Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program
Process History
With the completion of the Glen Canyon Dam in 1963, and the 25 million acre feet of water impounded behind it to form Lake Powell, inspired both great hope and concern from people interested in the future of the arid Southwestern United States. Hope because of the tremendous potential the Dam offered for stimulating the regional economy through power production and recreational activities, and concern over the unknown impacts the project would have on the cultural and natural resources of the Colorado River. In 1982, in response to rising concern over potential impacts, the Bureau of Reclamation, under direction from Secretary of the Interior James Watt, established the Glen Canyon Environmental Studies (GCES) Program. to "investigate relationships between Glen Canyon Dam operations and changes in Colorado River resources throughout Grand Canyon" (GCMRC, 1998).
Lake Powell stretches 186 miles upstream from the Dam.
"Glen Canyon Dam and its operations have altered hydrologic and temperature regimes in ways that have dramatically transformed the Colorado River ecosystem" (NRC, 1999).
The Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, in combination with the findings of the Glen Canyon Dam Environmental Impact Statement (GCDEIS, 1995) and the Record of Decision (ROD, 1996), call for the monitoring of effects on the Colorado River ecosystem and research into ways to increase natural resource protection and natural process restoration. Together, they called for the creation of the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program (GCDAMP) which consists of the following:
Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program (GCDAMP)
Governance structures
(NOTE: Possibly structure the writing of this like in the Elkhorns case with different paragraphs for each administrative body)
The unique organizational structure outlined in the EIS, a "triangle with parity," is another reason this program has been so successful to date. (Gold, 1999)
The Secretary's Designee, as described in the Final EIS, needed to be a senior DOI official with the responsibility for working as the Secretary's contact for the AMP, to make sure the AMP complies with the GCPA, EIS and the ROD, to review and approve recommendations from the AMWG on changes in dam operations, and generally to serve as "the focal point for issues and decisions associated with the program" (Gold, 1999).
The Adaptive Management Working Group (AMWG) is a Federal Advisory Committee chartered in February of 1997 created to "develop, evaluate and recommend alternative strategies for the operation of Glen Canyon Dam, and make recommendations to the Secretary" (Gold, 1999). Chaired by the Secretary's designee, the AMWG also develops plans for future activities and is "comprised of managers and stakeholders who determine primary objectives and information needs to be addressed by GCRMC" (?). The participating stakeholders include "Department of Interior agencies (Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Reclamation, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service), Western Area Power Association, Colorado River basin states, Native American tribes, Colorado River Energy Development Association, and environmental organizations."
The Technical Working Group (TWG), created by the AMWG at their first meeting in September of 1997, was designed to provide both GCRMC and AMWG with scientific and information advice. Representatives are appointed by the AMWG and, as with the AMWG, TWG "includes representatives from federal and state resource management agencies, Native American tribes, and a diverse set of research experts." The EIS specifies that the TWG should "translate AMWG policy and goals into resource management objectives and criteria and standards for long-term monitoring and research in response to the GCPA" (Gold, 1999). Additionally, the TWG was charged with helping to design monitoring and research at the GCMRC, and with providing information as requested by the AMWG.
The Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center (GCMRC), established in October of 1996, was created to "develop and administer plans for long-term monitoring and research of the Colorado River and its riverine environment." Specifically, GCMRC is responsible for "developing and implementing the annual monitoring and research plan, managing all adaptive management monitoring and research programs, managing and maintaining all data collected…, administering research proposals through a competitive contract process" (Gold, 1999) and coordinating the review and writing of reports and recommendations. "To ensure relevance to stakeholder needs," GCMRC has developed a strategic plan for long-term monitoring and research in nine resource areas: "hydropower, water, sediment, fish and aquatic, vegetation, threatened and endangered species, terrestrial wildlife, cultural resources, and recreation." This plan is reviewed on a regular basis by TWG and AMWG and recommended to the Secretary for adoption.
