Strategy Note
UNODC engagement in post-conflict and
fragile states
16 March 2009
I. Why UNODC should engage in post-conflict and fragile states
With the proliferation of intra-state wars and the privatization of conflict in “failing states”, national and inter-state security issues are losing their primacy and giving way to transnational, sub-national and individual security concerns. In conflict-ridden and post-conflict societies, non-military threats and human security issues dominate the security landscape.
Post conflict states, because of their fragility and limited capacity, are particularly vulnerable to the development of illicit trafficking and organized crime. Such trafficking may well have begun during (and indeed may have assisted in sustaining) the conflict, but it may act also as a significant destabilizing factor in the post-conflict and peace-building period, undercutting and corrupting state institutions, particularly in the rule of law sector. A failure to come to grips with this challenge, or the temptation to ignore it and only to provide quick fixes, will in the long term prove to be counterproductive as criminal networks, and criminal money, subverts government institutions and economic and social structures, thus undermining any processes of peacebuilding and democratic consolidation. Given the volume of money involved, the weakness of state structures and the resulting propensity for corruption in such states, they face a significant challenge to their stability and the general ability of their institutions (including the criminal justice system) to respond effectively to the challenge. Additional vulnerabilities also include increases in drug dependence in post-conflict and fragile states which are used as transit countries for illicit trafficking. In particular, if not properly addressed, corruption may dramatically worsen and corrupt practices can become endemic and institutionalized into reconstruction efforts which may, in turn, undermine state building processes later.
Such challengesare unlikely to decrease in severity in the near future. The rapidity with which the threat has grown, particularly in the context of West Africa, suggests that the international community has generally identified the issue too late and the response has been inadequate given the scale of the challenge. Experience to date suggests also that specialized interventions are required to respond effectively at the same time as general state institutions (including the criminal justice system as a whole) are strengthened. In relation to the latter, the UN system still has much to learn as to implementing appropriate specialized responses within the framework of the rule of law , connected to the overall process of security sector reform, as well as the requirement to understand the nature of the challenge emanating from criminal networks much earlier during any peacebuilding intervention.
Over the past year, UNODC’s exposure in post-conflict and fragile states has increased substantially. The Office has, of course, worked for many years in similar situations, most notably in Afghanistan, but the scope of the recent growth in such work is significant, including now Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, Iraq, Timor Léste, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This trend towards great involvement of the Office, which is likely to continue in the years ahead, is driven by two key factors: a) the impact of drug trafficking and organized crime in a number of post-conflict countries as well as a recognition of the comparative advantage of UNODC in assisting to counter these threats, particularly in work focused on strengthening the rule of law; b) an overall UN system response, demonstrated by the establishment of the Peacebuilding Support Office, which is focused on greater coordination amongst all UN actors in post-conflict and fragile environments, and greater UNODC coordination with two of the key players involved, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery of the United Nations Development Programme.
II. The principles of UNODC engagement
Given the above developments, the purpose of this Strategy Note is to outline the reasons for UNODC’s involvement, the comparative value that the Office can bring to post-conflict and fragile states, as well as to present a clear operational strategy for future involvement. The note contains an annex listing programme’s underway in post-conflict and fragile states to date (to be attached). The Note proposes that UNODC’s work in post-conflict environments be guided by four strategic principles:
1. Build knowledge:
While now much clearer than before, the links between key UNODC mandate areas (organized crime and corruption for example) and their impact in post-conflict states has not always been seen as key to peacebuilding, rather as issues that require attention once basic state institutions have been established. As stated, evidence suggests however that interventions are required much earlier to ensure that organized crime and corruption do not undercut newly established institutions altogether. What is required is to conduct more effective research/analysis on key factors undermining peace-building and post-conflict recovery. This includes UNODC actively participating in joint needs assessments which include illicit trafficking, organized crime and corruption as key priorities depending on the country and the degree of the threat involved. It also requires the Office to provide for the training of relevant peacekeeping and peacebuilding personnel to better understand the characteristics of organized crime, assess the impact of organized crime and related risk factors, and develop effective policy and programmatic responses.
