Formatting Papers for NTCS 97 (14Pt Bold Centered)

Virtual Reality: Consciousness Really Explained!

(Why, How, Where and What: A Radical Proposal)

Jerome Iglowitz

www.foothill.net/~jerryi

Note: I decided to restore this earlier version, (8-08-08), of this book to hold the original symmetry. This book is meant to be augmented with my later book: “Exotic Mathematics…”, which does a better job of explaining some of my ideas. Chapter 2 of this work especially is intended to be augmented with Chapters 1 through 3 of the later work, as it has been greatly misunderstood.

(Revised December 13, 1998)

Dedication

For Chris and my Girls. [1]

B.1. The Problem: Consider, finally, the formal and abstract problem. Consider the problem of designing instrumentation for the efficient control of both especially complex and especially dangerous processes. In the general case, what kind of information would you want to pass along and how would you best represent it? How would you control it? How would you design your display and control system? 33

B.2. The Argument for Schematism: 33

B.3. An Immediate Corollary: The Specific Case of Biology 35

B.4. An Immediate Retrodictive Confirmation: 38

C. Conclusion, (section): 39

Contra: 43

Preface to Chapter 2: The Logical Problem -and Realism Again 48

Meaning 53

Knowing: 54

Anthropological and Linguistic, and Logical Commensurability 54

Realism Again: 54

Chapter 2. How? The Logical Problem of Consciousness 62

Let’s Start from the Other End: First Hilbert's "Implicit Definition": 63

Cassirer and Classical Logic: 69

The Classical Concept: 70

Contra the Aristotelian Concept: 71

Cassirer's Alternative: "The Functional Concept of Mathematics": 72

Concept vs. Presentation: 74

Contra The Theory of Attention: 75

Major Consequences: 76

Re Presentation: 77

The Concept of Implicit Definition: 79

Implicit Definition vis a vis Presentation: 82

Why is this relevant to mind? 84

Contra Cassirer: 86

The Crux of the Issue: Presentation 87

Mind-Brain: The Second Hypothesis: 88

A Possible Physical Paradigm: 90

Convergence. 93

A crucial turning point in my argument: 95

Plain talk: 98

Conclusion: (chapter) 102

Introduction to Chapters 3, 4 and 5 103

(Towards a Resolution of the Paradox) 103

Chapter 3. Biology_Part II: Towards the Where and the What? 106

Biology & Epistemology 106

Closure: 108

Maturana and Varela: 112

The Axiom of Externality 132

An Answer to the New Dilemma: 139

Preface to Chapter 4 142

Chapter 4: Cognition and Experience: Quine and Cassirer 144

A fantasy: 146

The Epistemological Problem: 149

Cassirer Revisited: 152

Cassirer's Theory of Symbolic Forms: 154

The solution to the dilemma: 164

Whence Cassirer's Thesis: 167

Contra Cassirer: (What are the real parameters?) 170

[Important Note 6-20-1999: a modification of my conclusions] 179

The Power of Naturalism 180

Quine Speaks to my Proposal 188

Preface to Chapter 5, (the Final Step) 190

Chapter 5: What? The Substance of Mind 191

The Last Hurdle 194

The Third Hypothesis: a formal statement: 195

Philosophical Implications 196

Chapter 6: Conclusions and Opinions 198

Scientific Conclusions: 198

Devil's Advocate: 198

So Why Bother? 200

How do we live? 202

My "Act of Faith": 202

Chapter 7: Epilogue 204

Appendix A, (Information and Representation) 209

A Little Combinatorial Argument: 209

A Simple Limiting Argument: 211

The Argument: 212

Appendix B, (Isomorphism and Representation) 217

Appendix C, (Mind-Body and Artificial Intelligence: Hubert Dreyfus) 221

(1) the biological assumption: 222

(2) the psychological assumption: 222

(3) the epistemological assumption: 222

(4) the ontological assumption: 223

Appendix D: (Roger Penrose) 234

Appendix E: Dogmatic Materialism and Reality 239

Appendix F: "Dennett and the Color Phi" 243

An Extension of the Schematic Model: A Brief Sketch 249

Appendix G: An Outline of the Semantic Argument, (For Philosophers) 253

Appendix H : Extended Abstract 262

Afterward: Lakoff, Edelman, and “Hierarchy” 266

Lakoff: 266

The Classical Concept 267

Cassirer and Lakoff’s Logic 271

Edelman: 282

On “Presentation” 285

Re-entrant Maps 286

The Cartesian Theatre 288

On Epistemology: 291

Mathematical Ideals 291

Conclusion 298

Appendix I: a few Illustrations 300

Appendix J: (An elaboration of the possibilities of the discussion) 304

Bibliography 312

Dedication: 316

Preface to the Second Edition:

