Virginia Review of Asian Studies

Volume 16 (2014): 202-216

Donovan: China’s Growing Generation Gap

A SOCIETY IN CRISIS: CHINA’S GROWING GENERATION GAP

KELLY DONOVAN

UNC-GREENSBORO

Recently, China has attracted attention due to its economic growth and steadily increasing political influence. Theories suggest that China will be the next central player in world politics and that it will have the largest economy in the world (Zhao, 2012). Concurrently, there are arguments that dispute those claims and insist that China cannot support that kind of development for long (Zhao, 2012). Regardless of these arguments, the amount and the rate of development in China has already begun to alter the culture of its people and has created a Generation Gap that threatens the stability of the People’s Republic of China.

Born during and after the 1980s under the economic reforms and policies of Deng Xiao Ping, a new generation of Chinese citizens is maturing and moving in the opposite direction of the older generation. The previous generation, born under the influence of Mao Zedong’s Red Communist cosmovision from 1949 to 1976, values community, family, hard work, and modesty. However, the opening of the Chinese economy to Western influence and the growth of its State Capitalist Market[1], along with the implementation of the One-Child Policy, have led to the deterioration of those values. The One-Child Policy, which has led to a decreasing population of females (discussed later in this paper), has drastically shifted the views and stature of women in Chinese society, as Kay Johnson and her colleagues discuss in their article “Infant Abandonment and Adoption in China” (1998). Internet media sensation and social commentator Zhang Lijia expresses the views of many women in China who refuse to settle for men who do not meet the requirements of the new generation of financially independent and educated females, referencing the music video by Long Si Yu “黄金剩女版《没有车没有房》” [“huangjin shengnü ban <meiyou che meiyou fang>”; “Golden Age Women version of <No Car, No House>”] (2011) that responds to the original song “No Car, No House” directed towards women by jilted men. Others, like Jiaming Sun and Xun Wang, authors of “Value Differences between Generations in China: a study in Shanghai” (2010), take a quantitative approach and identify the differences between the old and the young since the opening of the market economy.

The cultural gap between China’s older and younger generations is significant because it is leading to growing resentment, miscommunication, unrest, and controversy within both political and social circles. If the Chinese Communist Party continues to leave the problems caused by the generation gap unaddressed, it is likely that protests and calls for reform by the younger Chinese will increase in number and strength, while the elderly will continue to blame their offspring for the issues plaguing their society. It is necessary that the Chinese Communist Party respond to and begin to resolve the problems created by the Generation Gap in order to ensure the future political stability and continued economic growth of their country.

In order to map out the problems that the Chinese Government needs to address, and to discuss how the State Capitalist economy and One-Child Policy are causing a divide in Chinese ideology, this project will look at a variety of sources. The connections made between sources that address the problems that their society faces today will be traced back to the roots of the issue: the economy and the One-Child Policy. Qualitative sources such as films, novels, blogs, journals, and music will be analyzed in order to explore the values that have changed between the generations. Quantitative data collected by researchers mathematically define the degree and extent of the divide. The focus of the analysis will be to explore the connections and relations between societal problems rather than merely defining the generation gap.

Vanessa L. Fong, Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Education at Harvard University, and Ying Wang MD, discuss the development of the One-Child Policy and the psychological development of single children in China in their article, “Little Emperors and the 4:2:1 Generation: China’s Singletons” (2009). The One-Child Policy, implemented in 1978, helped to curb the population growth that the government anticipated would exceed the carrying capacity of China’s economic progress and natural resources (Wang & Fong, 2009,1137). The State Family Planning Bureau that issues fines and confiscates property, among other methods, enforces the One-Child Policy (Wang & Fong, 2009, 1137). In his blog entry entitled “Social Regression, Government Extortion” (2007), HanHan, one of China’s most famous bloggers, commented on the flaws in the enforcement of the policy. New China Publishing Agency in Hefei, China published an article announcing that the new law regarding fees for the rich who violate the One-Child Policy would be “three to four times the annual income” for those who have a second child illegally, and if another child is born the “upbringing fees will be levied at double the previous rate” (Han, 2013, 19).

The purpose of this new law was to demonstrate to the Chinese citizens that the government was trying to address corruption and rule breaking by the wealthy, who commonly disregard the seriousness of the One-Child Policy (Han, 2013, 19). In response, HanHan questions whether or not taxing is effective since the rich can afford the fees and extra taxes while the poor, who are subject to disproportionate fines compared to their income, cannot afford the taxes, and as a result cannot adequately provide for an ‘extra’ child (2013, 20). HanHan sarcastically, and critically, addresses the government saying, “If the [poor] have no income, or negative income, then logically shouldn’t the authorities be imposing a negative fine on negative income, in which case wouldn’t the government, in effect, be paying the poor for having extra children?” (2013, p. 20). HanHan does not necessarily say he is against the One-Child Policy, only that the enforcement of the law is not fair or effective, since higher taxes on the rich will not deter them from having more children, and the law fails to address the problem of poor people having children for whom they cannot provide (2013, 21).

Regardless of its reception among the citizens, the policy has “prevented 250-300 million births,” reducing the fertility rate “from 5.7 births per woman in 1970 to 1.7 births per woman in 2000-2005” (Wang &Fong, 2009, 1137). The children born under this policy, lacking siblings, are often associated with undesirable characteristics and the tendency of parents to indulge their child’s every whim. These children became known as “小皇帝” [xiao huangdi] and “ 小公主” [xiao gongzhu], meaning “Little Emperors” and “Little Princesses” respectively.

