Electronic Supplementary Material
1 Definitions for all concepts related to external influences
Concepts: EI1 – Exclusion of Third Parties, EI2 – Relations with External Parties, EI3 – Capability to Adapt to Changes (resilience)
Management of social-ecological systems as discussed in the main article is always embedded in an external setting, influencing decisions on sustainability as well. One important concept is exclusion of third parties (EI1).
The importance of this factor follows directly from the definition of common pool resources, a frequent management form of SESs: if there is no exclusion or if it is not viable, it is no longer CPR-management but open access (Ostrom 2009). The exclusion of third parties is therefore central to stability and environmental sustainability (Berkes 2007).
The transition from open access to common pool resource management may be driven by the possibility of excluding third parties with technical measures such as fences or rule-bound measures such as property rights (Wade 1992). If the exclusion of third parties is given, the likelihood increases that actors manage the resource carefully and, by themselves, develop rules for the protection of the resource.
This concept is therefore particularly important for concrete appropriation decisions (Feeny 1992). There are different ways of regulating that only a certain group is entitled to appropriate (Tang 1992). Such boundary rules include land ownership, membership of an organization, special permissions or payment of a fee for appropriation. It does not seem to be decisive which of these mechanisms is used. It is more important whether such rules are considered fair and legitimate and if they are locally appropriate (Ostrom 1990).
Another important concept for any management are the relations to other parties (EI2). This includes all involved parties like NGOs, the national state and other nearby appropriating groups. Cooperations with the state or organizations such as NGOs strengthen legitimacy and legal certainty (GS3), which in turn promote long-term investment in the system (A4) (Berkes 1992; Berkes 2007). Since each stakeholder group is located within a network of relationships with other parties the manner of these relations is, according to some authors, absolutely critical for success or failure (Pomeroy et al. 1998). This claim is supported by the fact that good partnerships can lead to innovations and a more productive use of resources (Gruber 2008).
If other parties aid with concrete technical assistance efficiency is usually increased greatly (Pagdee et al. 2006). Financial aid improves the cost benefit balance of appropriators. One important kind of aid is the compensation for nature protection measures by the state or the designation of protected areas in the vicinity which usually means reduced earnings for the actors (Gutiérrez et al. 2011). However, two aspects of outside help often become problematic: first, if no attention is paid to the existing local institutions (GS6) and second, if the focus is exclusively on improving technology without regard to institutions. Unfortunately, many foreign aid projects still commit these errors (Ostrom 1992).
Another concept that has received much attention in recent years is resilience or the capability to adapt to changes (EI3). Here, it is used as the system and the actors being able to cope with sudden changes in technology, in interaction with markets or in the natural environment. Sudden changes – e. g. in technology, in interaction with markets or natural disasters – can disrupt the delicate balance in social-ecological systems (Xu et al. 2015). Rule systems have to be flexible to be able to deal with sudden shifts or crossing certain social or ecological thresholds (Blythe 2015). If they are able to to this they are resilient (Folke 2006). Such adaptive systems have, in comparison, a better long-term perspective because they are more stable in crises.
With regard to technological innovations, sudden changes in appropriation technologies seem to be detrimental. Whenever new technologies are implemented, particularly costs and benefits of extraction are affected (Agrawal 2002).
Market integration plays a role as well. If no market is available or if it is difficult to access, the extracted product has to be consumed or processed by the actors themselves which may not be optimal. Low market availability increases the concept dependency on the resource (A4). In sum, a weak connection to stable markets may therefore be positive.
Since many aspects of the environment tend to change more rapidly in a globalized world, adaptability plays an ever increasing role (Baland and Platteau 1996). (Pagdee et al. 2006) point out the complex interplay of many factors contributing to the change of institutions in such a rapidly changing environment. It is mostly the responsibility of the leaders to adjust local rules to new circumstances.
2 Documentation of literature review
We base our study of the 24 concepts on a literature review. As starting point, the studies mentioned in Table 1 in the main text were used. The references cited therein were followed and complemented by a keyword search on Google scholar, using as search terms “social-ecological systems”, “sustainable management” and „natural resource management“. The screening process is depicted in Figure 1:
Figure S1 about here.
