WHY ARE MISCONCEPTIONS IN SCIENCE SO HARD TO CHANGE?
JENNY CUMMING, University of Sunderland, School of Education.
Paper presented at the British Educational Research Association Annual Conference, Queen's University of Belfast, Northern Ireland, August 27th to August 30th
ABSTRACT Pupil's interpretations of objects and events in the material world are often at odds with the scientists' view. Because the ideas pupils already hold influence the way they interpret new learning experiences, such alternative views are a real barrier to future progress. Even when faced with clear evidence, learners' misconceptions have proved very difficult to modify.
This paper uses recent psychological thinking on implicit learning to examine afresh the research on children's misconceptions. Empirical data relating to children's early experiences are presented to make the case that the education of young children may be crucial for their future success as scientists.
PREAMBLE
The problem facing science educators
Driver (1983) describes the problem facing science educators in the following way:
"... as the child grows older, all its experiences of pushing, pulling, lifting, throwing, feeling and seeing things stimulate the ability to make predictions about a progressively wider range of experiences. By the time the child receives formal teaching in science it has already constructed a set of beliefs about a range of natural phenomena. In some cases, these beliefs or intuitions are strongly held and may differ from the accepted theories which science teaching aims to communicate".
Driver (1983:2)
As result of work such as this it is now widely accepted that pupils' ideas in science are often the result of their experiences outside school rather than a consequence of class teaching. It is also acknowledged that such personal ideas may well be incompatible with scientists' explanations of events. These incompatible ideas are sometimes called alternative views or misconceptions.
Pupils' alternative views are of crucial significance to teachers because "Like all human beings, children have a tendency to interpret new situations in terms of what they already know, thus reinforcing their prior conceptions" (Driver et al. 1985:198). As a result, "it is often noticed that even after being taught, students have not modified their ideas in spite of attempts by a teacher to challenge them by offering counter-evidence" (Driver et al. 1985:3). It is this tenacity of pupils' intuitive ideas which poses the problem.
In this paper, an outline of the constructivist view of learning will set the scene. This is the view, now widely accepted, which was first put forward to science educators by Driver herself. It describes how children undertake meaningful learning in science through an effortful process of construction. However, there is another kind of learning which is known to take place: implicit learning. Because it results in actions rather than words, it has been discounted by educators. Nevertheless, recent work on implicit learning indicates that knowledge gained through this different process can influence understanding, giving rise to a strong feeling of intuition which cannot be explained and which is not subject to reason. Furthermore, knowledge gained through an implicit learning process is more robust and resistant to change than knowledge gained through the conscious process described by constructivists. The distinctive process of implicit learning, the type of knowledge it produces, and the possible influence it has on understanding will be explored in relation to empirical work.
Learning for understanding: the constructivist view
It is accepted that children cannot just receive knowledge from teachers but must construct their own generalisations and understandings from a range of inputs. This is the view of constructivism, a perspective which "construes learning as an interpretive, recursive, building process by active learners interacting with the physical world" (Fosnot 1996:29).
In the constructivist model of learning it is assumed that children's ideas arise as the result of an intentional process. For example, Osborne and Freyberg, (1985:13) suggest that "... young children, like scientists, are curious about the world around them, and in how and why things behave as they do. Children naturally attempt to make sense of the world in which they live in terms of their experiences, their current knowledge and their use of language".
Even when the ideas produced by this constructive process are described as informal or intuitive, they are nevertheless imagined to be the result of intentional learning, since any other sort of learning is not believed to enter the conscious domain.
Two types of intentional learning can be identified: a) endogenous learning, which has its origin within the individual, and b) socio-cultural learning, which originates from interaction with other individuals. Both require mental effort.
Endogenous learning
Learning which has its origin within the individual takes place in isolation. Piaget (1972), in his description of the child as a little scientist, appears to have this process in mind. Far from emphasising the importance of social interaction in this process, he denigrates even the inner, silent use of use of language, for he argues that "... certain philosophical schools for example the logical positivists, have over-estimated the importance of language for the structuring of knowledge" (Piaget 1972:24). Although in this passage Piaget refers to very young children who have not yet developed facility in language, it has been taken by others to be a description of conscious, intentional and effortful learning which takes place without the mediation of language.
During endogenous learning generalisations are made through an individual thinking process, and may be as a result of interaction with the physical environment. A collection of ideas is deliberately reassembled in order to produce a new configuration. This knowledge can be recorded through symbols such as language, maps, charts, and writing. Considerable exertion is required to formulate the ideas into symbolic representation.