These so-called “spoiled children” have nevertheless become the sole hope of their parents to improve their standard of living and to become successful to bring honor to their families. They are now being referred to as the “4:2:1 Generation,” deriving from the “fact that one married couple (both singletons) will ultimately need to simultaneously care for four aging parents and one child” (Wang & Fong, 2009, 1139). In an increasingly competitive environment, students will spend long hours in preparation for the 高考 [gaokao], or the college entrance exams, since “entrance into a top university…[is] deemed the only way to secure a good future” (Wang & Fong, 2009, 1139). HanHan, as a member of the younger generation, expresses his displeasure towards the older generation’s expectations in his blog entry “Youth” (2010): “families may not treat them with much affection, for how much you earn is commonly the sole criterion Chinese families have for determining the value of a child” (2013, 157).

Even if success of the child does occur, it is not guaranteed that the members of the 4:2:1 Generation will do as their parents request and take care of the elderly. In their study of value differences in Chinese youth, Jiaming Sun, from the Department of Sociology at Texas A&M University, and Xun Wang, from the department of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Wisconsin, have discovered that the younger generations are more individualistic and “likely to live according to their own lifestyles regardless of what others think, and they are less likely to follow the traditional collective ideology” (Sun &Wang, 2010, 79). In an increasingly modern China where the population has been ranked as the most materialistic in the world, the success of the child does not necessarily equate to the welfare of the parents (Sun &Wang, 2010, p. 79). Buying into consumerism and materialism offered by the market economy, Chinese youth desire to increase their own standard of living in the cities, and may not consider their parents’ desires.

The rebellious nature of Chinese children today is not limited solely to single children. The tendency of children to neglect their parents’ hopes and dreams in favor of following their own ambitions can be seen in Lixin Fan’s documentary, the Last Train Home (2010). In rural China, the One-Child Policy is not as strictly enforced. Knowing her parents prefer and favor her brother over her, Qin decides to go to the city to work in a factory against her parents’ wishes. A year passes, and Qin returns home with her parents, who are also migrant workers, to spend the holidays. Tensions grow as her parents attempt to persuade her to return to school, and counter to traditional obedience, Qin curses at her father. After receiving a beating, Qin returns to the city and finds a new job in a Western style club, serving alcohol in traditionally inappropriate clothing. The documentary ends with her parents expressing disappointment after the 2008 financial crisis, saying that all their hopes rest on their children to be able to provide for them when they are older.

Instead of investing in more government assistance to the elderly to solve this problem, China has implemented a new law that went into effect in July of 2013. This new law requires that adult children go home to visit their elderly parents in an attempt “to protect the lawful rights and interests of parents aged 60 and older, and to carry on the Chinese virtue of filial piety” (Einhorn, 2013). The law fails to mention how often children must visit their parents and the consequences if they do not choose to visit, but it does require businesses to allow children to take off time to travel back home (Einhorn, 2013). In 2011, the population of elderly above the age of 60 in China constituted 185 million people; China’s National Committee on Aging believes that in forty years this number will increase to 487 million (Einhorn, 2013). With an increasing number of elderly and an ever-dwindling workforce due to the One-Child Policy, the Chinese “fear they will grow old before they grow rich” (Einhorn, 2013). When one looks at these statistics, it is no wonder that the older generation expects the younger to provide for them. However, the younger generation expects more freedoms and does not desire to work to provide for the older generation. Instead, they wish to be successful and benefit themselves.

The implementation of the One-Child Policy has also caused another issue: child abandonment and abortion. Traditional Chinese values support and encode the idea of “重男轻女” [zhongnan qingnü], literally “heavy boy, light girl.” This phrase represents the importance of each gender in a child. Males have heavy importance in the family since they carry the family name and are traditionally the ones to support the parents. Females are of light importance since they marry away to join the male’s family and require a dowry.

According to Kay Johnson, professor of Asian Studies and Politics at Hampshire College who focuses on women, development, and population policy in China, 90% of abandoned children are females (1998, 475). Of those girls, 87% have no brothers, meaning they are left so that the parents may have a chance of birthing a son (Johnson, 1998, 475-476). Boys are also abandoned; however, the majority of males left behind have some form of a disability, whether it is mental or physical (Johnson, 1998, 476). The study also showed that 79% of children are left under the age of two months (Johnson, 1998, p. 477). It is unclear what happens to the abandoned children. Most parents place children in high population density areas so that others may find and adopt the infants, but it is clear that some do die (Johnson, 1998, 502).

Nevertheless, this study focuses mainly on a rural population and does not consider urban pregnancies. The One-Child Policy in the suburbs and rural areas is not as strict as in urban areas. Rural families are sometimes allowed to have two children if the first-born is a female and the second a male. In the case that a male is born first, that is the only child permitted. Rural families are limited to two children maximum, even if both are females; they may not continue to have children until a male is born. One must question how many families know the gender before giving birth. Does the knowledge of the gender lead to the abortion of female babies? If the first child is a girl and the gender of the second child is known before birth, would the second child be aborted if female? According to Wei Xing Zhu, professor at Zhejiang Normal University, and his colleagues who conducted research on the matter, it is likely that the availability of ultrasounds, even to the rural poor, and the legality of abortion may play a role in the gender inequality (Zhu, 2009, p. 5). Wei Xing Zhu does state that abortion based on gender is illegal, but determining whether an abortion was performed due to gender is hard to prove (Zhu, 2009, p. 5).