The UAW 1938-1947 (Incomplete)

(labhisgm3)

The UAW--1938-1947 (incomplete)

The organization of GM set the stage for a major change in important areas of the workers movement, but the energies of the rank-and-file GM workers, and workers in other parts of the auto industry, but there were certain serious factors which shaped the movement:

1. Change in the CIO--once Lewis achieved the goal of an agreement in Basic Steel, his natural autocratic top-down tendencies became more prominent and his support of “official” union officers and conventional collective bargaining became more powerful

2. The “Roosevelt recession” of 1937 dropped membership substantially in mass production industries, allowing the bosses to dump militant union workers

3. FDR as a “friend of labor” is a myth--he used union money and support for his election campaigns but was never a true supporter. In fact, the inclusion of Section 7 in the NIRA, and the later Wagner Act, which gave unions some protection and established the National Labor Relations Board, was of little interest to him. For his election campaign in 1936, he took more than $1 million from the UMW and from Labors Non-Partisan League (the political action arm of the CIO) but refused to intercede on the workers behalf during the sit-down strikes. In his second term, became increasingly concerned with both foreign policy and with his own-re-election in 1940 and became much more cautious and conservative. Southern congressmen tried to block everything he did, establishing “sectionalism and states rights” as a prominent political feature--their opposition coincided with the CIO effort under the TWOC to organize textile, the major southern industry

4. Inside unions, there were bitter political splits as new offices became available and the mobility that we described after the Civil War reappeared--some union officers were dedicated, some were scheming opportunists, and some were well-intentioned but without good role models to follow, and some were political radicals

5. In 1940, JLL gives an back-me-or-dump-me ultimatum over Wendell Wilkie and disappears as a major force in US unionism. The UMW wages some bitter and controversial strikes during WWII which further distanced him from “patriotic” American workers and the leaders of their unions

Also by this time, workers and union leaders were solidly absorbed into the Democratic party, so a third party or other independent action, which many like Walter had advocated earlier (remember, he campaigned for Norman Thomas in 1936) disappeared

6. World War II--dampened, in the name of stability and patriotism, the class struggle--unions reached agreement on maintenance of memberships, on hiring, and other areas which gave them tremendous financial stability, at the price of the no-strike pledge and consolidation of bargaining patterns

The so-called Social Contract-The war also recreated a major issue on which the workers, union leaders and bosses seemed to agree--this is a period of drastically rewritten history, as major corporations, like GM and Ford, were consistent supporters, and financial contributors, for the Nazi government/movement--also GM and Ford resisted defense conversion if it threatened their enormous profit margins

7. Role of Communist party--lost favor after Hitler-Stalin Pact in August, 1939, and then reversed after two years of “neutrality” when Germany invaded the Soviet Union--combined with the usual red scares, the CP lost members and stature, setting the groundwork for the massive red scare after the end of the war

8. Continuing rivalry between the AFL and the CIO--see Pesotta on the AFL raids on ILGWU shops in Cleveland and in the contentious Carpenters vs. FLU’s in the lumber and sawmill industries of the northwest

9. Repeated legal challenges to the Wagner Act and defiance by some employers. In Westinghouse, for example, the UE developed out of a peculiar history and got “recognition” for more than 4 years (1933-37) even though W refused to sign any joint agreement, even on a bulletin board

It is important to understand that the UAW was (and is) unique because it was really organized from the bottom-up. JLL was a very bureaucratic union officer who rose to a challenge during the Flint strike but never really changed his outlook. His main interest was in organizing steel, to protect his “captive mine” UMW members, and he simply set up an organizing campaign, the SWOC, with Phil Murray as its unsalaried director. When SWOC started to organize steel workers in 1936, it did so in luxurious style: with a budget of $ 700,000 (5 from the UMW and 1 each from the ILGWU and the ACWA) it basically bought the leadership of the old Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, in early June, 1936 and on June 13, the SWOC started a campaign with 433 full-time and partime organizers, 35 regional offices and Steel Labor, and in December, 1936, JLL and Myron Taylor, chairman of the board of US Steel, met secretly to discuss a contract but the Flint sit-down came like a flash of lightning and negotiations were postponed until the UAW got recognition, at which point Taylor caved in--basically a campaign without real worker involvement, and in 1941, after being run out of the UMW by a vengeful JLL, Murray converted the SWOC into a union, with himself as President

