Air Force AFF
DDI 2008 – GT
Donlan/Kats-Rubin
GT Air Force
GT Air Force 1
1AC (1/14) 5
1AC (2/14) 6
1AC (3/14) 7
1AC (4/14) 8
1AC (5/14) 9
1AC (6/14) 10
1AC (7/14) 11
1AC (8/14) 12
1AC (9/14) 13
1AC (10/14) 14
1AC (11/14) 15
1AC (12/14) 16
1AC (13/14) 17
1AC (13/14) 18
1AC (14/14) 19
Inherency – Current DoD Strategy 20
Inherency – Current DoD Strategy 21
Inherency – Dependent Now 22
Inherency – Jet Fuel Demand 23
Inherency – Renewables Cut Now 24
Inherency – Synfuel Now 25
Inherency – Synfuel Now 26
Inherency – Synfuel Now 27
Inherency – Algae Not Coming 28
Air Power – Key to Heg 29
Air Power – Deterrence 30
Air Power – Chinese Deterrence 31
Air Power – Key to Ground Power 32
Air Power – Urban Warfare 33
Air Power – Urban Warfare 34
Air Force Dependence – Readiness 35
Air Force Readiness – On the Brink 36
Air Force Dependence – Readiness – Flying Hours 37
Air Force Dependence – Readiness - Comptrollers 38
Air Force – Readiness – Recapitalization 39
Air Force Dependence – Indirect Dependency 40
Air Force Readiness – Key to All Readiness 41
Oil Dependence – Economy 42
Oil Dependence – Laundry List 43
Oil Dependence – Peak Oil 44
Oil Dependence – Readiness 45
Oil Dependence - Readiness 46
Oil Dependence – Readiness – Convoys 47
Oil Dependence – Readiness – Tech 48
Oil Dependence – Terrorism 49
Oil Dependence – Terrorism 50
Oil Shocks – U.S. Vulnerable 51
Oil Shocks – Readiness 52
DoD – Heg/Energy Transition 53
Airlines – Brink 54
Airlines – Want Algae 55
Airlines Want Algae 56
Algae Solves Airlines 57
Competitiveness – Market Spillover 58
Competitiveness – Market Spillover 59
Competitiveness – Military Defines Market 60
Competiveness – Airlines 61
Algae Solvency – General 62
Algae Solvency – General 63
Algae Solves Dependency 64
Algae – Solves Dependency 65
Algae – Replaces FF 66
Algae Solvency – Warming/Pollution 67
Algae Solves Now 68
Solvency – Shifts from FT 69
Solvency – Military Key 70
Algae – Solves Ethanol 71
Solvency – Air Force Key 72
Solvency – Fed Key 73
Solvency – Contracts 74
Solvency – Cost 75
Food Prices Advantage (1/3) 76
Food Prices Advantage (2/3) 77
Food Prices Advantage (3/3) 78
Food Prices – Ethanol Ups Them 79
Ethanol Ups FF Use 80
Iraq Advantage (1/2) 81
Iraq Advantage (2/2) 82
2AC A2: Allies Will Give Us Cheap Oil 83
2AC NAVY Add-On 84
2AC Sequestration Add-On (1/2) 85
2AC Sequestration Add-On (2/2) 86
Algae Biofuel = Carbon Negative 87
Sequestration Increasing 88
2AC Alternate Military Sector CP 89
2AC Efficiency CP 90
2AC Ethanol CP 91
2AC Synfuel CP 92
2AC Synfuel CP 93
2AC Synfuel CP 94
Synfuel CP 95
Politics – Popular 96
*** Neg *** 97
Solvency – Timeframe 98
Solvency – More Energy 99
Synfuel Good 100
Synfuel – Military Key 101
Synfuel – Gov’t Funding Key 102
Synfuel – Spillover 103
Synfuel – Obama Gets Credit 104
Synfuel – Obama No Credit 105
Unpopular – Environmental Lobby 106
Bipartisan 107
AE? 108
1AC (1/14)
Contention One is Air Force Dependency
Military oil reliance is rising unsustainably now – a supply disruption would cripple overseas forces and worldwide power projection.
Yochi J. Dreazen, WSJ staff, 5/21/2008, U.S. Military Launches Alternative-Fuel Push Dependence on Oil
Seen as Too Risky; B-1 Takes Test Flight, Wall Street Journal, L/N [ND]
With oil's multiyear ascent showing no signs of stopping -- crude futures set another record Tuesday, closing at $129.07 a barrel in New York trading -- energy security has emerged as a major concern for the Pentagon.
