Iskra Fileva
Department of Philosophy Home: (857) 919-3694
UNC-Chapel Hill Office: (919) 962-0176
Caldwell Hall, CB#3125 Fax: (919) 843-3929
Chapel Hill, NC 29599
Employment
2011– present / UNC-Chapel Hill / Visiting Assistant Professor of PhilosophyFaculty Fellow of the Parr Center for Ethics
2010 – 2011 / Temple University / Visiting Assistant Professor
2008 – 2010 / University of Nevada, Reno / Post-Doctoral Fellow
Education
2003 – 2008 / Boston University, Ph.D.Doctoral Dissertation: Behind Action
2000 – 2002 / Saint Louis University, MA (pass with distinction)
Master’s thesis: Commensurating Ends
1994 – 1999 / Sofia University, Magister in Philosophy (pass with highest honors)
Areas of Specialization
Ethics, Moral Psychology, Aesthetics
Areas of Competence
Political Theory, Philosophy of Law, Epistemology, Metaphysics
Fellowships and Awards
Character Essay Prize, The Character Project, Templeton Foundation, 2013
Parr Center for Ethics, Faculty Fellow, UNC-Chapel Hill, 2011-2013
GRS Brightman Fellow, Boston University, Summer 2008
Earhart Fellow, Earhart Foundation, 2007-2008
Presidential Fellow, Boston University, 2003-2007
Research Assistantship, Saint Louis University, 2000-2002
Outstanding Undergraduate Student Fellowship, Sofia University, 1994-1999 (awarded each semester
on the basis of highest grades achieved)
Research
Books (Authored)
Character and Authority (provisional agreement with Oxford University Press). In progress.
Books (Edited)
Perspectives on Character. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
This is an interdisciplinary collection of essays with first-rate contributors from philosophy, psychology, and social science.
Journal Articles
“A Puzzle about Knowledge in Action,” Logique et Analyse, forthcoming.
“Will Retributivism Die and Will Neuroscience Kill It?” Cognitive Systems Research, Special Issue
on Philosophical Approaches to Social Neuroscience, forthcoming. Co-authored with Jon Tresan.
“Wisdom beyond Rationality: A Reply to Ryan,” Acta Analytica, forthcoming. DOI: 10.1007/s12136-
012-0171-3. Co-authored with Jon Tresan.
“The Neutrality of Rightness and the Indexicality of Goodness: Beyond Objectivity and Back Again,” Ratio 21, 3 (2008): 273-285.
Reviews
Review of Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays by Thomas Schelling, The Journal of Value Inquiry, forthcoming. DOI 10.1007/s10790-012-9352-y
Review of Reasons without Rationalism by Kieran Setiya, The Journal of Value Inquiry 43, 4 (2009): 521-530.
Book Chapters
“Playing with Fire: Art and the Seductive Power of Pain” in P. Destrée & J. Levinson, eds., Suffering Art Gladly. Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming.
“Two Senses of ‘Why’: Traits and Reasons in the Explanation of Action” in I. Fileva, ed., Perspectives on Character. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
“Introduction” in I. Fileva, ed., Perspectives on Character. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
“Communicability of Pleasure and Normativity of Taste in Kant’s Third Critique” in J. M. Torralba, ed., Doscientos Años Después: Retornos y Relecturas de Kant (Two Hundred Years After: Returns and Re-interpretations of Kant), Pamplona, Spain: Publication Services of the University of Navarra, No. 21 (2005), pp. 21-32.
“Can We Know Too Much, Do We Know Too Little, and Does It Make a Difference Either Way?” in H. Ikäheimo, J. Kotkavirta, A. Laitinen, and P. Lyyra, eds., Personhood, Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2004, pp. 43-53.
In the Media
“Talk and Taboo,” New York Times, forthcoming.
“Character and Its Discontents,” New York Times, March 25, 2012. Winner of the Character Project’s Character Essay Prize
“Philosophy and Style, or who’s Afraid of Beautiful Beasts?” ASA Newsletter (Spring, 2006): 1-2. Reprinted in Folly (April, 2007): 17-20.
