Thirty-Seventhsession

A/HRC/37/49

A/HRC/37/49
Advance Edited Version / Distr.:General
28February2018
Original:English

HumanRightsCouncil

Thirty-seventhsession

26February–23March2018

Agendaitem3

Promotionandprotectionofallhumanrights,civil

political,economic,socialandculturalrights,

includingtherighttodevelopment

ReportoftheSpecialRapporteuronfreedomofreligionandbelief[*]

NotebytheSecretariat

TheSecretariathasthehonourtotransmittotheHumanRightsCouncilthereportoftheSpecialRapporteuronfreedomofreligionorbelief,AhmedShaheed,pursuanttoresolution31/16.Inthereport,theSpecialRapporteuranalysestherelationshipsbetweenStateandreligionandtheirimpactonfreedomofreligionorbelief.HestressestheobligationofStatestoactasimpartialguarantoroffreedomofreligionorbelieftoallregardlessoftherelationshipsbetweenStateandreligionorbelief.

Contents

Page

I.ActivitiesoftheSpecialRapporteur...... 3

II.RelationshipsbetweenStateandreligionandtheirimpactonfreedomofreligionorbelief...3

A.Introduction...... 3

B.PatternsofrelationshipsbetweenStateandreligion...... 4

C.Internationallegalstandards...... 8

D.ImplicationsandconsequencesofrelationshipsbetweenStateandreligionon
implementingprotectionsforfreedomofreligionorbelief...... 12

III.Conclusionsandrecommendations...... 16

I.ActivitiesoftheSpecialRapporteur

1.Initsresolution31/16,adoptedinMarch2016,theHumanRightsCouncilextendedthemandateoftheSpecialRapporteuronfreedomofreligionorbeliefforaperiodofthreeyears.AhmedShaheedwasappointedastheSpecialRapporteuratthethirty-secondsessionoftheCouncilandheassumedhismandateon1November2016.

2.Anoverviewoftheactivitiesofthemandateholderbetween1November2016and31July2017isprovidedinthemostrecentinterimreportthathepresentedtotheGeneralAssemblyatitsseventy-secondsession(seeA/72/365,paras.1and2).Inaddition,hewasinvitedtoanumberofmeetingsandconsultationsonfreedomofreligionorbelief,includingthemeetingoftheInternationalContactGrouponFreedomofReligion,heldinNewYork,andthefive-yearreviewoftheRabatPlanofActionontheprohibitionofadvocacyofnational,racialorreligioushatredthatconstitutesincitementtodiscrimination,hostilityorviolence,heldinRabatinDecember2017.

3.Furthermore,heundertookacountryvisittoUzbekistanfrom2to12October2017.In2017,theSpecialRapporteursent40communicationsandissued14pressreleasesraisinghisvoiceagainsttheviolationoffreedomofreligionorbeliefindifferentcountries.HealsosentcountryvisitrequeststoArmenia,Egypt,Indonesia,Malaysia,Nepal,theNetherlands,Pakistan,SaudiArabia,SouthAfricaandTunisia.HisrequeststovisitTunisiaandtheNetherlandswereaccepted.

II.RelationshipsbetweenStateandreligionandtheirimpactonfreedomofreligionorbelief

A.Introduction

4.Statesineveryregionareincreasinglyconfrontingthechallengeofsafeguardingtherightofallpersonstofreedomofreligionorbeliefwhileprotectingarangeofotherrights.Establishingasoundbodyoflawsandpoliciesforprotectingfreedomofreligionorbeliefofteninvolvesbalancingarangeoffundamentalrightsguaranteedbyinternationalhumanrightsinstruments,amidmanifoldpolitical,economic,socialandculturalpressures.Morepeoplethaneverarelivingabroad.Over258millionpeoplewereinternationalmigrantsworldwidein2017,comparedwith173millionin2000.[1]Thepressuresengenderedbymigrationandglobalization,alongwitheasilyavailabletelecommunicationsandsocialmediatools,areacceleratingtheexchangeofideasandvalues,ultimatelychangingthedemographicandreligiouslandscapeofmanysocietiesandaccentuatingcompetinginterests.

5.Thesechangeshaveintensifiedtheriseoffundamentalistmovementsmobilizedagainstperceivedthreatsfromtheunderpinningsofsocialchangeandmodernity.SomeofthesemovementspossessnationalistorientationsthatservetoopposeStateeffortstorespondtodemographicshiftsbyaccommodatingnewerreligiouscommunities,includingbyexpandingprotectionsfortheirfullenjoymentofhumanrights.Thesecircumstancesaremadeevenmorecomplexbyheightenedsecurityconcernsemanatingfromongoingactsofviolencecarriedoutbyextremists,whichhaveresultedingreaterStateinterferencewithreligiousexpression.Religiousminorities,inparticular,areincreasinglyfacinglawsthatineffectrestricttheirfreedom,eitheraloneorwithinacommunity,tomanifesttheirreligionorbeliefinworship,observance,teachingandpractice.

6.TheroleofreligioninshapingthepublicagendaandthedutiesofStatestoupholdhumanrightsforallarebecomingincreasinglysalientininternationalrelationsandwithinnationalpolitics.Inmostmulticulturaldemocraticsocietiesorcountrieswhere“secularism”isupheldbytheirconstitutions,concernsovertheneutralityofthepublicspherehavemovedtocentrestageinpoliticaldebates,judicialpoliticsandpeople’sdailylives.Thisincreasingfocuson“secularism”iscloselyintertwinedwiththeneedtobothrespondtoreligiouspluralityinmanydifferentinstitutionalsettingsandadaptrelationshipsbetweenreligionandtheStateinwaysthatarecompatiblewithhumanrights.

7.Theever-evolvingnatureoftherelationshipsbetweenStateandreligionisofsignificancetothoseseekingtopromoteprotectionsforfreedomofreligionorbelief,becausethedegreetowhichStatesareentangledwithvariousreligionsorbeliefshasfar-reachingimplicationsfortheirdispositionandabilitytoguaranteehumanrights,especiallythoserightsexercisedbypersonsbelongingtoreligiousorbeliefminorities.ThepresentreportoffersaperfunctoryexaminationoftheimpactthattheserelationshipsposeforaState’sdispositiontorespectandprotectfreedomofthought,conscience,religionorbelief.

8.TheSpecialRapporteurbelievesthisexercisetobetimelygiven:(a)theincreasinglydisturbingtrendsingovernmentrestrictionsandsocialhostilitiesinvolvingreligionorbelief;(b)thegrowingchallengesposedbythestrugglesbetweensecularandreligiousactorsoverthe“publicspace”andthe“publicagenda”andtheincreasinglycomplexdynamicsthiscompetitiongeneratesforharmonizingfreedomofreligionorbeliefwithotherfundamentalhumanrights;and(c)theincrementallyalarmingthreatthatever-evolvingpoliciesonreligiousissuesareposingtofreedomofreligionorbelief.Accordingly,examiningtheimpactthattheserelationshipshaveontheenjoymentoftherighttofreedomofreligionorbelieffallssquarelywithinthemandatedescribedinparagraph18ofHumanRightsCouncilresolution6/37.

9.ThepresentreportdoesnotattempttoofferacomprehensivesurveyofthebreadthoftherelationshipsbetweenStateandreligionthatexisttoday.However,itdoesattempttoemployeasilydiscerniblepatternsamidtherangeofentanglementsthatStateshavewithreligion(s)orbelief(s),inordertoidentifythemostsalientdifferencesamongthem,alongwiththeramificationsthatsuchentanglementsposefortheimplementationofinternationalhumanrightsnormsandstandards.Thisinitialpresentationofthebasicpatternsinsuchrelationshipsisaccompaniedbyabriefreviewoftherelevantinternationalprotectionsforfreedomofreligionorbelief,alongwithasuccinctdiscussionaboutthepressuresthatsuchrelationshipsbringtobearonaState’sabilitytoimplementthesaidlegalprotectionsforall.SpacelimitationsdonotallowthepresentreporttoincludeanexhaustivetreatmentoftheissuesthatarisefromtheentanglementsbetweenStateandreligion.However,thereporthighlightssomeofthosepracticeswhichresultinviolationsthatarecommonlyassociatedwithcertainsuchrelationships.ThereportconcludeswithreflectionsonthetoolsandbestpracticescurrentlyavailabletoStatesseekingguidanceastheyundertaketheprogressivelycomplextaskofstrikingthisdelicatebalancebetweenfreedomofreligionorbeliefandotherhumanrights.

B.PatternsofrelationshipsbetweenStateandreligion

10.AllStatessupport,regulateorlimitreligionandbelieftosomeextent.SomeGovernmentsdeclareofficialreligions;otherGovernmentsgivepreferentialtreatmenttooneormorereligions;Governmentsalsocontrolorrestrictreligiousorganizationsandpracticeswithintheirdomain;andsomeGovernmentssingleoutthemanifestationofcertainreligionsorbeliefsforrestrictionsthatarenotplacedonalladherentswithintheirterritory.