The U.S. military consumes 340,000 barrels of oil a day, or 1.5% of all of the oil used in the country. The Defense Department's overall energy bill was $13.6 billion in 2006, the latest figure available -- almost 25% higher than the year before. The Air Force's bill for jet fuel alone has tripled in the past four years. When the White House submitted its latest budget request for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it tacked on a $2 billion surcharge for rising fuel costs.
Synthetic fuel, which can be made from coal or natural gas, is expensive now, but could cost far less than the current price of oil if it's mass-produced.
Just as important, the military is increasingly concerned that its dependence on oil represents a strategic threat. U.S. forces in Iraq alone consume 40,000 barrels of oil a day trucked in from neighboring countries, and would be paralyzed without it. Energy-security advocates warn that terrorist attacks on oil refineries or tankers could cripple military operations around the world. "The endgame is to wean the dependence on foreign oil," says Air Force Assistant Secretary William Anderson.
And, the Air Force is turning to synthetic fuels now, but they won’t work in the military or private sector.
General Michael P.C. Carns and Dr. James Schlesinger, Ret. United States Air Force general and co-chairman of Defense Science Board, February 2008, “More Fight – Less Fuel,” Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf [ND]
The U.S. is an expeditionary oriented force. When it fights, it uses fuel closest to the point of engagement. Yet, DoD is currently pursuing a number high profile, high cost demonstrations of domestically produced synthetic fuel. For example, the Air Force recently completed a $35M test program which showed that a jet fuel comprised of 50% Fischer-Tropsch synthetic fuel and 50% commercial fuel performs well in TF-33 engines on B-52 aircraft. This result is not unexpected since South African Airways have been flying a 50/50 mix of synthetic and commercial fuel for about 8 years. The expressed purpose of the initiative is to stimulate a domestic market for synthetic jet fuel. Further, the Air Force has stated a goal of obtaining half its domestic fuel consumption from domestic synthetic sources by 2016. Specifically, the Air Force has stated its intent to secure this fuel from a coal-to-liquid Fischer-Tropsch process.
The Task Force has strong concerns about the viability of this technology for a variety of reasons. Capital costs and production costs are high, putting investments at long term risks. The environmental control technologies needed to allow the plants to operate over the long term have only been demonstrated at limited scale and their costs are highly uncertain. Water demand also is very high using current production technology, and many coal reserves are in arid regions. The process produces large amounts of contaminated wastewater that must be treated. Further, a recent National Academy of Sciences report has raised questions about the estimates of coal reserves.23 The Task Force concluded these large expenditures could be used for more productive contributions to DoD’s most pressing energy challenges, rather than demonstrating synthetic fuel technologies that do not appear to have a viable market future or contribute to reducing battlespace fuel demand.’
And, the Air Force is uniquely vulnerable – status quo efficiency measures won’t be enough.
Yochi J. Dreazen, WSJ staff, 5/21/2008, U.S. Military Launches Alternative-Fuel Push Dependence on Oil
Seen as Too Risky; B-1 Takes Test Flight, Wall Street Journal, L/N [ND]
The problems are particularly acute for the Air Force, which uses about 2.6 billion gallons of jet fuel a year, or 10% of the entire domestic market in aviation fuel. The Air Force's fuel costs neared $6 billion last year, up from $2 billion in 2003, even as its consumption fell by more than 10% over the same period because of energy-savings measures, including a campaign to shut off lights and lower thermostats at bases.
1AC (2/14)
Rising oil costs destroy Air Force operating capabilities.
Reuters, 5/23/2008, Every $10 oil rise ups Air Force costs $610 million, http://www.enn.com/energy/article/36736/print [ND]
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. Air Force operates the "world's largest airline" and every $10-per-barrel increase in crude oil boosts its annual operating costs by $610 million, Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne said on Thursday.
The Air Force's bill for aviation fuel was about $6 billion in fiscal 2007, Wynne told a defense industry group. He declined to predict what the total would be for 2008.
U.S. crude oil futures soared to a record above $135 a barrel on Wednesday, more than double the price of one year ago.
"We are very concerned about the instability in oil prices because it wreaks havoc on how we manage our flying-hour program across the Air Force, just as it is wreaking havoc on the pricing statistics for an airline," Wynne said.
And fuel costs specifically drive budget and training cuts – lowers combat readiness.
Marc V. Schanz, Associate Editor of Air Force Magazine, 6/2007, The Fuel War, http://www.afa.org/magazine/june2007/0607fuel.pdf [ND]
Since then, fuel costs have risen by roughly one-third, even as the overall budgets have grown tighter. The result is reduced funding for flying hours to train aircrews. Flying commands have set minimum requirements for aircrew training, according to John Cilento, an ACC fl ying hour program analyst. “It is an issue,” said Gen. Ronald E. Keys, ACC commander. “It’s always an issue.” Col. Eric Best, chief of ACC flight operations, told Norfolk’s Virginian- Pilot that pilots are encouraged to land when a training mission is completed, even if it ends early, rather than continue flying until allotted time expires. In addition, said Best, operators are being encouraged to make more frequent use of simulators, though everyone realizes the systems can replicate only part of the flight experience. Indeed, the Air Force Flying Hour Program budget is slated to be reduced by around 10 percent each year from Fiscal 2008 until 2013. One big reason is high fuel cost. The result, ACC officials say, is less training and lower combat readiness.
