HOW WILL THE LEGALIZATION OF METHAMPHETAMINE
IMPACT A MID SIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY BY THE YEAR 2006?
A project presented to
California Commission on
Peace Officer Standards and Training
By
Captain Dennis McQueeny
Marin County Sheriff’s Office
Command College Class XXXI
Sacramento, California
November 2001
31-0621
This Command College Project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning considerations.
Defining the future differs from analyzing the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systemically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.
Managing the future means influencing the future; creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.
The view and conclusions expressed in this Command College project are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).
Copyright 2001
California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training
EPIGRAPH
The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.
Edmund Burke
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv
Chapter I
ISSUE IDENTIFICATION
Introduction 1
Statement of the Issue 10
Environmental Scan 11
Literature Review 13
Chapter II
FUTURES STUDY
Introduction 17
Nominal Group Technique 17
Trends 18
Events 23
Cross Impact Analysis 30
Alternative Scenarios 31
Optimistic Scenario 32
Pessimistic Scenario 33
Surprise Free Scenario 38
Chapter III
STRATEGIC PLAN
Introduction 42
Organizational Description 43
Situational Analysis 45
Strategy Development 50
Implementation Plan 53
Cost Analysis 54
Page
Chapter IV
TRANSITION MANAGEMENT
Introduction 56
Commitment Plan 56
Management Structure 60
Transition Techniques 62
Evaluation Activities 64
Chapter V
CONCLUSION
Project Summary 65
Recommendations 66
Implications for Leadership 66
THE APPENDICES
Appendix A
Nominal Group Technique Panel 68
Appendix B
List of Trends 69
Appendix C
List of Events 70
NOTES 71
BIBLIOGRAPHY 73
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1 Trend Summary 19
2 Event Summary 24
3 Cross Impact Analysis 30
4 Critical Mass Commitment 57
5 Responsibility Chart 63
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
With the support and encouragement of many people, I was able to complete the Command College. I am grateful that POST created the Command College and has sustained it throughout the years. Command College has been by far the most valuable and rewarding law enforcement educational experience I have ever had the honor or participating in.
I want to thank Sheriff Robert Doyle for allowing me the opportunity to attend the Command College. I also want to thank Sergeant Tim Lepinski for his leadership of the Marin County Major Crimes Task Force during my absences in San Marcos and when I was completing this and other required projects.
I am fortunate to have been a member of Class Thirty-One. This group of law enforcement professionals were a pleasure to be with, not only in the classroom, but after hours at dinners, baseball games, golfing and movies we enjoyed as a group. These men made the entire experience enjoyable and rewarding.
I want to especially thank my family. Vacations were shortened or cancelled and many important events were missed due to Command College commitments. My wife, Sheila, summed it up well in the early stages of the program, “ I hardly ever see you anymore. Even when you’re home, all you do is go upstairs and read.”
My children gained a valuable insight; education never ends.
70
CHAPTER ONE
ISSUE IDENTIFICATION
Introduction
In 1972, President Richard Nixon coined the phrase War on Drugs to give a sense of urgency and necessity to America’s battle against illicit drug use, especially among this country’s youth. Using this metaphoric comparison of America’s drug problems to a war was a headline grabber then, and it has the same effect today. In this country’s perspective, wars require a dedicated and relentless effort to win. Winning is everything, losing is not an option. This phrase served Nixon’s political needs in 1972, but it has since spawned endless debate and controversy. Today, many in America feel that the war has gone on for too long without any tangible results. Support is growing for new strategies and the battle lines are changing.[1]
As the fall of Saigon signaled the failure of another war, Nixon’s upcoming campaign needed an issue to ignite the electorate and force his opponents to take a side. America by the early 1970s had experienced Vietnam protests, urban riots, hippies, flower children, Charles Manson and rock star overdoses. It seemed that drug use was burgeoning and America’s youth were increasingly at risk. A White House study predicted that heroin-addicted soldiers returning from Vietnam would bring with them crime and the attendant problems of chronic addiction. This problem never materialized but Nixon used the report to heighten interest and awareness of another potential contributor to the drug problem in America.[2]
Nixon furthered his highly publicized war on drugs with the formulation of ODALE, the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement. This special unit of three hundred federal drug agents answered directly to the White House, not to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) or Customs, the federal agencies then fighting drugs. John Ingersoll, the director of BNDD at the time, was not even aware of the formulation of this unit. He first learned of ODALE when he saw President Nixon making the announcement on television. This unit’s mission was street level drug enforcement, an activity, heretofore, never undertaken by federal law enforcement.
