50-- DR

G.  1950-62—OR

H.  Challenges by OL along the way

The evolution of US GS in the early years of the CW did not result from a clearly defined national security doctrine. “Only in a piecemeal and staggered manner did the Truman administration decide upon the major elements of the American response to the Soviet Union.” [1]

VII.  Explanation of the two Policy Changes-- Why did a certain GS become dominant: the rise of bipolarity and the increasing level of threat-manifested by a more threatening behavior and growing capability to implement the threats;

The study presents two major propositions for explaining the GS changes:

1. The greater the level of threat posed by the SU (as measured by its aggressive behavior) >

The greater the shift in US strategy from Defensive to offensive

2. The more powerful the SU becomes (measured by its growing military capability), the more US strategy moves from Liberal to Realist

From DL to DR:

A. Iran—1946

B. Turkey/Greece 46-7 >Truman Doctrine (DR)

C. E. Europe/Polish elections

D. Czech Coup—48+

E. Berlin –48-9 > NATO (DR)

From DR to OR:

F. Korea >OR (NSC-68)- superiority

VIII.  Conclusions

I.  The Puzzle: why did America’s Soviet policy change twice in the five years following WWII?

Within 5 years from the end of WWII, the US changed its grand strategy twice. While starting with a cooperative strategy in relation to the SU (what I call “defensive liberalism”), the US moved about two years since the end of the war to a more hard-line policy, though still relatively moderate with a focus on diplomatic and economic means of containment (“defensive realism”). However, 3 years later, the US shifted gears again to a much more hawkish policy of reaching superiority and embarking on world-wide commitments and deployment (“offensive realism”).

What is the best explanation of such important and significant changes in GS?

The Ideational Competition: its links with a Typology of Grand Strategies

US officials and commentators raised a great variety of ideas with regard to the most effective and desirable US GS following the end of WWII in order to maximize US security and also to construct a more peaceful world order. Each one of these ideas was in accordance with the logic of one of the GS discussed here, respectively: OL, DL, OR and DR. More specifically, the Competition in the Market Place of post-WWII Ideas on US GS took place among the following ideas: The 4 Policemen was related to DL (mostly associated with FDR), Roll-back associated with OL (the key representative being John Foster DULLES), Balance of power/Spheres of influence derived from DR (the leading intellectual force was Kennan) or Superiority based on OR (the key advocate was Paul Nitze).

Let us briefly distinguish among the 4 approaches to security by introducing a general typology of Grand Strategies:

Whereas the distinction between offensive and defensive realism is a familiar one,[2] students of International Relations theory have tended to overlook the fact that a parallel distinction can be drawn within an ideology-promotion perspective. Most notably, it is possible to distinguish within the liberal perspective between offensive and defensive variants or branches of liberalism. Both liberal approaches focus on the benign influence of democracy on the external behavior of states and on international security and thus call to promote democracy, but they differ with respect to the means of democracy promotion. While defensive liberalism favors the promotion of democracy by peaceful means, the offensive approach advocates democracy promotion by the use of force if necessary.

The various combinations of these two dimensions produce four ideal types of great power approaches to security (see Figure 2): offensive realism, defensive realism, defensive ideology promotion and offensive ideology promotion. A combination of maximal use of force in a unilateral manner aimed at affecting the capabilities of the adversary produces an offensive realist strategy; defensive realism refers to a minimal use of force in a multilateral manner for affecting the balance of capabilities; defensive ideology promotion emphasizes the spread of ideology multilaterally by peaceful means; while offensive ideology promotion focuses on effecting regime change unilaterally and by the use of force.

If ideology promotion is done by a liberal power, such as the US, then defensive liberalism focuses on the use of “soft power” in a multilateral manner for promoting democracy, free-market economies and international institutions and thus affecting the rival’s ideological character;[3] In contrast, offensive liberals are willing to use massive force in a unilateral manner in order to promote democracy and affect the rival’s ideology.[4]

Even though some of these ideas became components of the post-war GS, many of them were not endorsed, esp. in the most important arena—the relations with the only other SP—the SU. However, some of them were implemented in relation to US allies in accordance with the conditions specified by the theoretical model presented here (the combined effects of the BOP and the balance of threat).

