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M.Nichols IB History
THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1936-39)
THE REGIME OF FRANCISCO FRANCO (1939-75)
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M.Nichols IB History
Causes of the Spanish Civil War – Long Term Reasons
Spain was a country of many different nationalities: Basques, Navarrese, Galicians, Leonese, Castilians, Aragonese, Catalonians, being amongst the most obvious. Many of these regions had their own languages or at least incomprehensible dialects, their own flags, their own histories, differing economies and certainly varying ambitions. In other words, Spain was neither a united nor a happy and contented country. The Civil War would both elicit and accentuate these differences.
Spain had a long history of civil wars and insurgency, with the monarchy having been deposed very briefly in the mid 1870s, for a republic.
In 1898, Spain lost the last colonies in her once glorious and enormous empire. The effective annexation by the USA of: Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico would have economic implications, but moreover would have a profounder impact on the whole nation’s confidence and outlook.
Early 20th century Spain was even less stable. The Tragica Semana of 1909, the ‘Three Red Years’ of 1918-1920 and the guerrilla war in Catalonia (1919-1923) saw enormous bloodshed and clashes between the forces of the establishment and the radical left. Spain enjoyed little consensus of opinion. Anarchist fought conservative; atheists were ranged against Roman Catholics; unionists fought non-unionists for work; and desperate peasants were pitted against their rapacious landowners.
There were not only deepening divisions within Spain, but as Forrest has pointed out, “divisions within the divisions”, with members of the left as keen to attack each other, as they were the right; while members of the right were also at each other’s throats!
WWI had seen an economic boom in a Spain, which had remained neutral, but which had supplied weapons, food and materials to both sides. However, once the war had ended, Spain’s economy had suffered a recession. Added to defeat in Morocco in 1921, Spain was a country waiting for dramatic political action.
In 1923, General Miguel Primo de Rivera became dictator after staging a coup d’etat. The officer corps were sick of the machinations of the corrupt state and the humiliations of constant military defeat.
The general was in power for seven years, until 1930. His rule (El Dictadura) saw a strange mix of progressive and reactionary actions. It also prepared the ground for the later and far more repressive Franco dictatorship, though the affable, hard-drinking and womanising Rivera was a very different man to the austere and fanatically Catholic, Franco.
Ultimately, Rivera was unsuccessful and he was forced into exile. In 1931, a leftist Republic was popularly voted into being, and King Alphonso XIII stepped down.
Rivera’s actions can perhaps, admittedly simplistically, be divided into broadly positive and negative actions:
The Positives / The NegativesIn Morocco, he moved from a policy of withdrawal to consolidation and war; he successfully ended the war there in 1926 and re-gained some Spanish pride; / He was a centraliser, who did try some limited de-centralisation, but was wary of giving power to the regions; he was certainly though nothing like Franco in this respect;
He tried to promote a more positive and modern image of Spain, encouraging tourism and sponsoring international exhibitions; / He annoyed the army when he refused necessary reforms (higher wages) and new equipment; it would be the army who effectively got rid of him in 1930;
In the army, he favoured meritocratic promotion (which, however, benefited one particularly brave officer, Franco); / He dismissed the Cortes, suspended elections and trial by jury, and estd. martial law, while the press was strictly censored;
His actions in Catalonia and the Basque region only encouraged fanaticism, but he was never as harsh with these regions as Franco would be; he allowed Basque and Catalan language schools, for example; / The educational system was highly regulated; by recognising the awards of Catholic universities, however, he only alienated the liberal intelligentsia by such actions;
Rivera tried to protect Spanish industry with tariffs, and he also encouraged, like all good dictators, ideas of autarky; this contributed towards the 300% increase in production & commerce; HEP schemes, better roads and rail also helped; / Wealthy landowners resisted his attempts at reform in the countryside; he couldn’t either raise taxes from the rich who also resisted, so Rivera resorted to borrowing, which destroyed the value of the peseta in 1928 and left a legacy of debt;
Rivera also had a humane side and tried to alleviate his people’s grinding poverty; / He forced many, including conservatives, into exile; this left a bitter legacy;
He did at least manage to secure the co-operation of the moderate UGT trade union, he also provided cheap housing and maternity benefits (though women were still not allowed to vote); / He made overtures to the moderate left and tried to establish a consensus with his Union Patriotica, but failed there also; the hard-line anarchist CNT union refused to co-operate with his government;
Rivera embarked on a number of public works schemes which brought full employment and better infrastructure as a result; / He tried to excise provincial corruption and the power of the caciques, but largely failed;
Spain was still far too provincial;
El Dictadura, however, was defeated by the coming of the Great Depression in 1929. The debts left (and inflation caused) by the regime’s excessive spending, as Preston points out, would be a heavy burden for a republic already beset by many other enormous socio-economic and political problems.
