Household experiences of flooding in Brisbane and Ipswich, Queensland
Results of Geoscience Australia surveys following flooding inSouth East Queensland in 2011 and 2013
Geoscience Australia
RECORD 2016/30
Shelby Canterford, Valdis Juskevics, Miriam Middelmann-Fernandes, Martin Wehner and Won Oh
Department of Industry, Innovation and Science
Minister for Resources and Northern Australia: Senator the Hon Matthew Canavan
Assistant Minister for Industry, Innovation and Science: The Hon Craig Laundy MP
Secretary: Ms Glenys Beauchamp PSM
Geoscience Australia
Chief Executive Officer: Dr Chris Pigram
This paper is published with the permission of the CEO, Geoscience Australia
© Commonwealth of Australia (Geoscience Australia) 2016
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ISSN 2201-702X (PDF)
ISSN 1448-2177 (Print)
ISBN 978-1-925297-31-7 (PDF)
ISBN 978-1-925297-33-1 (Print)
eCat 81854
Bibliographic reference: Canterford, S., Juskevics, V., Middelmann-Fernandes, M., Wehner, M. and Oh, W., 2016. Household experiences of flooding in Brisbane and Ipswich, Queensland: Results of Geoscience Australia surveys following flooding in South East Queensland in 2011 and 2013. Record 2016/30. Geoscience Australia, Canberra. http://dx.doi.org/10.11636/Record.2016.030
Contents
Executive Summary 1
Brisbane, Ipswich and the flood events 1
The surveys 1
Warnings and risk perception 2
Preparation, evacuation and moving back home 3
Damage and repair 4
Financial implications 5
Medical impacts, mental health and support 5
Discussion and conclusions 6
Warnings and risk perception 6
Mental health 6
Financial impacts 7
Friends, family and neighbours 7
Returning to unrepaired homes 7
Towards a framework of household resilience 8
Conclusion 8
1 Introduction 9
2 Brisbane, Ipswich and flooding 11
2.1 Historical flood events 12
2.2 2011 Floods 14
2.3 2013 Floods 15
3 The surveys 16
3.1 Survey design 16
3.2 Survey sample 17
4 Warnings and risk perception 21
4.1 Warnings, warning relevance and sources 21
4.2 Interpreting warnings 25
4.3 Risk perception 28
4.4 Chapter 4 summary 30
5 Preparation, evacuation and moving back home 32
5.1 Preparing for the floods 32
5.2 Evacuation and relocation 37
5.3 Returning home 38
5.4 Chapter 5 Summary 40
6 Damage and repair 41
6.1 Flood damage 41
6.1.1 Highlighted suburbs – Fig Tree Pocket and Rocklea 46
6.2 Disruptions to the household 47
6.3 Repair and rebuild 48
6.3.1 Highlighted suburbs – Fig Tree Pocket and Rocklea 50
6.4 Deterioration after repair 51
6.5 Mitigating against future flooding 53
6.6 February 2013 follow-up field survey 54
6.7 Chapter 6 summary 57
7 Financial implications 59
7.1 Extra costs and finance 59
7.2 Working following the flood 61
7.3 Property values 63
7.3.1 Analysis of residential sales data 64
7.4 Chapter 7 summary 66
8 Medical impacts, mental health and support 67
8.1 Medical impacts 67
8.2 Subjective well-being 69
8.3 Mental health 70
8.3.1 Clinical diagnoses and treatment 71
8.3.2 Relationships 71
8.3.3 Insurance 72
8.3.4 Other sources of stress and concern 73
8.3.5 Positive impacts 75
8.3.6 2013 Survey 76
8.4 Support 77
8.4.1 Gratitude 79
8.5 Chapter 8 summary 81
9 Discussion and conclusions 82
9.1 Warnings and risk perception 82
9.2 Mental health 83
9.3 Financial impacts 84
9.4 Friends, family and neighbours 84
9.5 Returning to unrepaired homes 85
9.6 Towards a framework of household resilience 85
9.7 Conclusion 86
Abbreviations and Acronyms 87
References 88
Household experiences of flooding in Brisbane and Ipswichiii
Executive Summary
In January 2011 extreme flooding occurred in the south-east corner of Queensland resulting in over 17,000 homes inundated in the cities of Brisbane and Ipswich. In the weeks following the floods, Geoscience Australia (GA) conducted a field survey to assess the scale of the damage on individual homes. The engineering survey was supplemented with GA’s first social survey, which was then repeated in 2013 following another flood event. This report presents the results of the social survey investigating the impacts of the 2011 and 2013 floods on flooded households in the Brisbane and Ipswich City Council areas.