11.ClassifyingStatesaccordingtopatternsintheirrelationshipswithreligion(s)orbelief(s)isparticularlychallenging.Suchrelationshipsarediverse;oftenreflectingthevicissitudesandvagariesofhistory,cultureandtraditions,alongwiththecompetinginterestsofpolitical,cultural,economic,secularandreligiousforceswithinStatesoverthepublicagenda.TherelationshipsbetweenStateandreligionarealsoconstantlyevolving;undergoingarangeofminorordramaticadjustments,typicallyinresponsetosocialorpoliticalpressures.[2]

12.StudiesusingvariousindicatorstodemonstratehowStatesengagewithreligionorbelief,andhowsuchentanglementsmayaffectGovernments’dispositioninpromotingandprotectingfreedomofreligionorbeliefhaveproducedmyriadclassificationmodelsfortherelationshipsbetweenStateandreligion.SomestudiesexaminethecorrelationbetweenStates’actionsorinactionwhichresultininterferencewithfreedomofreligionorbeliefandtheextenttowhichgovernmentalinstitutionsidentifythemselveswithreligiousinstitutionsorbeliefs.[3]OthersassesstheroleofconstitutionalstipulationsinestablishingandregulatingtheoverallrelationshipbetweenreligiousandStateauthorities.[4]

13.A2017study,whichfocusedontheofficialreligionpoliciesandreportedStatepracticesofall193StatesMembersoftheUnitedNations,concludedthatsome42percentofStateseitherdeclaredofficialsupportforonereligion(21percent)orconferredfavourontooneormorereligions(21percent).Another53percentofMemberStatesdidnotidentifywithanyfaithorbelief.AsmallnumberofMemberStates(5percent)exerted“averyhighlevelofcontroloverreligiousinstitutionsintheircountriesorholdanegativeviewofreligioningeneral”.[5]Anearlierstudy,ontheotherhand,whichalsoexaminedthelaws,regulations,governmentpoliciesandgovernmentactionsof177countries,produced14subcategoriesgroupedinto4overarchingrelationshipsbetweenStateandreligion—similartothoseidentifiedbythe2017study—concludingthat41Stateshadofficialreligions,77favouredoneormorereligions,43didnotidentifywithanyreligionand16hadanegativeviewoftheroleofreligioninpubliclife.[6]

14.Givensuchcomplexities,thereisnoconsensusastoeitherhowtherelationshipsbetweenStateandreligionshouldbeclassified,orontheterminologyforcharacterizingtheirnature.TheSpecialRapporteurdoesnotendorseanyconclusionorparticularmodelforsuchrelationshipsgeneratedbytheabove-mentionedstudies.Nevertheless,someindicatorsforunderstandingsuchrelationshipsarecommontothesestudies,andthegeneralpatternsforhowStatesengagewithreligionorbeliefgleanedfromthemareusefulforthepurposesofthisdiscussion.

15.ThisincludesexaminingStates’identificationwithreligion(s)and/orbelief(s)bywayofdeclarationinconstitutionsorotherfoundingdocuments,whichoffersomeinsightintotherangeofnormativeattitudesStatesmayholdtowardstherolesthatvariousreligion(s)and/orbelief(s)shouldplayinpubliclifeand,inextremecases,privatelife.Atthesametime,examiningStates’officialidentificationwithaparticularreligionisnotnecessarilydeterminativeofhowtheywillentanglethemselveswithreligionorinterrelatewithreligiouscommunitiesinpractice.Forinstance,Stateswithofficialreligions,typically,supportreligionmorestrongly,butdeclaringanofficialreligiondoesnotalwaysleadtohighlevelsofactualsupportforthatreligion.Consequently,acloseexaminationofthepracticesthatGovernmentsadoptisalsoessentialtounderstandingtheimplicationsthattheserelationshipsposeforfreedomofreligionorbeliefbeyondwhatthemereexistenceofanofficialreligionimplies.[7]

16.Ofthe660communicationstransmittedbythemandateholderfrom2004to2017,about86percentweresenttothe81Stateswithofficialorfavouredreligion(s)(412communications)andthe10Statesthatmaintainanegativeposturetowardsreligion(157communications).Bycomparison,14percentweresenttothe102Statesthatdonotidentifywithanyparticularreligion(91communications).

CommunicationssentbytheSpecialRapporteuronfreedomofreligionorbelieftoStatesMembersoftheUnitedNations,2004–2017

NumberofMemberStates / Numberofcommunicationssent
Stateswithofficialorfavouredreligions / 81 / 412
Statesthatdonotidentifywithareligion / 102 / 91
Stateswithanegativeviewofreligion / 10 / 157
Total / 193 / 660

17.Similarly,aglobalstudyofreligiousrestrictionsandsocialhostilitymotivatedbyreligionorbeliefillustratedastrongcorrelationbetweenthedegreetowhichaGovernmentisentangledwithreligionanditspropensityforprotectingorviolatingfreedomofreligionorbeliefand/orcombatingreligiousintolerance.[8]Some24(58.5percent)ofthe41StateswithanofficialStatereligioninthatstudyimposed“veryhigh”or“high”levelsofrestrictionsonreligiouspractices,while11(27.5percent)ofthe40Stateswithfavouredreligion(s),imposedsuchrestrictionsintheperiod2014–2015.Moreover,only5(4.9percent)ofthe102Statesthatdidnotidentifywithreligionengagedintheselevelsofinterferencewiththeprerogativesofreligiouscommunities,whileall10oftheStatesthathadanegativeviewoftheroleofreligioninpubliclifeinthesestudiesimposed“high”or“veryhigh”restrictions.

18.SocialhostilitieswerethelowestinStateswithanegativeviewofreligioninpubliclife,withonlyoneStatehavingreportedlyexperienceda“highlevel”ofsocialhostilitymotivatedbyreligion,while44percentofthoseStateswithanofficialreligionwererecordedashavingexperienced“veryhigh”or“highlevels”ofsocialhostilities.Intotal,22percentofStateswithpreferredreligion(s)andthosethatdidnotidentifywithreligionexperiencedsimilarlevelsofsocialhostility.

1.Stateswithofficialorfavouredreligion(s)

19.Statesthateitherofficiallyidentifywithreligionorfavouroneormorereligionsaregroupedtogetherintheaboveanalysisduetocommonfactorsamongthem.Namely,theiridentificationwithreligion(s)andthepreferentialtreatment/supporttheseStatesconferuntosaidreligion(s).ThedifferencesamongtheseStatesinvariablylie,however,intheextenttowhichStateswithofficialorfavouredreligionsareentangledwiththeinstitutionsoftheirpreferredreligion.Forthepresentdiscussion,therefore,theseStatesareviewedasoccupyingaspectrum,withthoseStateshavingnearlyindiscernibledemarcationsbetweengovernmentandreligiousaffairs(“religiousStates”)atoneend,andthosethatidentifywithorfavourareligion,butmaintaindistinctboundariesbetweenreligionandState(“secular-likeStates”),attheother.

20.TheconstitutionorotherfoundingdocumentsofStateswithanofficialreligionmaydeclareaparticularreligionoraparticulardenominationofareligiontobetheofficialorestablishedreligionoftheState.Thelawmayormaynotprovidefurtherdetailsaboutwhatsuchaprivilegemayentail,buttypicallytheofficialreligionoftheseStatesenjoyscertainpolitical,legalandfinancialprivileges.

21.Islamistheworld’smostcommonofficialreligion.Amongthe41countrieswithaStatereligion,25(61percent)nameSunniIslam,ShiaIslamorjustIslamingeneralastheirofficialfaith.MostofthecountrieswhereIslamistheofficialreligionareintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,whilesevenofficiallyIslamiccountries(28percent)areintheAsia-Pacificregion.Christianityisthesecondmostcommonofficialreligionaroundtheworld.Thirteencountries(32percentofcountrieswithanofficialreligion)declareChristianity,ingeneral,oraparticularChristiandenominationtobetheirofficialStatereligion.NineofthesecountriesareinEurope,twocountriesareintheAmericas,oneisintheAsia-Pacificregion,andoneisinsub-SaharanAfrica.Insomecases,theattachmentoftheStatetoreligionisengenderedbyhistoricalcircumstancesand,therefore,functionallysymbolic(mildestablishment),althoughlimitedprivilegestendtobegrantedtotheestablishedreligion.

22.Some40StatesMembersoftheUnitedNationsdonotformallydeclareaStatereligion,butfavouroneormorereligionsorgrantoneormorereligionscertainprivilegesnotaccordedtoothers,includinglegalandfinancialadvantages.[9]SomeoftheseStatessingleoutonereligionforsupportinamannersimilartoaStatewithanofficialreligion,othersestablishahierarchyofreligions—conferringvaryingdegreesofprivilegeaccordingtorankingpreference.ThisgroupalsoincludesStateswithformalcommitmentstotheseparationofreligionandStatebut,inpractice,theyfavouronereligion,orarefacinggrowingpoliticalpressuretoconferlegalprivilegesononereligionoverothers.InStatesthatunofficiallysupportreligion,thereligionreceivingpreferentialtreatmentmayormaynotbeidentifiedinthelegalframeworkbut,whentheyarementioned,thereferencerelatesmoretohistoryandtraditionthantotheprivilegeofthetruthclaimsofthatreligion.