There has been a Gradual transition between the approaches;

1.  From WWII--- to 1947—DL—BOTH FDR and also Truman continues his strategy

2.  1947--1950: from DL to DR—Kennan and the Truman Doctrine,

NATO in response to Berlin and the Czeck coup

3.  1950—l962—OR (NSC-68) in response to Korea

4.  OL—some related ideas are accepted, but not the core idea of liberation of E. Europe

The Changes are in response to key external-material events selecting which one of the ideas will be translated into the GS.

Rejection of alternative ideas: The US didn’t opt for BOP (DR), let alone the more extreme version of DL—disengagement, but opted for military superiority (OR) in the peak of the CW. It also mostly turned down roll-back/open door (OL) in the Soviet sphere or cooperative multilateralism with the SU such as in the form of “the four policemen” (DL).

The key argument--The explanation: Soviet (SU) power eliminated OL; SU threat brought down BOP and multilateralism of the 4 policemen. The combined effect of power and threat brought about OR.

My novel argument in relation to other analyses: the US GS was based on the logic of OR-- superiority as the GS (as opposed to Mearsheimer and also the liberal analyses), while the explanation for the dominance of this strategy was derived from the Soviet threat (as opposed to Layne).

II.  Lit. Review—Alternative explanations: Mearsheimer, Ikenberry, Dueck, Layne

Review of Mearsheimer, Ikenberry, Layne and Dueck re US Cold War strategy

Mearsheimer describes American behavior vis-à-vis Europe as offshore balancing for the period 1900-1990. The argument is that the US maintains the European balance of power by actively preventing a single great power from taking over Europe, followed by passivity as long as there is no further attempt to take over. The establishment of NATO and the long term commitment that followed was due to the fact that the Soviets controlled Eastern Europe and no European power could face them.[5] This is a defensive realist approach, as Layne has noted.

Layne argues that the US strategy during the first decade after WWII was to secure American hegemony “by removing the Soviet Union as a peer competitor.”[6] He argues that the US could have reestablished Germany and Japan as poles to prevent their possible fall (and their strategically rich environment) to Soviet hands, but the fact that this did not happen hints to a much more ambitious plan.[7] However, Layne might be wrong in describing the formation of America’s commitment to Europe. Unlike his account, the US did not “[enter] into the negotiations that culminated in 1949 in the North Atlantic Treaty,” but was dragged in by Europe. The Truman Doctrine did not just pop up. It was a result of several processes, of which one very significant was Great Britain’s statement in 1946 that it could no longer maintain Greece.[8] Layne argues that the US insisted that Eastern Europe should be open (i.e. not a Soviet sphere) mainly as part of its goal to ignite regime change in Moscow.[9]

Dueck argues that the US could have returned to strategic non-entanglement, engage in rollback, or divide the world to spheres of influence. All were pushed aside for containment.[10] He states that containment was ideological, and instead of BOP, it was seeking preponderance.[11] Dueck uses neoclassical realism to say that not only structural pressures determined US grand strategy, but also processes of agenda-setting, coalition building, and cultural factors - American liberal norms and ideas.[12] The spheres of influence approach was quite influential in Washington, but the US demanded that any such sphere would be open, that is not oppressive.[13] Containment, Dueck argues, was liberal, since it fostered “the strength of an international order characterized by free trade, national self determination and liberal democracy.”[14]

Ikenberry argues that WWII ended in two interrelated settlements: the Cold War and the Western arrangements.[15] The “containment order” included balance of power, nuclear deterrence, and political and ideological competition. The Western arrangement was a set of institutions among the Western countries and Japan. It was based on economic openness, political reciprocity and multilateral management of an American-led liberal political order.[16]