Socio-cultural learning
Learning which originates in social interaction uses knowledge created by others. For a person to gain this knowledge, s/he has to attend to the symbols produced by others, make links with the knowledge they have already, and reorganise that knowledge to encompass the new material. An example of socio-cultural learning is given by Scardamalia and Bereiter (1991), who researched children in the middle years of schooling while performing a writing task. The children gave a commentary of their thinking while engaged in the assignment. The more expert pupils revealed an inner dialectic between the knowledge they already held and the new information provided in the text of the assignment. Not only was new knowledge interpreted in the light of that already held, but prior knowledge was reassessed and reorganised in view of the fresh information. This interaction between prior knowledge and new information promoted fresh understanding. Scardamalia and Bereiter suggest that while such a recursive exercise is so intellectually demanding that only the more expert children succeed, a more supportive exchange can occur in verbal exchange between two people.
Very often conscious, intentional learning involves a combination of these two processes: an idea which originates from within the learner is related to material presented by others, or a concept originating in symbolic material is related to a personal idea or experience.
Implicit learning
According to the constructivist view just described, learning for understanding is a conscious and effortful process. In contrast, implicit learning is automatic and does not give rise to knowledge which can be described. Therefore it has not been considered relevant to the process of learning for understanding.
Implicit learning is different in kind from the intentional and laborious process described by constructivists in that it takes place instinctively and largely without the learner being aware that it is happening. It is apparently effortless, and results in the ability of the subject to carry out actions which s/he cannot explain. A consequence of this process is that the learner can respond almost instantaneously to a stimulus (for example, escape from dangerous situation) without thought. This behaviour has a high survival value and is found throughout the animal world. However, implicit learning does not result in the explicit knowledge which can be expressed through language.
In this section a distinction will be made between implicit learning and implicit knowledge. An explanation will follow of how implicit learning takes place, the type of knowledge it produces and how it might be the source of some of the intuitive ideas which interfere with pupils' learning in science.
a) Implicit learning and implicit knowledge
Before exploring the possible relevance of implicit learning for educationists it is necessary to clarify terminology: there is an important distinction to be made between implicit learning and implicit knowledge.
Berry and Dienes (1993) explain that there is some confusion over the use of the term implicit learning. For elucidation they differentiate between a) implicit knowledge and b) implicit learning:
i) Implicit knowledge
When defining implicit knowledge by contrasting it with explicit knowledge they suggest that "In general, explicit knowledge is said to be accessible to consciousness, and can be communicated or demonstrated on demand, whereas implicit knowledge is said to be less accessible to consciousness, and cannot easily be communicated or demonstrated on demand" (Berry and Dienes 1993:2).
ii) Implicit learning
Implicit learning refers to the way in which knowledge is acquired. "A person typically learns about the structure of a fairly complex stimulus environment without necessarily intending to do so, in such a way that the resulting knowledge is difficult to express. This is what we mean by implicit learning" (Berry and Dienes 1993:2).
This distinction between implicit knowledge and implicit learning is important. The knowledge and understanding gained through the effortful, conscious type of learning described by constructivists can become implicit through much use. It is well known that knowledge and skills which have been acquired consciously and explicitly become implicit with practice: "Although virtually all complex human skills are acquired through the laboured, conscious, and overtly controlled (declarative) processes of the novice, these gradually give way to the smooth, unconscious, and covertly controlled (tacit and procedural) processes of the expert" (Reber 1993:16).
b) The location and process of implicit learning
Squire and Zola (1996:13516) offer a taxonomy of memory systems. They suggest different sources and locations within the brain for explicit memories (which can be put into words) and implicit memories. In this classification explicit memory has two sources: facts and events. Both of these are associated with the medial temporal lobe and diencephalon regions of the brain. In contrast, according to Squire and Zola, implicit memory is associated with areas of the brain other than the two aforementioned regions and has five possible sources:
procedural skills and habits,
priming,
emotional responses,
non-associative learning,
skeletal musculature.
Consideration of implicit learning therefore excludes facts and events as sources of knowledge. The last two sources; non-associative learning and skeletal musculature are of particular relevance to the discussion of empirical work which will follow.
Information other than facts and events affords a large amount of sensory information which enters the brain of vertebrate animals, where it is instinctively scanned for patterns. Claxton (1997:18) argues that the "ability to detect, register and make use of the patterns of relationships that happen to characterise your particular environment is widespread in the animal world". For example, Rose (1992:285), in writing about his study of learning in day-old chicks, explains that "the chick is all the time observing, noting, exploring, remembering aspects of its environment because it has, to begin with, no way of knowing what is important to remember". Through such experiential learning, the animal can unconsciously predict what is likely to happen next, and modify its behaviour accordingly.
It is appropriate to relate implicit learning in humans to that of other animals because "what a phylogenetic analysis reveals is that, with increasing neurological sophistication, organisms become capable of detecting more and more tenuous covariations ... humans are capable of learning the rules" (Reber 1993:105). This unconscious apprehension of the 'rules' can be equated with insight. According to Brainerd and Reyna (1990:10-11), "the mining of information for its patterns enables subsequent discrimination to be made suddenly and insightfully".
