SECURITY, MILITARY, COMMERCIAL, AND SOCIAL TRANSLATION (PART 1)
1- Conflict in the Making: The Nile Water Wars
East Africa faces a stark and unfair choice: To surrender its sovereignty over the waters of the Nile, or put together a military alliance to deter Egypt’s US-funded war machine, argues war scholar MARTIN KIMANI. Either way, tension over the Nile has become one of the most important foreign and security policy issues for the East African Community.
Tanzania faces air strikes from Egypt because of its refusal to agree to a colonial treaty denying it use of water from Lake Victoria.
Kenya too is re-examining its allegiance to the 1929 Nile Basin Treaty, which limits its exploitation of Lake Victoria.
Egypt, the chief signatory and beneficiary of this arrangement, labelled Kenya’s position "a declaration of war" and threatened sanctions, using language that suggested that actions to lower the volume of Nile waters reaching Egypt could draw a military response.
Egypt’s resolve is about to be tested: Tanzania, which since 1962 has refused to recognise the treaty, arguing that it is under no obligation to honour treaties entered by Imperial Britain, is set to begin a huge irrigation project with water from Lake Victoria.
A strong response should be expected including, but not limited to: A lawsuit at the World Court, more heated rhetoric and sanctions.
If these fail, there is a possibility that the Egyptian armed forces would be ordered to launch "limited" air strikes.
In the past, Cairo has been willing to destabilise and threaten military attacks against any of its southern neighbours that pondered making large-scale use of the Nile.
This impasse is not going away, particularly given the gulf in negotiations between Egypt and the handful of nations eager to scuttle the 1929 agreement.
The East African Community should consider the situation to be a serious test of how far it can safeguard the security of its member countries by political and military means.
Hopefully, Egypt will be deterred from considering an attack against Tanzania — or any other member state — as a viable option.
To begin this process, the community’s leadership should urgently develop a common security policy with teeth, while exploring defence co-operation with whatever national entities emerge from Sudan’s peace talks, and Ethiopia (who are also disaffected signatories).
As the region’s population grows, and droughts such as the one now threatening Tanzania recur, exploiting the waters of Lake Victoria and the Nile will take on greater urgency.
Egypt should be left in no doubt that only good faith negotiations will satisfy all parties and that an attack on one member state will be considered an act of war against all.
In 1929 Britain signed the Nile Basin Treaty with Egypt, pledging on behalf of its colonies not to undertake any works that would reduce the volume of the Nile. Despite decolonisation, Egypt considers the treaty to be binding on Burundi, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda.
In 1959, three years after Sudan’s independence and its calls for a fair revision, the treaty was amended.
The total annual discharge of the Nile between Egypt and Sudan was measured at 74 billion cubic meters from which the former was allocated two-thirds — or 55.5 billion cubic meters — with the latter awarded the remaining 18.5 billion cubic meters.
These quotas made no provision for the nations that would shortly become independent and might also desire to exploit the Nile waters without Cairo’s permission.
Egypt’s position is that international law only allows the termination and suspension of existing treaties only under their provisions and through consent of all parties.
In addition, Egypt lays legal claim to its position by invoking its "natural and historic rights" and the "priority of appropriation".
This language lays the ground for war as it establishes any move against the treaty by its involuntary signatories can be considered an attack on inviolable Egyptian rights.
There is little doubt that Egypt is helplessly dependent on the Nile whose fresh water feeds a fast-growing population of 70 million. It has been thus since Pharaonic times, and the states intent on renegotiating the treaty should understand that Egypt will not budge if its survival is not a central concern for all.
But Egyptians are not the only people whose access to the Nile is crucial. Ethiopia accounts for more than three-quarters of the water flowing into the main Nile, but uses less than one per cent despite often suffering from deadly droughts that might be assuaged by increased irrigation.
Tanzania is now in the middle of a severe drought and needs fresh drinking water from Lake Victoria.
Its proposed project will immediately benefit half a million people, and double that in two decades — all without drawing an amount that would adversely affect other users of the lake.
Kenya and Uganda too want to follow suit and develop the resources on their land — to pursue their sovereign rights.
Yet as recently as December 2003, Mahmoud Abu-Zeid, the Egyptian minister responsible for that country’s water resources, was threatening that in the event of such action, Kenya could "not lay claim to sovereignty to protect itself from any action that Egypt may want to take."
How will these two positions come closer without either war or a capitulation of the sovereign rights of the East African nations?
The East African Community should begin by making a high level public statement recognising Egypt’s right to a Nile with sufficient water to feed its people.
It should concurrently lay out the principle of rebus sic stantibus — which in international treaty law allows parties to terminate a treaty due to a fundamental change of circumstance.
Making these statements jointly and in public will establish both the willingness to negotiate and also the legal basis for casting aspersions on the treaty.
The leaders should then convene a high-level defence conference aimed at seeking operational convergence between the community’s military forces.
Though no country in the region is willing or is in a position to engage in a continental war, there is need to begin establishing a deterrent ability even though it will not be militarily viable for years to come.
At present, even united, the East African Community is unlikely to intimidate Cairo on a martial basis.
Since Egypt signed the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1979, the United States has allocated it $35 billion in bilateral aid, with $25 billion of that figure being spent directly on the military.
The Egyptian army has 320,000 active soldiers, and a reserve pool almost as large. It is heavily mechanised and modern, with almost 2000 tanks of recent vintage.
