Through A Lens Darkly?: Russian Television and Terrorism Coverage in Comparative Perspective

Paper prepared for The Mass Media in Post-Soviet Russia International Conference

April 2006

University of Surrey

United Kingdom

Sarah Oates

Politics Department

University of Glasgow

Glasgow G12 8RT

United Kingdom

Email:

http://www.media-politics.com

Is the way in which Russian television covers terrorism essentially just a reflection of the Russian political situation or does it illustrate a useful case study with implications for a more comparative approach to how governments frame terrorism on television? This paper compares the coverage of terrorism and national security issues in recent elections in Russia, the United States and Great Britain. At issue is how much the Russian case can teach us in comparative terms about how governments, politicians and television producers frame the issues of terrorism and international security. In terms of a broader perspective, this paper is interested in challenging some of the notions about the models of interaction among governments, television and citizens. Evidence from this study suggests that neither the libertarian nor the social-responsibility notions of media/government/citizen interaction are particularly useful in explaining how governments frame issues of terrorism and national security, how television reports these issues or how citizens react to them. Rather, it would appear in Russian and U.S. elections that there is a rhetoric of fear, nationalism and the desire to assert authority in a chaotic world order. On the other hand, attempts in British parliamentary elections to incite nationalist or security concerns (mostly by the Conservatives in a somewhat indirect way) were widely unsuccessful. This would suggest two important findings. First, media ‘models’ with roots in the work of Siebert et al. (1963) are hiding, rather than illuminating, significant similarities between Russian and U.S. notions of framing, television production and audience reaction in terms of terrorism and international security. This would suggest the need for a new type of media model, based on a type of rhetoric of ‘fear and loathing’ amongst those in the government, the media and the audience. The second finding that emerges from this three-country study is that the British campaign is rather distinct for failing to fear-monger about terrorism and security issues. This is true despite the country’s far longer history of domestic terrorism and involvement in the second Gulf War.[1]

The study in context

This study attempts to inform the scholarly debate in some distinct areas, notably the role of the media in election campaigns, the analysis of the coverage of terrorism, media in a post-communist state, and discussions about media models in general. This makes it somewhat of a challenge to fit this study into the relevant current literature. This is often the case with political communication, as it tends to sit at the intersection of different areas of political inquiry (i.e. between mass media and political parties, between political parties and voters, between government elite and television). When you extend the area of inquiry over country boundaries, the levels of complexity multiply and the danger of conceptual stretching rises dramatically. By the same token, however, this is a very useful exercise because it helps political communication studies to rise above the description of the interaction among elites, the media and the audience in a single country. Some of the most intriguing and useful studies in political communication (Curran and Park, 2000; Gunther and Mughan, 2000; Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Kaid and Holtz-Bacha, 1995; Norris, 2000, 2001; Semetko et al., 1991) have compared the institutions of political communication across country boundaries. Comparative political communication is a very useful way to challenge and perhaps build new media models that can help scholars, politicians, journalists and citizens understand the function – and sometimes the danger – of the mass media as a powerful political institution.

Elections and the mass media

Decades of study (mainly in the U.S., but also in many other advanced industrial states) suggest that the media’s role in election must be considered within the context of other factors (Berelson et al., 1954; Butler and Stokes, 1974; Campbell et al, 1960; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Nie et al. 1979; Norris et al., 1999). The debate now focuses on how much influence can be ascribed to the media either in terms of long-term political attitudes or short-term vote decisions. To summarise more than half a century of the study of elections, the media tend to matter more in times of political upheaval or significant political change. There is evidence that people pay attention and even change their mind on important issues during elections (Semetko et al., 1991). This influence tends to be more obvious in studies of the attempts to develop democracy in former authoritarian regimes. For examples, a study of Russia has found that in the absence of developed political parties or established political figureheads, the media have much more power to both set the political agenda and establish political forces (Oates, 2006b). Thus, we know that while a clever election campaign cannot get an unpalatable candidate or party elected, election messages matter a great deal when there is a considerable political shift or when the candidates have roughly the same amount of support from the electorate.[2]