The Independent Review Panels (IRP) were set up as two or three bodies by the EIS for "periodically reviewing resource specific monitoring and research programs and for making recommendations to the AMWG and GCMRC regarding monitoring, priorities, integration and management" (Gold, 1999). In short, they "provide independent assessments of program proposals and accomplishments to ensure scientific objectivity and credibility." (NOTE: The IRP may either once or now be called the Independent Science Review Group (ISRG)). In its Mission Statement, the GCMRC states that its research needs will also be guided by "a Federal Agencies Cooperative Action committee with representation from the National Park Service, Bureau of Reclamation, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of Energy; Indian tribes; state governors and agencies; power customers; environmental, commercial and other associated interest groups." One of the IRPs will be the Science Advisory Board (SAB), whose purpose will be to provide scientific advice to GBMRC and "to ensure that Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program scientific and technical activities are efficient, unbiased, objective, and scientifically sound." Appointment of the advisors to this interdisciplinary board will be based on "their standing and accomplishments in the scientific community."
Outcomes (from Gold, 1999)
"The 1996 'Beach/Habitat-Building Flow' experiment was a scientific, management, and political success. Beaches were built, sand was deposited to protect cultural resources, and negative effects on other resources were minimized."
"The November 1997 Habitat Maintenance Flood (HMF) is itself a tribute to how well the adaptive management process is working. It took two years to plan the 1996 flood and only two months to plan the 1997 flood… [The] results have led to the development of the hypothesis that if fine sand or silt are to be retained in the system, then floods in the range of the 1996 BHBF or higher will need to be made as soon as possible after significant tributary flooding occurs on the Paria River."
"Other accomplishments from this program include the development of hydrologic triggering criteria, resource evaluation criteria to determine whether or not we should propose a flood should the hydrology provide us the opportunity to do one, the development of an annual State of the Canyon Resources report, and the first efforts to develop an integrated model of the Colorado River ecosystem."
Sources of Success (from Gold, 1999)
"The establishment of an extensive consultative process that brings all stakeholders to one table to discuss their goals and develop a shared vision for the Colorado River ecosystem."
"The willingness of the stakeholders to embrace uncertainty in our scientific understanding of how best to management the Colorado River ecosystem and a willingness to treat future floods as experiments."
"The establishment of an organizational structure that requires scientists and managers to work together to recommend future management actions. This 'triangle of parity' structure has been critical to the effective working of the AMP."
"The willingness of the Assistant Secretary to ensure that the head of the GCMRC is on an equal level with the other federal personnel that play leadership roles in this program."
"The establishment of GCMRC… [which] uses a competitive RFP process and external peer review to ensure the quality and credibility of the information it produces."
"The AMP has been embraced by Reclamation and the other stakeholders as the right approach for doing business. The support of the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary has also been critical during the formative stages of this program. And the program has enjoyed flexibility on the part of all parties, while operating within the framework of the existing Law of the River."
Barriers
Integrating Science
The AMWG in January of 1998 established a set of "hydrologic triggering criteria" to determine when to release a "beach/habitat-building flow." These criteria are based on January forecast for spring runoff exceeding 140% of normal, and Jan-July forecast of higher than a certain flow. "The Center and the TWG have developed several beach/habitat-building flow scenarios, as well as a "resource criteria" procedure to ensure systematic and timely responses to hydrologic conditions, impact assessment, and compliance requirements in the event that a hydrologic triggering event does occur" (NRC, 1999).