Causes of the Spanish Civil War – Short Term Reasons
The deposition of the monarchy in 1931, itself created all sorts of problems. Rivera’s regime had made the monarchy’s anachronism very apparent to many Spaniards. The ‘hands on’ Alphonso, had been a poor figurehead for a country beset with so many problems. Even supporters of the monarchy were not overly fond of Alphonso and had tried to overthrow him in 1928. 1930 saw another attempted coup against the King, presciently, by the military this time.
The fact he was finally got rid shows the growth of republican and leftist sentiment in Spain, and hints at the increasing radicalisation of the whole country. The new republic, however, was hated by the monarchy’s supporters (themselves divided into two factions: the Alphonsists and the Carlists), as well as by the Catholic Church. The monarchists were determined to destroy the republic, by force, if necessary. They were supported by militant priests. In his Italian exile, Alphonso would continue to stir things up and would not formally abdicate the throne until 1941.
The new republic had to deal with a whole range of extremist political and paramilitary groups:
The Left / The RightThe (anti-clerical)Socialist Party / The (clerical) CEDA
Basque & Catalan separatists / The (fascist & centralising) Falange
The (Marxist) POUM / Alphonsists
Anarchists / Carlists
The 1931 elections produced a Cortes intent on reform; the 1933 Cortes was intent on reversing reform; while the third and last election in 1936 produced another radical government, the Popular Front (P.F.).
The ‘reformist years’ of 1931-33, under Alcala Zamora (who resigned in protest at radical, religious reforms) and later Azana, were detested by the right. Reforms included:
q The Catholic Church (in which only 20% of Spaniards were active) was disestablished and its state subsidies withdrawn; freedom of worship and dissolution of the Jesuits were also radical reforms; Church schools were to be closed; the traditional status and privileges of the RC Church in Spain were effectively ended;
q Laws were passed to protect rural labourers from cheap imported labour and tenants were given protection against arbitrary eviction; large estates were nationalised, without compensation;
q Reforms were made to the army;
q Catalonia was given some limited autonomy, as was Barcelona University;
q Universal suffrage at 23 was introduced;
q Women were now allowed to come to prominence in the arts, trade unions and even the government;
q People became free from arbitrary imprisonment and the death penalty was abolished;
q Divorce was legalised;
q Old-age pensions were introduced;
q A People’s University for adults was founded in Madrid;
q By 1932, 10 000 new primary schools had been built;
q Culture was taken to the rural classes in the form of travelling theatre, film shows, etc.
q The arts flourished with prominent individuals like Miro, Lorca and Bunuel coming to prominence;
Who would be likely to hate these reforms?
The conservative CEDA regime of the increasingly reactionary, Gil Robles, between 1933-36, would attempt to reverse a lot of these reforms:
q The Jesuits were allowed to teach and the state schools were now attacked;
q Peasants lost their job security and were evicted form their land;
q Trade unions were attacked;
q The leader of a right-wing coup attempt in 1932 was pardoned;
The whole country seemed to be descending into extremism and cruelty: corpses of enemy groups were mutilated; churches were burnt down and church tombs desecrated; political figures were assassinated; strikes and riots became common; the military attempted a coup in 1932 (and learnt from its mistakes); evictions and persecution became common in the countryside; the press was incredibly confrontational; even government ministers, like Largo Caballero, lost faith with the democratic process.
The political yo-yoing of extremist policies (what Forrest calls a “vortex of instability”), with little consensus shown by either side, in a land not known for moderation anyway, was a disaster. The circumstances of a Great Depression, which hit Spanish exports hard and created further socio-economic hardships, only worsened an already inflammable situation.