23.Inpractice,therelationshipsthattheseStateshavewiththefavouredreligion(s)areremarkablydiverse.Amongthe40countriesthathaveapreferredorfavouredreligion—butnotanofficialStatereligion—mostfavourChristianity.Twenty-eightcountries(70percent)haveChristianityasthepreferredreligion,mostlyinEuropeandtheAmericas.Fivecountriesinsub-SaharanAfricaandthreeintheAsia-PacificregionhaveChristianityasthefavouredreligion.Insomecountries,multiplereligionsarefavouredtoasimilarextentbytheState.

2.Statesorthosethatdonotidentifywithareligion

24.ThemajorityofStatesMembersoftheUnitedNations(102)donotdeclareaStatereligionorconferprivilegeonreligions.Thisincludes35AfricanStates,22countriesintheAmericasalongwithanequalnumberinEuropeand19Asia-PacificStates.Generallyspeaking,thesecountriestendtomaintainaseparationofchurchandState,ora“principleddistance”betweenreligionandState,basedonwhatmaybecalleda“context-sensitivesecularism”whichenablesaflexibleapproachtotheissuesoftheinclusionorexclusionofreligioninpubliclifeandthedegreeofsuchengagementordisengagement.[10]

25.ManyoftheseStatesalsohaveexplicitcommitmentstorespectfreedomofreligionorbeliefintheirlegalframework.However,theydonotnecessarilyavoidpromotingorrestrictingreligiouspractice.Infact,manyofthemareincreasinglyplacingrestrictionsonvariousaspectsofmanifestationofreligionorbelief,includinglimitsonthepublicdisplayofreligiousattire.

26.SomeStatesareviewedas“cooperationist”;providingsupporttoallreligions,suchasthroughtheprovisionofdirectfundingtoallcommunities.Othersprovideonlyindirectfunding,suchasthroughtaxexemptions,butalsoaccommodateallreligions.OtherStatesstressseparatismandthefreeexerciseofreligionwithinthepublicsphere,whileothersplacegreateremphasisonpreservingasecularpublicspaceandreservingreligionfortheprivatesphere.[11]

3.Stateswithanegativeviewoftheroleofreligioninpubliclife

27.AsmallnumberofMemberStates(10)viewreligionassomethingnegativethatshouldbeexpurgatedfrompublicaffairs,andgenerallyrespondwithsevererestrictionsonthecivicspace.ThelegalframeworkoftheseStatescaninvolvecommitmentstosecularity,freedomofreligionoreventoaparticularreligion.SomeoftheseStatesbantheroleofreligioninpubliclifealltogether,whileothersallowfornominalfreedomtoworship.ButthehallmarkoftheseStatesistheirpropensityforimposingverytightrestrictionsonthelegalstatus,funding,autonomyandpoliticalactivitiesofreligiousactorsandinstitutionsforthepurposesoflimitingtheroleofreligion,generally,inpublicand,attimes,privatelife.

C.Internationallegalstandards

1.Hardandsoftlaw

28.InternationalhumanrightstreatiesarereticentonthesortofrelationshipaStateshouldhavewithreligionorbelief.Theydo,however,imposeadutyuponStatestobeimpartialguarantorsoftheenjoymentoffreedomofreligionorbelief,includingtherighttofreedomfromreligion,forallindividualsandgroupswithintheirterritoryandsubjecttotheirjurisdiction.TheHumanRightsCommittee,inparagraph9ofitsgeneralcommentNo.22(1993)ontherighttofreedomofthought,conscienceandreligion,statesclearlythatthefactthatareligionisrecognizedasaStatereligionorthatitsfollowerscomprisethemajorityofthepopulationshouldnoteffectivelyimpairtheenjoymentoftheirrightsundertheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,includingarticles18and27,orresultindiscriminationagainstnon-believersoradherentstominorityreligions.

29.TheHumanRightsCommitteenotesthatthisdutyinvolvesbothnegativeobligations,likerefrainingfromperpetuatingdiscriminatoryacts,andpositiveduties,suchastheobligationtoprotectagainstthird-partyinfringements,includingincitementtoreligioushatred.StatesarealsoobligedtoensurethatindividualsbelongingtominoritiesareabletopractisetheirreligionsorbeliefsorreceivepublicsupportinthesamemannerasadherentstoaStatereligion.Otherpositivedutiesincludesatisfyingallobligationsstipulatedbyarticle27oftheCovenantandbytheDeclarationontheRightsofPersonsBelongingtoEthnic,ReligiousandLinguisticMinorities,whichrequireStatesto“takemeasurestocreatefavourableconditions”thatenablepersonsbelongingtoreligious,ethnicandlinguisticminoritycommunities,to“expresstheircharacteristics”.Furthermore,theBeirutDeclarationandits18commitmentson“FaithforRights”[12]explicitlyrefertopreventingtheuseofthenotionof“Statereligion”or“doctrinalsecularism”todiscriminateagainstindividualsorgroups,andto“reducingthespaceforreligiousorbeliefpluralisminpractice”.

30.ThenatureofaState’sobligationtopromoteandprotecttherighttofreedomofreligionorbeliefmustbeunderstoodwithinawiderhumanrights-basedframeworkthatstressestheprinciplesofuniversality,equalityandfreedom,andwhichsatisfythedutiestorespect,protectandpromoteallhumanrightsforeveryone.Article18oftheCovenantrequiresStatestorespectandprotect,withoutdiscrimination,thefreedomofthought,conscience,religionorbelief,whichincludes:(a)therighttohaveortoadoptareligionorbeliefofone’schoice;(b)theunconditionalfreedomfromcoercion;(c)therighttomanifestthatreligionorbelief,eitherindividuallyorincommunitywithothers,inworship,observance,practiceandteaching;and(d)thelibertyofparentsandguardianstoprovideareligiousandmoraleducationforchildreninaccordancetotheirconvictionsandinaccordancewiththeevolvingcapacitiesofthechild.Anumberofotherobligationsandspecificdutiesaredetailedinarticles1–6oftheDeclarationontheEliminationofAllFormsofIntoleranceandofDiscriminationBasedonReligionorBelief.

31.Torealizethisright,Statesmustalsoguaranteeequalprotectionunderthelaw,especiallywithinthescopeofarticles5and20(2)andasspecificallymandatedbyarticle26oftheCovenant.Anyinterferencewiththerighttomanifestone’sreligionorbeliefmustbelimitedtotheexhaustivegroundsspecifiedbyarticle18(3),butineverycasewhileensuringthefreedomofthought,conscienceandreligionorbeliefforeveryoneonthebasisofequalityandnon-discrimination.NoState,grouporpersonmayengageinanyactivityaimedatthedestructionofanyrightsandfreedomsenshrinedintheCovenant(art.5).

32.TheworkoftreatybodiesandthemandateoftheSpecialRapporteurshowsnotonlythatunderstandingsofhowtheserightsarerealizedhaveevolvedinthepastthreedecades,suchasinthecaseof“reasonableaccommodation”,butalsothediversityofwaysinwhichtherealizationoftheserightsmightbeimpeded.Moreover,communicationsandreportsproducedbythemandateholderrevealthatallaspectsoffreedomofreligionorbeliefhavebeenchallenged,althoughsomemorefrequentlythanothers,especiallyincontextswheretheStateimposesaparticularideologyrelatedtoreligionorbelief.Increasingly,thisworkalsoillustratesthattheviolationoftherightoffreedomofreligionorbeliefbynon-StateactorsisusuallymorewidespreadincontextswheretheStatefailstoextendequalprotectionstoall.