I read recently of a neuropsychological study of the brainscans of fiercely partisan political adherents. It consisted in the recording of brain scans of fierce democrats, or fierce republicans when listening to the speeches of their own, or the other party’s candidates. What the study showed was that the rational sections of the brain were largely suppressed when hearing the opponent’s views, and the emotional areas were intensified. And conversely, when hearing one of their own, just the opposite occurred. They were very ready to reason along with their spokesman, and suppress their negative feelings. I think this is significant for most human interaction, and it is particularly relevant to a discussion of the mind-brain problem –our deepest, most important, and most divisive scientific problem.

Most of us have very definite ideas as to where any solution to the mind-brain problem must ideally start. Any beginning, deviating more than a “comma” away from that ideal triggers an almost complete dismissal and the creation of an active adversary from the very first page. No contrary argument will be entertained or admitted. And yet this problem is not yet solved. After almost three thousand years it is not solved! Is it almost solved? I think not, though you may not agree with me. Might we be “almost there”? Perhaps the physicists will discover “the consciousness particle” at the bottom of it all! I think not.

There are certain basic presumptions we all bring to the problem: “mind”, “material”, “law”, …, but not necessarily with the same priority. My point will be that which order we choose will not be significant in the end. All perspectives must ultimately meet. How is that possible? That is the theme and purpose of this book.

I believe this particular problem will determine our ultimate views and our ultimate actions in ethics and behavior. I believe it will determine our absolute future or our extinction as a species. I do not believe that our future is hopeful.

Let me start this work therefore from the simplest perspective –the materialist perspective, and see where it leads, (we would reach that same end if we were to begin anywhere else).

Jerome Iglowitz, December 2009
Introduction

"Popper [said that] ... hypotheses are interesting only if they are bold -that is, if they are improbable and thus likely to be falsified. For then, to withstand falsification by rigorous testing is a triumph, and such a hypothesis is significant. Safe (that is, probable) hypotheses are a dime a dozen, and the safest are logical truths. If what science is seeking is primarily a body of certain truths, it should stick to spinning out logical theorems. The trouble with such safety, however, is that it doesn't get us anywhere." (P.S. Churchland, 1988, P.260)

Is anyone really interested in an answer to the mind-body problem? And why should they be? If science is able one day to deal with all of the ravages of mental illness, and to explain the whole of human behavior as biological phenomena -as it surely will- then the problem would seem fit for the debates of philosophers with philosophers alone, and of interest to no one else.

But, as in science generally, there is also a problem of organization - how do we organize these biological phenomena? And more -how do we predict and integrate them? It is one thing to catalogue prior experiment, and it is quite another to integrate it into a comprehensive and predictive framework useful to empiric practice. Ptolemean vs. Copernican cosmology is the prototypical illustration of the distinction. Ptolemean theory was quite capable of cataloging any celestial movement, but it could not lead to Kepler's laws. It was sterile for the progress of future deep science. Heisenberg and Schroedinger[1] supply a more modern instance. Heisenberg’s matrix conception of quantum mechanics was comprehensive, but not predictive. Schroedinger’s alternative was.

There is a fundamental prejudice in the history of human thought: it is that the large-scale organization of reality is simple. The whole history of science seems to confirm this premise. From Euclid to Copernicus, from Galileo to Newton to Maxwell and Hertz to Einstein to Heisenberg and Schroedinger and Bohr, from Aristotle to Darwin and Pauling..., this is our central premise.

The problem of the organization of the brain, our central and self-referential problem, is then either the exception to this rule, (paradoxically it is also the center of our understanding, i.e. man’s organization, of all the other organizations), or it will itself be organized on such a principle. But is the Copernican center of that organization to be found in the fundamental principles -and organization- of biology and chemistry, or in principles unique to the brain itself? In short, is a "Newtonian physics" of the brain possible? If it is, then the problems of "mind", and "mind-brain" become crucial as they supply critical clues to that organization.

But there is another aspect to the general problem presented here. It is not only that no solution has yet been presented for the mind-brain problem, but rather that the consensus of contemporary scientific opinion seems to be that there is no solution possible consistent with our ordinary, (i.e. "folk"), understanding of mind and perception. The consensus, (in the community of “hard scientists”), is that only actions and mechanical processes are possible, that "understanding" and "perception" must necessarily be reduced to the mechanical vocalizations, (and the precursors of such vocalizations), of linguistic automatons. I do not claim that this is not a formally consistent solution, but its center of organization lies clearly in the principles of biology and physics, and not of the brain itself.

If another solution is submitted, it must be appraised in terms of the new possibilities it opens. To be worthy of serious consideration, it must promise -and specifically suggest- new and powerful empirical results: philosophy is not enough. Though it may offend basic dogma, though it may profoundly offend our sensibilities, if it also proffers deep and profound scientific advance, then it must be considered seriously. The solution I will present here, though highly esoteric, (in a mathematical sense of the word), has definite and specific implications for the directions of empirical research. Though scientifically and philosophically radical, I believe it resolves the whole of the mind-brain problem for the first time. It is, moreover, eminently compatible with the very same sort of radicalness which grounds modern physical science.

Let me be very clear. My purpose is passionately empiric and my conclusion pointedly scientific, not merely philosophical. I postulate a deep reorientation of the foundations of neuroscience with an unswerving focus on productivity. But as Cassirer, for instance, has amply illustrated, it is the case for all the crucial turning points in the history of science that deep progress necessitates serious re-examination of what were, before, philosophic certainties. Those prior "certainties" have always precluded the profoundest leaps of our greatest scientific theories. Philosophy has been the crucial business of the greatest of our scientists –at the very points where their most significant work was done. [2]

Stylistic and Semantic Notes:

Because of the complexity of my conception and because it is so far removed from the accepted paradigms, I have had to solve severe artistic and semantic problems to give what I hope will be a lucid exposition. [3] My thesis is a synergistic and multidisciplinary combination of three very radical ideas. Each of these is, by itself, capable of a linear, (though not simple), exposition and argument. Each, however, raises profound new difficulties which must be answered. It is only in their combination that a plausible and, I think, a convincing rationale can be made. I therefore face a difficulty of much the same sort that Kant, (for instance), faced in the exposition of his ideas which faced a similar difficulty and which he illustrated with the problem of explaining the parts of the body. To understand the hand, (he argued), the arm and the heart and the brain must be understood, -and conversely. The parts are only truly intelligible in their integration into the whole. I had originally tried, (reasonably I thought), to present an overview and synopsis of my individual themes and their interconnection in an introductory chapter, giving at least a general answer to the problems they raised.

When I circulated early versions of my thesis for comment, I received numerous initial reactions of high interest from persons whom I considered bright and able, (not because they were interested!) But most of these contacts just "died away", with no further response. A few brave souls, (or those with more background in the field), managed to get past the initial statement and into the "meat" of my theory, and they have helped me enormously with their criticisms and suggestions. I do not think the others dropped out because of a lack of ability or willingness -or because of disbelief. It is my experience that most people are not shy about expressing disagreement, but that never happened. Those I contacted told me they simply "bogged down" in the Introduction and Synopsis, (the original Chapter 1), and got lost.

I think this was a fault of my presentation. I concluded that the sheer density, the innate complexity, and the necessary abstractness of such a synopsis, undertaken without prior familiarity, was enough to "boggle" almost any mind. If these were not my own ideas, I would probably stand likewise. They are simply too far from the standard paradigm to be presented in such a form.

The alternative presentation raised difficulties of its own, but I concluded that it was the only way to make my ideas comprehensible in a lucid form. That alternative was to just "dive in", to give just a very general statement -which I give here- to the effect that I will present three radical themes, (1. a biological rationale for the brain, 2. a logical rationale for the mind, and 3. an epistemological rationale which reconciles the first two), that each is unsettling, and that it is only in combination that they become convincing. Or, rather, each is individually plausible, but the new difficulties each raises are resolved and plausible only in their synergistic combination. Each offers a specific and constructive counterproposal to accepted wisdom. My biological thesis, for instance, proposes that "cognition" and human reality, (viewed from a contemporary Naturalist perspective), is virtual. It is a schematic and internally organizational, (rather than a representational), artifact of evolutionary metacellular process. My argument is considerably more complicated than that, however, postulating original logical and epistemological dimensions to the problem and ultimately suggesting a home for “mind” itself.

Formatting Papers for NTCS 97 (14Pt Bold Centered)

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