Both of these attributes of political change and unease were present in the November 2004 U.S. general election between President George W. Bush and Democratic contender John Kerry. This was the first U.S. presidential election since the traumatic events of 9/11. In addition, for the first time since Vietnam, the electoral contest was taking place while the U.S. was engaged in a significant war. Public opinion polls showed a country deeply divided about the response to 9/11, the terrorist threat and the second Gulf War. President Bush had to contend with the some severe economic problems as incumbent president, while Kerry struggled to project an adequate set of policies or leadership charisma to serve as president. In Russia and Britain, however, the electoral situation was marked far more by stability than change. There was no serious challenger to Russian President Vladimir Putin and the pro-Kremlin forces left for either the Duma race in December 2003 or the presidential contest the following March. Although there was relatively little public support from British citizens for the British involvement in the second invasion of Iraq, there was no viable alternative to the Labour Party in the spring of 2005. In addition, as in Russia, there were no serious British economic downturns or issues for contenders to use as a springboard to electoral success. While the minority (and anti-war) Liberal Democrats did particularly well in Britain in the 2005 elections, it was not enough to make a significant political difference in the composition of the British Parliament. In addition, the British Conservative Party did a particularly poor job of campaigning, attempting awkward scare-mongering tactics based on immigration and an ‘Are You Thinking What We’re Thinking’ elitist campaign that was out of step with mainstream British politics.

Specific studies of election campaigns using data from these three nations emphasise different issues and political relationships. At the same time, there is the tendency to use the U.S. campaign system – despite its noted anomalies – as a reference point. Scholarship surrounding U.S. election campaigns has focussed on issues of framing that reduces the scope of political debate, shrinking sound bites for candidates and the reduction of the campaign to a ‘horse race’ and a growing trend toward negativity and mudslinging in political advertising (for example, see Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; Kaid and Johnston, 2000; Patterson, 1993). This is studied within the context of general public opinion and the notion of partisan identification, which remains a critical predicator of vote choice in the United States. In the United Kingdom, there is less emphasis on class-based voting (part of the twin trend of a blurring of class lines and a move toward the political centre by the major parties) and more on the professionalisation of political campaigning. This trend was identified as the possible ‘Americanisation’ of British election campaign by Denis Kavanagh (1996) and as ‘modernisation’ by others such as Negrine and Papthanassopoulos (1996). Elements of the possible ‘Americanisation’ of British elections include reliance on professional public relations services; election news tailored to meet the needs of the media (especially television); victory or defeat increasingly seen as linked to campaign performance; the creation of pseudo-events; and an increase in negative campaigning. To call this ‘Americanisation’ is a bit misleading in the current campaign climate, as the techniques are now fairly global. Blumler and Kavanagh (1999) identify international political trends that include the growing professionalisation of political communication; the transformation of mass publics into differently targeted markets for messages; test-marked appeals to private emotions rather than collective interests; and a decline of the ideological and party mechanisms that have structured power and participation in many nations over extended periods of time, i.e. the notion of the permanent campaign.

Kavanagh himself -- as well as others – have been quick to point out that British elections aren’t completely Americanised and are unlikely to become so. Part of this is due to cultural reasons – the British public is less tolerant of in-your-face advertising in general – but in large part it is due to differences in political institutions. British political parties are centralised, powerful organisations that have enormous control over the selection of candidates, the setting of central policy, and the voting behaviour of elected representatives. As there is no separation of the executive and legislature in Britain, the ‘personalisation’ of the Prime Minister, albeit far greater than in the past, is in fact far less relevant either in the campaign or in agenda-setting in general.

