Prism Neg – MNDI BT 2015
Topicality - Curtail
Curtail = Decrease
1nc
“Curtail” means to prohibit
Friman and Andreas ‘99 (H. Richard Friman - associate professor of political science at Marquette University. Peter Andreas - academy scholar at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. The Illicit Global Economy and State Power. Google Books p. 76)
The efforts of governments to curtail illicit financial flows today bear more similarity to the initiatives of the 1920s that those at Bretton Woods. To begin with, international efforts to prohibit capital flight have been almost nonexistent.
Violation –702 doesn’t prohibit domestic surveillance – allows loopholes
“TFA” language in 702 allows NSA to bypass restrictions against domestic surveillance
Donohue ‘15 --From the Georgetown university of law.(Laura K., “Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content,” Georgetown Law. n/a date. http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2364&context=facpub)//TS
The component statutory interpretations, particularly TFA and the assumptions that mark the foreignness determination, undermine the protections created for U.S. persons in Sections 703 and 704 of the statute. They make it possible for the NSA to obtain significant amounts of American citizens’ communications. Until the FAA, the surveillance of U.S. persons outside domestic bounds took place under the weaker standards of Executive Order 12,333. Part of the purpose of the FAA was thus to increase the protections afforded to U.S. persons travelling abroad. 214 The way in which Section 702 is being used, however, allows the NSA to bypass Section 703 by making assumptions about legal status and location and potentially subjecting U.S. persons to surveillance without meeting the requirements of Section 703. The amount of information at stake is not insubstantial. For years, the volume of intercepts under Section 702 has been one of the principal concerns of legislators familiar with the program. Senators have consistently expressed unease about the intelligence community’s claim that it is impossible to quantify how many Americans’ communications have been implicated in the operation of Section 702.215 What has gradually become clear is that the program significantly more expansive than initially understood.21
Vote neg – destroys limits - aff justifies bi-directional plan texts, which undermines core neg ground like terrorism and politics DA and CP’s that compete on not decreasing domestic surveillance
Proves no solvency – TFA language creates letter of the law loophole
Topicality - Domestic
Domestic Surveillance = Data TFA US persons for Coercive Purposes
1nc
Domestic surveillance means that it must target US persons – not just be collected within the US
McCarthy, 6 – former assistant U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York. (Andrew, “It’s Not “Domestic Spying”; It’s Foreign Intelligence Collection” National Review, 5/15, Read more at: http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/122556/its-not-domestic-spying-its-foreign-intelligence-collection-andrew-c-mccarthy
Eggen also continues the mainstream media’s propagandistic use of the term “domestic surveillance [or 'spying'] program.” In actuality, the electronic surveillance that the NSA is doing — i.e., eavesdropping on content of conversations — is not “domestic.” A call is not considered “domestic” just because one party to it happens to be inside the U.S., just as an investigation is not “domestic” just because some of the subjects of interest happen to reside inside our country. Mohammed Atta was an agent of a foreign power, al Qaeda. Surveilling him — had we done it — would not have been “domestic spying.” The calls NSA eavesdrops on are “international,” not “domestic.” If that were not plain enough on its face, the Supreme Court made it explicit in the Keith case (1972). There, even though it held that judicial warrants were required for wiretapping purely domestic terror organizations, the Court excluded investigations of threats posed by foreign organizations and their agents operating both within and without the U.S. That is, the Court understood what most Americans understand but what the media, civil libertarians and many members of Congress refuse to acknowledge: if we are investigating the activities of agents of foreign powers inside the United States, that is not DOMESTIC surveillance. It is FOREIGN counter-intelligence.
That, in part, is why the statute regulating wiretaps on foreign powers operating within the U.S. — the one the media has suddenly decided it loves after bad-mouthing it for years as a rubber-stamp — is called the FOREIGN Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The United States has never needed court permission to conduct wiretapping outside U.S. territory; the wiretapping it does inside U.S. territory for national security purposes is FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, not “domestic surveillance.”