There was important organizing outside the auto industry which helped expand the CIO:

In 1926, Gerard Swope, president of GE and called by Bernstein “the most imaginative of industrialists,” concluded that unionism was coming and secretly met with William Green to discuss a plan of organization for GE workers, suggesting (as Phil Murray did a full 10 years later) that the unions try to simply take over the GE Plans of Representation, and then use the dues to finance organizing campaigns against smaller electrical manufacturing companies--Swope had one condition: the union must be an industrial union, to avoid costly negotiations with small unions, like the pattern-makers, etc.--while Greene seemed agreeable, Swope never heard from him again, no doubt because of the internal problems that any industrial union plan would create inside the AFL--

In 1935, James B. Carey, president of the National Radio and Allied Trades, met with Greene to propose an industrial campaign against GE but Green, while he told Carey he was supportive, never advocated the industrial union position, and the carpenters, Machinists, IBEW all spoke against the charter--as of December, 1934, there were 12 radio FLUs with a membership of 7.407, of whom 5,686 worked at Philco--Carey wanted to protect the higher wage base at Philco by organizing its competitors and this could be done only by a union with an industrial charter--the most vocal opponent was G.M. Bugniazet of the IBEW who said that, in addition to opposing any industrial charter, the FLUs were in the AFL only because of “sufferance of his organization” and Hutcheson asserted jurisdiction over wooden cabinets--Lewis supported the charter application, in keeping with the San Francisco resolution, and stated that the radio workers should be “allowed to work out their own destiny even if it does take in some craftsmen”

In February, 1935, the Council also considered a request by the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, which had established itself in the Camden yards of the New York Shipbuilding Company, but Wharton (IAM) were berserk because the shipbuilding industry had traditionally been divided among craft union jurisdictions--

In February, 1935, Thomas H. Brown, president of Mine, Mill also appeared before the council to denounce a settlement negotiated by Frey(Molders) on behalf of the metal and building trades council in September, 1934, during the Mine. Mill strike against Anaconda Copper--the WFM had received a charter in 1911 from the AFL as broad as the UMW charter, and Brown denounced the agreement as a craft “raid” against his union--Frey had basically settled for the skilled trades without any participation from Mine, Mill and Lewis moved that at the end of the contract, the crafts withdraw from the contested areas, an area of concern since the UMW also had a contract with Anaconda, but Wharton replied that the metal trades did not even recognize the UMW charter!

The tirades go back and forth--Tobin denounced Mine, Mill as “socialists” and pledged that the craft unions would never cede jurisdiction, and JLL even researched to the original WFM charter--still the council raged against industrial unionism, so JLL stated:

The failure of the American Federation of Labor to organize the workers in these mass-production industries creates a hazardous situation as far as the future of the Federation is concerned. If the Wagner bill is passed there is going to be increasing organization and if the workers are organized in independent unions we are facing the merging of these independent unions in some form of national organization. (quoted Bernstein, p. 386)

In March, 1935, the radio locals met in Cincinnati to vote to make their council permanent and to carry their fight to the floor of the AFL Convention in Atlantic City in October--in early July, these FLUs voted to withhold per capita, depositing the funds into an escrow account--the locals spoke only for radio locals, two-thirds of whom were in the Philco shops in Philadelphia--the organizing had moved across the river to Camden, to the RCA-Victor plants, and into the electrical apparatus plants of GE, in Schenectady and Lynn, and to the big W plant in East Pittsburgh--representatives of these locals met in the summer, 1935, and formed the Electrical and Radio Workers Union--in October, delegates met before the AFL Convention with the national Radio and Allied Trades Council and voted to merge, with Carey once again requesting a charter from the AFL--referred to the ExCouncil for a slow death but, as Carey was leaving the floor, JLL called out “Carey, that was a damned good speech” and then when JLL socked Hutcheson, industrial unionism had another industry to organize--locals had another meeting in December, 1935, with Murray and Brophy present and passed a resolution that “no local would accept a second-class membership from the IBEW”