2. Forge strategic partnerships:
Given its size and the difficulties of operating in post-conflict and fragile states, UNODC must rely on key partners to ensure an effective response. This includes the development of joint programmes and/or the appointment of ‘double-hatted’ personnel for post-conflict states and the integration of UNODC expertise and programmes into DPA (as it is the case in Sierra Leone where a joint appointment with UNODC will provide for advisors on countering-corruption and organized crime), DPKO (as in Sudan where an UNODC programme office is part of the mission team), or UNDP (as in Somalia where UNDP is facilitating and funding work conducted by UNODC and where, under an MOU between the two organizations, a series of post-conflict states have been identified for joint work). These cooperative efforts are specifically designed to ensure a coherent and comprehensive UN approach to the conflict-crime nexus. Integrating UNODC mandates and expertise into the larger UN system-wide effort would prove the most coherent, viable and sustainable modality for UNODC intervention in these countries.
3. Build regional responses to isolate the impact of post-conflict and state fragility:
Post-conflict and fragile states constitute a core source of vulnerability within the wider regions where they are located, given the cross-border effects of organized crime and illicit trafficking. Central to UNODC’s response must be to take a lead in building regional and cross-border alliances to ensure that the impact in neighbouring countries is reduced and that communication between states is improved to respond effectively to cross-border threats. This has been the principle of UNODC’s approach to the Paris Pact, by bringing together countries affected by drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Indeed, given the fragile nature of the states on the West African coast affected by conflict and their vulnerability to drug trafficking and organized crime, a regional response is an absolute requirement here and UNODC, DPKO, DPA and INTERPOL are working towards the establishment of a joint programme. The above approach would be in line with the new generation of UNODC Regional programmes being developed in various areas of the world, and with the recommendations contained in the draft“Report of the Secretary General on peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflict ( March 2009)”.
4. Focus on the transition to long-term capacity building:
UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts occur by their nature time bound. UNODC’s comparative advantage lies in its providing policy and technical assistance for long-term capacity building. While early interventions to respond to the immediate requirements to fight organized crime or drug trafficking, or to understand their extent and impact, are a necessity, the overall focus of the Office should be on ensuring the effective transition from post-conflict to peacebuilding to normalization and partnership. Implicit in this transition must be the recognition that in all the states where UNODC is currently involved, and barring threats to the security of overall UN operations, the Office is committed to building long-term and sustainable programmes of support. However, the Office must engage as early as possible to ensure a seamless transition to longer-terms forms of capacity building.
III. Defining post-conflict and fragile states
There is no straightforward, clear-cut definition of a fragile state, which is typically plagued by a complex multiplicity of persistent problems. A state is generally termed fragile when the government either cannot or will no deliver core functions to the majority of its people[1]. This is very often the case in countries that have been victim to conflict – one of the four “traps” identified by Paul Collier in his analysis of failing countries, “The Bottom Billion”[2]. Post-conflict countries are typically characterized by poverty, instability, weak institutions, a lack of security and respect for the rule of law, and widespread corruption[3].
States in which public institutions, political processes and social mechanisms are ineffective, not inclusive or illegitimate are vulnerable in many respects. External shocks, epidemics, climate change, natural disasters and environmental degradation can have seriously destabilizing effects. Unstable states are particularly vulnerable to criminal and terrorist networks, thus aggravating their situation. The worst case scenario is a complete collapse of the state, or a withdrawal from parts of its territory, leading to permanent insecurity, chronic violence and an escalation of humanitarian crises.[4]
The instability of fragile states often affects both regional and global security. Events in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Haiti, Afghanistan, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to name a few examples, have shown that the effects of instability can extend far beyond national borders, in the form of the expansion of criminal networks, illicit trafficking, refugee flows, arms smuggling, piracy, the breakdown of trade, and the spread of HIV/AIDS.[5]
Promoting and guaranteeing the rule of law in a fragile country dramatically improves its overall development. This is widely recognized by the international community today, and recent policies and practices reflect an understanding of the connection between legal and non-legal features of the development process[6]. The World Bank has highlighted the fundamental importance of institutional and social change for the development process[7]. Several UN documents, including the Secretary-General’s seminal report to the UN Security Council on Rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies issued on 23 August 2004[8], the report of the High Level Panel In larger freedom: towards development, human rights and security for all[9] and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document[10] emphasize the central role that the rule of law plays in this process.
Needless to say, strengthening the rule of law and re-establishing justice is all the more essential for post-conflict societies. Not only does it advance recovery but, by addressing the grave injustices of war and the root causes of conflict, it can help prevent a future return of hostilities.The above-mentioned 2004 Secretary-General’s report sets the direction of UN policy on the rule of law in post-conflict states: “Justice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives. Advancing all three in fragile post-conflict settings requires strategic planning, careful integration and sensible sequencing of activities. Approaches focusing only on one or another institution, or ignoring civil society or victims, will not be effective”.
