2016 GSM Report - Daesh

GSM

063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

Original: Italian

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST

SPECIAL GROUP

THE EXPANSION OF daesh

TO LIBYA AND THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN

draft report

Andrea MANCIULLI (Italy)

Rapporteur

October 2016

* Until this document has been adopted by the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur.

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063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.INTRODUCTION

II.“LOST” TERRITORY AND THE PRESENCE OF DAESH

A.LIBYAN EPICENTRE

B.REGIONAL REPERCUSSIONS

III.DISPUTED TERRITORY: DAESH BETWEEN WELLS, TERMINALS AND TOWNS

A.SURROUNDING INSTABILITY

B.BALKAN EXTENSION

IV.BOUNDARY SPACE: BETWEEN THE SAHARA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN, MIGRATION PROSPECTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DAESH

V.ECONOMIC SPACE: BUSINESS FOR DAESH AT THE GATES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

VI.VIRTUAL SPACE: INTERNET, CYBERNETICS AND THE MEDIA

VII.SURVIVAL SPACE: FROM VICTORY IN SIRTE TO THE STABILISATION OF LIBYA

VIII.CONCLUSIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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063 GSM 16 E rev. 1

1. INTRODUCTION

1. Among the new challenges that the Atlantic Alliance has to face in the post-Arab Spring period, terrorism continues to constitute a central threadcontaining a concoction of problems that have not yet been solved. The new crises arising out of “revolutions” against the regimes in the MENA Region (Middle East and North Africa) have exacerbated already critical situations and heightened their effects. A case in point is illegal immigration and the overall context of social decay in the countries where the “revolutions” started.

1. Daesh was the subject of the previous report of the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM). It is on the heels of the broader backdrop of terrorism that this analysis was conducted to better understand the nuances of the current phenomenon.

1. An attempt to define terrorism within the restricted confines of terminological codification is an arduous task, one that has led to endless discussions that continue to give rise to uncertainties and disagreements.

1. For the indiscriminate violence of terrorism, which is developing at several levels, to creep in, develop and spread in its closest acceptance of ideology, the phenomenon of terrorism requires:

- a space;

- one or more lines of action;

- a reason or justification;

- a receptive audience capable of “propagating” the respective lines of action.

1. These critical factors vary depending on the natural development of the culture and society of each community, generating continuous adjustments and gradual adaptations in the threat, which at times lead to the exhaustion or extinction of the phenomenon, but which most often create unprecedented profiles of innovation and brutality.

1. A globalised society such as the current one therefore has to face a terrorist threat which has inexorably developed accordingly, propelling instability and bewilderment in communities which used to be inaccessible. The change which al-Qaeda imposed on 11 September 2001 on the very notion of a terrorist threat through an attack against the society of the United States, was a turning point in the safety habits throughout the world: a revolution in military affairs, applied to this framework of indiscriminate and unjustifiable violence that demonstrates the common acceptance of terrorism. Since Nine Eleven, the main organisations that have disseminated and applied the strategy of terror on the international stage have been qualified as “Qaedist” or “inspired by al-Qaeda.” But the parable of this terrorist organisation has been demonstrably weakened due to several concurrent factors:

- decimation of its leaders;

- internal struggles and conflicts;

- failure to achieve the territorial objective;

- static nature of the threat (the violent rise of Daesh[1] has revived an albeit weakened Qaedist activism).

1. The summary of the aforementioned factors has created the conditions for the affirmation of a new idealisation of extremism. The “change of pace” today is based essentially on the establishment of a particular territorial entity, which is offensive and unacceptable to the international community, but desired, propagated and actively defended by the partisans of Daesh, the “caliphate,” a social redemption strategy icon that attracts militants like magnets. The threat continues to stem from a transnational global terrorist organisation (since Daesh has evolved from al-Qaeda), even though the use of cells distributed through a capillary network (typical of the al-Qaeda strategy) has been replaced by a closure within the “borders” of a “quasi State” (materialised by the caliphate). Daesh is more conventional, with (real) aspirations for the territorial expansion of – and attached to -- the Caliphate, but with its own “foreign policy,” which is vital to the survival of its “domestic policy.” Daesh is far more than a mere terrorist organisation at this time, with millions of dollars at its disposal to finance its operations. It does not need to set up cells outside its borders. The media propaganda machine, which is clearly superior to that of al-Qaeda, has already manipulated and radicalised hundreds of followers. These are the “ambassadors” of the caliphate, the ones who have no opportunity of reaching the caliphate, who are incited to seek jihad in their countries of origin, if necessary supported and assisted by those returning from the caliphate: returnee veteran foreign fighters.