Brisbane, Ipswich and the flood events
Brisbane is the capital of Queensland and in 2011 was home to 1.09 million people (ABS 2012). Ipswich is part of the Greater Brisbane area, lying approximately 35km to the south-west, and had a population of 172,000 (ibid). Both have experienced strong population growth over a number of decades, exposing an increasing number of people to natural hazards. Brisbane and Ipswich have both had a history of severe flooding.
The first flood event was the result of an exceptional rain event in the second week of January 2011 following record levels of rain during December that saturated catchments and caused flooding (Executive Summary Figure 1) in the Brisbane and Bremer Rivers (BOM 2011). On the 13th of January 2011, the Brisbane and Bremer Rivers peaked at 4.46m (Brisbane City gauge) and 19.4m (Ipswich gauge) respectively. Around 17,100 properties were inundated over the course of three days; 3,000 in Ipswich and 14,100 in Brisbane (Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 2011). Many of the tributary creeks also flooded due to inflow or by being unable to drain into the flooded rivers.
The second flood event occurred after Tropical Cyclone Oswald formed on 21st January 2013 from a tropical low in the Gulf of Carpentaria (BOM 2013). The cyclone itself was very weak and made landfall as a Category 1 cyclone only 12 hours after being named. However, broader weather conditions at the time forced the resulting low south along the Queensland coast, causing extensive flooding in many communities in Queensland and New South Wales. Very heavy rainfall, that reached the second highest on record for two, three and four day totals, fell in the Brisbane River catchment between the 26th and 28th of January. Record levels of flooding were recorded in Lockyer Creek, and the Bremer River reached 13.9m at Ipswich. The Brisbane River reached a minor flood peak of 2.3m at Brisbane City (BOM 2014) and many of the creeks also experienced flooding.
The surveys
Following the flooding of the Brisbane-Bremer River catchment in 2011 a postal survey instrument was designed to examine the impact of flooding on the community, and was then replicated with minor amendments for the flooding in 2013. The first survey of the Brisbane and Ipswich floods in January 2011 was undertaken in April and May of 2012. The development of the survey instrument was the result of a collaboration between GA and a New Zealand Government agency, the National Institute of Wind and Atmospheric Research (NIWA). It was designed to provide input into a range of work programs at GA and NIWA, mainly the social, economic and engineering programs. The second survey was triggered by the smaller flood event in January 2013 which affected Brisbane and Ipswich. This later survey was undertaken in October and November 2013. The first survey drew on NIWA’s prior survey experience and based the format and some questions on their own template. GA activity leaders were then consulted to determine their needs, and the resulting questions incorporated into the instrument.
Executive Summary Figure 1 Locations of responding households for the 2011 and 2013 Brisbane and Ipswich surveys with the 2011 flood extent. Source: State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources and Mines) 2012, http://dds.information.qld.gov.au/dds/
The households invited to participate in the first survey were drawn from two earlier field survey activities conducted in Brisbane and Ipswich. Of the 5000 households invited to participate, 1267 responses were received, representing a 26% response rate. Of these respondents, 722 indicated they were willing to participate in further research and were mailed the second survey. A higher response rate was achieved in the second survey with 61% responding. The spatial distribution of affected households who responded to the surveys is mapped in Executive Summary Figure 1.