UNODC supports this holistic and coherent approach to strengthening the rule of law – both in the broad sense of promoting accountable governance and the more specific sense of building strong security and judicial sectors. As stressed by scholars and practitioners, effective long-term justice reform must focus not only on formal institutions and informal/traditional justice systems but also on ordinary people and their urgent needs.
UNODC efforts to strengthen the rule of law seek the involvement and participation of relevant national stakeholders and the legal empowerment of all segments of society, particularly women, children, minorities and other marginalized groups, and civil society.
Establishing security is clearly a top priority in conflict-ridden and post-conflict countries. Abroad definition of the security sectoras provided in the Guidelines of the Development Assistance Committee of OECD (2005) includesall state institutions and other entities that play a role in ensuring the security of a state and its people. These include:
- core security actors: armed forces, police services, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian), coast guards, border guards, and customs authorities;
- management and oversight bodies: the executive, national security advisory bodies, legislative committees, government ministries of defence, internal affairs and foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies, and civil society organizations;
- justice and rule of law: the judiciary and justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, human right commissions and ombudsmen, and customary and traditional justice systems;
- non-statutory security forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security companies, and political party militias.
A piecemeal approach to Security Sector Reform (SSR) ignores how the activities of these various actors affect each other. A recent study showed that the UN integrated missions tend to prioritize certain aspects of SSR to the detriment of others, focusing, for instance, on building the capacity of police services while paying little attention to judicial or prison reform. The governance aspect of SSR, particularly support for parliaments and civil society, is often neglected in favour of re-establishing the capacity of basic security actors, such as the police or armed forces.
As stated by the Secretary-General in his 2008 report “Securing peace and development: the role of United Nations in supporting security sector reform”, SSR requires an holistic approach. At the same time, its wide scope calls for modesty, because no single actor can be involved in all reform areas. Each must set priorities and identify core tasks. Individual SSR programmes do not need to encompass all aspects of what is broadly understood as the security sector. They do, however,need to bedesigned and implemented in full awarenessof SSR’s complex interdependencies.
In his study [11], H. Hanggi identifies the special challenge posed by these interdependencies: “The SSR concept bridges those previously separate international discourses of security policy, peace-building, democracy promotion and development cooperation. These cross-sectoral characteristics make the SSR approach innovative and promising while simultaneously rendering it more demanding in terms of conceptualization and particularly implementation.” As Hanggi points out, successful SSR requires finding “a mode of close collaboration between very different epistemic communities, in particular between the development and conflict transformation community on the one hand and the traditional – often military focused – security community on the other.”
UNODC is well placed, given both its technical assistance and capacity building role as well as its connections to bilateral specialized agencies dealing with drug trafficking and organized crime, to bridge this gap between the development and security communities. From UNODC’s perspective, SSR in the area of police reform and restructuring cannot focus only on aspects such as community policing (important as this is), but it should also stress the critical issue of building specialized capacity to counter serious and organized crime and related illicit trafficking. In addition, the Office’s focus also includes capacity building of civilian personnel in relevant Ministries concerned with the management of strategic change.
SSR is not simply a technical exercise and it cannot be separated from political issues, economic development, sound public management and the broad rule of law. UNODC fully recognizes that SSR is a highly political process that must be placed in its specific and national and regional context.
IV. Promoting a UN system-wide approach
No single country or organization has the requisite capacity or authority to conduct the full range of activities necessary to effectively combat organized crime. It should also be recognized that support from the international community for the rule of law and security and justice sectors in post-conflict settings is still weak. This is reflected in the lack of multi-year funding and also in the lack of available skilled personnelfor bilateral and multilateral operations.
It is, therefore, crucial that international actors working in “post-conflict/fragile states”, including bilateral and multilateral donors, aid agencies, non-governmental organizations, private foundations and the United Nations, ensure maximum coordination of their activities. This goal, however, remains difficult to achieve. It requires all partners to agree on a common programme of transitional justice, justice reform and rule of law development.
UNODC considers inter-organizational work and partnership building to be a key aspect of its work. It is a member of the UN Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group that was established after the World Summit in 2005 to ensure the quality, policy coherence and coordination of system-wide efforts to promote the rule of law.