“Who’s Got Character,” interview with radio talk show host Jose Drost-Lopez, PsychTalk Radio, May 2, 2012. Available at: http://psychtalkradio.com/2012/05/01/whos-got-character/
Under Review
“The Sources of Passivity”
“Context without Contextualism”
“Why it’s Fine in Shakespeare but a Flaw in Sienkiewicz”
“Metaethics and Mental Time Travel: A Reply to Gerrans and Kennett” (with Jon Tresan)
In Progress
“Trust without Evidence”
“Constructivism after Mackie: A Reply to Shah”
“Why Harm Won’t Go the Way of Phlogiston” (with Jon Tresan)
Presentations
“Context without Contextualism,” 39th Conference on Value Inquiry, Bowling Green University,
April 2013 (forthcoming)
“The Ways of Wisdom,” 23rd World Congress of Philosophy, Athens, August 2013 (forthcoming; by invitation)
“The Sources of Passivity: Why, if at all, is Character Not Up to us?”
× Eastern APA, Main Program, Atlanta, GA, December 2012
× European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, London, August 2012
× Department Colloquium, University of Maryland, April 2012 (by invitation)
× Moral Psychology Discussion Group, Duke University, March 2012
“Historical Inaccuracy in Art,” BSA Annual Meeting, Queen’s College, Oxford University, September 2012
“On a Recent Attempt to Combat Skepticism about Virtue with Pragmatism about Virtue Ascription,” Visiting Scholars Workshop, UNC-Chapel Hill, August 2012
“Traits and Reasons in the Explanation of Action”
× Penn Philosophers’ Lunch, University of Pennsylvania, April 2011 (by invitation)
× Visiting Scholars Workshop, UNC-Chapel Hill, August 2011
“A Puzzle about Knowledge in Action”
× Eastern APA, Main Program, Boston, December 2010
× Temple University Colloquia Series, September 2010
“Skepticism about Collective Responsibility,” Conference on Collective Intentionality VII: Perspectives on Social Ontology, University of Basel, Switzerland, August 2010
“Thought Experiments in Philosophy and Fiction”
× Philosophy and Literature Conference, Vaasa University, Finland, May 2010
× Sixteenth International Philosophy Colloquium on Art, Evian (Lake Geneva), France, July 2010
× International Congress of Aesthetics, Beijing University, Beijing, August 2010
“Can a Film Answer a Philosophical Question?” Film-Philosophy III Conference, University of Warwick, July 2010
“Can You Act on a Reason That You Don’t Know You Have?” Fourth Conference of the Dutch-Flemish Association for Analytic Philosophy, Higher Institute of Philosophy, Leuven, January 2010
“Beyond Concealment”
× Center for Applied Ethics and Philosophy, Hokkaido University, Japan, November 2008
× V Interuniversity Workshop on Art, Mind and Morals, Universitat Illes Balears, Spain, December 2008
“Two Puzzles about Reasons for Action,” Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, York University, Toronto, June 2007
“The Neutrality of Rightness and the Indexicality of Goodness: Beyond Objectivity and Back Again”
× Eastern APA, New York, December 2005 (winner of Graduate Student Travel Award)
× Ockham Society, Oxford University, November 2005 (by invitation)
× International Humanities Conference, Cambridge UK, August 2005
× Thirty-second Conference on Value Inquiry, Baton Rouge, April 2005
“Vice’s Non-Innocent Victims”, Emotions, Others and the Self, Åbo Akademie, Finland, August, 2005
“Foolish Games: Hobbes and the Safer Strategy of Trustworthiness”
× Pacific APA, San Francisco, March 2005
× Society for Student Philosophers, Grand Valley, October 2005
“Communicability of Pleasure and Normativity of Taste in Kant’s Third Critique”
× UK Kant Society Graduate Conference, Oxford University, July 2007
× Beauty Looking in the Eyes of the Beholder, Graduate Center at CUNY, November 2004
× Annual ASA Meeting in Houston, November 2004 (winner of graduate student travel stipend)
× 200 Years After: Returns and Re-interpretations of Kant, University of Navarra, March, 2004
“Can We Know Too Much, Do We Know Too Little, and Does It Make a Difference Either Way?” Dimensions of Personhood, University of Jyväskylä, Finland, August, 2004
“Might Truth Be Subversive of What We Really Care About?” Special Conference on Values, Rational Choice and the Will, University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point, April, 2004
“What Should We Do If We Want to Do What We Should?” University of Oregon Graduate Conference, March 2002