Interfacing with the Public
Lessons learned
NOTES FROM VARIOUS READINGS
NRC's main critiques of GCES in 1987 (as reported in NRC 1996):
1. "insufficient geographic and conceptual scope,"
2. incomplete listing of all possible management options
3. "weak integration of components,
4. lack of a clear master plan,
5. excessively internalized staffing of the research effort"
David Wegner's list of NAS recommendations not included in GCES II:
1. Hiring senior scientist at DOI level
2. Development of study plans and proposals through a public process
3. Official integration into program of the "ecological effects and impacts of Lake Powell and Lake Mead on the ecosystem of the Colorado River"
4. Development of full and comprehensive approach
"Colorado River Ecology and Dam Management" Symposium Recommendations to USBR:
1. Initiate long-term research and monitoring in the Grand Canyon (including a call for careful planning, an adaptive management approach to "integrate science into its management of natural resources," and the creation of an advisory group at the secretarial level of DOI "so that the varying agency missions will be less of a barrier to effective resource management" (which was also recommended by NRC in 1987))
2. Ensure that Dam operations are flexible (including a call for USBR and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) to integrate scientific info into decision making by making a greater effort to "meld economic and operations research into ecosystem research" and to recognize uncertainty)
3. Seek research talent from the academic sector (specifically to contract people with demonstrated research experience as opposed to small businesses oriented towards timelines and deliverables and to use a panel of peer scientists to review proposals)
4. Include the USGS on the Federal Executive Management Committee (this committee, appointed by USBR to oversee Dam operations, at the time consisted of USBR, NPS, USFWS, Bureau of Indian Affairs, WAPA and AZ Game and Fish)
5. Use an ecosystem approach to Grand Canyon research (including a call to avoid implementation in isolation, a ban on introduction of exotics and calls for other specific work)
6. Revisit 1987 NRC recommendations on the GCES (and examine them for applicability to GCES II)
NRC (1996) assessment of failings in the organizational structure of GCES:
1. "BOR failed to reinforce independence and effectiveness of project management"
2. By making the GCES program manager answerable to a district office of the BOR, one of the cooperating agencies, the manager "was outranked by most of the individuals who made up the cooperating group"
3. The GCES program manager was also directly answerable to regional administrators who were much more sensitive to the needs of water supply and power production than to broader issues such as the Grand Canyon's status as a World Heritage site. After some debate, the administrators did agree to forego some power revenues to allow experimental releases, but the GCES program retained strong regional biases
4. This position within BOR also allowed BOR's interests to take precedence on GCES's research agenda, making the interests of other DOI agencies like NPS and FWS secondary (at least at first - it improved and widened over time)
NRC recommended in 1987 that the manager be answerable instead to an Assistant Secretary of the Interior which "would likely have resulted in better coordination of scientific research questions and a more rapid route to consensus among the various agencies." (NRC, 1996) Unfortunately, the change was not made so "the history of GCES is marked with interagency conflicts that could have been minimized or avoided." A broader perspective might also have facilitated the exchange and sharing of information, which could have been very useful but never took place.
5. "In practical terms the project manager was unable to withhold funds from agencies that failed to meet contractual obligations and had difficulty in confining or directing the scope along lines that were contrary to those preferred by individual cooperators." Specifically, there were examples of contracting agencies (like the USGS) pursuing research with GCES funds that were far more relevant to USGS' broader mission than to specific information needs of the BOR relating to earth and water sciences on the Colorado River
6. "Internalization of expenditures among the federal cooperators"
7. "Introduction of ancillary objectives through law or administrative fiat that were not necessarily relevant to the project's objectives" (like bald eagle studies)
8. BOR contracted GCES research out to mostly other agency staff (like archeology and general ecology research to NPS, native fish biology to Arizona Dept of Game and Fish, sediment transport to USGS) rather than BOR or independent researchers which meant that "researchers had primary responsibilities to their home agencies rather than the BOR, so when funding or scheduling conflicts arose, the bureau's position was secondary. The result was instability for GCES because important reports were delayed, and their results could not be used for midcourse corrections or further planning for related projects."
9. Funding was highly variable on a yearly basis which discouraged multiyear research, in part because GCES received its funding through power revenues, which varied with the priorities of the regional administrator and natural fluctuations of water levels
Examples of Interagency Conflict with GCES
1. early conflicts between BOR and NPS because of overlapping jurisdictions
2. in later phases between GCES and FWS concerning the humpback chub because GCES had conducted research but the ESA required FWS to do work as well (which was funded by GCES) and BOR endorsed preferred alternatives for dam operations based on the GCES conclusions which were different than those developed by FWS. "The result was that two agencies in the Interior Department took different positions on how best to protect the endangered fish, and both positions were based on research funded through GCES." (The issue was settled in 1993 when FWS agreed to support BOR's position in exchange for the guarantee of continued funding for NPS studies of the endangered fish)