Chapter 7: Securing and Enforcing Judgments

B. Enforcement of Judgments and Orders

*p. 792, Note 4: See Hyundai Securities Co. v. Lee, 232 Cal.App.4th 1379, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 264 (2015) (enforcing most of a judgment from Korean court under California's Uniform Foreign–Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, CCP §§ 1713–1724).

*p. 801, Note 3: Normally, an injunction or other judicial order applies to enjoined parties only. However, it can be applicable to classes of persons through whom the enjoined person may act, such as agents, servants, employees, aiders, abettors, etc., though not parties to the action, and any such parties violating the terms with notice can be found guilty of contempt for disobedience. Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1355, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203, 219, review granted, 381 P.3d 231 (2016) (nonparty Yelp ordered to remove defamatory reviews from its website that defendant had written about the plaintiff).

C. COSTS AND ATTORNEY’S FEES1. Costs

*p. 802: The California Supreme Court has held that a defendant prevailing in an action brought pursuant to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Gov’t Code § 12900 et seq., is not entitled to its ordinary court costs as a matter of right pursuant to CCP § 1032. Instead, Gov’t Code § 12965(b) governs cost awards in FEHA actions, allowing trial courts discretion in awards of both attorney’s fees and costs to prevailing FEHA parties. However, in awarding attorney’s fees and costs, the trial court's discretion is bounded by the rule of Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978); therefore, an unsuccessful FEHA plaintiff should not be ordered to pay the defendant's fees or costs unless the plaintiff brought or continued litigating the action without an objective basis for believing it had potential merit. Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire District, 61 Cal.4th 97, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826, 347 P.3d 976 (2015).

*p. 809, Note 2: See Sanford v. Rasnick, 246 Cal.App.4th 1121, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 614 (2016) and Charton v. Harkey, 247 Cal.App.4th 730, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 369 (2016) (in both instances, trial court reversed for not taxing costs properly).

2. Attorney’s Fees

p. 808, Note 1(b): The California Supreme Court has established a default rule that when a defendant pays money to a plaintiff to settle an action and the action is subsequently dismissed, the dismissal is not in the defendant’s favor and the plaintiff has obtained a net monetary recovery for purposes of CCP § 1032(a). As this is just a default rule, the parties may make their own arrangements regarding costs. DeSaulles v. Community Hospital, 62 Cal.4th 1140, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 429, 708, 370 P.3d 996 (2016).

p. 810: * The California Supreme Court has held unanimously that Serrano v. Priest,

20 Cal.3d 25, 141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303 (1977), permits a trial court to anchor its calculation of a reasonable attorney’s fee award in a class action on the basis of a percentage of the common fund recovered through litigation. Serrano’s discussion of the use of the lodestar method as the means of calculating a reasonable fee in “every case” was “made in connection with an award under the ‘private attorney general’ doctrine.” Lafitte v. Robert Half International, Inc., 1 Cal.5th 480, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 555, 376 P.3d 672 (2016).

p. 811: The U.S. Supreme Court has reiterated that the American Rule is the “basic point of reference” for fee awards and that it is deeply rooted in the common law. Baker Botts L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2164, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015).

*p. 820, Note 4: For a case where the plaintiff was denied attorney’s fees for acting as a catalyst because he did not make a reasonable attempt to settle his dispute before filing his action in court, as required under Graham, see Carian v. Department of Fish & Wildlife, 235 Cal.App.4th 806, 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 594 (2015).

*p. 829, Note 2: “An action (or cause of action) is ‘on a contract’ for purposes of section 1717 if (1) the action (or cause of action) ‘involves' an agreement, in the sense that the action (or cause of action) arises out of, is based upon, or relates to an agreement by seeking to define or interpret its terms or to determine or enforce a party's rights or duties under the agreement, and (2) the agreement contains an attorney fees clause.” Hjelm v. Prometheus Real Estate Group, Inc., 3 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1170, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 404 (2016) (quoting Douglas E. Barnhart, Inc. v. CMC Fabricators, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 230, 241–242, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 440 (2012)).

p. 830, Note 4: Contrary to Young, which thought that the nonreciprocal federal rule applied to state fee award statutes, the California Supreme Court has held that: “When the Legislature intends that the successful side shall recover its attorney’s fees no matter who brought the legal proceeding, it typically uses the term ‘prevailing party.’” Tract 19051 Homeowners Ass’n v. Kemp, 60 Cal.4th 1135, 1145, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 701, 708, 343 P.3d 883 (2015) (quoting Jankey; italics added by Kemp Court). In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court has reaffirmed the Christiansburg Garment interpretation that a prevailing defendant in a federal civil rights action is permitted to recover attorney’s fees only if the plaintiff’s action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” James v. City of Boise, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 685, 686, 193 L.Ed.2d 694 (2016).


*p. 831, Note 5: A statute can also override a contractual provision for reasonable attorney’s fees in special circumstances. In Dorsey v. Superior Court, 241 Cal.App.4th 583, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 834 (2015), as a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeal held that a statute limiting attorney fee awards in small claims court appeals to $150 superseded the contractual attorney fee provision.

*p. 833: For a case awarding attorney’s fees under state and federal law, see Kerkeles v. City of San Jose, 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 196 Cal.Rptr.3d 252 (2015).