#3-208
To Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons
June 1, 1942 [Washington, D.C.]
Personal and Confidential
Dear Emmons:
I received your memorandum of May 9th, regarding the reorganization of your Headquarters and recommending certain additional general officers for your staff.1 I think I thoroughly understand your point of view and the embarrassment involved in getting officers for particular positions without adequate rank—that is, rank they probably could obtain by service with troops.
Frankly, for your eye alone, the War Department is not opposed to your idea. My problem is to get approval by the President of general officers for staff positions. For example, it was not until the last list that I succeeded in getting a brigadier for one of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff of the entire ground forces of the Army. The other three Assistant Chiefs of Staff are colonels, outstanding officers and constantly being jumped in the promotion of officers on troop duty. I am hopeful on the next list of getting one more of these men made a brigadier general.2
I have had similar difficulties at other headquarters, in Great Britain, with the Air Corps, here in Washington, and, until very recently, with my own staff. The point I am trying to make clear is that when I can manage such promotions as you proposed, I will see that they are accomplished, but it is a difficult business.
Again, to be very frank, on the list approved while I was in London but prepared by me before my departure, fifteen names were scratched off, all of them staff. I succeeded in getting a few of these back on the last list. General Clark, Deputy Commander for the Ground Forces, was made a major general, but on the basis that it is intended to give him a corps command in England, though this is most confidential.3
I will do my best to help you out in this matter, but it is going to be a slow business, and I am inclined to think that the procedure in the case of Collins will be the usual method—to get an outstanding man as a brigadier general and he later goes on troop command as a major general.4
Naturally we are following anxiously each phase of the approaching crisis in the central Pacific. Your radio has just come in reporting the first plane contacts, west of Midway.5
Faithfully yours,
Document Copy Text Source: George C. Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, Selected Materials, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia.
Document Format: Typed letter.
1. Emmons had written to describe his January reorganization of the Hawaiian Department Headquarters into tactical operating (forward) and rear echelons. He requested that his chief of staff be promoted to major general and that his two deputy chiefs of staff and several other staff officers be promoted to brigadier general. His staff had to maintain daily contact with naval officers occupying analogous positions, and Emmons noted that "almost without exception the Naval officers enjoy superior rank to that of the Army officers with whom they are dealing." (Emmons to Marshall, May 9, 1942, NA/RG 165 [OCS, Project Decimal File 1941–43, Hawaii].)
2. Lloyd D. Brown, head of G-3 at Army Ground Forces, had been promoted to brigadier general on May 24. The other staff section chiefs and their dates of promotion to brigadier general were: G-1, Alexander R. Bolling (August 2, 1942); G-2, James T. Duke (March 17, 1943); G-4, Willard S. Paul (June 24, 1942); and Plans, Lyman L. Lemnitzer (June 25, 1942).
3. Mark W. Clark had been promoted to major general in April 1942. In mid-June he would assume command of the Second Army Corps, then leave for England on June 23, and would be appointed chief of staff for Ground Forces in Europe in July.
4. J. Lawton Collins had served as chief of staff of the Hawaiian Department from December 1941 until early May 1942 during which time he had been promoted to brigadier general in February. In May Collins had assumed command of the Twenty-fifth Infantry Division and was promoted to major general by the end of the same month.
5. Emmons replied that he appreciated Marshall's efforts to get promotions for his key staff officers. "We must have competent officers in these jobs and Heaven knows there are few enough of them and they must not be discouraged by being jumped.” Emmons concluded with a lengthy review of the still unclear results of the Army Air Forces' role in the battle of Midway, which at that time was greatly exaggerated. He reported that army aircraft had hit two carriers, three battleships, two cruisers, a destroyer, and two transports at a cost to themselves of seven planes and four crews. (Emmons to Marshall, June 7, 1942, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 8, Book 5].) Later investigations indicated that army planes had caused little damage to the Japanese task force. Relations with the navy were somewhat strained by the Army Air Forces' claims. (H. H. Arnold, Global Mission [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949], pp. 378–79.)
Recommended Citation: ThePapers of George Catlett Marshall, ed.Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 3, “The Right Man for the Job,” December 7, 1941-May 31, 1943 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 219–220.