1. The multidimensional aspect of this extremist ideology acquires a decisive value in the strategy of Daesh: it is the physical area of a state which is turned into a conquered territory for the caliphate. Borders, which acquire anticolonialistrevenge value against the infidel West that had created them years earlier, are today (virtually) eliminated by an ideological and brutal project that aims to exploit any geopolitical fragility of recognised state entities to enter, take root and consolidate. Emirs and sheiks were in the service of the colonial plan at the time to bring about new states, which are now crumbling. The guerrilla warfare and terrorism waged by the Islamic State of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi are currently in the service of a completely different plan: to tear down the borders drawn a century ago, and unite Sunnis under the black flag of a new caliphate (Negri).

1. Extremist proselytising finds breeding ground in the socio-institutional void created by governmental mismanagement to exploit the social malaise. The “Arab Spring” has paradoxically fostered the project of a militant armed and unarmed Islamic radicalism that exploits the chaotic, revolutionary situationand tries to put in place governmental entities that are close to the extremist ideology or, in the very least, to expand areas abandoned by the state to sow the seeds of extremism.

1. The essential issue to examine today consequently becomes the juxtaposition between the concept of “territory” and terrorism. The dynamics that govern every aspect of this equation shed greater light on the threat.

1. “LOST” TERRITORY AND THE PRESENCE OF DAESH

1. The concept of gradual enlargement of the caliphate’s borders is vital to Daesh’s propaganda, and follows different rationales and multiple implementation strategies. First of all, there is the simple territorial expansion of the established “non-State:” where precarious situations hold sway, as in Syria and Iraq, Daesh fighters try to undermine the previous sovereignty of the governments in Baghdad and Damascus. The situation of ongoing hostilities makes it impossible to speak of “effective control of a delimited territory” for the time being, which makes Daesh a non-State actor, i.e. a terrorist organisation endeavouring to overthrow governments and establish control.

1. The increasingly ramified and deeper penetration of Daesh in totally different social fabrics (from Europe to Asia, including the Maghreb, Africa and the Middle East), has followed a consolidated model thanks to the growing radicalisation of vast segments of society, particularly young people, who are at times disillusioned by the failure of revolutionary movements which they had launched themselves, and at other times seeking abortive social revenge, for whom the idealisation of a single Islamic state provides a surreptitious answer.

1. This is supplemented by the countless shows of support by extremist entities and groups that have already taken root in many countries and thus represent an initial globalisation of the threat. Consideration should also be given to the most detrimental forms of growth of the caliphate: those that use the latest media resources to disseminate powerful propaganda messages that incite radicalisation from a distance. This is the strategy that exploits the discontents of Western societies, the lack of integration and the consequences of a worldwide economic crisis that still persists, thereby constituting many points of erosion of the state. It is the strategy geared to occupying the territories that the State has already lost or abandoned, the urban ghettos in the throes of crime or refugee camps for those fleeing from crisis zones. Daesh provides lone wolves, aspiring foreign fighters and returnee veterans with an added reason to support the extremist cause, namely to be part of the caliphate, whilst staying in their countries of origin; to become “ambassadors” and “sponsors” with the conviction to contribute in any way or manner to the dissemination and expansion of the state reality coveted and desired by Al-Baghdadi.

1. France (Charlie Hebdo, Bataclan, and Nice), Belgium (Brussels airport), or Turkey (Istanbul airport) are but a few sad cases in point of this new horrendously efficient form of reach at the caliphate disposal.