2.Realizingfullequalityandnon-discrimination

33.AState’smotivesforperpetuatingunlawfuldiscriminationareofteninformedbythenatureofitsrelationshipwithaparticularreligionoritsespousalofaparticularideologicalpositionvis-à-visreligion.AsnotedbytheSpecialRapporteurinhispreviousreports,[13]freedomofreligionorbeliefandtherighttoequality/non-discriminationareinextricablylinked.Forthisreason,itcanbesaidthat“theoverarchingtest”forwhethertheentanglementsbetweenStateandreligionarepronetoperpetuatingrightsviolationsistheirresultingpropensityforpromotingnon-discrimination“intheequalenjoymentofallhumanrightsbyall”.[14]

34.KeyindicatorsofaState’sdispositiontopromotenon-discriminationincludehowit“addresseswomen’srights,minorityrights,criminalpunishments,neutralityineducation,neutralityinresolvingdisputesbetweenandwithinvariousreligiousorbeliefcommunities,andpublicmanifestationsoffreedomofreligionorbelief”.[15]WhereaStateexplicitlyassociatesitselfwithparticularreligion(s)ortruthclaim(s),membersofunaffiliatedgroupsinvariablysuffervariousformsofdiscrimination—includingdirect,indirect,orboth—whichhaveanegativeimpactontheirabilitytoexercisetheirfreedomofreligionorbelief.[16]AStatemust,therefore,ensurethatthe“purpose”or“effect”ofitsentanglementwithreligiondoesnotleadto“thenullificationorimpairmentoftherecognition,enjoymentorexerciseofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedomsonanequalbasis”.[17]

35.Statesmustfirstimposesanctionsforanydiscriminationonthebasisofreligionorbeliefwhenitcomestotheexerciseofenumeratedrightsenshrinedinanumberofhumanrightsinstrumentsinordertofullyrealizefreedomofreligionorbelief.Moreover,Article26oftheCovenantprovidesafreestandingrighttoequalprotectionunderthelaw,whichcanbeinvokedregardlessofwhethertheright(orbenefit)inquestionisonethatisenumerated.Asalreadynoted,inStateswhereethnic,religiousorlinguisticminoritiesexist,thesepersons“shallnotbedeniedtheright,incommunitywiththeothermembersoftheirgroup,toenjoytheirownculture,toprofessandpractisetheirownreligion,ortousetheirownlanguage”.[18]WhiledifferentialtreatmentbetweendifferentgroupsbyStates(includingbasedonreligionorbelief)maynotalwaysamounttounlawfuldiscriminationifthecriteriaforsuchdifferentiationarereasonableandobjective,theburdenisalwaysontheStatetoprovidesufficientproofthattheaimofsuchtreatmentistoachieveapurposewhichislegitimate.[19]

36.Thefullrealizationofequality,includingwithrespecttotheexerciseoffreedomofreligionorbelief,requiresStatestomovebeyondtackling“formaldiscrimination”toachieving“substantiveequality”.WhileeliminatingformaldiscriminationrequiresremovingbarrierstoensurethataState’sconstitution,lawsandpoliciesdonotdiscriminateonprohibitedgrounds,achievingsubstantiveequalitymeans,interalia,“immediatelyadopt[ing]thenecessarymeasurestoprevent,diminishandeliminatetheconditionsandattitudeswhichcauseorperpetuatesubstantiveordefactodiscrimination”.[20]Furthermore,longer-termmeasureswouldberequired,thatshouldresultintheStateundertakingpositivestepstoensurethatindividualsbelongingtoreligiousorbeliefminorities[21]areabletoenjoyreligiousfreedomsandrightsonapermanentbasisandequaltomembersofthemajorityreligionorbelief.Thus,aspreviousmandateholdershavestressed,equaltreatmentisnotsynonymouswithidenticaltreatment.

3.Indivisibility,intersectionalityandmutuallyreinforcingnatureofrights

37.Religiousdiscriminationdoesnotonlytakeplacewhenanindividual’srighttomanifesttheirreligionorbelieffreelyisrestrictedorinterferedwithbytheStateornon-Stateactors.Itcanalsotakeplacewhenanindividual’senjoymentofotherfundamentalrights—forexampletherighttohealth,education,expression—isrestrictedorinterferedwithbyStateornon-Stateactorsinthenameofreligion,oronthebasisofaperson’sreligionorbelief.

38.IncertainStateswherereligionhasbeengiven“official”orprivilegedstatus,otherhumanrightsofindividuals—especiallywomen,personsbelongingtoreligiousminoritiesandlesbian,gay,bisexual,transgenderandintersexpersons—aredisproportionatelyrestrictedorvitiatedunderthreatofsanctionsasaresultoftheobligatoryobservationofState-imposedreligiousorthodoxy,suchasregulationofwomen’sattire(e.g.thehijab)ortheneedtoconcealone’snon-conformingsexualorientationorgenderidentity.

39.TheSpecialRapporteuralsonoteswithconcerntheincreasingtrendbysomeStates,groupsandindividuals,toinvoke“religiousliberty”concernsinordertojustifydifferentialtreatmentagainstparticularindividualsorgroups,includingwomenandmembersofthelesbian,gay,bisexual,transgenderandintersexcommunity.Thistrendismostoftenseenwithinthecontextofconscientiousobjection,includingofgovernmentofficials,regardingtheprovisionofcertaingoodsorservicestomembersofthepublic.

40.Suchdiscriminationismostinjuriouswherelawsandpoliciesaregroundedintheimpositionofcertaintheologicalprescriptionsorworldviews,ratherthanonjustificationsaccessibletoall;especiallywherethereareglaringdemocraticdeficitsandalsosocialinequalitiesalongethnicorreligiouslines.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatthejurisprudenceoftheHumanRightsCommitteeandtheregionalhumanrightscourtsupholdthatitisnotpermissibleforindividualsorgroupstoinvoke“religiousliberty”toperpetuatediscriminationagainstgroupsinvulnerablesituations,includinglesbian,gay,bisexual,transgenderandintersexpersons,whenitcomestotheprovisionofgoodsorservicesinthepublicsphere.

41.OfsignificantnoteisthefrequencyatwhichStates’adherencetofaith-basedclaimsaffecttheircapacitytoprotectthehumanrightsofwomen.Thevoluminousreligious-basedreservationsenteredbyStatespartiestotheConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationagainstWomenareonecaseinpoint.Thebreadthofimpositionsonwomen’srightsjustifiedbyStatesinthenameofreligion,includingthosewhichlimittheirfullparticipationinpolitical,socialandeconomiclife,perpetuateanenvironmentthatenablesharmfulpracticesagainstwomen[22]andpreventssocietyfromachievinggenderequality.Thisincludesthedenialofaccesstoreproductivehealthservicesandrefusalstoprovideadequatelegalandpolicysafeguardsagainstdomesticviolencemanifestedintheformofmaritalrapeandso-called“honourcrimes”.[23]

42.TheSpecialRapporteurwouldliketoreiteratethatfreedomofreligionorbeliefcanneverbeusedtojustifyviolationsoftherightsofwomenandgirls,andthatitcannolongerbetabootodemandthatwomen’srightstakepriorityoverintolerantbeliefsusedtojustifygenderdiscrimination.[24]Itwouldbecontrarytobothwomen’shumanrightsaswellasfreedomofreligionorbeliefprovisionstoallowonesetofrights(i.e.women’srights)tobeunderminedonthebasisofclaimsmadeindefenceoftherighttofreedomofreligionorbelief.

43.TheSpecialRapporteuralsonotestheoverlappingandsometimestenserelationshipbetweentheexerciseoffreedomofreligionorbeliefandfreedomsofexpression,peacefulassemblyandassociation(articles19,21and22oftheCovenant,respectively).Criticismofreligion,religiousleadersordoctrine,whichisoftenanexerciseoffreedomofexpression,isnotaviolationoffreedomofreligionorbelief.Inhispreviousreports,theSpecialRapporteurhighlightedthespecialrelationshipbetweenarticles18and19oftheCovenant,notingthatanti-blasphemylawsandanti-apostasylawsshouldberepealed.[25]

4.Limitationsontherighttomanifestfreedomofreligionorbelief

44.Whileinternationalhumanrightslawallowscertainrestrictionsrelatedtothemanifestationofone’sreligionorbeliefswithrespecttoworship,observance,practiceandteaching(oftenreferredtoforumexternum),anyandalllimitationsmustbetheexceptionandnottherule.Theselimitationsmustbenarrowlyconstruedandmustnotbediscriminatorytowardspersonsbelongingtoareligionorbelief.Moreover,theburdenofjustificationforsuchrestrictionsfallsonthosewhowishtoimposethem.

45.Accordingtoarticle18(3)oftheCovenant,whichmustbestrictlyinterpreted,alllimitationsonfreedomofreligionorbeliefmustbeprescribedbylawandtheymustbenecessaryanddirectlyrelatedtopursuealegitimateaim:theprotectionof“publicsafety,order,health,ormoralsorthefundamentalrightsandfreedomsofothers”.Theserestrictionsmustalsobeproportionatetotherealizationofthelegitimateaimand,therefore,theleastrestrictiveamongalltheadequatemeasuresavailable.Areviewofinformationpublishedbyhumanrightsmechanisms,includingtreatybodiessuchastheHumanRightsCommittee,showsthatmanyStatesrelyonrestrictionsastheruleandnottheexceptionandoftenfailtoprovideanyjustificationsforlimitingfreedomofreligionorbeliefpursuanttothecriterialaidoutinarticle18(3).TheSpecialRapporteurnoteswithconcerntheprevalenceofcountriesthathaveadoptedacomplexsetofregulationsthatunlawfullyrestrictvariousmanifestationsoffreedomofreligionorbeliefonthebasisofvagueandbroadconceptssuchas“nationalidentity”,“nationalunity”or“culture”.Inaddition,“nationalsecurity”maynotbeinvokedasagroundforlimitingthefreedomtomanifestone’sreligionorbeliefunderinternationalhumanrightslaw.

