2ac Blox Dartmouth 2010 1
2AC Blocks- Japan Aff
1
Last printed 9/4/2009 7:00:00 PM
2ac Blox Dartmouth 2010 1
2AC Blocks- Japan Aff 1
AT: Disads
2AC Hege DA [1/6] 1
1AR Heg Unsustainable Extension 8
1AR Russia China Extension 9
1AR Proliferation Turn Extension 10
1AR Offshore Balancing Extension 11
2AC Re-arm Bad Disad [1/3] 12
1AR Ext. to Japan Rearming Now 15
1AR Ext. to Japan will never rearm 16
1AR Ext. to Japan rearming leads to deterrence 17
1 AR Ext. to No Possibility of War in East Asia 18
1AR Ext. to Impact Turn: Japan rearm causes stability 20
1AR Ext. to Case Outweighs 21
2AC Appeasement DA [1/2] 22
1AR EXT: Japanese Appeasement 24
2AC Compensation DA 25
1AR Compensation DA 26
2AC CMR [1/5] 27
2AC Cap and Trade [1/2] 32
1AR extensions Plan Unpopular 34
2AC Jobs Bill [Link Turn] [1/2] 35
2AC Jobs Bill [Impact Turn] 37
2AC Kan Credibility [1/2] 38
1AR Kan Credibility [1/2] 40
2AC Iran Redeployment DA [1/2] 42
AT: Kritiks
2AC Security [1/3] 44
1AR Security K Extensions 47
2AC Gender K [1/2] 48
1AR Gender K Extension 50
AT: Counterplans
2AC Pass Kan Financial Reform CP 51
2AC DOD CP [1/3] 52
2AC X-O CP [1/2] 55
2AC Kick the US out CP [1/2] 57
2AC Kick Out Counterplan [1/2] 59
2AC Consult NATO CP [1/3] 61
1AR Consult NATO CP [1/3] 64
2AC: Consult Japan CP [1/2] 67
2AC Consult Japan NB- Alliance 69
2AC AT: Consult Japan NB (Sino-Russia) 70
1AR Consult Japan Extensions 72
1
Last printed 9/4/2009 7:00:00 PM
2ac Blox Dartmouth 2010 1
2AC Hege DA [1/6]
1. Collapse is inevitable – regional powers are filling in.
Feffer 2009 [John, co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus, “US Hegemony Slips into History,” Asia Times, September 12, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KI12Ak01.html]
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new period of unipolar American power. In this country, liberals and conservatives alike celebrated the triumph of market democracies under the leadership of the United States. The Bill Clinton administration attempted to consolidate America's geoeconomic power. The George W Bush administration attempted to consolidate America's military and geopolitical power.
And today, the Barack Obama administration surveys the wreckage of these efforts to preserve a unipolar world. The global economy is in deep recession and the United States is drowning under the costs of maintaining its post-Cold War empire. Thechaos in Iraq and Afghanistan stands testament to the failures of our military pretensions.
Terence Edward Paupp, in his new book The Future of Global Relations, traces the downward trajectory of US power and forecasts a very different future for the international community. In the first half of his book, which tackles international relations theory as well as real-world examples, Paupp describes the decline of US hegemony. The US has persuaded other countries to do its bidding not so much through naked imperial force as through the indirect application of economic, political and military force. Our friends and allies, in other words, believe that they are acting in their own interests when they support the US. Moreover, by setting the terms of the global economy and by maintaining the largest military in the world, the US can exert control over countries with which it has only the barest of relations.
The American hegemon, Paupp argues, has been losing its legitimacy - and thus its power - for some time. The crisis in casino capitalism, the inability of the US military to subdue the Taliban in Afghanistan and insurgents in Iraq and the declining legitimacy of the institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization) through which the US has exerted hegemonic power have all contributed to a hollowing out of unipolarism (in much the same way that outsourcing has eroded US manufacturing).
Rising regions are Paupp's key to the future. Regional economic organizations (such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN), regional security organizations (such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization), hybrid regional formations (such as the European Union), and regional powers such as China, India, and Brazil have all challenged Washington's preeminence. "As American hegemony declines," he writes, "there shall be a corresponding rise in South-South regional alliances that will constitute, de facto, a new counter-hegemonic alliance against the US Global Empire."
This is not a new thesis, as Paupp himself admits. The Bandung conference that launched the Non-Aligned Movement in 1955 and the efforts of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in the 1970s to launch a NewInternational Economic Order both articulated a future of South-South cooperation. Two principal factors distinguish the current era, however. For one, human rights movements around the world have constrained the actions of rights-abusing states, both within their borders and transnationally. And second, social movements have become a powerful participant in international affairs, with efforts like the World Social Forum applying the state-centric concepts of Bandung and UNCTAD at a grassroots level.
Don't expect an easy transition to this new world of rising regions, Paupp warns. Hegemons do not enthusiastically give up their privileges. And the experience of the Non-Aligned Movement, UNCTAD, and even the World Social Forum suggests that the future may well be just as contentious as the Pax Americana of the Cold War period.