Commentaries
Comments on Matthew Smith’s “Bootstrapping and the Authority of Intentions,” RoME V, University of Boulder, Colorado, August 2012
Comments on David Dick’s “Frankfurt’s Unthinkable Actions,” Eastern APA Meeting, Washington, D.C., December 2011
Comments on Mary Beth Willard’s “Historical Criticism and the Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance,” Eastern ASA Meeting, Philadelphia, April 2011
Comments on Nishi Shah’s “The Limits of Normative Detachment,” Northwestern Ethics Conference, Northwestern University, May 2010
Comments on Christine Neulieb’s “Plato on Human Action as Artistic Representation,” Eastern ASA Meeting, Philadelphia, April 2010
Comments on Michael Thune’s “Does Disagreement Lead to Skepticism? A Response to Feldman,” 63rd Annual Mountain-Plains Philosophy Conference, University of Nevada, Reno, October 2009
Comments on Marcus Arvan’s “A Simple Account of the Permissibility of Following Orders in an Unjust War,” 45th Annual Meeting of the Western Canadian Philosophical Association, University of Alberta, October 2008
Comments on Sarah Worth’s “Narrative Inference, Narrative Reasoning,” Eastern ASA Meeting, Philadelphia, April 2008
Comments on William McCarthy’s “Aesthetic Value and Our Obligations to the Natural Environment,” Pacific ASA Meeting, California, March 2008
Comments on Stefan Cojocaru’s “Motivation beyond Personal Expectations,” Boston University Graduate Student Presentation Series, November 2007
Comments on Russell Weaver’s “There Is No Such Thing as an Interpretation (Sort of), or Why We Can’t Tell Whether Jake Barnes Develops or Not,” Eastern ASA Meeting, Philadelphia, April 2007
Comments on Nicholas Michaud’s “Moral Luck and the Loss of Ignorance,” Meeting of the New Jersey Regional Philosophical Association, The College of New Jersey, March 2007
Invited Public Talks
“The Right to Healthcare,” Faculty-Student Panel Discussion, UNC-Chapel Hill, April 2013
(forthcoming)
“It Wouldn’t Have been Worth it If that Island Were Made of Gold,” Panel Discussion on the China-Japan Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island, UNC–Chapel Hill, September 2012
“The Price of Silence,” Center for Human Science, Chapel Hill, NC, May 2012
“The Psychiatrist and the Marketplace, or the Madness in Treating Madness,” Lunch and Learn Series, Parr Center for Ethics, UNC-Chapel Hill, April 2012
Teaching Experience
At UNC-Chapel Hill
Phil 272 The Ethics of Peace, War, and Defense, Spring 2013
Phil 384 Prisoner’s Dilemma, Fall 2012/Spring 2013
Phil 364 Ethics and Economics, Fall 2011/Spring 2012
Phil 280 Law and Morality, Spring 2012
Phil 170 Social Ethics and Political Theory, Fall 2011
At Temple University
Phil 3222 Contemporary Ethical Theories, Fall 2010
Phil 4221 Social and Political Theory, Fall 2010
IH 851 Intellectual Heritage, Spring 2011
At the University of Nevada, Reno
Phil 207 /PSC 227 Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy, Spring 2010
Phil 245 Contemporary Moral Issues, Spring 2010/Summer 2010
Phil 440/640 (in conjunction with 712) Theory of Knowledge, Fall 2008/ Fall 2009
Phil 101.003 /101.004 Introduction to Philosophy, Fall 2008/Fall 2009
Phil 441/641 (in conjunction with 712) Metaphysics, Spring 2009
Phil 295 Philosophy of Literature/Eng 223 Topics in Literature, Spring 2009
At Saint Louis University
Phil 300 Business Ethics, Summer 2001
Professional Service
Journal Referee
Philosophical Papers, Acta Analytica
Honors Thesis Supervisor
× Joseph Alpert, “The Concept of Happiness in Philosophy and Behavioral Economics,” Spring 2011, Temple University
× Carl Hernandez, “Bergson’s Theory of Laughter,” University of Nevada, Reno, Spring, 2010
Other
× Judge for North Carolina Ethics Bowl and the North Carolina Ethics and Leadership Conference, 2012-2013
× Graduate Advisor for the undergraduate journal Arché, Spring 2008
× Editor of Khora (trilingual philosophy journal published in Sofia), 1999-2000
× Organizer of: Karbank Symposium, Boston University, May 2007; Interfaith Dialogue Panel, Temple University, April 2008; Interdisciplinary Workshop on Character, UNC-Chapel Hill, May 2013 (forthcoming)
Languages
French (good reading skills, some speaking skills)
German (reading knowledge only)
Japanese (fair reading and speaking skills)
