1960S US Subsidy of Supersonic Transport
1960s – US subsidy of Supersonic transport
1970 – SST program put on hold for economic, political, and environmental reasons
1971-1974 – SST Climate Impact Assessment Program.
1974 Spray can CFC issue surfaces
1974 Molina and Rowland study published linking CFCs to potential ozone depletion.
1975 UV- Skin cancer link study published
1977-1985 Ozone depletion enters international political arena
1977 UNEP World Plan of Action for the Ozone Layer meeting
1978 Spray can CFC ban (US mainly, many Euro countries not)
1983 EPA was facing a lawsuit from the Natural Resources Defense Council designed to force EPA to take action to protect stratospheric ozone under the Clean Air Act.
1985 Vienna Convention, not binding and no protocol for reducing CFC emissions. "Umbrella Treaty". US, Canada, Sweden, Norway, and Finland on one side (proposing 80% reduction, complete production ban); EEC countries on the other (30% cut, production cap). Vienna Convention was important because it represented a common ground on which international consensus had been reached
1985 late. Farman et al study on sharp decreases in Antarctic ozone inventories.
1986 EPA announced its new Stratospheric Ozone Protection Plan. 150 million additional skin cancer cases under BAU, no reductions, 3 million deaths before 2075.
1986 late. negotiations on a protocol to the Vienna Convention for controlling CFCs resumed. The new U.S. position, as outlined by EPA and the State Department, called for a near-term freeze on the production of CFCs and halons and a long-term phaseout. The U.S. position was based on new research that pointed to a strong and growing consensus in the international scientific community concerning the serious threat that CFCs posed to the ozone layer, and EPA risk assessment that demonstrated that unacceptable risks were associated with ozone depletion
1987 the Montreal Protocol was achieved in the astonishingly short period of nine months
Environmental Diplomacy lessons:
1. Scientists must assume a critical new role in international negotiations.
2. Political leaders may need to act even while there are still scientific ambiguities, based on a responsible balancing of the risks and costs of delay.
3. A well-informed public opinion can generate pressure for action by hesitant politicians and private companies.
4. Strong leadership by major countries and/or institutions can be a significant force in mobilizing an international consensus.
5. A leading country or group of countries can take preemptive environmental protection measures, even in advance of a global agreement.
6. Both nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and industry are major participants in the new diplomacy.
7. The effectiveness of a regulatory agreement is enhanced when it employs realistic market incentives to encourage technological innovation.
8. Economic and structural inequalities between North and South must be adequately reflected in an international regulatory regime.
9. The size and format of a negotiation may significantly influence the results.
10. Finally, the signing of a treaty is not necessarily the decisive event in a negotiation; the process before and after ratification is critical.
Three critical factors:
Evolving Science
Collection of data on CFC buildup
Scientific basis for link between CFCs and ozone depletion (1974)
Observational evidence for depleting ozone (1985)
Link between increased UV exposure and cancer
Catastrophic Nature of the Risks: The "Dread Factor"
public's perception of the risks.
Comparables: nuclear power, nuclear weapons, DDT and other pesticides, liquid natural gas, and asbestos
Industry and the Search for Substitutes