Nixon appointed former Customs Commissioner Myles Ambrose to head ODALE. Ambrose was a large man with a no-nonsense reputation in federal law enforcement. He was just the man Nixon needed to create some sensational drug busts that would capture media attention. Commissioner Ambrose used the inner city streets of American cities to create the telegenic drug war that Nixon wanted for his reelection campaign. Eighteen months later with Nixon in office, ODALE had served its purpose and was disbanded.[3]
In 1973, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was formed. Congress mandated that DEA’s primary mission would be the interdiction of illicit drugs on the highest level. It was placed in the Justice Department and given a higher stature than any previous federal drug enforcement agency. Drug agents from ODALE, BNDD and Customs were combined into this one agency. With elevated status, DEA’s budget grew as agents were added and offices were opened around the country. Nixon made good on his campaign promise. He began training, arming and preparing his troops for the war on drugs. Nixon resigned in 1973 amid the Watergate scandal and Gerald Ford ascended to the presidency.
Ford’s administration continued some of the treatment programs started by Nixon, but questions arose during this time about the real drug problem versus the perceived problem. President Ford considered the issue of studying the decriminalization of marijuana, something heretical to his former boss.
The war on drugs began to waiver without the strong advocacy of Richard Nixon. Eleven states either removed penalties for possession of marijuana or reduced the sanction to the level of a traffic ticket. In the 1976 presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter said incarcerating marijuana smokers was counterproductive.
Once elected, President Carter appointed Stanford-trained psychiatrist Peter Bourne as his drug policy advisor. Dr. Bourne was the first national drug advisor who really knew about drug addiction. He was one of the original founders of the Haight-Ashbury Free Clinic in San Francisco. Bourne finally convinced Carter that marijuana should be decriminalized and Carter addressed congress on this issue on August 2, 1977.[4] It appeared that the war on drugs was surrendering, until cocaine began to appear as a popular new drug in the mid 1970s. Poor judgement in prescribing a sedative for a staff member led to a scandal and loss of credibility for Bourne. Rumors began to spread that Bourne had attended a Washington, D.C. party where marijuana and cocaine had been used. Bourne resigned and Carter appeared vulnerable on drug issues. With the 1980 reelection campaign and Ronald Reagan looming ahead, the Carter administration restrained from further comments on the drug legalization issue.
Ronald Reagan saw an opportunity and he, like Nixon, deftly used drugs and crime issues against Carter in the 1980 campaign.[5] He quickly reversed the treatment and decriminalization movement of Ford and Carter and moved to return retribution and revenge to government’s role in drug enforcement. “We’re taking down the surrender flag that has run over so many drug efforts. We’re running up a battle flag.”6 The Omnibus Crime Act of 1984 gave the Reagan administration more and more weapons to deal with the incredible wealth and power that cocaine traffickers were amassing. Federal prosecutors were given new laws with stiffer penalties. Asset forfeiture laws were enacted to take away the drug dealers ill-gotten wealth. Drug profits or property used to facilitate drug-dealing efforts were subject to seizure without an underlying criminal conviction.