46.Someofthemostcommonlyappliedregulationsdirectlyinterferewiththeautonomyandinternalmanagementoffaithcommunities,includingtherighttoproselytizeandspreadafaith;thefreedomtoestablishandmaintaincharitableorhumanitarianinstitutions;andtherighttotrain,appointandelectcommunityleadersandmembersoftheclergy.[26]TheSpecialRapporteurobservesthatStateswhichofficiallyidentifywithareligion,orthathavesignificantentanglementswithparticularreligion(s),orthosethatmaintainanegativeposturetowardsreligion,aremostpronetothesetypesofunlawfulinterference.

47.Nevertheless,Statesthatadoptmoresecularorneutralgovernancemodelsmayalsorunafoulofarticle18(3)oftheCovenantiftheyinterveneextensively,overzealouslyandaggressivelyinthemanifestationofreligionorbeliefallegingtheattempttoprotectotherrights,forexampletherighttogenderequalityorsexualorientation.Suchprotectioneffortsneedtobereconciledwiththeobligationstoupholdfreedomofreligionorbelief,althoughitsmanifestationcanbelimitedifthisleadstotheviolationoftherightsandfreedomsofothers.Whentheserightsultimatelyclash,everyeffortmustbemade,throughacarefulcase-by-caseanalysis,toensurethatallrightsarebroughtinpracticalconcordanceorprotectedthroughreasonableaccommodation.

D.ImplicationsandconsequencesofrelationshipsbetweenStateandreligiononimplementingprotectionsforfreedomofreligionorbelief

48.WhetherStatessupportreligionformallyordosoinpractice,ordonotidentifywithanyreligion,orpursuepoliciesintendedtolimitreligionorbeliefinpubliclife,manyStatesadoptpoliciesandengageinpracticeswhichresultinarangeofimpedimentsand/orviolationsoffreedomofreligionorbeliefand/orinterrelatedrights.WhileStatesthatimposeofficialreligionsontheirpopulationsandthosethatseektorestrictallformsofreligionaremostpronetoviolatingtherighttofreedomofreligionorbelief,nogovernancemodelfortherelationshipsbetweenStateandreligionistrulyimmunefromunlawfullyrestrictingorundulyinterferingwithmanifestationsofreligionorbelief.

49.Forexample,Stateswithanegativeviewofreligionthatattemptto“sanitize”thepublicspherefromanyreligionorbelief,orbyrejectingpoliciesforaccommodationmay,insomecases,runafouloftheirdutytorespecttherighttomanifestone’sreligionorbelief.Sucheffortsmayalsofailthe“test”ofnon-discrimination,bywhichStatesareobligedtorealizeformalandsubstantiveequalityforallindividuals,includingmembersofgroupsinvulnerablesituations,suchasreligiousminorities.

50.Thus,regardlessoftherelationshipsStatesmayallegeormayhavewithreligion(s)orbelief(s),themannerandextenttowhichtheysupport,restrict,regulateandlimitreligioninthepublicorprivatespheresposesignificantimplicationsfortheimplementationofhumanrightsobligations.TheextenttowhichStateactionsresultininterveningwithreligionorbelieforinunderminingotherunderlyinghumanrights,andtheleveltowhichgovernmentandreligiousinstitutionsareentangled,haveseriousimplicationsfortheabilityofStatestorespect,protectandpromotefreedomofreligionorbelief.

1.Stateswithofficialorfavouredreligion(s)

51.ThemajorityofStateswithofficialreligions,orthatfavouronereligionoverothers,devisesystemsformanagingvaryingdegreesofsupporttothepreferredreligionandinmanycasestootherreligionsbeingpractisedintheirjurisdictions.Thismeansthatinmostofthesecountries,theinstitutionsofoneormorereligionsreceivebenefitsthatarenotsharedbythoseofallfaiths.Statesthatofficiallyidentifywithorconferpreferenceonaparticularreligionare,typically,morelikelythanotherStatestointerferewithreligiouspractices.[27]Accordingtoonerecentstudy,some78percentofStateswithofficialorfavouredreligioninterferedtosomedegreewiththereligiousmanifestationofindividualsorbeliefgroupsin2015.[28]

(a)“ReligiousStates”

52.Asubsetofthesecountries,consideredtobe“religiousStates”,explicitlyidentifyasconfessionalStates;orStateswhichofficiallypropagateaparticularreligionandencouragetheircitizenstodolikewise.TheseStates,typically,possesssystemsofsupportthat,ineffect,granttheofficialreligionamonopolyinreligiousandStateaffairs.Indoingso,religiousStatestakeaproactiveinterestinthepreservationandpropagationofStatereligions—anendeavourthat,attimes,conflictswitharangeofotherobligationsthatmustalsobeobservedinordertobothrealizefreedomofreligionorbeliefforallpersonsandprotectarangeofotherhumanrights.

53.GovernmenteffortstosecureandpreservethemonopolythatStatereligionshaveinthepublicaffairsofthesecountriesofteninvolve:(a)theapplicationofhighlevelsofrestrictionsontherightsofindividualsthatdonotsubscribetothemajorityreligion;(b)ahighdegreeofregulationoftheinstitutionsandassociationsofminorityreligions;and(c)apropensitytoenforcereligiouspreceptsoftheStatereligion.Assuch,religiousStatesaremorelikelytodiscriminateagainstminorityreligionsandtendtoplacehighlevelsofrestrictionsonfreedomofreligionorbeliefofall.

54.Insomeofthesecountries,membersofnon-favouredreligionsareprohibitedfromengaginginpublicactsofreligiousexpressionamongmembersofthefavouredreligion,andplacesofworshipusedbytheformerareoftenplacedundergovernmentsurveillanceinordertoensurethatmembersofthefavouredreligiondonotattendreligiousservicesheldonthosepremises.Governmentsmayalsoprohibitwomenfromprayinginpublicorimposedresscodesonthem.Moreover,theconversionofreligiousminoritiestotheStatereligionisencouraged,butconversionsawayfromthepredominantreligionisantitheticaltotheState’sinterestsandthereforestronglydiscouragedorevensanctioned.Thisalsomeansthatproselytismbyminorityreligionsorbeliefstomembersofthedominantreligioniseitherstronglydiscouragedorprohibited.

55.SomereligiousStatesconstitutionallyreserveanimportantpositionandroleforthereligiouspreceptsoftheStatereligion,forexamplebyrequiringreligiousdoctrinetobe“asource”or“thesource”oflegislationorbyprohibitingtheadoptionoflawsthatcontravenereligiousdoctrine.SuchentanglementsbetweenthepoliticalorganizationsoftheStateandreligiousauthorityandgovernanceoftenresultinthemainstreamingofreligiouslawswithintheState’slegislative,executiveandjudicialactivities.ThisincludeslawsthatdefinetherelationshipreligiousStateshavewithminorityreligionsandthosethatgovernpersonalstatuslaws,includinglawsthatgovernmatterssuchassexualandreproductiverights,marriage,divorce,childcustodyandinheritance.

56.Membersofaparticularfaithmayenjoyprivilegedaccesstopublicoffice,includingbyreservingtheofficeoftheheadofStateorheadofGovernmentorotherseniorpositionsformembersofthatfaith.Womenmayalsobeexcludedfromholdingcertainpublicposts,suchasHeadofStateorcertainpositionsinthejudiciary.Therecanalsobegovernmentalcontrolofclericalpositionswithinthedominantreligion.

57.Religiousinstructionmaybecompulsoryinpublicschoolsortheauthoritiesmayinotherwaysinterferewiththefreedomofreligionorbeliefofchildrenorwithparentalrightsregardingtheeducationoftheirchildren.Religiousminoritiesmightfacesevererestrictionsinthedisseminationofknowledgeabouttheirtraditionsorinthetrainingoftheirclericalorder.

58.SeveralStateswithofficialorpreferredreligionsrestrictreligionorbeliefbyformallybanningcertainreligiousgroups.Amongthosecountriesintheworldthathavethiskindofbaninplace,44percentarecountrieswithanofficialStatereligion,while24percentarecountriesthathaveapreferredorfavouredreligion.BanningofreligiousgroupsismuchlesscommonamongStatesthatdonothaveanofficialorpreferredreligion,withonlythreecountriesinthiscategorymaintainingformalbansonparticulargroupsin2015.[29]InadditiontoStatescriminalizingatheism,theuseofanti-blasphemyandanti-apostasylawsamounttoadefactobanonthemanifestationofhumanismandnon-religiousbeliefs.

(b)“Secular-like”Stateswithofficialorfavouredreligion(s)

59.UnlikereligiousStateswherethereisahighdegreeofgovernmententanglementwithreligion,thereareanumberofStatesthatdeclareofficialreligionsorexpresspreferenceforoneormorereligions,renderingotherreligionsunequalinlaw,butnotnecessarilyperpetuatinginequalityamongadherentsofreligionsorbeliefsnotsupportedbytheState.TheseStatestendtopossesssystemsforseparationbetweenreligionandState,oftenavoidingthenotionthatreligiousclaimshaveanybearingonpolitical,legalorpolicychoices.

