WECC Report to the Board – March XX, 20181

Reliability Coordinator (RC) Role in Western Interconnection

Briefing Paper to the WECC Board of Directors on the Role and Function of an RC and evolving efforts around multiple RCs in the Western Interconnection.

Jim Robb

Chief Executive Officer

March 7, 2018

155 North 400 West, Suite 200

Salt Lake City, Utah 84103-1114

Western Electricity Coordinating Council

Multiple Reliability Coordinator Board Update, March 7, 20181

Table of Contents

Purpose

Background on the Reliability Coordinator (RC) Function in the West

Criticality of the RC Function

WECC’s responsibilities during this transition

RC Certification and Registration/Mapping: WECC’s Role

Typical Certification process:

Typical RC Registration/Mapping Process:

WECC’s Role in Certification:

Current WECC Efforts to Assure Interconnection-wide Reliability

Other Planning Considerations

Summary

Purpose

The ultimate configuration of Reliability Coordinators (RC), and the affiliations of TOPs and BAs to those RCs, is not yet settled.However, it appears certain that over the course of the next 18-24 months,Reliability Coordination in the Western Interconnection (WI) will change dramatically as multiple RCs commence operations where currently only one RC operates. The transmission and generation topology of the WI has a number of unique features that require additional coordination and information sharing to ensure no degradation of reliability of the WI when/if multiple RCs emerge.

As the RC is the highest level of authority (and accountability) for maintaining Bulk Power System (BPS) reliability, the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) is committed to working with entities (i.e., Southwest Power Pool (SPP), California Independent System Operator (CAISO), Peak Reliability (Peak RC), and any others) to ensure this structural change does not impact the quality of BPS reliability. To that end, this briefing paper focuses on:

  • background on the RC function;
  • role and function of an RC and related processes;
  • registration, mapping and standards; and
  • a high-level update on current efforts by WECC in coordination with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC).

Background on the Reliability Coordinator (RC) Function in the West

Reliability Coordinators (formerly called Security Coordinators) were first established nationally in 1995 when the industry through NERC adopted a policy requiring all reliability councils to have Transmission Security Centers overseeing the day-to-day operations of the BES. The role of these security centers (now called RCs) is to provide a second set of eyes on the electric Interconnection to identify emerging real-time disturbances and direct, as necessary, actions to prevent disturbances from turning into cascading events resulting in blackouts. The West originally had four security centers that were hosted at fourmember-control areas: Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), California Independent System Operator (CAISO), and Arizona Public Service (APS).

In 2004, the WECC Board of Directors (Board), then a hybrid board with 25 Stakeholder Directors and nine Independent Directors, expressed concern about the performance of the security centers.The Board launched a member-driven review over the ensuing two years that culminated in an industry-agreed strategy to establish an Interconnection-wide RC function and host it at WECC. In addition to ensuring compliance with all (now enforceable) WECC and NERC Standards, the goals were to build a strong capability, establish independence from the host sites, and develop a suite of tools that mirrored the integrated operation of the Western Interconnection and capture economies of scale.

Two centers were set up for redundancy, one in Loveland, Colorado and the other in Vancouver, Washington. Interconnection-wide models were developed, and tools were put in place to ensure effective RC operations. A significant program to deploy synchrophasors across the Interconnection was funded through a DOE grant, and the RC now has extraordinary access to Real-time data to observe and assess the Real-time performance of the Interconnection.

Following a major cascading outage in the Southwestern portion of the Interconnection in 2011, the RC strategy for the West was again reconsidered by WECC’s Board of Directors. The decision was made to restructure WECC and, in 2014, Peak Reliability was formed to acquire WECC’s RC assets and assumed the RC function for the West. That again was a very intentional decision to establish Peak as an independent company focused solely on the RC function for the entire Western Interconnection. In addition, a significant investment program in people, processes, systems, and tools occurred. These investments were part of a settlement that resulted from the findings of the FERC/NERC Arizona-Southern California Outages on September 8, 2011 (Joint Report)regarding the RC’s role in the Southwestern Outage.

Note: we often refer to “one RC” for the Western Interconnection. In fact, there are currently two. The Alberta Electric System Operator assumed the RC function for Alberta when WECC bifurcated in 2014. However, it is important to note that the Alberta system, while large, exists at the edge of the Interconnection and exchanges very little energy with the rest of the West and only through two paths. Also, there are extensive data sharing and communications protocols in place between Alberta and Peak that ensure strong coordination between the two entities. For purposes of this statement, we will refer to “one RC for the West” that excludes the more-or-less radially-tied Albertan system.

The current RC structure in the West is operationally independent of the Balancing Authorities (BA) and Transmission Owner/Operators (TO/TOP) of the BES. This was an important aspect of the original RC strategy the WECC Board launched in 2004. After the 2011 cascading Southwest outage, FERC and NERC determined the RC and its hybrid governance structure created conflicts of interest. In addition to separating the RC from WECC, an independent Board was also established for Peak so that its independence and authority could not be compromised.