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M.Nichols IB History
Forrest comments that governments between 1931-36 were less interested in building political bridges than blowing them up. There was little effort to come to agreement with opponents who were increasingly demonised. The political centre was side-lined and all but ignored.
The radical P.F. government of February 1936, by its policies, would force the military into action. This was the one institution it should not have annoyed. Without the military there would have been no civil war.
The army had had poor relations with the reformist governments since Azana’s attempts at military reform began in 1931. The army was politically purged; its powers limited; its academies closed and its equipment remained obsolete. The army felt persecuted. It hated the left, especially communism. However, Hills says we should not see, even at this stage, the majority of senior officers as rabidly reactionary. Their support only came in July 1936 once the alzamiento had started.
The Robles administration certainly helped to allay military fears. General Franco used his Foreign Legion and Moorish troops to bloodily repress strikes in Asturias. He was at this stage still a loyal officer.
However, the return of a leftist government, in February 1936, determined the army on action. The government tried to forestall this by sending Franco to the Canaries and Mola, stupidly, to (Carlist) Navarre.
The country seemed to be on the edge of anarchy: peasants were seizing land; newspapers were stirring up hatred; the CNT was organising mass strikes; separatists in Catalonia and Aragon were gaining support.
Mola and Franco decided to act after the murder of the extreme right-wing politician, Calvo Sotelo, in July, 1936, by pro-government, Communist Civil Guard officers. Franco would bring over troops from Morocco (by Fascist and Nazi planes, lent by Mussolini and Hitler).
70% of Spain remained loyal to the government. This would ensure a long and bloody war of 2 years and 9 months duration (Jul. 1936-Mar. 1939).
The Republicans/Loyalists / The Rebels/Insurgents/NationalistsSocialists / The Army
Communists (POUM) / CEDA
Anarchists / Falange
Trade Unionists / Catholic Church
Catalans and Basques / Landowners
Industrial cities and centres / Monarchists
The Spanish Civil War (1936-39)
Why were the Nationalists unable to achieve a quick victory?
The Nationalists were unable to achieve a quick and easy victory because:
q They were quickly besieged by loyalists in places like the Montana and Alcazar barracks; Nationalist efforts then had to go into lifting the sieges;
q Many towns and cities including the capital, Madrid, and most famously Barcelona, were never for the revolt;
q Madrid was ably defended by Generals Miaja and Rojo;
q The various leftist militias (like that of the highly effective Communist PCE, including its famous ‘Fifth Regiment’) also fought enthusiastically against the rebels;
q In addition, the Republicans initially had some of the best equipment in the War: T26 Russian tanks, good artillery, Polikarpov planes, accurate maps;
q The Spanish navy remained loyal to the Republic, as did the majority of the air force;
q The Republic increased the wages of its supporters in the militia, police and military from November 1936 and led a huge recruitment drive;
q The resources of Catalonia would help to sustain the loyalists;
q The Republic also had access to the mineral resources of Asturias, the food of the Mediterranean provinces and the industry of the Basque lands;
q The Republic had 75% of the railway engines and rolling stock, Spain’s gold reserves and its main radio stations;
q Republican propaganda and education were excellent and well co-ordinated by the Communist ‘La Pasionaria’ and political commissars attached to the army;
q The Republic also had elements of luck on its side like inclement weather at the battles of Jarama and Guadalajara, and the often hesitant and incompetent Nationalist leadership of Franco, at times: plans to attack Madrid were found left in an Italian tank, for example;
q Mostly, perhaps, because the coup was not widely supported by the Spanish people and was never a popular uprising; the Republican zones had double the population of that of the rebels and even the occupied areas still probably had a majority who hated Franco;
What was the nature of outside involvement?
q Germany and Italy gave help almost immediately to Franco’s forces; Germany supplied Junkers transport aircraft, Heinkel bi-planes fighters, a whole squadron of bombers (The Condor Legion), artillery, light tanks, fiscal assistance (540m RM) and military advisers; Italy likewise provided planes, tanks, 50 000 CTV soldiers and munitions like machine guns;