Surveillance is monitoring with preventive intent
Lemos, 10 - Associate Professor at Faculty of Communication at Federal University of Bahia, Brazil (Andre, ““Locative Media and Surveillance at the Boundaries of Informational Territories”,
http://www.irma-international.org/viewtitle/48348/
Although they often appear to be synonymous, it is important to distinguish between informational control, monitoring and surveillance so that the problem can be better understood. We consider control to be the supervision of activities, or actions normally associated with government and authority over people, actions and processes. Monitoring can be considered a form of observation to gather information with a view to making projections or constructing scenarios and historical records, i.e., the action of following up and evaluating data. Surveillance, however, can be defined as an act intended to avoid something, as an observation whose purposes are preventive or as behavior that is attentive, cautious or careful. It is interesting to note that in English and French the two words “vigilant” and “surveillance”, each of which is spelt the same way and has the same meaning in both languages, are applied to someone who is particularly watchful and to acts associated with legal action or action by the police intended to provide protection against crime, respectively. We shall define surveillance as actions that imply control and monitoring in accordance with Gow, for whom surveillance "implies something quite specific as the intentional observation of someone's actions or the intentional gathering of personal information in order to observe actions taken in the past or future" (Gow. 2005. p. 8).
According to this definition, surveillance actions presuppose monitoring and control, but not all forms of control and/or monitoring can be called surveillance. It could be said that all forms of surveillance require two elements: intent with a view to avoiding/causing something and identification of individuals or groups by name. It seems to me to be difficult to say that there is surveillance if there is no identification of the person under observation (anonymous) and no preventive intent (avoiding something). To my mind it is an exaggeration to say, for example, that the system run by my cell phone operator that controls and monitors my calls is keeping me under surveillance. Here there is identification but no intent. However, it can certainly be used for that purpose. The Federal Police can request wiretaps and disclosure of telephone records to monitor my telephone calls. The same can be said about the control and monitoring of users by public transport operators. This is part of the administrative routine of the companies involved. Once again, however, the system can be used for surveillance activities (a suspect can be kept under surveillance by the companies' and/or police safety systems). Note the example further below of the recently implemented "Navigo "card in France. It seems to me that the social networks, collaborative maps, mobile devices, wireless networks and countless different databases that make up the information society do indeed control and monitor and offer a real possibility of surveillance.
Violation – PPD28 limits foreign information gathering, not surveillance for coercive purposes on domestic people.
Voting issue – for limits and ground. They explode the topic –
(1) All information gathering is topical under their interpretation and the negative loses security based disads and critiques
(2) Expanding ‘domestic’ to cover immigration and foreign counter-intelligence – which are both big enough to be separate topics
AND, Extra-Topicality is illegit – adding PPD 28 is necessary for their solvency, which means they have unique advantage from the non-topical part of the plan. Reject the entire aff as not topical - don’t allow severance.
PPD-28 Regulates Foreign Surveillance
T- PPD 28 regulates foreign intel
Litt and Joel 14 (Robert Litt, he second General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and Alexander W. Joel, the first Civil Liberties Protection Officer for the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Interim Progress Report on Implementing PPD-28”, October 17, 2014, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-and-publications/204-reports-publications-2014/1126-interim-progress-report-on-implementing-ppd-28) // AW
PPD-28 reinforces current practices, establishes new principles, and strengthens oversight, to ensure that in conducting signals intelligence activities, the United States takes into account not only the security needs of our nation and our allies, but also the privacy of people around the world.¶ The Intelligence Community already conducts signals intelligence activities in a carefully controlled manner, pursuant to the law and subject to layers of oversight, focusing on important foreign intelligence and national security priorities. But as the President recognized, “[o]ur efforts will only be effective if ordinary citizens in other countries have confidence that the United States respects their privacy too.”¶ To that end, the Intelligence Community has been working hard to implement PPD-28 within the framework of existing processes, resources, and capabilities, while ensuring that mission needs continue to be met.
A2: We meet - American Companies are US Persons
American companies irrelevant to 702 authority – communication content determines domestic persons, not holder of the data – this means NSA’s interpretation of the plan would still allow for domestic surveillance according to LETTER OF THE LAW
Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr6304pcs/html/BILLS-110hr6304pcs.htm)//LP
Requirement to adopt.--The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall adopt targeting procedures that are reasonably designed to-- ``(A) ensure that any acquisition authorized under subsection (a) is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States; and ``(B) prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States.