Criticality of the RC Function

The RC is the highest level of authority in the Real-time operation of the grid, with significant accountability for ensuring that any disturbances are contained to prevent cascading outages through the BPS.The RC’s role is to:

  • Maintain the widearea view and situational awareness that goes beyond the role andcapabilities of the individual Balancing Authorities, Transmission Operators or Transmission ServiceProviders (TSP).
  • Ensure Real-time operating reliability of the grid (RC footprint) through the followingfunctions:
  • Determine the type of potential contingency analyses to beundertaken.
  • Coordinate outages and related restorationstrategies.
  • CoordinatewithTPsandTSPs,andexchangeoperationaldatawithGOs,LSEs,TOs,GOPsand TOPs.[1]
  • MonitorthepowerflowandsystemstabilityacrosstheInterconnectionanddirectcoordinated corrective actions by TOs and GOPs when necessary to ensure the system is operated within acceptablelimits.
  • Share critical performance data such as Real-time telemetry, current operational status of facilities, and sophisticated high-speed metering data (from phasor measurementunits).
  • Use sophisticated models and computer simulation tools (e.g., State Estimator tool, West-wide System Model and Real-time Contingency Analysis) to identify and mitigate risks to reliabilityin theReal-time.

WECC’s responsibilities during this transition

As the Regional Entity for the Western Interconnection, WECC has well-defined responsibilities and authorities related to this transition:

  • Ensure that the RC(s) that are formed are certified to perform the registered function.
  • Ensure that all TOPs and BAs are aligned with a certified RC (mapping).
  • Perform ongoing compliance monitoring of the RCs to ensure they are compliant with the applicable Standards.

It is also instructive to note what WECC does NOT have the authority to do:

  • WECC cannot mandate that any TOP or BA be aligned with any particular RC.
  • WECC cannot prevent a new RC from forming if it passes certification requirements.

RC Certification and Registration/Mapping: WECC’s Role

Typical Certification process:

Entity Certification requires a well-planned, in-depth review and well-documented assessment of an entity’s capability to perform the tasks of a certifiable function (e.g., Reliability Coordinator) for which it has applied.This assessment focuses on people, processes and systems and is meant to ensure that the RC can execute the RC function in accordance with the established RC Standards.It does NOT imply anything about operational excellence in performing the function.

This assessment may include:

  • Control Center Functionality
  • Applicable Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements
  • Data Collection / Sharing
  • Facilities monitoring and control
  • Real-time Assessments
  • Next-Day Operating Plan
  • SOL Methodologies in use for operations horizon
  • Voltage Control
  • Outage Coordination (including communication equipment)
  • Congestion Management
  • Emergency Operations
  • RC Restoration Plan
  • Operator Certification and Training
  • Critical Infrastructure Protection
  • Interpersonal communications including Operating Instructions

Typical RC Registration/Mapping Process:

The RC registration process follows the NERC Rules of Procedure (Section 500) steps. These include:

  • New Reliability Coordinators will submit registration request to WECC through WECC.BIZ.
  • WECC Registration verifies transfer of areas between RCs.
  • Registration confirms that entity is NERC Certified to perform the function.
  • WECC provides NERC with a recommendation to approve or reject an RC Application.
  • After transfer occurs, WECC conducts entity mapping to ensure that all areas are under the oversight of a single Reliability Coordinator.

WECC’s Role in Certification:

WECC, as the Regional Entity, will assemble the RC Certification Teamthat will consist of representatives from an existing RC, a BA and a TOP in the proposed RCArea, each affected Regional Entity, and NERC.Entities such as government representatives or other stakeholders may petition to be observers in theCertification process.

WECC, as the Regional Entity is expected to provide leadership throughout the certification process by:

  • Reviewing entity Certification applications for completeness.
  • Coordinating with NERC on certification activity.
  • Assembling a Certification Team and ensuring they have completed all steps to be a team member.
  • Establishing the scope for the certification.
  • Requesting information from the entity seeking certification.
  • Planning and conducting at least one on-site visit to the entity’s facility with the certification team.
  • Tracking any deficiencies from the entity found during the certification process.
  • Preparing the final report.