Though its soldiers are not highly trained as a whole, it would be wise to assume that they at least are the equal of those in East Africa.
But the main threat would probably come from the formidable Egyptian air force. It is capable of advanced strike missions and boasts just under 200 advanced combat aircraft from a total of 600 — and has 30,000 active personnel.
With the aid from the United States unabated for now, Mubarak’s government is sure to continue upgrading its capability.
The aim for proposing that the EA Community takes steps to address security therefore is not a call to pour our scarce resources into arming for war against Egypt. That is not going to happen and is unlikely to match the aforementioned build-up.
Rather it is to present a united front that in the years to come will attain the ability to defend its air space effectively.
Since the need to exploit Nile waters by all concerned parties is sure to remain a priority for years to come, seeking security convergence now will encourage Cairo to try and settle the issue sooner rather than later.
Should they insist on making no concessions, it may mean that when the Community countries eventually pull out, it may be in future circumstances when Egypt’s military is not overwhelmingly superior. Not pursuing this policy means that Egypt, confident that threats of war are a winning card, will only rattle its sabre louder rather than vying for a deeper commitment to peaceful negotiation.
To develop a common defence policy will have other benefits besides dealing with Egypt; therefore steps in this direction should be considered an eventual necessity and not a short-term strategy.
While its Memorandum of Understanding on defence matters pointedly does not refer to foreign interventions, its success will only be assured in a secure environment.
Pursuing political and military cohesion may dissuade states and militias in the region from choosing violent domestic options, which may draw a united East African response.
Addressing the challenge of renegotiating or exiting the 1929 treaty is thus an opportunity to build a more secure future.
Military relationships with the other nations facing Egypt’s should be explored. Ethiopia, which is most adversely affected by the treaty, should be a key partner in developing a deterrent ability.
Though the Community is too poor and militarily weak to enter into a mutual defence treaty with Ethiopia or Sudan, it should adopt a position of rhetorical unity much like the frontline states did against South Africa during apartheid.
Only then will negotiations move beyond macho posturing and the belief that Mubarak’s American-funded military is sufficient to keep the East African nations from asserting their sovereign rights.
They in turn should carefully keep the mercury cool by constantly, and in good faith, recognising the Nile as Egypt’s lifeblood.
2- HOW THE CIA GATHERS AND ANALYZES INTELLIGENCE
The excitement of spying and secret operations sometimes leads people to assume that a piece of information is important just because it is secret. In reality, CIA analysts spend much of their time gathering and analyzing information from newspapers, television and radio broadcasts, speeches by foreign leaders, and other public sources. CIA analysts call these open sources, and they are sometimes adequate to predict how a country is likely to act in the future. This enables the president, Congress, and other important officials to formulate effective U.S. policy. In many cases, however, open sources provide only an incomplete picture of how a country will act. In some instances, in fact, governments may deliberately publicize false information in order to fool the United States and other countries.
In many cases open sources do not provide enough information to enable analysts to draw firm conclusions. A piece of the picture will often be missing or unclear. Analysts must find the missing piece of the picture, which is often deliberately concealed by potential enemies of the United States. Once the analysts have found the piece, they must rely on their training and judgment to recognize where it fits into the overall picture. To help CIA analysts develop a complete understanding of world events, the CIA supplements open sources with three clandestine (secret) sources. The clandestine sources include human intelligence provided by CIA field officers, electronic intelligence gathering, and intelligence provided by other agencies. Analysts sift through and evaluate all the open and clandestine sources to develop a general assessment of how a country will act. The analysts pass these assessments to their superiors, who forward important reports to the director of central intelligence, who takes responsibility for keeping the president informed.
A Field Officers
The CIA deploys hundreds of field officers all over the world to gather intelligence for the United States. The field officers report to CIA headquarters through the station chief in the country where they are placed. Each station chief supervises several field officers, assessing the information they have gathered and sending it to CIA headquarters. Field officers are expected to have detailed knowledge of the country where they are stationed, although the CIA has sometimes been criticized for sending out unqualified and poorly trained personnel. Field officers must be United States citizens.
Field officers rarely break into foreign military bases, infiltrate political parties, or otherwise try to collect sensitive information themselves. Instead they usually persuade foreign citizens to provide information. Sometimes foreign citizens volunteer to give secret information to the CIA. In oppressive regimes, their motive is sometimes altruistic and even patriotic—they feel they can best serve their country by providing the CIA with information that will help bring about social and political change or diminish the possibility of war. Such a spy is known as a defector in place.
In other situations CIA field officers use money or blackmail to convince foreign citizens to betray their country. The CIA field officer’s most difficult job is figuring out who might be willing to spy for the United States, and then using the right amount of persuasion and coercion to turn the foreign citizen to the American cause. The process of identifying and turning a foreign citizen is delicate because the best sources of information are often senior government and military officials. Approaching the wrong official might lead the foreign government to arrest or even kill the field officer. Even after a subject has been turned, field officers must constantly assess the accuracy of the information that he or she provides.
Because turning a foreign citizen is difficult and the intelligence received is sometimes unreliable, the most valuable spy is often not someone who has been turned, but a defector in place. At times, such “human assets” have supplied vital information that could not have been obtained by technical means. For example, from 1953 until his execution by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) sometime in 1959 or 1960, Pyotr Semyonovich Popov, a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet army, supplied the CIA with important information about USSR missile systems. Popov’s information helped the CIA understand the Soviet military threat before the advent of satellites made it possible to spy on the USSR from space.