Phil. 270 – Epistemology Assertion, Knowledge, and Lackey
2/28/17

Announcement: Demotion of reading #10 (Williamson, “Knowing and Asserting”): You can still write your course paper on this reading, or bring it up in the final exam, but you will not be held responsible for knowing it (beyond what you are told about it in Lackey’s paper or in lecture).

The Knowledge Account of Assertion: A speaker must know that p in order to be epistemically positioned well enough with respect to p to assert it. This takes a couple of different further forms in the literature:

·  The Rule for Assertion: Assert p only if you know that p

·  In asserting p, a speaker represents it as being the case that she knows that p

-Note that these cover only “flat-out” assertions of p, not “hedged” assertions

-Support for KAA: the knowledge version of Moore’s Paradox: “It’s raining outside, but I don’t believe that it is.” KAA provides a nice explanation for why this so badly “clashes.” Other accounts, not so much.

-More support for KAA: “Conversational data”, esp.: How “How do you know?” can be such a pointed challenge to an assertion, and “You don’t know that!” can be such a natural and pointed admonition.

-Knowing and asserting as a case of “swaying together”, and the Relativized KAA: In order to be in a position to assert that p, a speaker must know that p according to the standards for knowledge that govern her context as she asserts.

-Lackey’s alternative: RTBNA, Reasonable to Believe Norm of Assertion: One should assert that p only if (i) it is reasonable for one to believe that p, and (ii) if one asserted that p, one would assert that p at least in part because it is reasonable for one to believe that p. (p. 608.9)

-Important: p needn’t be true for a speaker to assert that p in accordance with RTBNA. (This differs importantly from KAA – and also from other accounts.)

-Lackey’s cases of “Selfless Assertion” (pp. 598-600): RACIST JUROR, DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR, CREATIONIST TEACHER.

-Issue: Other than RACIST JUROR, these are cases in which the assertion is made as the speaker is acting in a particular institutional role. Should we even try to accommodate such cases? (Consider a more frivolous case of selfless assertion, a playful use of “possible” or “might.” Of course, a difference here is that Lackey’s cases are the reverse of frivolous.) Note: Lackey addresses these issues at pp. 599.5-601.9

-A possible verdict: Perhaps Lackey’s RACIST JUROR should say something else, perhaps a little more complicated? In light of such an option, is it really so unproblematic for RJ to say what he does? (I find what’s going on in RJ’s head a bit murky. Does he really not believe what he says? Does he really believe it’s false?)

-Perhaps the heart of the matter (here going beyond what’s in any of our readings, or in the literature, so far as I know): Lackey is focused like a laser on issues of blame. But perhaps we should consider: taking responsibility. Why it might be a good bargain for a speaker to be able to take responsibility for the truth of (and her knowledge of) p.