V. ANSWERS TO PROBLEMS AND PROBLEM CASES CHAPTER 1:

1.No. In order for Donahue to fall into any of the protected categories, the statute would have to be taken to read, “equine activity sponsor, equine activity participant, equine professional, veterinarian, farrier, or any other person in the entire world.” As Judge Painter notes, “[a] person who negligently crashes an airplane into the crowd at an equine event would thus be immune from liability, at least for injuries to thrown riders, as would someone who lets [his or her] dog run out in the middle of a steeplechase.” The maxim of ejusdem generis, which says that a general classification preceded by a list of specific classifications is bound by the common traits of the specific classifications, indicates that “any other person” should be read to mean “any other person who works with equines.” Donahue was not such a person. Gibson v. Donahue,772 N.E.2d 646 (Ohio App. 2002).

2.No. For an explanation of the Court's rationale, see this outline's earlier discussion of United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1979).

3.Yes, according to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court observed that due process of law is “a summarized guarantee of respect for those personal immunities so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be fundamental, or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” It added that “the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combating crime too strenuously.” The deputy sheriffs engaged in “conduct that shocks the conscience” and employed “methods too close to the rack and the screw” to be deemed constitutional. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). (Note: At the time this case was decided, evidence obtained through a forced stomach pumping probably was admissible in a majority of the states that had considered the questions. In addition, at that time, the Supreme Court had not yet required that state courts exclude evidence obtained through an illegal search or seizure. Rochin was included in the text as a discussion problem because it is arguably a case in which the Supreme Court used a form of reasoning resembling the natural law approach, even though the Court denied that it was doing anything of the sort.)

4.No. The Supreme Court utilized the plain meaning technique in rejecting the evicted tenants’ argument that the lease provisions should not be read as authorizing their eviction when they did not know of the drug-related activity of other members of their household. The Court stated that the statute’s reference to “any drug-related criminal activity” swept in such activity of which the tenant was aware as well as such activity of which the tenant was unaware. Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2002).

5.Yes. Carefully examining the words used in the statute and giving them their ordinary and usual meanings, the Supreme Court held that the Rouseys' IRA funds were funds they had a right to receive "on account of . . . age." The Court also held that the funds existed pursuant to "plans or contracts" that were "similar" to the plans or contracts listed as examples in the statute. It did not matter, the Court noted, that the IRA funds could have withdrawn early by the Rouseys, because the penalty for early withdrawal placed a significant limitation of the ability to withdraw prior to the age of 59½. The right to receive the IRA funds was still "on account of . . . age." Thus, the IRA funds were exempt from the bankruptcy estate. Rousey v. Jacoway, 125 S. Ct. 1561 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2005).

6.Legal realists would note that this situation clearly presents a divergence between the "law in the books" (the positive laws) and the "law in action" (what the police and prosecutors actually do). Natural law thinkers typically say that unjust positive laws are not law and should not be enforced and obeyed. What is needed to determine how a particular natural law thinker would respond to these laws is some indication whether that thinker regards them as just or unjust. To know how a natural law thinker would respond to these laws, one needs to know the content of the natural law she espouses. A natural law tradition influenced by certain religious groups, for example, might well dictate approval of the laws at issue. A more rights-centered conception of natural law, however, might go the other way, depending on the content of the relevant rights.

7.An extreme legal positivist would say that the laws are valid positive law and they should be enforced and obeyed. Natural law thinkers, on the other hand, would generally say that unjust laws are not law and should not be enforced and obeyed. Because Sunday closing laws restrict economic freedom, a natural law person of strong laissez-faire views would regard them as unjust, and would say that they should not be enforced and obeyed. A natural law thinker who is a Christian traditionalist would probably take the opposite view, because these laws respect the Sabbath.

As usual, legal realists would be quick to note how the non-enforcement of these laws vindicates their distinction between the law in action and the law in the books. Adherents to sociological jurisprudence could identify the social factors that originally led to the enactment of Sunday closing laws--e.g., religious sentiment and the political power of religious groups. They could also note that the current failure to enforce Sunday closing laws reflects the growing secularization of American life, the prevalence of society’s consumer orientation, and the political influence of business. They could further suggest that a balancing of interests between these forces and remaining religious influences explains why Sunday closing laws have not been repealed outright. Finally, some sociological thinkers might argue that the law should follow the times, and that, because Americans evidently want to be able to shop on Sunday, Sunday closing laws should not be enforced or obeyed, or should be repealed.

8.Because statutes control over conflicting rules, the judge deciding the Sigler case must apply the rule set forth in the 2003 statute rather than the common law rule set forth in the Churchich decision.

9.Yes, despite the then-generally prevailing common law rule of “no liability outside privity” (i.e., a defendant that manufactured a defective product was not liable for a plaintiff with whom the defendant did not deal). The New York Court of Appeals held that Buick could have foreseen the dangers a negligently built automobile would present to people such as MacPherson who would buy it from dealers, and that Buick therefore had a duty to those people to prevent their injury. In a landmark decision that helped shape modern product liability law, the court held that Buick’s not having sold the car directly to MacPherson made no difference. Justice Cardozo (then serving on the New York Court of Appeals and later a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court) wrote that Buick “knew the danger. It knew that the car would be used by persons other than the buyer, a dealer in cars ... Yet [Buick] would have us say that [the dealer] was the [only] person it was under a legal duty to protect. The law does not lead us to such an inconsequent conclusion.” Commenting on the decision’s departure from the “no liability outside privity” rule, Justice Cardozo observed that “[p]recedents drawn from the age of travel by stagecoach do not fit the conditions of travel today.” Justice Cardozo extended certain precedents and distinguished others, and produced an opinion that remains a famous example of breaking new common law ground through the process of case law reasoning. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. , 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1916).

  1. No. In this case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the conclusion of other courts of appeal and determined that certain federal employees are not necessarily “person[s]” for purposes of the False Claims Act. The concept of a qui tam action, said the court, contemplates that the government and the relator (the one who filed the action) will be two separate entities. If a federal employee is obligated by her office to pursue information regarding fraudulent activity, she cannot be regarded as a relator distinct from the government. Such was the case with Holmes, who, in uncovering the fraud and causing the investigation to occur, was simply doing her government job. Holmes v. Consumer Insurance Group, 279 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2002).