Russian (very good reading skills, some speaking skills)
Professional Affiliations
Member of the American Philosophical Association
Member of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology
Member of the American Society for Aesthetics
Non-Academic Interests and Activities
creative writing, classical music (piano and guitar playing, improvisation), mathematical puzzles, various card games
References
Professor Susan Wolf (UNC-Chapel Hill); Tel.: +1 (919) 549-0668, Ext. 214; Email:
Professor Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (UNC-Chapel Hill); Tel.: +1 (919) 627-1403; Email:
Professor Jeanette Boxill (UNC-Chapel Hill), Director of the Parr Center for Ethics; Tel.: +1 (919) 962-3317; Email:
Professor Aaron Garrett (Boston University), dissertation committee chair; Tel.: +1 (617) 358- 3617; Email:
Professor Adrian Moore (Oxford University), dissertation reader; Tel: +44 (1865) 274-953; Email:
Professor Simon Keller (University of Victoria, Wellington), dissertation reader, Tel.: +64 (4) 463-9638; Email:
Professor Russell Hardin (New York University), dissertation reader, Tel.: +1 (212) 998-8500; Email:
Dissertation Abstract
This is a project on the nature of rational action. The guiding questions that frame my inquiry are “What is it to act on reasons?” and “What does it mean to explain an action?” The thesis is motivated, to a large extent, by the belief that currently existing models of action are too simplistic: they do not adequately represent the complexity and the often ambiguous character of human motivation. My main overall purpose has been to provide an account that captures that complexity. The thesis has an essay format. The essays are on interlocking themes and,taken together,add up to a comprehensive and coherent picture.
In Chapter One, I question the widespread assumption that when we act for reasons we know what our reasons are. I argue that an agent may act in ignorance, or partial ignorance, regarding his or her reasons, and an action involving ignorance of this sort may still qualify as reason-based. I conclude from here that we need to develop a suitable new model of action, and I proceed to offer such a model. Briefly, I argue that an action qualifies as reason-based when the agent performing it possesses a reasons explanation of it and is (at least partly) motivated to act by the fact he possesses such an explanation. The crucial point is that the agent may not be motivated – not even in part – by the content of the reasons that constitute the explanation in question.
In Chapter Two, I offer a parallel argument concerning the structure of justification: an action is justified, I claim, when a justificatory reason for it exists, and the agent performing the action is (at least partly) motivated by the existence of a justificatory reason; the agent may not, however, be motivated, not even in part, by the content of the justificatory reason.
The theme of Chapter Three is the role of rational principles in action explanation. On the view I develop, rational principles implicit in action explanation play a dual role – on the one hand, they govern the explanation itself, much as lawlike generalizations govern scientific explanations; on the other hand, ex hypothesi, they are assumed to have governed the agent acting. Reflecting on this duality leads to important conclusions regarding the sense in which reasons explanations are normative. At the end of the chapter, I proceed to criticize Jonathan Dancy’s prominent account of normativity.
In Chapter Four, I examine trait-based explanations of action (explanations of the type “He did A because he is honest”), and I compare them to reason-based explanations (“He did A because he thought that A was the right thing to do”). I raise such questions as: How do traits explanations explain? Why do we ever use traits explanations rather than reason-based ones? Is it because reasons explanations leave something unexplained, something that traits can explain further? The answers I offer, taken together, constitute a systematic account of the connection between the two types of action explanation and of why we need both despite the fact that the two are connected and have similar functions.
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