Warnings and risk perception
Warnings are an extremely important aspect of household preparedness for an impending flood event. While warnings are issued for most events, the effectiveness of reaching the target households can be variable. More than half of respondents did not hear a warning prior to the 2011 floods, and another 10% heard a warning but thought it was not relevant to them (Executive Summary Table 1). Two-thirds of respondents received a warning prior to the 2013 floods, even though this was a much smaller event. There were no differences in households receiving a warning by location, with neighbours having very different experiences. In 2011 households received warnings most commonly from television, radio and friends, family or neighbours. In 2013 websites replaced friends, family or neighbours as a common warning source. For households that received a warning from one source only in 2011, most received the warning from friends, family or neighbours, but were also least likely to think the warnings were relevant. Respondents who heard warnings from three or more sources were most likely to think that the warnings were relevant to them. The number of households who received a warning increased between the 2011 and 2013 households, showing that experience is important, however experience did not always influence warning perception during the 2011 event.
Executive Summary Table 1 Warning receipt and warning relevance, proportion of responding households, 2011 and 2013 floods.
Warning receipt and relevance / 2011 flood (%)(n=1237) / 2013 flood (%)
(n=407) /
Received a warning and the warning was relevant / 38 / 47
Received a warning but the warning was not relevant / 9 / 20
Didn’t receive a warning / 54 / 33
Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
The reasons why warnings were not relevant shows that the warnings were considered too general and respondents were unable to relate them to their circumstances. Warnings that included flood heights at a specific gauge or did not mention particular suburbs were not seen as relevant. Other respondents had previous advice or understanding that their home would not flood.
This research shows the understanding of risk needs to be explored further. Many households were unaware that their homes could potentially flood, and so did not see the warnings as relevant. Respondents commented that they purchased or built above the 100 year average recurrence interval or 1974 flood level and were surprised to find that their home flooded during the 2011 event. Respondent’s comments indicated that they did not realise that the broader understanding of flood levels can change with new modelling or analysis of historical events, and that changes upstream may change their risk.
The answers to the warnings questions indicate that respondents have a much more complex view on what a warning looks and sounds like than expected. This view cannot be explained by the data collected in either survey. The complexity may be a result of the long length of time between the flood events and when the surveys were conducted, a time where memories are lost, altered and augmented.
Preparation, evacuation and moving back home
Adequate preparation and being aware of the potential danger can, to some extent, minimise the damage caused by floods. Some preparation activities must commence long before a flood is approaching, particularly mitigation activities and purchasing insurance. When the flood is imminent potential damage to the home cannot be avoided, however household actions can reduce the amount of damage to furniture and personal possessions.
Many households were unaware of the risk of flooding before the 2011 floods were imminent, and so most preparation actions focused on flood response activities such as lifting furniture. The majority of households lifted furniture and personal possessions in 2011 with fewer removing items. However many households found this ineffective given the height of the water. Others regretted undertaking activities like sandbagging rather than saving more items, so in 2013 many more households removed items. For many households who responded to the 2013 survey, the experience and lessons learned from the 2011 flood influenced their behaviour in the later flood. The responses suggest that the experience gained in 2011 may have reduced the vulnerability of households to potential flood damage in 2013.
When initially evacuating most households stayed with family or friends. Many households stayed with family or friends longer term, but private rental accommodation was also used by some. The average time to return back home was 3 months but the median time was only 3 weeks. Respondents whose homes were still to be repaired at the time of the survey returned home earlier than those whose homes were complete, indicating households were returning to homes still needing repair. The height of overfloor inundation, delays in finding tradesmen, having children aged under 5 and having insurance were all found to increase the length of time to return home. Households that included someone who volunteered in any organisation in the last year decreased the time to return home.
Damage and repair
The most noticeable impact of disasters is the damage to homes. Disaster are typically measured in the number of homes and other buildings impacted and the associated costs of repair and rebuild. Other items are also lost that mean more to households than their dollar value would imply. These personal items are a major part of the loss that households feel.
Prior to the 2011 floods 71% of respondents thought that they were covered by flood insurance. However only 32% of all households had their claim fully paid, and a further 13% received only a partial payment. On average respondents received a damage bill of $140,500 of which $72,700 was paid from their own pockets. Extrapolating to all 17,100 homes the total damage bill was $2.4billion with the costs equally shared by households and insurance companies. Not all damage can be measured as dollar values, with irreplaceable items such as photographs, personal records and collections also lost. Items normally considered replaceable, such as books, were often frequently noted. Respondents noted the sentimental value of these items as they are associated with particular people and events.