That such learning is not deliberate may come as a surprise to educators, but this is not Claxton's view: "No conscious intention, no effort, no deliberation, no articulation is needed to fulfil this brilliant function. Knowing, at root, is implicit, practical, intuitive" (Claxton 1997:9). In fact he believes that this way of learning is an important source of human knowledge: "The greater part of the useful understanding we acquire throughout life is not explicit knowledge, but implicit know-how. Our fundamental priority is not to be able to talk about what we are doing, but to do it - competently, effortlessly, and largely unconsciously and unreflectingly" (Claxton 1997:20).
It might be imagined that such learning takes place only in the young, but this is denied by Claxton, who claims that "It is a mistake to suppose that we grow out of it as we grow older" (Claxton 1997:21).
The process of implicit learning described here does not deny the constructivists' view that the individual must construct his or her own knowledge. The difference is that implicit knowledge is not deliberately constructed and does not require effort.
Notwithstanding the apparent effortlessness of implicit learning, the brain itself is intrinsically a very active organ, using approximately 20% of the energy of the body as measured by oxygen consumption.
c) The distinctive properties of implicitly learned knowledge
Berry and Dienes (1993:13) identify a number of important characteristics which establish the functional independence of implicitly learned knowledge:
•relative inaccessibility of the knowledge with free recall or forced-choice tests,
•limited transfer to related tasks,
•associated with incidental learning conditions,
•engenders a sense of intuition,
•is resistant to decay.
These characteristics resonate well with the sources given in Squire and Zola's (1996:13516) work.
The importance of a 'sense of intuition' the penultimate item given in this list, is amplified by Brainerd and Reyna (1990). They argue that the role of intuition has been underplayed in contemporary theoretical work. Among other ideas, they propose a conception of knowledge acquisition which emphasises the role of general processing systems that operate by extracting the 'gist' from particular settings. In contrast to the intentional learning of classroom science, they put forward evidence to suggest that the generation of meaning in informal situations is not necessarily actively constructed in a way analogous to reasoning and problem-solving, but "grown" in interrelational mental networks which are pattern-like. Perhaps their most convincing argument is the "principle of least effort" (Brainerd and Reyna 1990:23); that organisms will naturally operate in a way that conserves energy. They emphasise, however, (1990:37-9) that "intuition is not sloppy or irrational".
Berry and Dienes (1993) emphasise the resistance to decay of knowledge gained through implicit learning. Knowledge gained in this way is the last to disappear when the brain is subject to trauma or damage. This attribute gives a clue to the reason why, if misconceptions are the result of implicit learning, they are so difficult to change. It is that it they are "more robust and resilient, more resistant to disruption, than our conscious abilities" (Claxton 1997:19).
d) The link between implicit learning and conscious understanding
Since conscious knowledge made explicit through language can be conveyed to others, accumulated, passed from one generation to the next, and enshrined in symbols, it is a great achievement of the human species. However, recent research on implicit learning suggests that knowledge gained in this way plays a more important part in all kinds of learning than was realised, being the fundamental process upon which evolution of human brain activity is based. In fact some authors now consider that although the two types of learning are distinct in important respects, linking pathways must exist within the brain. Reber (1993:3-4) argues that "from an evolutionary standpoint one can see implicit learning and cognition as richly intertwining issues and not as two distinct fields. They share a common process: the detection of covariation between events".
A more controversial idea is that knowledge learned implicitly can be used intentionally. Reber's work with adults on probability studies and the implicit learning of artificial grammars leads him to conclude that "implicitly acquired knowledge is responsible for performance that goes beyond what estimates of conscious knowledge would predict" (Reber, 1993:47).
How can information of which one is unaware be transported into consciousness? An explanation is proposed by Karmiloff-Smith (1992), who argues that activity within the brain can cause information in one form to be re-described (frequently more than once) by a process of repetition and transformation. Her idea of "Representational Redescription" could explain how implicit information can be incorporated into explicit knowledge, "by iteratively re-representing in different representational formats what its internal representations represent" (Karmiloff-Smith 1992:15).
e) Implicit learning and children's intuitions
When Driver describes the misconceptions held by pupils as being in the form of "beliefs or intuitions" (Driver 1983:2) she reasons that such knowledge is constructed by children about a range of natural phenomena before they receive formal teaching. The assumption is that children have attempted to make sense of information they have received through conversations with family members and friends, television programmes and comics, as well as through their own unconstrained observations of the material world. From the context both of her own work and that of other constructivists it seems taken for granted that such ideas arise through deliberate construction, even though the process occurs in an informal setting outside the classroom and may not have been verbalised.
The crucial question is whether it is possible that some of the misconceptions held by pupils have arisen through the automatic, unintentional processing of brain function: implicit learning. In order to test this idea, an example of alternative ideas in dynamics will be analysed.