1. LIBYAN EPICENTRE

1. In terms of the proliferation of extremism, the Arab Spring provided major opportunities which were promptly seized, first by local extremist groups in various regional contexts. Then, better structured transnational terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda, aware of the potential for expansion in those countries, invested resources and planned actions to take a gradual and persistent foothold.

1. The more chaotic the situation becomes in a society, the more rapid, arrogant (and brutal) the expansion of terrorist groups will be. Al-Qaeda has adjusted its presence through its ramification in Algeria, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), or through resident affiliated organisations, such as Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST), and Ansar Bait al-Maqdis in Egypt. At the same time, starting from Syria and Iraq, Daesh has implemented its global programme for a worldwide outreach in open conflict with al-Qaeda. The appearance of a force such as Daesh alongside “historical” protagonists linked to al-Qaeda has altered and complicated the traditional frame of reference for regional terrorism. In West Africa, for instance, after joining Daesh, Boko Haram assumed the name of the Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP), and thus contributed to the turmoil of radicalism in neighbouring countries as well (Niger, Chad and Cameroon). Boko Haram has gained recognition in “world jihad” through this “marriage of convenience,” while Daesh has obtained undeniable benefits, especially on the propaganda front, since it can now boast of a vast region in the heart of Africa as an “expansion of the caliphate.”

1. Libya, one of the symbolic countries of the recent Arab revolutionary popular movements, has gradually become a refuge for terrorist groups operating in North Africa and in the Sahel-Saharan region. The persistence of a long period of post-regime political uncertainty, combined with the manifest activism of militias, has turned the country into a perfect epicentre of instability for the entire region. Furthermore, the abrupt elimination of the Gaddafi regime overturned political and administrative institutions which have not had the opportunity or the capacity to reorganise an efficient institutional and security apparatus. Libya has thus acquired strategic value for the penetration of Daesh in the Mediterranean by providing access to ports, vast stockpiles of arms, and lucrative smuggling routes (Barrett).

1. Fezzan (a southern region of Libya) has traditionally been a caravan and illegal trade route, long beyond the reach of security administrative authorities that have come and gone in the country’s government. The region is still dominated by armed ethnic tribes that have always controlled and governed this territory, open to the exploitation of the trafficking flows and therefore also open to alliances of convenience with extremist elements keen to infiltrate and to exploit such flows.

1. Cyrenaica, the historical oriental province far from the central power in Tripoli, welcomed the first groups of Libyan fighters back from Syria and Iraq, thus staying true to its tradition as the province most steeply inclined to a radical presence. This is the region where the revolution of February 2011 erupted as an expression of a latent and repressed social malaise. It is also the place where this malaise was transformed into radicalism with the greatest ease by providing the bases for the first pledges of allegiance to Daesh by local groups such as Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL).

1. For its part, Tripolitania is still the centre of attempts to build a democratic state, even though it too is riven with corruption, active militias, historical and tribal antagonisms and vendettas that followed the collapse of the regime. Here, the resurgent phenomenon of terrorism is chiefly characterised by (at times major) occasional attacks against the fragile institutional apparatus under reconstruction, rather than a structured and stable presence of terrorist cells capable of controlling the territory.

1. Nevertheless, the presence of Daesh in Libya has very different characteristics from that in Syria and Iraq (Oxford Analytica). The clash between Sunnis and Shiites has never really affected the ethnic and social substrata (more than 97% of the population in Libya is Sunni). The process of taking root was decidedly slower, arduous and strongly influenced by the local confrontation between al-Qaeda and Daesh. Nevertheless, the prevailing chaotic situation in Libya is too great an opportunity for expansion to ignore. Al-Qaeda is very keen to preserve its control in certain areas, whilst Daesh is spreading to the detriment of its adversary and the state apparatus.

1. Al-Baghdadi called on aspiring foreign fighters from the African region to choose Libya rather than Syria and to expand the borders of the caliphate by flocking to the North African country, taking control, and creating an additional haven compared to the organisation’s experience in Syria and Iraq.