In 1985, crack cocaine hit the streets of America. This cheap, smokeable form of cocaine was now accessible to the poor. Inner city America exploded with gang wars, homicides and crack babies. The media wasted no time in exploiting the dramatic scenes of another drug-related murder, drug cops making dramatic sweeps or raids on fortified crack houses. Crack cocaine created a frighteningly real and vivid drug war, played out in the living rooms of America every night. More had to be done, and soon the drug war spread. America looked to stop cocaine at its source, in the coca plantations of Colombia and Peru.
George Bush, when Vice President, was assigned by President Reagan to head a multi-agency strike force in South Florida in the mid-1980s. Cocaine smuggling and distribution was out of control in South Florida. Bush’s strategy worked; however, an unintended consequence led to the alliance of Colombian drug cartels with Mexican cartels and the shifting of smuggling to the Mexican border. A much larger problem emerged as Mexico’s police, politicians and even the military fell prey to the corruptive influences of the Mexican cartels and the huge profits they were reaping.
George Bush won the presidency in 1988. He had been severely criticized in the campaign for his handling of the drug war for Reagan. The federal antidrug budget had been tripled during Reagan’s years in office and there was virtually nothing to show for it. Bush vowed to fight on. Federal money and asset forfeiture dollars were flowing into the coffers of federal, state and local drug enforcement agencies. However, a series of scandals and revelations shed light on America’s involvement in Central and South America.
The Iran-Contra guns-for-drugs scandal revealed in Senate hearings that the CIA was aware of the Contra’s involvement in drug trafficking. National Security aide Ollie North brought this sordid affair directly into the White House. Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega had been a CIA operative for many years and a photograph of Noriega and Bush together during this period added to Bush’s growing credibility problems.
A CBS-New York Times poll taken just prior to the 1988 elections showed that half of the Americans polled saw drug trafficking as the number one international problem.[7] When George Bush assumed the presidency, he knew from his CIA and drug war background that an international effort requiring all of America’s resources would be needed to fight the drug war and he knew that Americans supported it.
George Bush’s one term in the White House marked a watershed period in America’s drug war. The military’s involvement in supporting drug interdiction activities in South America and along our Southern borders increased dramatically. The FBI and DEA joined with state and local law enforcement to provide manpower and financial assistance to local task forces and drug units. Asset forfeiture reached its zenith, with states passing laws mirroring federal asset seizure laws.
During George Bush’s term, the combined local state and federal drug budgets were $120 billion, more than Americans spent on private health insurance.[8] In the early 1990s, press reports were common with anecdotal stories about police scandals produced by the drug war. Drug cops stealing drug money, drug cops raiding the wrong house, drug cops hurting or killing innocent people were common newspaper headlines. Real estate and personal property were being seized without due process or underlying criminal convictions. America began to speak up and politicians began to listen.
A child of the ‘60s, a saxophone player and an admitted marijuana smoker who did not inhale, William Jefferson Clinton entered the White House in 1992 and many opponents of the drug war saw an opportunity to turn things around. Clinton included more drug treatment in his massive health care reform proposal; however, Congress succeeded in thwarting Clinton’s reform strategies on health care.
Clinton appointed Dr. Joycelyn Elders to be his Surgeon General. She had advocated for a change in national drug policy prior to appointment, so her stance on drugs was clear. However, once in office she responded to a question after a speech, “I do feel that we would markedly reduce our crime rate if drugs were legalized.”[9] The White House quickly responded and noted that President Clinton was against the legalization of drugs. Dr. Elders’ critics could not be silenced and she eventually resigned. Clinton’s first drug budget was similar to Bush’s, with a heavy emphasis on enforcement.
In1996, California passed into law Proposition 215, the medical marijuana or Compassionate Use Act. This followed the passage of a similar law in Arizona. The law reads in part:
To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that the person’s health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides relief.[10]
The confusion that this law created for California law enforcement and District Attorneys has yet to be settled. But the same wealthy philanthropists who provided millions of dollars for the successful passage of Proposition 215 also spent millions to fund the successful passage of Proposition 36 in November 2000.