Where does that leave understanding Russian elections vis-à-vis U.S. election campaigns? In the early years of the Russian Federation, there was an overt attempt to import U.S. models of political advertising, in particular by Russia’s Choice in the 1993 Duma campaign. The Russia’s Choice campaign was seen to be a failure, although the pro-Yeltsin party did manage a reasonable return of both party and single-member district seats in the first Duma. It is clear that Russians had a type of proto-party identification (Colton, 2001; Oates, 2006b; White, Rose and McAllister, 1997; White, Wyman and Oates, 1997), able to group themselves well into ideologies including communist, nationalist and market-friendly forces. However, the mass media – especially the key television stations – chose to support particular political players and their parties rather than help to foster a party system reflecting the preferences of the electorate. There was a surprisingly strong response to appeals to nationalism and xenophobia by the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia and its leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the 1993 Duma race (Oates, 2006b; White, Rose and McAllister, 1997). Russian parties became markedly more nationalistic, more hawk-like and less market friendly by the 1995 Duma elections (Oates, 1998). Over the course of additional elections (1996, 1999, 2003 and 2004), messages from Russian parties and candidates continued to put an emphasis on nationalism/national pride (Oates, 2006b). There also was a continued growth of image over substance in political advertising, particularly in messages from pro-Kremlin parties such as Unity in 1999 and United Russia in 2003. Overall, the media system contributed to the dominance of image-driven parties with little policy substance over more ideologically substantive parties such as the Communist Party of Russian Federation and Yabloko. This contributed to the failure of a healthy party system in Russia. The dominant political party in the 2003 elections, United Russia, was little more than an advertising vehicle for Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and other Putin allies.

It isn’t intellectually helpful to say that Russian political parties are ‘Americanised.’ It is quite true that evidence suggests that the dominant Russian political parties have come to depend on style over substance (and a large amount of paid advertising and favourable news coverage on the state-run First Channel). In this sense, parties rely heavily on the media, including staged events, sound bites from leaders and professional campaign management, during elections. Elections, however, are relatively separate now from real political power in Russia. By the same token, political parties also are relatively divorced from power. There is a very different dynamic in the United States. Although presidential candidates are judged by personal characteristics, personal beliefs and individual policy statements, these candidates also represent political parties. In addition, if these leaders are elected, they are held accountable[3] to the tenets of the U.S. Constitution by Congress, the Supreme Court and the public (in terms of re-election or general support).

Hence, what is the value of studying the interaction of Russian politicians, parties, the media and the public? The value is that it is gives us a chance to view how power is organised and supported when the only meaningful political institution between the ruler and the ruled is the mass media. It throws the power of the mass media into a type of relief, in which the boundaries and potential of the institution as a political tool become more clear. As Russia lacks effective political parties, social groups, pressure organisations, an effective parliament or an independent judiciary, the only remaining conduit between the rulers and the ruled is the mass media. This is not to suggest that the dynamic is that of the Soviet era, in which the dictates of the rulers were distributed via the mass media (along with socialization etc.). Rather, the rulers and the ruled in Russia are engaged in a different type of socialization, in which the leaders use the mass media to inform the public of the new norms in the society. The audience then comes to understand the new terms of the society, seeking solace, comfort and a sense of identity from the mass media (particularly television). The Putin regime is seeking to instil a sense of authority and legitimacy. As with any country in a crisis state – such as a country at war – it is not surprising that this has resulted in aggressive calls to nationalism. Nor is it surprising in a chaotic and transitional period that the audience (as measured in this study through focus groups) has responded positively to the framing of Russia as a great power, the demonization of the Chechen people and the acceptance of a grinding civil war. At the same time, it comes as no great surprise that Russians evince the same sort of duality as found in Soviet citizens. They question the efficacy (as opposed to the philosophical right) of taking a hard-line stance and worry about the security of their country. Interestingly, they often appear to more worried about a superpower such as the United States than the more proximate problem of Chechen terrorism. Yet, while citizens of this regimen were once willing to follow these questions through to mounting a challenge to the regime during glasnost, experience appears to have made them more pragmatic. They acknowledge their concerns about rising authoritarianism, yet at the same time favour a strong hand over the uncertainty that more liberal introspection is almost sure to bring.