Trio-Conference Among Hitotsubashiuniversity, Oxforduniversity and Australiannationaluniversity

HitotsubashiUniversity

31 March 2010

Trio-Conference among HitotsubashiUniversity, OxfordUniversity and AustralianNationalUniversity

Working Title: “Europe in Global Governance: The role of the European Union in respondingto and regulating beyond its region

Presenter:

Dr Hartmut Mayer

Fellow and Lecturer in Politics (International Relations)

St. Peter’s College, University of Oxford

Oxford, OX 1 2DL, United Kingdom

Email:

PRESENTATION OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION:

Welcome to audience

HEALTH WARNING:

This presentation is prepared for a special lecture at HitotsubashiUniversitybut some underlying arguments have been previously published in the following projects:

Hartmut Mayer, “The Long Legacy of Dorian Gray: Why the European Union Needs to Redefine Its Perspective, Responsibility and Role in Global Affairs”, in: JournalOf European Integration, Vol. 30, No 1 (Mar 2008), p.7-25.

Hartmut Mayer, “Is it Still called ‘Chinese Whispers’? The EU’s rhetoric and action as a responsible global institution”, In: International Affairs, Vol. 84/1 (January 2008), pp. 61-79.

Hartmut Mayer, “Declining might in the limelight: European responses to new regional powers”, in: South African Jounal of International Affairs, Vol 16/2 (August 2009), pp. 195-214.

Hartmut Mayer/Henri Vogt (Eds.), A Responsible Europe? Ethical Foundations of EU External Affairs, Basingstoke: Palgrave 2006.

I would like to draw the attention to these publications for further references. I have also included ideas of my current research project on “European reactions to Rising Powers” which I undertake with the German Institute on Global and Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg.

1.: Europe in a Non-European World

Thepresentation analyses the EU’s role in global governance from a normative and from a non-European perspective. Its starting assumption is that Europe’s global influence in the 21st century can best be enhanced if Europe recognises the fact that the EU is clearly embedded in a “Non-European World”. It argues that Europe needs to acknowledge an increasingly peripheral place in world affairs and has to create a new narrative for EU external affairs in the twenty-first century that does not see Europe as the world’s anchor. The EU can only remain credible and effective if it shifts its mind-set from Europe’s promises and ambitions to Europe’s global obligations.It calls for a more modest EU that avoids raising unrealistic and exaggerated expectations. Instead of assuming more tasks by chance or choice, the EU must have a clearer sense of what it should do alone and what has to be done through better inter-institutional co-operation. A responsible EU would overcome Euro-centric notions of self-importance and would remain significant only if it served the global community by its very considerable economic and political means.

1.1. Why the European Union Needs to Redefine Its Role in Global Affairs

The changing balance of forces characterised by economic globalisation, emerging regional powers, new security challenges, cultural diversity and very old problems of development and global social justice all contribute to an increasing marginalisation of Europe as a driver in world affairs. It is argued here that, as a prerequisite for fostering new, stable and mutually beneficial partnerships with other world regions, Europe has to fundamentally revise its Eurocentric self-image and rhetoric and should have a serious debate on its wider global responsibilities.

Although the EU has been in a prolonged period of reflection, it suffers from an overdose of self-centredness and milder or wilder forms of Euro-narcissism. The pride of the past half-a-century, the energy and idealism of an enlarged EU as well as the ever more ambitious Brussels rhetoric about an increasing global role diverts us from realistically assessing the requirements of EU foreign policy in the twenty-first century: Europe must clearly “de-Europeanize” in order to remain a significant player in the emerging global order.

The presentation intends to elaborate on this central message. It calls for a change of perspective on the EU’s role and responsibility in world affairs. The presentation’s point of departure is the notion that most scholarship and policy-discourse about the future of European external relations remains too self-absorbed, looking through European eyes in a well shaped European mirror. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, Europeans, looking at themselves still believe to be fresh, innovative and even rejuvenated after enlargement and some transatlantic emancipation. Outsiders, with some delight, notice the wrinkles, the cracks in Europe’s face instead, and they identify shallowness in Europe’s old missionary illusions. World order is shifting with speed, and whether recognised in Brussels or not, Europe is perceived by most rising powers and new players as an area of significant decline. At the same time, Europe is talking tediously to itself and surprisingly confidently to others. Europeans still see the old continent as a normative leader and a, sometimes the, model for other regions. If not redefined and refined, such message no longer sells.

