Hawaii & Federal Rules of Evidence

EVIDENCE (LAW 543) Fall 2017

HANDOUT #1

HAWAII & FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE)

with Commentary 1 - 75

Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 76 – 105

(with amendments proposed for Dec. 2017)

Professors John Barkai & Kenneth Lawson

William S. Richardson School of Law

University of Hawaii at Manoa

(808) 956-6546

http://www2.hawaii.edu/~barkai/L543.html

HAWAII RULES OF EVIDENCE

These Rules of Evidence are found in HRS Chapter 626

HRS §6261 Enactment. The Hawaii Rules of Evidence as set forth in this section is enacted:

ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

tab hereRULE 100 TITLE AND CITATION.

These rules shall be known and cited as the Hawaii Rules of Evidence. Each rule shall be cited by its number. A complete citation to a rule may read as follows: Rule ______, Hawaii Rules of Evidence, Chapter 626, Hawaii Revised Statutes.

RULE 100 COMMENTARY

The purpose of this chapter is to codify the law of evidence, to promote informed judicial rulings on evidence points, and to achieve uniformity in the treatment of evidence among the courts of this State.

RULE 101 SCOPE.

These rules govern proceedings in the courts of the State of Hawaii, to the extent and with the exceptions stated in rule 1101.

RULE 101 COMMENTARY

This rule differs from Fed. R. Evid. 101 only in that "courts of the State of Hawaii" has been substituted for "courts of the United States and before United States magistrates." Rule 1101 provides greater detail regarding the applicability of the rules in various courts and proceedings.

RULE 102 PURPOSE AND CONSTRUCTION.

These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.

RULE 102 COMMENTARY

This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 102. It parallels similar provisions in the Hawaii Rules of Court, see Carp 2, HRCP 1, and HFCR 1. Except for Articles III and V, these rules have as their model the Federal Rules of Evidence (Fed. R. Evid.), 28 U.S.C. app., at 539 (1976), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. Fed. R. Evid. (Supp. 1979). Accordingly, the commentary to each rule (except in Articles III and V) indicates whether the rule is identical with or differs from the counterpart federal rule. The intent is to make applicable, as an aid in construction, the federal decisional law construing identical or similar Fed. R. Evid. provisions. Other sources for these rules, noted from time to time in the commentaries, are the Uniform Rule of Evidence and the Cal. Evid. Code (especially for Article III).

RULE 102.1 EFFECT OF COMMENTARY.

The commentary to these rules when published may be used as an aid in understanding the rules, but not as evidence of legislative intent.

RULE 102.1 COMMENTARY

This rule has no Fed. R. Evid. counterpart. It closely resembles Hawaii Rev. Stat. s 701105 (1976), which limits the effect of the penal code commentary because, as the commentary to that section points out, "of the strong judicial deference given legislative committee reports and other evidence of legislative intent authored by the Legislature or its staff." See State v. Aiu, 59 H. 92, 98, 576 P.2d 1044, 1049 (1978); State v. Anderson, 58 H. 479, 483, 572 P.2d 159, 162 (1977); State v. Alo, 57 H. 418, 42627, 558 P.2d 1012, 1017 (1976); State v. Nobriga, 56 H. 75, 77, 527 P.2d 1269, 1273 (1974).

RULE 103 RULINGS ON EVIDENCE.

(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and:

(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or

(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked.

Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.

(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in question and answer form.

(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.

(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court.

RULE 103 COMMENTARY

This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 103.
Subsection (a): This subsection expresses the principle that a ruling admitting or excluding evidence cannot be assigned as error unless it affects a substantial right and unless the court is clearly apprised of the nature of the claimed error and of the corrective action sought. The objection or motion to strike, addressed to a ruling admitting evidence, and the offer of proof, directed to a ruling excluding evidence, provide the appropriate procedural mechanisms.
The rule restates existing Hawaii law. In Trask v. Kam, 44 H. 10, 22, 352 P.2d 320, 32627 (1959), the court pointed out that error in admission of testimony is not a basis for reversal absent "substantial resulting prejudice" to the rights of a party. See Bergson v. Post, 38 H. 436 (1949); HRCP 61.
In State v. Okura, 56 H. 455, 458, 541 P.2d 9, 11 (1975), the court held: "A motion to strike must be specific; it must be directed with precision to the matter sought to be stricken and a general motion to strike all testimony must be overruled if any portion of that testimony is admissible." There is a need for a specific offer of proof, Warshaw v. / Rockresorts, 57 H. 645, 651, 562 P.2d 428, 433 (1977), unless the nature of the error is clear, Territory v. Branco, 42 H. 304, 313 (1958).
Subsection (b): This subsection generally restates relevant provisions of HRCP 43(c). The intent is to provide the appellate court with a record adequate for final disposition of an evidentiary point. The provision is discretionary rather than mandatory, leaving determination of adequacy of record to the judgment of the trial court.
Subsection (c): This provision recognizes that an exclusionary ruling may be nullified if the evidence sought to be excluded is brought to the attention of the jury either through an offer of proof or other means. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); HRCP 43(c).
Subsection (d): This provision resembles HRCrP 52(b): "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Cf. Lindeman v. Raynor, 43 H. 299, 303 (1959): "[E]ven without objection the court may reject improper evidence."