And the budget is key to force modernization and operations – any reductions directly affect readiness.
Lawrence Spinetta, 1st Fighter Wing Safety Office chief, Fall, 2006, Air Force Journal of Logistics, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_3_30/ai_n27099563/print?tag=artBody;col1 [ND]
The Air Force is not concerned with profitability, but it is concerned with managing shocks to its budget from price volatility. Fluctuations in the price of oil adversely affect the Air Force's ability to ensure the necessary funds are available to finance force modernization and fund operations. The timeline of the federal government budget cycle requires the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (the Comptroller) to estimate and establish a stabilized price for fuel and other fuel-related commodities 18 months in advance of budget execution. Figure 1 diagrams the Defense Department's budget process as related to fuel. Not surprisingly, prices set by the Comptroller often prove wildly inaccurate. For example, last year the Pentagon's forecast was so inaccurate that it had to set a revised oil price that was 50 percent higher than the original price. (16) The problem is that the Services' budgets use inaccurate forecasts and make budgeting decisions based on prices that are not representative of actual costs (see Figure 2).
1AC (3/14)
Air power’s the U.S.’s key asymmetric advantage – it’s the only way to deter rivals in the Middle East, stop insurgents, and solve Chinese conflict.
Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF Maj. Gen., 9/2006, America’s asymmetric advantage, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/09/2009013 [ND]
INFLICTING HOPELESSNESS
So where does that leave us? If we are smart, we will have a well-equipped high-technology air power capability. Air power is America’s asymmetric advantage and is really the only military capability that can be readily applied across the spectrum of conflict, including, as is especially important these days, potential conflict. Consider the record. It was primarily air power, not land power, that kept the Soviets at bay while the U.S. won the Cold War. And it was not just the bomber force and the missileers; it was the airlifters, as well. There are few strategic victories in the annals of military history more complete and at so low a human cost as that won by American pilots during the Berlin airlift. Armageddon was avoided.
And the flexibility and velocity of air power also provides good-news stories in friendly and low-threat areas. For example, huge U.S. transports dropping relief supplies or landing on dirt strips in some area of humanitarian crisis get help to people on a timeline that can make a real difference. Such operations also illustrate, under the glare of the global media, the true American character the world needs to see more often if our strategic goals are to be achieved.
Air power also doesn’t have the multi-aspect vulnerabilities that boots on the ground do. It can apply combat power from afar and do so in a way that puts few of our forces at risk. True, occasionally there will be a Francis Gary Powers, and certainly the Vietnam-era POWs — mostly airmen — became pawns for enemy exploitation. Yet, if America maintains its aeronautical superiority, the enemy will not be able to kill 2,200 U.S. aviators and wound another 15,000, as the ragtag Iraqi terrorists have managed to do to our land forces.
And, of course, bombs will go awry. Allegations will be made (as they are currently against the Israelis) of targeting civilians and so forth. But the nature of the air weapon is such that an Abu Ghraib or Hadithah simply cannot occur. The relative sterility of air power — which the boots-on-the-ground types oddly find distressing as somehow unmartial — nevertheless provides greater opportunity for the discreet application of force largely under the control of well-educated, commissioned officer combatants. Not a total insurance policy against atrocity, but a far more risk-controlled situation.
Most important, however, is the purely military effect. The precision revolution has made it possible for air power to put a bomb within feet of any point on earth. Of course, having the right intelligence to select that point remains a challenge — but no more, and likely much less so, than for the land forces. The technology of surveillance is improving at a faster rate than is the ability to conceal. Modern conveniences, for example, from cell phones to credit cards, all leave signatures that can lead to the demise of the increasing numbers of adversaries unable to resist the siren song of techno-connection.
Regardless, eventually any insurgency must reveal itself if it is to assume power, and this inevitably provides the opportunity for air power to pick off individuals or entire capabilities that threaten U.S. interests. The real advantage — for the moment anyway — is that air power can do it with impunity and at little risk to Americans. The advances in American air power technology in recent years make U.S. dominance in the air intimidating like no other aspect of combat power for any nation in history.
The result? Saddam Hussein’s pilots buried their airplanes rather than fly them against American warplanes. Indeed, the collapse of the Iraqi armed forces was not, as the BOTGZ would have you believe, mainly because of the brilliance of our ground commanders