2. Short Overview of previous research on Europe’s Global Role

Research on “Europe’s Role in the World” is an important topic for academics, politicians, diplomats and the interested public alike. It is, however, not a new one. In addition to general research on European Integration, in which the foreign policy dimension always played a part, there has been a specific body of literature on the EC/EU’s external relations ever since the inception of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970. EPC was the first successful framework to harmonise the foreign policies of EC/EU member states. Different from other policy areas, external relations are still decided by intergovernmental, rather than supranational decision-making procedures. Because of overlapping national and European foreign policies, the difficult decision-making and harmonisation procedures and the general lack of foreign and policy resources and tools, the role of the EU in the world has been characterised by an “expectations-capability-gap” (Christopher Hill). Most research in the field of EU external relations has focused on either expectations (external demands, self-imposed normative goals etc.) or capabilities (internal structure, actual outputs etc.) and sometimes on both. For illustrative purposes and to place my own research on “responsibility” within the existing literature a short overview on key research questions in the existing literature should be provided:

The Nature and Scope of Previous Research

Broadly speaking, most of the previous research concentrated on

the nature of EU external relations (institutional questions, relationship between member states and the EU’s external relations, institutional coherence and consistency)

the EU as an Actor (uniqueness of the actor, relative power, strengths and weaknesses, the changing capacities of the EU as an actor)

the EU’s effectiveness in the various dimensions of its external relations (effective multilateralism in global trade, effective promotion of democracy and human rights etc.)

the position and role of the EU in the global balance of power (notions of global polarity, the EU within a bi-polar, uni-polar, and co-operative or competitive multi-polar world order)

the legitimacy of the EU as a global player

the EU as a creator and agent of global norms (norm setting, promotion, implementation, adjustment)

the EU as a model in one form or the other (for other regions, powers, trade blocks, security arrangements)

Rhetoric and Action in EU External Relations:

A new rhetoric on the role of the European Union in world affairs is an obvious political demand in light of the remarkable transformation of global order since the end of the Cold War. We are still in a transition period: it is defined by the end of bi-polarity, the rise of new powers as well as the new strength of globalising economic and civil society actors. The old nation states, the established international organisations, the new business and the civil society players are currently rebalancing the foundations of global order. The EU, originally born into the Cold War logic, adjusted its external capabilities with significant achievements in the last 15 years. Underestimated and overestimated at the same time, the EU is clearly one of the most comprehensive and holistic actors globally. Within this specific presentation, however, there is no room to assess the remarkable transformation of the EU, in particular its new strategic ambitions and security policies.

While the EU and global order have changed significantly over the last 15 years, the EU’s traditional rhetoric has not altered much at all. With America’s declining intellectual leadership and its loss of prestige as a result of the mistaken ideology of “America‘s uni-polar moment” -- peaking between 2001 and 2005 but with bad echoes likely to last for decades -- the EU and its member states are now particularly well placed to feed a new global discourse on ethics, sustainable economic development, global justice and responsibility.

The contribution has to be well founded, and Europe has to fill the gap quickly. A senior person in the Swedish defence ministry recently suggested to me that Europe might only have 10 to 15 years left to remain relevant in the 21century. If it does not act swiftly, convincingly and responsibly, the opportunity to influence world order might be lost forever.

3. Bakground for Europe’s Role in the World: Discourses on World Order

Ever since the end of the Cold War, debates on European are influenced by larger waves of change in global politics as world order. The roots of the acceleration of economic globalisations can be traced back to at least the early 1960s. Without summarising the debates on global order which others have done, it is striking that the established experts on European foreign policy engage far too little with scholars on global order, economic globalization, global governance and regional and area studies, a serious intellectual deficit that should not be elaborated in this chapter. Larger visions of world order have come in different fashions over the last 20 years and include roughly ten versions:

*First, UShegemony in a uni-polar world

*Second, neo-realist instability at a global scale. No power or group of powers would dominate and no hegemon would manage to stabilise regions. The likelihood of wars and crisis spreading around the world would be high

*Third, either antagonistic or cooperative multi-polarity with several distinct poles or concentrations of old and new powers such Russia, China, India and Brazil (more or less challenging established powers in the West). Multi-polarity could be cooperative assuming that the few major powers would cooperate on defining rules and would discipline those who violate them. In the 1990s, a well received variant of this vision was the concept of tri-polar regionalism (US, EU, Japan) with competing trading blocs. Alternative visions of multi-polarity are perceived as fiercely competitive with the possibility of dialogue between major powers possibly breaking apart

*Fourth, hierarchical (top and great powers, middle powers, small powers or alternatively super-powers, great powers, regional powers) and “layer-cake-models” of order with uni-polar, multi-polar, multi-regional and transnational layers with regard to different policy areas

*Fifth, a return to bi-polarity with the US (West) and China heading for the new clash in the 21century

*Sixth, cultural friction, clash of civilizations, asymmetric warfare and globally networked terrorism as the defining feature of an unstable world

*Seventh, notions of a more stable transpolar order where economic rather than political power is decisive and where states are in rapid decline as they are overtaken by business, markets and other non-state actors