60.Inothercases,theseStatesconfermulti-tieredpreference,wherebyonereligionreceivesthemostbenefits,whileotherreligionsreceivelessbenefitsthanthepreferredone,butstillmorethanothers.Inothercases,multiplereligionsorbeliefgroupsaregivenbenefits,althoughlessthanthepreferredreligion.Finally,multiplereligionsreceivebenefitsthatothersdonot.ManyoftheseStatesactivelycooperatewiththeinstitutionsoftheStatereligion,providingthesebodiesaprotectedandautonomousroleinsocietythatisrecognizedataconstitutionallevel.InsuchStates,religiousgroupscanplayanimportantroleinsocietyandcanworkwithcivilauthoritiestoachievecommongoals.[30]

61.SomeoftheseStateshavemuchincommonwiththenon-identificationcategory.However,evenintheabsenceofovertformsofdiscrimination,theremaybehiddenorindirectformsofdiscrimination.Thismayoccur,forexample,intheeducationsector,eitherthroughdiscriminatoryfundingorineffectiveopt-outoptionsfromcompulsoryreligiouseducationinpublicschools,orintheobservanceofdaysofrest.CertainformsofreligiousmanifestationmayalsobeprivilegedoverothersintheseStatesbyinterpretingsuchexhibitionstobereflectionsofculturalheritageorbyassigningsecularmeaningstothem,suchas“nationalvalues”or“tradition”.

2.Statesthathavenoidentificationtoreligion

62.AbroadanddiversesetofStates(53percent)withvariedculturesandcoveringallregionsarecharacterizedashavingnoidentificationwithreligion.AcorefeatureoftheseStatesistheemphasisplacedontheprincipleofnon-discriminationandtheneedtomaintainequidistancebetweenallbeliefgroupsandtheState—eveninthefieldofreligiouspracticesorwhetherornotsomereligionsandbelieftraditionsareseenaspartoftheState’sculturalorhistoricalheritage.

63.Insomecases,theseStatessupportreligion,providingavarietyofarrangements,suchasfinancialbenefits,toallreligionsthatmaintaintheirindependencefromtheState(thecooperationistvariant).However,thismayexcludenon-religiousbeliefgroups.Inothercases,directfundingisnotprovidedbutotherformsofsupport,suchastaxexemptions,is(theaccommodationistvariant).SomeoftheseStatesadvocateforseparationfromallreligionasameanstoprotectbothStateandreligiouscommunitiesfrominterferingintheaffairsoftheother.WhilesomeStatesgobeyondthepromotionofseparationandcallforsecularismperse,withmanifestationofreligiouspracticesstrictlyrelegatedtotheprivatesphere.Inallcases,religiousgroupsfunctionautonomously.[31]

64.TheseStatesappearbestpositionedtorespectarangeofhumanrights,includingtherighttofreedomofreligionorbelief.TheseparationbetweenreligionandpoliticsintheseStates,forexample,givesthemagreaterspacetofulfiltheirroleasimpartialguarantorsoffreedomofreligionorbeliefforall;authoritiesaremorelikelytoconfronthatecrimesandincitementtoreligioushatredonequalgroundsandtoprovideequaljudicialassistancetoallindividualsregardlessoftheirreligiousorbeliefcommunities.Secularschoolsarealsomorelikelytoequiptheirstudentswith(neutrallytaught)religiousliteracy,basedonobjectivehistory,andtheuseofreligiousvaluesandreferencescanbepartofthepoliticaldiscourse,competingwithnon-religiousbeliefsandotherrationalestoinfluencepublicpolicy,inthe“marketplaceofideas”.

65.However,theseStatesmayalso,inpractice,faceseveralchallenges.Forexample,benefitsprovidedonanequalbasismaybemoreaccessibletoestablishedreligiouscommunitiesthansomeneweroremerginggroupswhomaystruggleforrecognitionandcontinuetobeperceivedand/orstereotypedas“sects”.Furthermore,insomecases,whereattemptstoaccommodatereligiousdistinctionsarerejectedassignsofinappropriateStatefavouritismordifferentialtreatment,theerosionofthefreedomofreligionorbelief,frequentlyinthenameof“others’rights”,canoccur.Astringofjudicialproceedings,debatesinthemediaandpoliticalinitiativeshavecontributedtothistransformativeprocess,puttingintojeopardycertainreligiousritesandpracticessuchasmalecircumcision,kosherslaughteringandthewearingofreligioussymbols.Suchregulationofreligiouspracticesometimestendsto“erectabarrierbetweenone’sconscienceandactionsmanifestingthatconscience”[32]andcanbeindifferenttotheintegralnatureofsomeformsofpracticetoindividualconscienceandagency.

66.AlthoughtheseStatesappearbestpositionedtoprotectreligionandtheStatefromeachother,andtorecognizetheuniversalityoffreedomofconscience,theextenttowhichthemodelisabletoachieveitsobjectiveisinnosmallmeasurerelatedtotheabilityandwillingnessoftheseStatestoimplementtheirofficialpolicies.Thus,someStatesthatprofessnon-identificationstrugglewithupholdingthispledgewherethereisdisregardfortheruleoflaw,andwherepoliticizationandrisingxenophobiachallengetheneutralorsecularfoundationsoftheState.Therefore,likeallothermodelsfortherelationshipsbetweenStateandreligion,theextenttowhichnationalreligionlawssatisfyinternationalstandards,thedegreeofrespectfortheruleoflawandtheleveloftoleranceandrespectfordiversityinlawandpracticearerequisitedeterminatesforbeingabletorealizethegoaltobeanimpartialandtrustworthyguarantoroffreedomofreligionorbeliefforeveryone.[33]

3.Stateswithanegativeviewofreligion

67.Worldwide,10countriespursueapolicyofcontainingreligion.FrequentlyassociatedwithState-promotedatheism,theauthoritiesintheseStatespursueahighlyrestrictivepolicytowardsreligion.TheunderlyingfeatureofthismodelisthattheStateintendstocontrolreligion,bothinthepublicand,attimes,privatespheres.Regulationsareenforcedtokeepreligionoutofpublicaffairs.Authoritiescultivateanegativeidentificationtowardsanyreligion.Inotherwords,theobligationtoaccommodateeveryone’srighttoenjoyfreedomofreligionorbeliefisnotrespected.

68.Ironically,suchStatebehaviourisnotunlikethepolaroppositeofthismodel:“religiousStates”,wherereligionisenforceduponindividuals.Thetopeightrecipientsofcommunicationsbythemandatearefromthesetwogroups.Inbothcases,theStateembodiesasacrednesswherenootherreligionorbeliefshouldrivaltheStateideology.Asaresult,theoverallcontextoftheseStatesisrepressiveandcontainselementsofcoercion.Restrictionsonreligiouspracticesareoftenarticulatedinthenameofensuring“equality”forallcitizens.However,equalopportunitiesforindividualstoenjoytheserightsmaybenon-existent.Infact,allformsof(individual)freedomaresacrificedinthenameof(collective)equality.

69.TheseStatestendtoimposehighlevelsofrestrictions,resultinginawide-rangeofdocumentedviolationsoffreedomofreligionorbelief.Moreover,otherinterdependentandmutuallyreinforcingrightsareinvariablyviolatedtoo,includingthefreedomsofopinion,expression,peacefulassemblyandassociation,whichareallinterdependentandinterrelated.Amongthemostnotoriousexamplesofthisintersectionofrightsistheabilitytoexpressviews,andtoexpress,write,publish,disseminateorimportreligiouspublications—aswellastopractisetheseritesincommunitywithothers.Censorshipoverpress,mediaandpublicationsrestrainawholerangeoftheserights.

70.Thefreedomofconsciencemaynotberecognized,asinthecaseofcompulsorymilitaryserviceforconscientiousobjectors,whentheStatedoesnotprovidethemwiththeoptionofanalternativeservicethatiscompatiblewiththereasonsforconscientiousobjection,ofanon-combatantorciviliancharacter,inthepublicinterestandnotofapunitivenature.[34]

71.Proselytizingisalsocommonlybannedforallreligiousgroups.Privateorpublicobservancesofreligiouspractices,worshiporcustomsarefrequentlyproscribed.Similarly,thisappliestogainingaccesstoandbuildingplacesofworship.TheSpecialRapporteur’smandatehasreceivedreportsthat,insomecountries,attendanceatplacesofworshipisrestrictedbyageandlocation,orthattheobservanceofcertainreligiouspractices,suchasthoserelatedtodietorfasting,isprohibited.Limitationsonthefreedomofmovementmightresultinrestrictionsontraveloverseasfortheperformanceoffaith-basedorfaith-relatedactivities.