The resulting hits were reduced by applying several inclusion criteria. We included only studies that (1) were based on empirical case studies,
(2) were based on primary evidence, not secondary sources,
(4) dealt with traditional SESs (forestry, fishery, irrigation, land use, wildlife).
Using these criteria resulted in 32 articles. These 32 studies split into peer-reviewed articles (25), books (2), book chapters (3) and dissertations (2). They analyze, on average, 55 case studies adding up to a total of 1749 cases. The break-down of sectors is as follows: 844 irrigation cases (48%), 382 forestry cases (22%), 223 fishery cases (13%) and 300 cases of more than one sector (17%).
3 Full definitions of all concepts
3.1 Resource system (RS)
RS1 – Resource size
Definition:
The physical size of the resource system. It may be measured in area (e.g. forestry), length and / or storage capacity (e.g. in irrigation systems).
Connections: boundaries (RS2), accessibility (RS3), number of actors (A1), monitoring (GS8)
RS2 – Resource boundaries
Definition:
The boundaries of a resource mark its geographical limits to the outside. This includes the knowledge of actors of the boundaries.
Connections: resource size (RS1), exclusion of third parties (EI1), legal certainty (GS3)
RS3 – Accessibility
Definition:
The ease with which resource system and resource units can be reached. Most important is the time to travel to the system and reach key locations. Accessibility includes both the distance from the actors’ homes to the resource and the extraction process of resource units. The extraction process can be constrained by geographical barriers or biophysical constraints (e. g. seasons).
Connections: monitoring (GS8), manageability (RU1), regeneration (RU2)
RS4 – Initial Ecological Condition
Definition:
The state of the resource system before an actors' group with a certain rule set begins to appropriate resource units from it. Ecological condition comprises the quality of resource system and of resource units as well as externalities and system stability.
Connections: dependency on resource (A4), information (GS5), participation (GS2)
3.2 Resource Units (RU)
RU1 – Manageability
Definition:
Manageability describes the process of handling resource units. This includes how predictable the units are (availability of information available; complexity and dynamics of the system; easyness of finding units) as well as the ease of harvesting (mobility and accessibility of units) and handling (storage and transportation).
Connections: accessibility (RS3), information (GS5), monitoring (GS8)
RU2 – Regeneration of Resource Units
Definition:
The growth or replacement rate describes how fast resource units that are extracted replace themselves ({Dietz 2002 #1862}). This allows calculating the pressure on them given the extraction rate. Key concepts include the regeneration time between harvests (life cycle of units); i.e. the time until resource units have been replenished completely (e.g., water) or have reached maturity (e.g., fish), and the amount that may be extracted without degrading the resource (maximum sustainable yield). The latter constitutes a key parameter influencing many other critical concepts ({Pagdee 2006 #1531}).
Connections:information (GS5), condition at the beginning (RS4), number of actors (A1)
3.3 Actors (A)
A1 – Number of Actors
Definition:
The number of actors in the actors’ group who are appropriators.
Connections:regeneration (RU2), social capital (A3), group composition (A2)
A2 – Group Composition
Definition:
This factor describes the level of heterogeneity in the actors’ group regarding different subconcepts like ethnicity, socio-economic standing, etc.
Connections:social capital (A3), information (GS5), fairness (GS7)
A3 – Social Capital
Definition:
Social capital may be defined as robust local social networks, established norms and trust between the members of a particular community facilitating coordination and cooperation ({Pretty 2003 #1845}; {Gruber 2008 #1263}; {Schurr 2006 #385}).
Connections: relations (EI2), number of actors (A1), adapted rules (GS6)
A4 – Dependency on Resource
Definition:
This concept indicates the degree of dependence on the resource for survival. The subsistence level is influenced by the availability of alternatives, by ownership and the benefits that can be extracted from the resource.
Connections: regeneration (RU2), accessibility (RS3), participation (GS2)
A5 – Dependency on Group
Definition:
The group members are dependent upon each other regarding provisioning, distribution and/or appropriation of resource units ({Baland 1996 #338}).
Connections: number of actors (A1), dependency on resource (A4), participation (GS2)
3.4 Governance Systems (GS)
GS1 – Group Boundaries
Definition:
This factor describes who belongs to the actors’ group and who does not. This includes the knowledge about group boundaries of the actors themselves.