1. Daesh’s hub in Libya is therefore closely linked to the clandestine flows that cross its territory. Daesh in Libya has rapidly gone from a local entity (local groups who pledged allegiance to the caliph) to an organisation based on influx of foreign fighters and non-Libyan members. But it has also managed to retain and exploit a distinctly Libyan connotation: as in the case of Iraqi former Baathists in the organisation operating in Iraq and Syria, Daesh in Libya can count on a solid group of former members of the Gaddafi regime, who could not be reabsorbed in the post-revolutionary political and military context.

1. Daesh’s expansion and rooting rationale had to be adapted to the Libyan context as well, whilst capitalising on a well-defined, violent and efficient propaganda media push, similar to that used in Syria and Iraq. The steady progress of conquest by Daesh has been achieved in identified stages in each theatre where the phenomenon has developed: intelligence, Dawa (proselytism, moral indoctrination and missionary work), Hisbah (imposed observance of Islamic principles), military offensive, governance (Zelin).

1. From the first bastion of Derna, the Daesh cells defined and imposed local administrative rules and regulations similar to those applied elsewhere, as in Raqqa, Syria or Mosul, Iraq. The Daesh propaganda machine then included Libya among its priority objectives and flooded the virtual information world and the social media with messages just as effective as those that had been tried and tested in Syria and Iraq. The massive radicalisation action through the media was launched far ahead of initiatives on the ground (attacks). Daesh prepared (and frightened) a public opinion far too distracted by the political and military polarisation that still divides the country. It attracted and recruited hundreds of young non-Libyans by offering them the social redemption they yearned for in their country of origin. The Daesh propaganda machine in Libya carries out “soft” activities, such as Hisbah and Dawa (proselytism and moral indoctrination), concurrently with “harder” efforts, by referring to the security and violence of territorial conquest (Engel).

1. The gradual expansion of the Daesh phenomenon in Libya resulted from a combination of media propaganda, unscrupulous recruitment and the affiliation of indigenous groups exhilarated by the triumphsin Iraq and in Syria. Gradually, incidents of violence indicative of the organisation’s presence spread at a steady pace from the eastern end of Cyrenaica towards the capital (on the western front, at the other end of the country). This slow but steady advancement was marked by resounding events (pledges of allegiance by significant groups, territorial conquests, spectacular attacks), but also held back by the lack of a consolidated command and control structure and properly trained personnel.

1. Daesh declared the creation of three Wilayahs (governorates or provinces) in the peripheral region of Derna: Tarabuls, along the western coast; Barqah to the East, and Fezzan to the South-West.

1. The caliph’s men then moved to establish their Libyan capital in Sirte, modelled on Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq.

1. Daesh concentrated its expansion efforts on Sirte, Tripolitania, turning it into a symbolic bastion of its imposed presence in Libya. This is where the extremist ideology of Daesh converged with the interests of a privileged class of society (former Gaddafi followers) relegated by law to the political isolation imposed on the Libyan parliament by the Islamist parties (the Muslim Brotherhood) when the revolution had ended. Sirte thus witnessed a “Gaddafisation” of Daesh, in a way similar to the “Baathisation” of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Hundreds of former members of the security apparatus under the Gaddafi regime accepted to have the black banner of Daesh hoisted on their structures. Finally, there is probably a hard core of “effective” Libyan fighters in Sirte, which were joined over time by elements stemming chiefly from other terrorist organisations and militias.

1. In proclaiming its presence in Libya little by little, Daesh has to reckon with the solid position of Ansar al Sharia, a group of al-Qaeda-inspired local extremist militiamen, which took part in the revolution of February 2011. Relations between the two groups are diverse, ranging from the current confrontation in Derna between extremist groups backing al-Qaeda (including the Derna chapter of Ansar al-Sharia) and Daesh, to local tactical collaboration (Ajdabiya, Benghazi), or the total superposition and osmosis of the two entities (Sirte).

1. REGIONAL REPERCUSSIONS

1. Libya’s role as a destabilising centre is not due exclusively to the protracted institutional crisis. Two very important issues also come into play:

- the first has to do with the consequences of the (unhindered) trafficking (of all sorts) in the hinterland;