In January, 1936, Carey once again went to the Ex Council meeting in Miami to request a charter--the IBEW denounced him, offered Class B memberships to radio workers at reduced dues, but stated that the IBEW support in 1933 for FLUs were only temporary until radio workers could be transferred into the IBEW--Green later told Carey that the IBEW could revoke the FLU charters at any time--

On February 7, 1936, the UMW convention urged the radio locals “to establish a national industrial union” and Carey called his board into session and voted to create the UE, with its first constitutional convention in Fort Wayne, IN, in early September, 1936--Carey Pres and Julius Emspak, of the Ge-Schnectady council, as sec-treas--the AFL immediately revoked all radio charters and the convention voted to request affiliation with the CIO--raised a technical question since, at this time, the CIO was still a part of the AFL, as Dubinsky whined, but JLL said that admitting the UE would strengthen the CIO and it happened

In the spring, 1937, a group of machinery locals, headed by James J. Matles, was admitted to the UE--originally were part of the TUUL, and then, in response to CP shifts in policy, Matles had led them back into the AFL (Machinists) and now out into the CIO--in September, 1937, at a convention in Philly, the machine locals were admitted, the name was changed and Matles was named Dir of Org--in 1938 Carey became sec-treas of the CIO--targeted RCA for organizing--plants in Camden, purchased from the Victor Talking Machine Co.-- had 12,000 workers, with 60% women

the corporation was diversified, with talking pictures, broadcasting, manufacturing, phonograph records and many patents--David Sarnoff ran the company--

RCA--first unionism came in March, 1933, in response to wage cuts by the tool and die makers in Camden and RCA responded with the Employees Committee Union (ECU)--in 1936, the local affiliated with the UE as Local 103 and on May 20, it demanded a signed contract with a closed shop, elimination of the ECU and a 20% wage increase--Sarnoff could not conceive of exclusive representation and first brought in Hugh Johnson, who brought in JLL!--what a coup--on June 23, the UE struck RCA and went out for a month--RCA tried scabs and spies but the union prevailed and on June 12, 1936, Sarnoff agreed to a NLRB election for exclusive representation with a majority of those eligible to vote, re-employment of strikers, prevailing wages (so that RCA would match Philco scales), but the NLRB claimed that this agreement violated The Act because the union had to win the majority of those voting, not just voting, and when the ECU boycotted the election the UE got only 3,016 votes of 9, 752 eligible and RCA refused to recognize--but the Board certified, pending the constitutional challenge to the Act itself--in the spring, 1937, The Act was upheld and in August, 1937, RCA negotiated an agreement with the UE for exclusive representation--the ECU then got a charter from the IBEW and competed in Camden for two years before the UE won another NLRB vote and stuffed the IBEW

GE was still the target--Swope the President was a son of immigrants, attended MIT and graduated in the Class of 1895 with Alfred P. Sloan--friends to Jane Adams and Dr. Alice Hamilton and worked first at Western Electric and then, after WWI, went over to GE as head of international operations--later became “Mr. Inside” as president while Owen D. Young was “Mr. Outside,” as chairman of the board--created the country’s fourth largest corporation and in 1937, Swope was named “best brain” over Sloan--set up a student loan fund at Union College which financed Emspak’s education--became a New Dealer, interested in social questions--in 1930, “the Swope Plan” offered to Hoover was basically the NRA to combat unemployment--in 1932, he lobbied Green and Woll to support unemployment comp--conceived the Reading Formula and sat on the first National Labor Board--but was also an open supporter of the Nazis, and the book Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler by Professor Antony C. Sutton, (a book which is suspect for its biblebelievers web site) notes that in the 1933 election, German GE gave Hitler 60,000RM for the campaign, and GE joined with Siemens to restrict development of tungsten carbide in the US while Krupp improved process in Germany--as late as 1942, Henry Ford encouraged Ford of France to continue building vehicles for the Wehrmacht