*Eighth, optimistic scenarios of a structured and well governed New World Order centred in strong institutions of global governance, the rule of law and functioning international regimes

*Ninth, a world of economical and culturally integrated and distinct regions with interregional dialogues and agreements

*Tenth, more recent debates on a non-polar world characterised by numerous centres of meaningful power. Haas defines such order to include six major powers (like the multi-polar image): China, the EU, India, Japan, Russia and the US. Different from a simple multi-polar image in Haas’ vision there is a second significant layer of regional powers to include Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Saudi-Arabia, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea. Most importantly “meaningful power centres” include the major international organisations (UN, IMF, World Bank, ASEAN, African Union, OPEC, Shanghai co-operations etc.) and even “states within states” (California etc.) and global cities (New York, London, Sao Paolo, Tokyo, Shanghai). They also include the largest world energy, manufacturing and financial firms. Each of these power centres, states in particular, are then constantly challenged from above (International Organizations), from below (militias such as Hamas, Taliban, Hezbollah) and from the side (NGOs and corporations). Churches, networks of political parties, global media, drug cartels and global charities all play an independent additional and powerful part. (Haas: 2008).

Most significant, Haas’ comprehensive vision of a “non-polar world” does not consider any European individual country, neither Britain, France or Germany as independent “meaningful centres of power”. It is one vision only, but it certainly reflects a much broader view held about Europe outside Europe. Any reflection on national adaptations to non-European powers must be part of larger debates on France’s, Britain’s, Germany’s and the EU’s place within “a world of many worlds”. These classical concerns of geo-politics must then be also linked to reflections on the societal consequences of economic globalisation. Questions about the future of advanced economic societies facing competition of rising industrial powers are as important as concerns about the extent to which a “European Way of Life” can be preserved. As indicated above, foreign policy-makers in Britain, France and Germanyhave broadly failed to sufficiently integrate with thinkers on globalisation, development and on non-Western approaches to international affairs.

France, Germany and Britain, while acknowledging the rapid shifts in global order, still seem to be trapped in traditional Euro-centric perspectives. They see themselves and the United States as the centres of gravity in world politics, possibly even enhanced after EU enlargement. In contrast, most rising players perceive Europeas an area of significant decline (Lisbonne-de Vergeron 2007, Fioramenti and Lucarelli 2007). The old message of Europe as a normative leader for other regions no longer sells. In fact non-European, non-Western voices, among them the ever present Kishore Mahbubani and Fareed Zakaria (Mahbubani 2008, Zakaria 2008) have managed to influence even main stream debates in the Euro-American world. The real impact of an ongoing “globalisation of global thought” is still to come as few western voices have already changed perspective. David Slater, who is one example at least, calls for post-colonial geo-politics (Slater 2004) and argues that the three constitutive elements of western thinking have come under serious threat. These elements were: First, the Western belief that a very special and primary feature of its inner socio-economic, political, individual and cultural life justified a civilizational role vis-à-vis others. Second, it was based on the traditional conviction that this special culture was intrinsic to the Euro-American development and the result of a process of mutual self-affirmation which owed nothing to exchange and association with non-Western cultures. In fact, a sense of superiority flows from the self-referential framework expressed in the exclusive claim as being a driver of modernization and liberal development. The third element is the claim that the Western model, be it the American or European version, constitutes a universal step forward for the whole of humanity in all regions of the world. (Slater 2004)

Without going into detail, it is important that these three core assumptions are still implicit in much of the thinking of national adaptation strategies in Germany, France and Britain. It adds to the uniqueness of the European or Western perspective, but is unlikely to be shared or tolerated by other regional and rising powers in the future. There is indeed a powerful “case against the West (Mahbubani 2008).

4. Common Challenges, National Adaptation Strategies: Individual Responses by Germany,France and Britain

4.1. Germany

Debates on the transformation of German foreign policy since 1990 have been the most substantial among the three European powers. A fundamental rethink was no surprise as German unification required a comprehensive reflection about a future foreign policy. However, until recently the German debate has also been the most provincial: Europe’s central power engaged in an essentially European debate on European order (Hellmann 1996, Mayer 1997, Mayer 2001) and only recently developed a wider global perspective.

This GIGA-research project and similar agendas in other German think tanks indicate that Berlin is finally shifting gear. Despite these new efforts, much more dialogue between the various German research communities would be essential for achieving the impact that the topics deserves and for substantially influencing Berlin’s global outlook . The traditional foreign and security policy community still speaks too little to area studies scholars. Furthermore, compared with France and Britain, there is a much smaller pool of experts for many world regions and regional powers. Last but not least, ministries as well as the chancellor’s office are still organised around outdated rationales and still retains unit desks such as “East”, “West”, “Developing World” and “Global Questions” (Globale Fragen). The reform of German foreign policy and a wider global perspective are still steady work in progress.