72.TheseStatesalsocommonlyinterfereintheinternalarrangementsoffaithcommunities,suchasintheappointmentofclericsandthelanguage,contentanddurationofreligiousservices.Insomecases,theStatemaydesignateareligiousleaderforacommunitywhilepersecutingthespiritualleaderappointedbythecommunityitself.Likewise,theStatemayevensetupanofficialreligiousorganizationforthepurposeofcontrollingratherthansupportingareligion.Thegeneralcultureofcontrolinsuchcountriesdoesnotprovidespaceforplaceswhereadiscursivechallengetoestablishedauthoritycanflourish.Restrictionsimposedonthemanifestationofreligioneitherexceedthetestofproportionalityorcitegroundsnotprovidedforbyinternationallaw,suchas“nationalunity”,“religiousharmony”or“sowingdivisionamongthepeopleandreligions”.Increasingly,security-relatedargumentsaredeployedtosuppressreligionorbelief.Newreligiousgroupsareoftendeclared“dangerous”to“nationalsecurity”,eventhougharticle18(3)oftheCovenantdoesnotincludenationalsecurityasalegitimatelimitationgroundforrestrictingthemanifestationofreligionorbelief.Arrestsforreligiousactivitiesarecarriedoutandreligiousofficialsormembersmaysufferfromcontinueddetentionorharassment.

73.Insomecases,religiouseducationisprohibitedinpublicorprivateschools.Generally,religiouseducationistightlycontrolled,forexampledirectgovernmentcontrolofteachersandrestrictionsontherunningofreligiousschools.Generalcensorshiplawsmightrestricttheavailabilityofreligiousliterature,savethosethatareofficiallysanctionedbytheState.Anti-religiouspropagandacanappearinofficialorsemi-officialgovernmentpublications.

74.Discriminatoryorburdensomeregistrationrequirementsmaybeimposedonreligiousorganizations.Thesemayincludesettingahighbarforeligibilitywithregardtonumbers,geographicspreadorlengthofpresenceinthecountry;orrequiringthatregistrationapplicationbesignedbyallmembersofthereligiousorganizationandcontaindetailedpersonalinformation;orthatareligiousassociationcanonlyoperateattheaddressidentifiedinitsregistrationdocuments;orthattheyrequireperiodicrenewalofregistration.

III.Conclusionsandrecommendations

75.AlthoughinternationallawdoesnotprescribeaparticulartypeofrelationshipbetweenStateandreligion,thecommunicationsissuedbythemandateholdershowthatcertaintypesofrelationshipsaremorefrequentlyassociatedwithviolationsoffreedomofreligionorbeliefthanothers.Suchrelationshipsareincrediblydiverseandcomplex,butthreebroadtypesofrelationshipsarediscernibleandprovideausefulanalyticalbasistodiscussthechallengesthatStatesfaceinpromotingandprotectingfreedomofreligionorbelief.Thesethreetypesofrelationshipsare:(a)Stateswithofficialorfavouredreligions;(b)Stateswithnoidentificationtowardsareligion;and(c)Statesthatpursuepoliciestoheavilyrestricttheroleofreligion.

76.AllStates,regardlessoftheirrelationshipwithreligion,facechallengesinthefieldofhumanrights.However,aspectsoftwosuchrelationshipsdiscussedinthepresentreportappearhighlyincompatiblewiththerangeofStates’obligationstoupholdfreedomofreligionorbelief.Theseincludethoseof“religiousStates”andthosewithanegativeviewofreligion’sroleinpubliclife.TheextenttowhichStatessupportanofficialreligion,thedegreetowhichtheyenforcethatreligionandtheextenttowhichtheycontrol,regulateandrestrictthereligionposesignificantimplicationsforStates’dispositiontopromoteandprotectfreedomofreligionorbelief.Ontheotherhand,Stateswithanegativeviewofreligiontendtoimposerestrictionsonallreligion,includingthoseheldbythemajorityofpersonsundertheirjurisdiction.Ironically,eventhoughtheyrepresentpolaroppositemodelsintermsofsupportfortheroleofreligioninpubliclife,Statesthat“heavenlyenforce”andthosethat“heavilyrestrict”religionarebothmotivatedtoestablishamonopolyfortheirideologiesand,assuch,oftenrequireforceandgenerallyinvolvediscriminationagainstthosethatdonotsharetheirviews.

77.Statesthatenforceitsofficialreligionhaveveryhighlevelsofrestrictionsonfreedomofreligionorbeliefandoftendiscriminateagainstpersonsbelongingtoreligiousminorities,women,lesbian,gay,bisexual,transgenderandintersexpersons,convertsorapostatesandnon-believers.StateswithanegativeviewofreligionhaveequallyhighlevelsofrestrictionsonfreedomofreligionorbeliefforanyindividualmanifestinganotherbeliefcontrarytoStateatheism.Inbothcases,thenexusofotherinterdependentandmutuallyreinforcingrightsisinvariablyviolatedtoo,suchasfreedomsofopinion,expression,peacefulassemblyandassociation.Thus,inthesemodels,evenpersonsbelongingtothenumericallymajorityreligionmaybesubjecttorepressionandpersecution.

78.Statesthathavepreferencestowardsreligion(s)frequentlyengageinpracticesthatundulyrestrictpeople’sfreedomofreligionorbelief,inparticularreligiousorbeliefminoritieswhomaybesingledoutanddiscriminatedagainst,asaresultofadefactoordejure“hierarchyofreligions”.ThosethatarepreferredbytheStategenerallyhaveahistoricalpresenceinthecountryandthepreferentialrecognitionaccordedtothemmaybemotivatedbyadesiretoincludealsoreligiousminoritiesinnation-building.However,thisisoftenaccompaniedbydiscriminationagainstnewerreligions,includingburdensomerequirementsforregistration,alongwithdenialofrecognition,orattemptstomaintaininterreligiousharmonythroughlawsthatproscribereligiousoffenceorinotherwaysprivilegethereligiouscollectiveoverindividualrights.

79.Statesthathavenoidentificationtoreligion,beingnumericallythelargestofthethreecategories,encompassabroadrangeanddiversityofStates.ThehallmarkofthiscategoryofStatesisthestanceoftreatingallreligiouscommunitiesonanequalbasis,althoughtheyrangefromthosethataremorepositivelyinclinedtowardstheroleofreligioninsocietytothosewhoseektoprivatizereligiouspractice.WhilemanyStatesinthismodelarepredisposedtorespectfreedomofreligionorbelief,therearealsomanychallenges,includingthatofmanagementofconflictsbetweendifferenthumanrights.Wherethereisahighdegreeofconvergencebetweensocialvaluesandreligiouspractices,therearefewerclashesbetweenreligiousfreedomandotherhumanrights.However,wherethereisapluralityofsocialvalues,difference-blindpoliciesmightdefactocreateahierarchyofrightswherelawsofgeneraleffectimposedisproportionateburdensonreligiousminorities,unlessthereisreasonableaccommodation.

80.Whilethesethreebroadcategoriesserveausefulanalyticalfunction,therearealsoimportantdistinctions.Stateswith“mild”formsofestablishment,i.e.wheretheattachmentissymbolicandshornofanypolicyorlegalsignificance,seemtohavemoreincommonwithsomeversionsofthenon-identificationmodel,especiallywheretherearestrongcommitmentstoequalityandnon-discrimination,whileatthesametimerecognizingthepositiverolethatreligionsandbeliefsplayinsociety.Likewise,thoseinthenon-identificationcategory,especiallythosethatprivilegedoctrinalsecularismoverreligiousconcerns,andpursuedifference-blindpolicies,riskviolatingitsobligationstorespectthefreedomofreligionorbeliefofpersonsbelongtoreligiousminorities.

81.InternationalhumanrightslawimposesadutyonStatestobeimpartialguarantorsoftheenjoymenttofreedomofreligionorbeliefofallindividualsandgroupswithintheirterritoryandthosesubjecttotheirjurisdiction.Moreover,thereisnohierarchyofhumanrightsandwherefreedomofreligionclasheswiththerighttonon-discriminationandequality,orlawsofgeneraleffect,thefocusshouldbeonensuringthatallhumanrightsareprotected,includingthroughreasonableaccommodation.Amidrisingdiversity,itappearsaxiomaticthattheroleoftheStateasanimpartialguarantoroftherightsofallismostlylikelytobefulfilledwhentheStateadoptsapostureofcooperationandaccommodationwithoutidentification.Indeed,itisdifficulttoconceiveofanapplicationoftheconceptofStateReligionthatinpracticedoesnothavediscriminatoryeffectsonthevarietyof“others”thatarecreated.[35]

82.WhilemanyStatesexpresscommitmentstoguaranteeingfreedomofreligionorbelief,someoftheprotectionsarenarrowerthanthosespecifiedinarticle18oftheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsorincludelimitationsthatareinconsistentwithinternationallaw.SomeStatesdonotprovideanylegalguaranteesorindeedbancertainreligiouscommunitiesorsubjectthemtoburdensomeregistrationprocesses,whichdenythemlegalpersonality.TheSpecialRapporteurrecommendsthatStates’legalframeworkmustbealignedwiththeguaranteesoffreedomofreligionorbeliefspecifiedininternationalhumanrightslawasauniversalhumanright.