Connections: number of actors (A1), monitoring (GS8), group composition (A2)
GS2 – Participation of Actors
Definition:
The level of involvement of actors in collective action situations. Existing rights, arenas and institutions are important aspects of participation.
Connections: social capital (A3), adapted rules (GS6), fairness (GS7)
GS3 – Legal Certainty and Legitimacy
Definition:
Acceptance of the local community as authority in regard to local jurisdiction and local legislative authority. The level of recognition of these rights by other groups, NGOs and the national state ensures the stability and security of local transactions.
Connections: relations (EI2), compliance (GS9), adapted rules (GS6)
GS4 – Administration
Definition:
An administration communicates and executes rules and decisions of the rule-giving body. It is also responsible for parts of the organization of the community.
Connections: compliance (GS9), relations (EI2), information (GS5)
GS5 – Information
Definition:
The information and communication flow within the community and to other stakeholders. This includes actors' knowledge of the SES.
Connections: relations (EI2), manageability (RU1), resource size (RS1)
GS6 – Characteristics of Rules
Definition:
Rules are adapted to local circumstances. They are easy to understand, flexible to adapt to new situations and there are feedback mechanisms about their effective operation.
Connections: social capital (A3), monitoring (GS8), exclusion (EI1)
GS7 – Fairness
Definition:
This concept describes actions, behavior and rules that should both be just and level inequalities as far as possible. It comprises equality of benefits as well as equality of costs and duties.
Connections: social capital (A3), monitoring (GS8), dependency on resource (A4)
GS8 – Monitoring
Definition:
Monitoring means gathering information about social and environmental aspects of appropriation. This information can then be used both for control and ensuring rule compliance.
Connections: compliance (GS9), conflict management (GS10), information (GS5)
GS9 – Compliance
Definition:
The level of complying with established rules and legislation. In many systems, compliance is achieved through enforcement (e. g. guards) and sanctions.
Connections: monitoring (GS8), conflict management (GS10), resource size (RS1)
GS10 – Conflict Management
Definition:
How disagreements between individuals, groups or other stakeholders are treated, solved or mediated both within the community and in interactions to outside parties.
Connections: compliance (GS9), number of actors (A1), group composition (A2)
3.5 External Influences (EI)
EI1 – Exclusion of Third Parties
Definition:
Exclusion of third parties refers to preventing appropriation by other groups through law or rules.
Connections: resource boundaries (RS2), group boundaries (GS1), legal certainty (GS3)
EI2 – Relations with External Parties
Definition:
This concept describes the various interactions between all involved parties like NGOs, the national state and other nearby appropriating groups. These interactions span a continuum between close collaboration (partnership) and heavy conflict.
Connections: legal certainty (GS3), participation (GS2), administration (GS4)
EI3 – Capability to Adapt to Changes (resilience)
Definition:
System and actors are able to cope with sudden changes in technology, in interaction with markets or in the natural environment.
Connections: condition at the beginning (RS4) , regeneration (RU2), information (GS5)
4 List of all studies used in the literature review
- Acheson 1975
- Agrawal and Chhatre 2006
- Araral 2009
- Balana et al. 2010
- Baland and Platteau 1996
- Berkes 1986,Berkes 1992
- Berkes 2007
- Brooks et al. 2012
- Casari 2003
- Chhatre and Agrawal 2008
- Cinner et al. 2012
- Cleaver 2000
- Cox 2010
- Dayton-Johnson 2000
- Frey and Rusch 2013
- Gruber 2008
- Gutiérrez et al. 2011
- Lam 1998
- McKean 1992
- Meinzen-Dick 2007
- Nagendra 2007
- Olsson et al. 2004
- Pagdee et al. 2006
- Pomeroy et al. 1998, Pomeroy et al. 2001
- Sandström and Widmark 2007
- Scheberle 2000
- Schlager et al. 1994
- Schurr 2006
- Tang 1989,Tang 1992
- Thomson et al. 1992
- Tucker et al. 2007
- Wade 1992
5 Further information on the 32 studies used for analysis
Table S1 about here.
6 List of variables used in the 32 studies and their relation to the 24 concepts of the synthesis
Table S2 about here.
7 References
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