Especially true because, per the American companies, individuals own data, not companies
Verizon ‘14 (“Amicus Brief: U.S. Search Warrants Do Not Apply to Data Stored Overseas,” 12/15/14, http://publicpolicy.verizon.com/blog/entry/us-search-warrants-do-not-apply-to-data-stored-overseas )//LP
Today, Verizon filed an amicus brief in support of Microsoft’s appeal to reverse a federal court’s decision that allowed the U.S. government to use a warrant to compel Microsoft to produce a customer’s email stored overseas. We were joined on our brief by Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, eBay, salesforce.com and Infor. The case does not involve Verizon or any Verizon customers’ data. Indeed, Verizon has not received any warrants from the U.S. government for customer data stored in our enterprise data centers outside the United States and we do not expect to receive such demands. Still, we have submitted this brief in order to turn back an unlawful overreach by the U.S. government. The law does not allow the U.S. government to use a search warrant to obtain customer data stored overseas. The U.S. Supreme Court has reiterated many times that U.S. statutes are presumed not to have extraterritorial application unless Congress “clearly expressed” its “affirmative intention” to the contrary.Congress has not clearly expressed its intention in any U.S. statutes that domestic warrants should apply to data stored in other countries. And there is good reason for that. For starters,the data at issue (the contents of private emails) belongs to a customer, not to the provider. Moreover, if U.S. law were to require a U.S. business to turn over customer data stored overseas it would conflict with the laws of many other countries that protect the privacy of such data and limit disclosure outside the country in which the data is stored. Furthermore, permitting the U.S. government to use a warrant to obtain data stored overseas would just encourage foreign governments to claim that they can obtain data stored in the U.S., which would threaten the privacy of Americans.
Domestic = In US Territory
1nc
“domestic” in the context of surveillance means collection of data in US territory
Thompson, ‘13 -- Legislative Attorney (Richard M. Thompson II is writing for the congressional research service, 4/3/13, http://www.pennyhill.com/jmsfileseller/docs/R42701.pdf) LP
In a series of cases that provide the closest analogy to UAVs, the Supreme Court addressed the use of manned aircraft to conduct domestic surveillance over residential and industrial areas. In each, the Court held that the fly-over at issue was not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, as the areas surveilled were open to public view.
Domestic is only Domestic networks
Savage and McConnell 15 (John E. Savage, An Wang Professor of Computer Science Box 1910, Computer Science Department Brown University Brown University, Bruce W. McConnell Bruce McConnell is responsible for leading EWI’s communications and networking with public and private sectors around the world, Senior Vice President, January 20,2015 http://www.ewi.info/idea/exploring-multi-stakeholder-internet-governance accessed June 28, 15)PA
It is domestic when the data transits only domestic networks. It can become an international issue when it crosses territorial boundaries, for example, when data is encrypted.
Violation – American companies store data internationally – this is the data that their internal links assume and it means that aff restricts foreign surveillance
Voting issue – for limits. They explode the topic –
Expanding ‘domestic’ to cover territory outside the US justifies surveillance of US bases, embassies, and international drones. Makes neg research burden impossible.
AND, Extra-Topicality is illegit – they may restrict some domestic servers, but they must also limit international servers to solve the aff. Reject the entire aff - don’t allow severance.
Data stored on non-US servers
Data is stored outside US territory by domestic companies
Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai 6/12/14 http://mashable.com/2014/06/12/microsoft-u-s-government-data-foreign-servers/ “Microsoft Fights U.S. Government Over Rights to Data on Foreign Servers” Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai is a reporter at Mashable's New York headquarters, where he covers cybersecurity, tech policy, privacy and surveillance, hackers, drones, and, more in general, the intersection of technology and civil liberties. Before Mashable, Lorenzo was an intern at Wired.com, where he wrote for Danger Room, and Threat Level. A recent graduate of Columbia's Graduate School of Journalism Lorenzo is also a Law graduate at University of Barcelona.