RULE 104 PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS.

(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subsection (b). In making its determination the court is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.

(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.

(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require or, when an accused is a witness, if the accused so requests.

(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary matter, subject oneself to crossexamination as to other issues in the case.

(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.

RULE 104 COMMENTARY

This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 104.

Subsection (a): Questions of admissibility frequently hinge on determinations of fact. Under Rule 603.1 a witness incapable of understanding the duty to tell the truth is disqualified. Communications may be privileged under Rules 503, 504, 504.1, and 505 if they were intended to be confidential when uttered. The hearsay exceptions in Rule 804(b) require that the declarant be shown to be "unavailable as a witness" as provided in Rule 804(a). McCormick discusses the reasons for entrusting the determination of such preliminary matters to the court:

If the special question of fact were submitted to the jury when objection was made, cumbersome and awkward problems about unanimity would be raised. If the judge admitted the evidence ...... to the jury and directed them to disregard it unless they found that the disputed fact existed, the aim of the exclusionary rule would likely be frustrated ......

McCormick, Evidence s 53 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCormick].

This subsection addresses also the issue of applicability of the evidence rules during such preliminary determinations of admissibility. As the Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) points out:

If the question is factual in nature, the judge will of necessity receive evidence pro and con on the issue. The rule [104(a)] provides that the rules of evidence in general do not apply to this process ...... and that the judge should be empowered to hear any relevant evidence, such as affidavits or other reliable hearsay. This view is reinforced by practical necessity in certain situations. An item, offered and objected to, may itself be considered in ruling on admissibility, though not yet admitted in evidence.

Any attempt to extend the rules of evidence to preliminary issues of admissibility would be selfdefeating and, in most instances, self contradictory. The sole exceptions are the rules of privilege, see Article 5 infra. As provided in Rule 1101(c) infra, the rules of privilege apply at all stages of actions or proceedings. This is consistent with the intent of the privilege rules. Most commonly, the status of the communicant rather than the content of the communication determines whether or not the privilege legitimately may be invoked; and compulsory disclosure of the communication, even at a preliminary hearing, might serve to defeat the purpose of the privilege.

Subsection (b): This is the standard rule of conditional relevancy. It governs instances in which the probative value of an item of evidence depends on the existence, and the proof, of another fact. For example, the relevancy of a written contract would be conditioned upon proof of the authenticity of the signature of the party signing it. See McCormick s 53, E. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 4546 (1962).

Unlike questions of preliminary admissibility, factual issues of conditional relevancy are properly within the province of the jury rather than the court, subject to preliminary determination by the court that sufficient foundation has been laid to support a determination by the jury that the condition has been fulfilled. As with other factual determinations, the proponent may offer evidence in support of the condition, the opponent may offer contrary evidence, and the jury rather than the judge must reconcile the dispute.

Subsection (c): In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 394 (1964), the Supreme Court held that preliminary hearings on admissibility of confessions must be held outside the jury's hearing. The requirement that preliminary matters be heard out of the jury's presence when the accused is a witness and when he "so requests" was added to Fed. R. Evid. 104(c) by a House subcommittee which felt that "a proper regard for the right of an accused not to testify generally in the case dictates that he be given an option to testify out of the presence of the jury on preliminary matters."

No clearcut rule can be established to determine under what circumstances other preliminary questions should be addressed outside the hearing of the jury. It must be left to the discretion of the court to balance such countervailing factors as danger of prejudice and needless waste of time. This principle of judicial discretion is implied in HRCP 43(c), which provides that the judge may require that an offer of proof be made outside the hearing of the jury.

Subsection (d): Because of the possible breadth of crossexamination under Rule 611(b), this subsection is intended to safeguard the rights of the accused and to encourage his participation in determinations of preliminary matters. Under this restriction, the accused may choose to testify upon any preliminary matter without exposing himself to crossexamination about "other issues in the case"; nor does such testimony constitute a waiver of his right to refuse to testify in the main proceeding. However, he may be crossexamined upon any matter raised during his direct testimony upon a preliminary question.