Current WECC Efforts to Assure Interconnection-wide Reliability

Our primary concern is the reliability and security of the Western Interconnection—this critical mission will drive and shape all our actions. WECC will continue to monitor and participate in the evolving multiple RC initiatives and will provide updates as necessary to the WECC membership. WECC’s current efforts are focused on:

  • Preparing to execute the Certification processes for all of the RCs (it is worth noting that Peak Reliability has been operating under a provisional certification provided by NERC until all of the September 8, 2011 outage Settlement Agreement reliability enhancements have been completed – Peak’s Certification expires on May 31, 2018.
  • Identifying all the potential seams issues that will need to be managed to ensure that inter-RC coordination is as free from interruptionas possible.WECC is evaluating whether the existing RC Standards are adequate to ensure such coordination takes place and if any new standards or criteria added to existing standards need to be established in West.This work is ongoing and, if WECC concludes the existing NERC Standards are NOT adequate for the WI’s situation, a Standard Authorization Request (SAR) will be prepared and the WSC will begin the process of establishing any needed standards/criteria.

To ensure that BPS reliability is not impacted with the structural changes brought along by the possible formation of multiple RC entities, WECC staff hasalready raised several unique considerations for discussion and future resolution with Peak Reliability and any potential new RC applicants. Many of these questions were also shared by WECC as part of a formal statement to the Colorado Public Utilities Commission at a Commission Information Session on Reliability Coordination in June 2017.A summary of the reliability considerations isincluded below:

  • Uniqueness of the Western Interconnection (WI) over the Eastern Interconnection (EI):

The EI’s electrical topology is tightly coupled, consisting of shorter transmission lines and load centers closer to generation sources.The electrical topology of the WIconsists of a looped configuration and long transmission lines with load centers located extensivedistances from generating sources. Because of this topology, major transmission paths in the WI are often-times limited by system stability problems rather than by overloading of lines, and disturbances in one part of the system can very quickly propagate into other parts of the system.

  • Loopflow and Phase Shifting Transformers (PST):

The Western system was developed to take advantage of a unique resource base (Rocky Mountainand Southwest-based coal-fired resources and Pacific Northwest hydropower). Transfer of these resources during various operating seasons causes a phenomenon known as loopflow, which is the unscheduled flow (USF) component of an energy transaction. This USF causes congestion on certain paths and prevents owners and operators of these paths from usingtheir own transmission capacity.

To mitigate this congestion, the WI TOPs have installed several PSTs whose operation is coordinated by Peak Reliability to minimize congestion while assuring continued reliable operation of the entire WI. When these controllable devices are used, reliability requirements will take priorityover any desired commercial use. Currently, three of the PSTs are in the footprint of the MWTG, while the remaining five are located within the balance of the interconnection.Depending on the final RC footprint, this could result in the PSTs being under the jurisdiction of two, possibly three RCs, necessitating the need for coordinated operation.

  • Contingencies and Mitigation Options:

Because of the dynamics of the WI, major contingencies like loss of the Pacific DC Intertie, partial/complete loss of the Pacific AC Intertie,or large generator outages in the Southwest can create large power swings across the WI. To mitigate these major events, the WI has high-speed protection schemes and safety nets (e.g.,Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)andUnderfrequency load shedding (UFLS)) that take strategic actions to drop generation and load, insert reactive devices and, in extreme conditions, create multiple load and resource islands to avoid complete blackout and facilitate restoration. Continuous operation of the WI requires the ability to have full Interconnection-wide situational awareness, Interconnection-wide outage coordination and the ability to model contingencies and key protection systems using a full West-wide System Model (WSM) that is routinely updated to ensure accuracy of topology.

  • Data, Communication and Congestion Management Tools:

With multiple RCs in the WI, the issues noted above will require timely and accurate power system data sharing across secure and compatible data networks, using common tools and models (e.g.,Enhanced Curtailment Calculator(ECC), WECC Interchange Tool (WIT), WSM) for situational awareness, outage coordination, congestion management and Real-time contingency analysis.The Western Interconnection must be studied in its entirety using common planning and operational models to ensure the highest form of reliability. This requires a collectiveunderstanding of coordination and operating philosophies, including the establishment of Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits and System Operating Limits (IROL/SOL). With multiple RC footprints containing multiple combinations of BAs and TOPs, seam issues will require a high level of coordination.

Other Planning Considerations

WECC is also mindful of the need for continued coordination of planning data sets and tools for all the Interconnection.We have discussed and will continue to emphasize with CAISO and SPP the need and desirability for their participation inFERC 1000 planning processes (we anticipate the Western U.S. Planning Regions will be realigned as a result of the RC footprint changes), participation in the Reliability Assessment Committee (RAC) at WECC, and the creation of the Anchor Data Set (ADS).

Summary

These changes to the Reliability Coordinator will have profound implications on the Interconnection.WECC is very mindful of its responsibilities, accountabilities and authorities during this transition.WECC has experienced a collaborative working relationship with all the relevant entities engaged in the multiple RC initiative.

This level of cooperation and collaboration will be essential as we manage the transition to a new RC structure.

Western Electricity Coordinating Council

[1]TP – Transmission Provider; TSP – Transmission Service Provider; GO – Generator Owner; LSE – Load-Serving Entity; TO –Transmission Owner; GOP – Generator Operator; TOP – Transmission Operator.