83.Anti-blasphemylaws,whichfrequentlyservetoupholdState-sponsoredreligionortruthclaims(existingeveninStatesthatdonotformallyidentifywithonereligion)stifletheenjoymentoffreedomofreligionorbelief,andtheabilitytoengageinahealthydialogueaboutreligion.Theyarealsousedtotargetpoliticaldissidents,humanists,non-believersoranyreligiousthinkerwhoexpressesdifferenttheologicalviewsthantheState-sponsoredreligion.Asalsocalledforinseveralrecentinternationalactionplans,suchanti-blasphemylawsmustberepealedasamatterofpriority[36]andareincompatiblewiththeCovenant.[37]

84.TheStatemustrecognizethat,althoughthereareassociationalrights,freedomofreligionorbeliefisarightthatresideswiththeindividualandnotwithagroupperse.Therefore,anti-conversionlawsareinconsistentwiththeinternationalhumanrightsframeworkandamountstoanillegalinterferencewithanunqualifiedrighttofreedomofthought,conscience,religionorbelief.

85.Therightofparentstoprovideamoralandreligiouseducation,consistentwiththeirreligiousworldviewsandinaccordancewiththeevolvingcapacitiesofthechild,mustbefullyrespected.Inthisregard,theSpecialRapporteurwouldliketohighlighttheusefulguidanceprovidedintheFinalDocumentoftheInternationalConsultativeConferenceonSchoolEducationinRelationtoFreedomofReligionorBelief,ToleranceandNon-Discrimination[38]andtheToledoGuidingPrinciplesonTeachingaboutReligionandBeliefsinPublicSchools.[39]

86.Whenofferingaprivilegedlegalstatuspositionforcertainreligiousorbeliefgroups,suchaspecificstatusshouldbeaccordedinstrictconformitywiththeprincipleofnon-discriminationandshouldfullyrespecttherighttofreedomofreligionorbeliefofallhumanbeings.Privilegedpositionsaccordedtoreligiousorbeliefgroupsshouldneverbepoliticizedforpurposesofidentitypolitics,asthismayhavedetrimentaleffectsonthesituationofindividualsfromminoritycommunities.

87.Statesareremindedoftheirobligationtoprovideprotectiontorefugeesandmigrants,regardlessoftheirspecificreligionorbelief.Thepretextthatrefugeesandmigrantswoulderodethetraditionalreligiousmake-upofacountryamountstoa“territorialization”ofreligion,whichviolatesthespiritandtheletteroftheuniversalrighttofreedomofreligionorbelief.Statesshouldalsoreformfamilylawandpersonalstatuslawprovisionsthatmayamounttodejureordefactodiscriminationagainstpersonsbelongingtoreligiousorbeliefminorities,forexampleininheritanceandcustodymatters.Statesshouldestablishapolicyofpublicsymbolicactionsbywhichtheysendaclearmessagethatreligiousorbeliefminoritiesarepartofthelargersociety.Anexampleofsuchsymbolicpresenceistheparticipationofpoliticalrepresentativesinceremoniesheldbyminorities.

88.Respectforfreedomofreligionorbeliefiscloselyrelatedtothedegreeoftoleranceandrespectfordiversitywithinasociety.TheSpecialRapporteurwouldliketoreiteratetherecommendationsmadebyhispredecessorsonencouragingStatestofacilitateinterfaithcommunicationandtoinvestinbothreligiousliteracyandreligiousfreedomliteracy.

89.Finally,theSpecialRapporteurwouldliketoreiteratecommitmentIVofthe“FaithforRights”framework,whichwarnsagainsttheuseofthenotionof“Statereligion”todiscriminateagainstanyindividualorgroupaswellasagainsttheuseof“doctrinalsecularism”,whichrisksreducingthespaceforreligiousorbeliefpluralisminpractice.[40]HestressesthatStatesmustsatisfyarangeofobligations,includingtoadoptmeasuresthatguaranteestructuralequalityandtofullyrealizefreedomofreligionorbelief.Inthelightoftheseobligations,theSpecialRapporteurechoestheimportanceofadoptingamodelfortherelationshipbetweenStateandreligionthatisinharmonywiththeconceptof“respectfuldistancing”—i.e.politicalandlegal,butnotsocial,disentanglementfromreligion—whichrestsona“deepgroundingofsecularitybasedonhumanrights”.Suchamodelensures“thattheStatedoesnotresorttoreligiousexclusivityorbiasinculture,identity,schooling,orevensymbolismforshort-termendsandforvestedinterests,butwillcontinuallystrivetocreatespacesofinclusivenessforallasanactiveandongoingendeavour”.[41]

1

[*]*Thepresentdocumentwassubmittedlatetotheconferenceserviceswithouttheexplanationrequiredunderparagraph8ofGeneralAssemblyresolution53/208.

[1]UnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,InternationalMigrationReport2017:Highlights(NewYork,2017).

[2]JonathanFox,PoliticalSecularism,Religion,andtheState:ATimeSeriesAnalysisofWorldwideData(CambridgeUniversityPress,2015).

[3]ColeDurham, “PatternsofReligionStateRelations”,inJohnWitte,Jr.andM.ChristianGreen(eds.),ReligionandHumanRights:AnIntroduction(OxfordUniversityPress,2011).

[4]DawoodAhmed,Religion-StateRelations,2nded.,(InstituteforDemocracyandElectoralAssistance,2017).

[5]PewResearchCenter, “ManyCountriesFavourSpecificReligions,OfficiallyorUnofficially” (WashingtonDC,October2017).

[6]Fox,PoliticalSecularism(seefootnote2).

[7]Ibid.

[8]PewResearchCenter, “GlobalRestrictionsonReligionRiseModestlyin2015,ReversingDownwardTrend” (Washington,D.C.,April2017).

[9]PewResearchCenter, “ManyCountriesFavourSpecificReligions” (seefootnote5).

[10]RajeevBhargava, “RehabilitatingSecularism,” inCraigCalhoun,MarkJuergensmeyerandJonathanvanAntwerpen(eds.),RethinkingSecularism(OxfordUniversityPress,2011),pp. 92–113.

[11]ColeDurham, “PatternsofReligionStateRelations” (seefootnote3).

[12]SeeBeirutDeclarationandits18commitmentson “FaithforRights”,commitmentIV,availableat

[13]SeeA/HRC/34/50,para.31;andA/72/365,para.46.

[14]HeinerBielefeldt,NazilaGhaneaandMichaelWiener,FreedomofReligionorBelief:AnInternationalLawCommentary(OxfordUniversityPress,2016),p.351.

[15]Ibid.

[16]SeeA/HRC/19/60,para.62;A/67/303,para.47;andA/HRC/34/50,para.32.

[17]Seearticle2(2)oftheDeclarationontheEliminationofAllFormsofIntoleranceandofDiscriminationBasedonReligionorBelief.

[18]Seearticle27oftheCovenant.

[19]See,forexample,HumanRightsCommitteegeneralcommentNo.18(1989)onnon-discrimination,para.13;andCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsgeneralcommentNo.20(2009)onnon-discriminationineconomic,socialandculturalrights.

[20]SeeCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsgeneralcommentNo.20,para.9.SeealsoNazilaGhanea, “Religion,EqualityandNon-Discrimination”,inJ.WitteandC.Green,ReligionandHumanRights(2011).

[21]SeeA/HRC/22/51.

[22]SeejointgeneralrecommendationNo.31oftheCommitteeontheEliminationofDiscriminationagainstWomen/generalcommentNo.18oftheCommitteeontheRightsoftheChildonharmfulpractices.

[23]SeeforexampleHumanRightsCommitteegeneralcommentNo.28(2000)ontheequalityofrightsbetweenmenandwomen,para.21.

[24]SeeA/65/207,para.69;A/66/156,para.16;A/68/290,para.30;A/HRC/16/53,para.16;A/HRC/19/60/Add.1,para.44;andA/HRC/34/50,para.50.

[25]SeeA/72/365;A/HRC/34/50;A/HRC/31/18;andA/HRC/22/17/Add.4.Seealso

[26]See,forexample,article6oftheDeclarationontheEliminationofAllFormsofIntoleranceandofDiscriminationBasedonReligionorBelief.

[27]Fox,PoliticalSecularism(seefootnote2).

[28]PewResearchCenter, “ManyCountriesFavourSpecificReligions” (seefootnote5).

[29]Ibid.

[30]DawoodAhmed,Religion-StateRelations(seefootnote4),p.11.

[31]ColeDurham, “PatternsofReligionStateRelations” (seefootnote3).

[32]SeeSheldonLeader, “FreedomandFutures”,inModernLawReview,vol.70,iss.5,pp.713–30.

[33]SeeA/HRC/25/58,para.37.SeealsoBielefeldt,GhaneaandWiener,FreedomofReligionorBelief(footnote15),p.357.

[34]SeeHumanRightsCouncilresolution24/17,para.9;andA/HRC/35/4,para.21.

[35]SeeBielefeldt,GhaneaandWiener,FreedomofReligionorBelief(footnote15),p.341.

[36]SeeA/72/365,paras.28and76.

[37]SeeCommitteeonHumanRightsgeneralcommentNo.34(2011)onthefreedomsofopinionandexpression,para.48.

[38]SeeE/CN.4/2002/73,appendix.

[39]See

[40]See

[41]SeeBielefeldt,GhaneaandWiener,FreedomofReligionorBelief(footnote15),pp.355–359.