Ikenberry identifies six grand designs that competed: global governance; an open trading system that would govern itself; Atlantic union; geopolitical interests based system that would provide access to resources and markets for the US; creating a multipolar system by assisting Europe to become a “third force”; containment. [17]

III.  Differences of Opinion in the lit. (see also below):

IV.  A. regarding what GS the US followed

B. regarding the explanation of the selected GS

Theorist US GS / Explanation of US GS
Mearsheimer Def. Realism / Rise of a potential hegemon in Eurasia without a local balancer-def. realism
Layne Off. Lib. / Open door-off. liberalism
Dueck Def. Lib./realist / Liberalism on the cheap-def. Liberalism with some systemic effects
Ikenberry Def. Lib / Institutional leadership-def. liberalism
Miller From Def. Lib.
To DR to OR / Changes according to power and threat, while liberalism is mediating
Key Competing theories which explain US GS in the CW
Objectives / Means / School / Regional focus in the CW /

Problems

Dueck / Spread liberalism / --Cheap (defensive)
--Realism explains why roll-back and isolationism were not selected,
--liberalism explains why spheres-of-influence not selected
-- containment—the only GS that matched IR and liberalism / Defensive liberalism
(with some IR systemic influence) / Europe / --illiberal behavior
tacit shperes
--not cheap (due to BP& threats
Spheres-of-influcne: Stalin
Behavior prevented it
Threatened
It-signal
of threat
Layne / Open Door (economic Liberalism) / Extra-regional hegemony / Off. Liberalism / Europe / --hegemony imposed on a reluctant US by the IR system (European weakness, GB decline and SU threat), not due to open door
-- security threats are the IVs
Mearsheimer / Affect the distribution of capabilities
(for
Material security) / --Regional Hegemony (in the W. Hemisphere)
--Off-shore balancing re. Europe/Asia / Off. Realism in the Americas;
Defensive Realism in Europe / Europe / US seeks hegemony, not balance in Europe and world-wide due to high security threats
And the BP
structure—
US responsibility
Ikenberry / Promote (liberal) international order / US Multilateral leadership of International Institutions / Defensive Liberalism / Europe / --multilateralism re. the West, not outside
--unilateral vs. the SU
--material/security factors are the Ivs which lead to the multilateral leadership
Miller / US preponderance / Unilateral-exclusionary vs. the SU (the Marshall Plan, NATO); multilateral vs. Western allies / 1st wave Off. Realism / World -wide / BP & SU threat explain US GS—BP--system compells US to intervene—no other to pass her buck-GB decline
--SU high threat leads to quest for preponderance
-- liberalism—intervening, not IV
US GS / Explanation of US GS
Mearsheimer Def. Realism / Rise of a potential hegemon in Eurasia without a local balancer-def. realism
Layne Off. Lib. / Open door-off. liberalism
Dueck Def. Lib./realist / Liberalism on the cheap-def. liberalism
Ikenberry Def. Lib / Institutional leadership-def. liberalism
Miller From Def. Lib.
To DR to OR / Changes according to power and threat, while liberalism is mediating
Was it possible to reach an accommodation with Stalin?
Mearsheimer / NO—SU powerful, aspirant for hegemony in Eurasia with no local balancer; The US was the only power which could balance it
Layne / YES—it was possible to set up Germany as an independent power, thereby reestablishing Multipolar BOP in Eurasia and allowing the US to disengage; Stalin was only dissuaded by the Marshall Plan;
US interested in dominating NATO allies and maintaining Open Door
Dueck / Yes—explicit spheres-of-influence agreement could be accepted by SU but rejected by the US due to liberal opposition to SU domination of E. Europe
Ikenberry / The focus was on constructing a liberal order in the West
Miller / NO--SU powerful in the middle of Europe in l945 and expansionist/threatening behavior since 1946 which could be deterred and contained by a superior and resolute power, though OR by US escalated the Cold War, but US also conducted DR re. SU sphere of influence


2. Rejection/Falsification of Alternative explanations: