CHAPTER 13

INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Students of emergency management are exposed to a great deal of information on what is being done in the United States and, to a lesser degree, the English speaking world. However, they are often unaware of the different approaches to emergency management used in other regions. This chapter identifies some of the ways in which countries differ systematically in their hazard vulnerability, economic resources, government organization, quality of the built environment, civil society, role of the military, and role of international organizations. The chapter then turns to six case studies of emergency management capabilities in East Asia, South Asia, South America, Oceania, and Europe.

Introduction

Research on emergency management suffers from the same problems as much social science research; most of it has been done in the English speaking countries and much of the remaining work has been done in former colonies of these nations (Heady, 1996). Students of emergency management are thus exposed to a great deal of information on what is being done in the English speaking world, yet are often unaware of the different approaches to emergency management used in other regions. A few scholars have examined the applicability of emergency management principles developed in rich countries to other areas. They have concluded that the principles of an all hazards, integrated, and comprehensive approach covering all phases of emergency management and integrating relevant agencies, together with a focus on building community resilience at the local level, are viable and useful in a wide variety of settings (Martin, et al., 2001). However, resources, both human and technical, are frequently lacking for the development of adequate programs (Vatsa & Joseph, 2003).

One reason to study policies and programs used in other countries is that, increasingly, countries are learning and borrowing policies from each other (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Globalization has had two important effects. First, it has exposed all countries to an increasingly competitive economic system. Second, advances in the technology of communications have made it possible for policymakers to communicate quickly and easily. Because of these changes, policymakers increasingly look beyond their national borders for ideas on how to address problems at home.

Governments are not the only institutions looking for ideas abroad. NGOs of all sorts are also engaged in learning from a wide range of institutions outside of their host countries’ borders (Stone, 2000). Indeed, many NGOs such as Greenpeace are multinational organizations, that routinely engage in cross-national policy transfer. Corporations, independent policy institutes, and less well organized transnational social movements can also engage in cross-national policy transfer.

The transfer of policy across national borders is complicated by the presence of “national policy styles” (Howlett, 1991). These policy styles are based on the different characteristics of the governments involved, as well as the ways in which the governments relate to civil society. As a result, policy transfers are not always successful. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) identified three ways in which policy transfers can fail.

· Uninformed transfers fail because the borrowing country does not understand the policy it is adopting;

· I ncomplete transfers fail because the borrowing country does not transfer the necessary elements of the policy; and

· I nappropriate transfers fail because there are too many differences between the social, political and economic contexts of the two countries.

Factors That Cause Variation in Policy Choices

Countries can be compared on the basis of many characteristics including regime type (roughly on a continuum from totalitarian to democratic), political culture (traditionalistic, moralistic, and individualistic), orientation toward modernity (Inglehart, 1997; Barber, 1997), and level of economic development (Gross Domestic Product per capita[1], Human Development Index[2], or Gini coefficient[3]) Yet, administrative structures are relatively similar across a broad range of countries because the function of an administrative structure has an effect on the shape it takes (Peters, 1995). In addition, organizational models are frequently shared among groups of countries. For example, former colonies frequently have administrative structures that closely resemble those of their former colonial masters. Countries that share membership in a multinational organization such as the European Union (EU) frequently come to share forms of administrative organization in order to simplify crossnational cooperation. In disaster management, the influence of the UN through programs such as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) and its successor program, the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) has contributed to the diffusion of common models, while encouraging countries to adapt these models to their own realities. Regional emergency management organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Centro de Coordenación para la Reducción de los Desastres Naturales en América Central (CEPREDENAC), and the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) have also influenced the evolution of emergency management across a wide variety of nation states.

When comparing emergency management policies, the most relevant dimensions of comparison must include the “propensity for disaster, local and regional economic resources, organization of government, and availability of technological, academic, and human resources, … level of local responder training, resilience of infrastructure, public opinion of the government’s ability to manage the crisis, and the availability of specialized assets” (Haddow & Bullock, 2003, pp. 165-166). In other words, the most relevant dimensions of comparison arise from what emergency managers know as hazard vulnerability (recall Chapter 6) and local capability (recall Chapter 3). The rest of this chapter will consider the dimensions listed above, but will also examine the role of the military in society, the development of civil society, and other factors affecting the various programs throughout this chapter. These factors are linked in complex ways to produce a unique profile of hazard vulnerability and emergency management in each country.

Hazard Vulnerability

As Chapter 6 indicated, hazard vulnerability varies according to hazard type and level of exposure. Frequently, a country’s types and levels of hazard exposure influence its organizational structure and the quality of its emergency management organizations. Countries with high levels of hazard exposure have often been found to have “disaster cultures” enabling them to adapt and respond to recurrent events. Their emergency management organizations can also show a high level of adaptation to particular hazards. For example, countries facing frequent typhoons have developed more sophisticated programs and policies than those that do not. Bangladesh has developed a system of evacuation platforms because of the very flat terrain, and Taiwan has put a great deal of money into typhoon warning research.

An example of the way in which hazard exposure and experience can shape national emergency management programs occurred in Central America after Hurricane Mitch in 1998. Prior to the arrival of this devastating hurricane, most countries of the region had devoted little attention to emergency management. They had established basic “civil defense” programs, usually associated with the military and concentrating on disaster response. However, there was little or no attention paid to the connections between economic development programs and the production of hazard vulnerability. After the hurricane, the governments of the affected countries began to change their national development programs to a sustainable development paradigm. These emphasized the linkages between social factors, environmental degradation, and hazard vulnerability (Lavell, 2002).

Economic Resources

Emergency management is low on the priority list in poorer countries, as indeed it is elsewhere. Whole societies live on the brink of economic collapse, so other problems such as the provision of basic education and public health services seem to be of more immediate concern. Thus, emergency management is often an afterthought that rises on the public agenda only after a disaster occurs. In the meantime, poverty and uncontrolled rapid urbanization generate large concentrations of vulnerable populations in high risk urban areas. Moreover, the lack of attention to the links between environment and human settlements has delayed the development of a better understanding of sustainable development and increased the incidence of disasters in rich and poor countries.

The quality of emergency management in a country is related to the amount of resources available nationally for emergency management and to the amount of resources available from outside a country. Many poor countries struggle with high levels of foreign debt, often incurred by undemocratic regimes. To compound the problem, some of these countries devoted much of their national budget to the military. This left little money for improving the country’s human capital through education and health care. Emergency management was left far down the list of discretionary spending programs. Sometimes this situation has been exacerbated by structural adjustment programs imposed by multinational lending agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Nonetheless, some countries have been able to use funds from donor nations and international lending agencies to improve their emergency management capabilities.

Hazard insurance availability varies from one country to the next. Few countries have systems with market penetration as widespread as the National Flood Insurance Program of the US In part, this is because participation in the NFIP is a condition for getting a mortgage. Many foreign countries lack disaster insurance programs or, if they do have one, premiums are too high for the majority of the population to afford them. In these countries, businesses might have disaster insurance, but few homeowners do. National governments might want to require homeowners to purchase hazard insurance but cannot do this by requiring hazard insurance as a condition of mortgage approval, as in the US. The reason this option is unavailable is that many fewer people in these countries borrow money to buy a house. In many cases, people first buy the land and then build each room of the house as they save enough money to purchase the construction materials. As a result, these governments lack the mechanism the US government uses to intervene in the housing market.

Haddow and Bullock (2003) mention the availability of “specialized assets” as a factor affecting emergency management. These specialized assets may include items needed during response operations such as heavy equipment, trained Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams, hazmat capabilities, technical expertise such as GIS, and training facilities. Such resources are not available universally, but often are shared regionally through organizations such as the Caribbean Community’s Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2002). USAR teams, in particular, are eager to participate in emergency response efforts no matter where they occur. They can provide valuable assistance, on the job training, and assistance with the psychologically difficult task of body retrieval—although it is rare that they are able to arrive quickly enough to accomplish rescues during the critical first hours. This is due to the logistics of moving large numbers of people and their equipment, as well as to legal and political problems with such movements. In some cases, flyover rights have been denied to USAR teams, and the entry of search dogs without the normal quarantine or veterinary procedures frequently causes problems. Thus, there is increasing interest in local development of hazmat and USAR capabilities, using foreign teachers if necessary, or sending a first generation of practitioners to study abroad and bring back the needed knowledge for a train-the-trainers approach.

Organization of Government

One of the most important issues affecting emergency management is the degree of political centralization in a particular country. The control of policies, programs, and resources by the highest (national) level limits the ability of local governments to mount a rapid emergency response or to develop appropriate hazard mitigation programs. Emergency management is a service, like police and fire protection, that is delivered over a dispersed area. Consequently, it benefits from a significant degree of decentralization, allowing local governments to manage the service delivery (Peters, 1995, p. 161)

An excessive emphasis on major disasters tends to lead to overcentralization because it is assumed there will be a need for governmental coordination over the very large areas affected. Unfortunately, this also requires communication of information through multiple layers of government—which delays response and recovery operations. In reality, small frequent events cause more deaths and economic losses than larger ones. When small events occur, local governments can respond with more agility and effectiveness if they do not need to await instructions and resources from the central government. Thus, empowering local governments and their populations to deal with local events is very effective, but is frequently resisted by the national governmental authority because it reduces central control. Frequent small events also point to the connections between patterns of development and hazard vulnerability, which can increase calls for more public participation in national goal setting. This also threatens a status quo that benefits entrenched elite groups.

The location of emergency management agencies in all levels of government is related to these agencies’ effectiveness and also to the emphasis given to different aspects of hazard vulnerability. An agency that is charged with responding to disasters, but has a low status in government, will have difficulty in finding and delivering the needed resources in a timely manner. Emergency managers benefit when they receive input from scientific agencies, such as those who map the national territory or deliver weather forecasts, but they are often isolated from such valuable input by their location in government.

The level of professionalization within the emergency management agency varies a great deal across countries. When an agency has a high political profile and adequate resources, it is more able to attract and keep well qualified and dedicated personnel. Few countries have an adequate supply of well trained emergency management professionals, however. This situation is of great concern, and a number of countries are addressing the lack of personnel by beginning training programs at the university and postgraduate level. Istanbul Technical University in Turkey and the Autonomous University of Nicaragua have recently developed multidisciplinary programs in emergency management that include both physical and social science components, and there are other examples worldwide.

Quality of the Built Environment

The quality of a country’s infrastructure, housing, and business and industrial installations affects the level of its disaster exposure and the type of emergency management program required to meet its needs. For example, the better the quality of the construction, the less need there is for urban search and rescue techniques after earthquakes. Similarly, good roads make it easier to evacuate large numbers of people from flood and hurricane zones. However, it does not necessarily follow that countries with higher quality infrastructure have uniformly lower hazard vulnerability. Countries with large numbers of high rise office and apartment buildings have an increased need for highly developed firefighting capabilities, as do those with large chemical manufacturing installations.