2AC Heg DA [2/6]
2. Predominance spurs a Russia-China military alliance that ends in nuclear extinction
Roberts 07 Senior Research Fellow @ the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, William E. Simon Chairin Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Paul Craig“US Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance,”http://www.lewrockwell.com/roberts/roberts218.html)
This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgkyzstan, and Kazakstan are participating. Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. This new potent military alliance is a real world response to neoconservative delusions about US hegemony. Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers, read by Russians and Chinese, about why the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China. Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills, like Bush and Cheney, for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration’s unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously. As the US has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts, it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict. In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict, the neocons are positioning US anti-ballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Neocons are people who desire war, but know nothing about it. Thus, the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. However, US administrations after Reagan’s have broken the agreements and understandings. The US gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia’s borders. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of V. Putin. These are gratuitous acts of aggression. Both the Russian and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic development, not to their militaries. Yet, both are being forced by America’s aggressive posture to revamp their militaries. Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: a nuclear exchange between the US, Russia, and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach. In a mere 6.5 years the Bush regime has destroyed the world’s good will toward the US. Today, America’s influence in the world is limited to its payments of tens of millions of dollars to bribed heads of foreign governments, such as Egypt’s and Pakistan’s. The Bush regime even thinks that as it has bought and paid for Musharraf, he will stand aside and permit Bush to make air strikes inside Pakistan. Is Bush blind to the danger that he will cause an Islamic revolution within Pakistan that will depose the US puppet and present the Middle East with an Islamic state armed with nuclear weapons? Considering the instabilities and dangers that abound, the aggressive posture of the Bush regime goes far beyond recklessness. The Bush regime is the most irresponsibly aggressive regime the world has seen since Hitler’s.
2AC Heg DA [3/6]
3. Heg causes war with Iran
Layne 07 Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute
(Chris, The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, , p. 76-77
Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire, the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Washington’s policy, as President George W. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is “intolerable.” Beyond nuclear weapons, however, there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. Chief among these is Iraq. Recently, Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis, concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. In a real sense, however, Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. These are reflected in current U.S. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action; determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East; and gaining U.S. dominance over that region. In this respect, it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct.
4. Extinction
Hirsch 06 Professor of Physics at the University of California
(Jorge, [“Nuking Iran,” ZNet, April 10)
Iran is likely to respond to any US attack using its considerable missile arsenal against US forces in Iraq and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf. Israel may attempt to stay out of the conflict, it is not clear whether Iran would target Israel in a retaliatory strike but it is certainly possible. If the US attack includes nuclear weapons use against Iranian facilities, as I believe is very likely, rather than deterring Iran it will cause a much more violent response. Iranian military forces and militias are likely to storm into southern Iraq and the US may be forced to use nuclear weapons against them, causing large scale casualties and inflaming the Muslim world. There could be popular uprisings in other countries in the region like Pakistan, and of course a Shiite uprising in Iraq against American occupiers. Finally I would like to discuss the grave consequences to America and the world if the US uses nuclear weapons against Iran. First, the likelihood of terrorist attacks against Americans both on American soil and abroad will be enormously enhanced after these events. And terrorist's attempts to get hold of "loose nukes" and use them against Americans will be enormously incentivized after the US used nuclear weapons against Iran. Second, it will destroy America's position as the leader of the free world. The rest of the world rightly recognizes that nuclear weapons are qualitatively different from all other weapons, and that there is no sharp distinction between small and large nuclear weapons, or between nuclear weapons targeting facilities versus those targeting armies or civilians. It will not condone the breaking of the nuclear taboo in an unprovoked war of aggression against a non-nuclear country, and the US will become a pariah state. Third, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will cease to exist, and many of its 182 non-nuclear-weapon-country signatories will strive to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent to an attack by a nuclear nation. With no longer a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, any regional conflict may go nuclear and expand into global nuclear war. Nuclear weapons are million-fold more powerful than any other weapon, and the existing nuclear arsenals can obliterate humanity many times over. In the past, global conflicts terminated when one side prevailed. In the next global conflict we will all be gone before anybody has prevailed.
2AC Heg DA [4/6]
Heg cause prolif – multipolarity will solve it
Weber et al 07 Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley (Steven with Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, and Ely Ratner, Ph.D. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center, [“How Globalization Went Bad,” Foreign Policy, Issue 158, January/February,)
Axiom 3 is a story about the preferred strategies of the weak. It's a basic insight of international relations that states try to balance power. They protect themselves by joining groups that can hold a hegemonic threat at bay. But what if there is no viable group to join? In today's unipolar world, every nation from Venezuela to North Korea is looking for a way to constrain American power. But in the unipolar world, it's harder for states to join together to do that. So they turn to other means. They play a different game. Hamas, Iran, Somalia, North Korea, and Venezuela are not going to become allies anytime soon. Each is better off finding other ways to make life more difficult for Washington. Going nuclear is one way. Counterfeiting U.S. currency is another. Raising uncertainty about oil supplies is perhaps the most obvious method of all. Here's the important downside of unipolar globalization. In a world with multiple great powers, many of these threats would be less troublesome. The relatively weak states would have a choice among potential partners with which to ally, enhancing their influence. Without that more attractive choice, facilitating the dark side of globalization becomes the most effective means of constraining American power. SHARING GLOBALIZATION'S BURDEN The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. There's effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security. It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war, to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much of this analysis is overblown. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But that doesn't matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In Tehran, Pyongyang, and many other capitals, including Beijing, the bottom line is simple: The U.S. military could, with conventional force, end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S. conventional military power. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Before 1989, states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union's nuclear umbrella for protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Today, it is fast becoming a necessity. North Korea is the clearest example. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding, nuclear armed communist neighbors, it was officially at war with its southern neighbor, and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U.S. troops on its border. But, for 40 years, North Korea didn't seek nuclear weapons. It didn't need to, because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Within five years of the Soviet collapse, however, Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Korea's founder, Kim II Sung, barely flinched when former U.S. President Bill Clinton's administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. That brinkmanship paid off. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power, and Kim's son rules the country with an iron fist. America's conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Saddam Hussein's great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters, great powers could split the job of policing proliferation, and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. It's often forgotten now that, during the Cold War, the only state 'with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one— nuclear weapons. Moscow simply wouldn't permit it. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran, but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. And the Russians are aiding Iran's nuclear ambitions. When push comes to shove, nonproliferation today is almost entirely America's burden.