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The Self and social-political (history) theory
The self is “human nature” insofar as we can know the self as a subject of humane study!
The self as the subject of humane study is the study of our “human nature”!
Introduction
Perhaps, the only remaining value (or “good”) that still has general consent in our Western culture is the value or good of the “self”. Recent discussions among social-political theorist appear to support this claim concerning the importance of the self. For example, Michael Sandel (Liberalism and the limits of justice, 1982) criticizes John Rawls (A theory of justice, 1971) for holding an “insubstantial” conception of the self. The communitarian Sandel charges that John Rawls as the representative of traditional liberalism makes the self inviolable but as he does so he also makes the self invisible. That is,Sandel claims that Rawls’ concept of self has more to do with solving the philosophical problem of establishing the priority of “rights” over the “good”, than it does with a“theory of justice” in service of the needs of real individuals. Rawls proposes a concept of the self that is designed to protect it from the contingencies of its environment even as he calls into question liberalism’s very effort to protect “dignity” and “autonomy” for the self. Indeed,Sandel claims that Rawls’ concept of self is so “thin” that it is hardly worth protecting at all. Moreover,Sandel claims that Rawls’ ideal community does not penetrate the self enough to generate “social feelings” or “individual sacrifice” that the political principles of equality and mutuality seem to require.The communitarian Sandel comments that it is only when individuals define themselves in terms of the good they share are they willing to make sacrifices to keep the community going. Thus whileSandel can agree with Rawls that individuals do act in their self-interests, Sandel maintains that if the self is extended to include the good of the others, assurely both liberalism and communitarianism deem desirable, then the interests of self will also have to include others.
This kind of criticism of liberalism differs from that which might have occurred in the 1960s. Back then liberals were accused of holding erroneous empirical views about the self (e.g., reducing it to possessive individualism) but today both liberals(Rawls) and communitarians (Sandel) have abstract metaphysical conceptions of the self. Thus, the communitarian Sandel has an equally abstract view of the self as does the liberalist Rawls. Alford’s purpose is to challenge this trend among social-political theorists, whether they are liberals or communitarians, towards theoretical abstractedness of the self.That is, Alford rejects the social-political theorists’ purely theoretical/metaphysical approach to the self.
Along with the abstract theoretical/metaphysical views of the self that social-political theorists have proposed, social-political theorists also follow a dualism with respect to their conception of the self.
Thus, the self is either (1) a socially constituted entity in that the self is conceived as possessing certain attributes that are essential to account for the principles of social order, or (2) the self is a self-constituting entity with such attributes as freedom, self-direction, agency, etc., but never both.
Communitarians usually see the self as socially constituted, whereas liberals usually see the self as self-constituting. [Sandel accuses Rawls of holding incompatible images of the self, images that are both inter-subjective and individualistic (a strange accusation for surely the self could be both as Rawls claims).] In any case, the reason for this dualism in social-political theory is because the selfis not valuedfor its own sake but is usually derived from “higher” universal principle or value (such as “rights”, “duties” “equality” etc.) that are properly the concern of social-political theory.
Remarkably, this metaphysical/theoreticalapproach to the self by social-political theorists gets some support today from post-modern continental philosophy in its own move towards abstractness. Thus, while social-political theorists’ metaphysical conception of the self as merely a rhetorical concept employed in philosophical, legal, and political theory, continental philosophy has eliminated, or de-centered, the self altogether. On this latter view the self is merely a symptom of our inability to accept our in-authenticity in desire, ideal, or action (that is, our in-authenticity in being unable to accept our “subjectivity”). For example, Foucault and Lacan suggest that when the self is not deceiving itself, it is nothing but the assertion of the “will-to-power” (Nietzsche).
My concern here is not to eliminate (deconstruct) or de-center the self, but rather to construct it in drawing on the work of Heinz Kohut and Jacques Lacan. Thus, in constructing the self I do not want to follow Nietzsche in claiming that the self is merely a wild self-assertion (to do this is to open myself to the same criticism as is directed at Foucault and Lacan). Rather I want to use the psychoanalytic ideas of Kohut and Lacan to counteract the tendency towards the abstractness in social political thought regarding the self.
[One should note that this abstractness is also evidently characteristic of the “self” conceived of as object/concept in psychology – a remnant of the Enlightenment bifurcation of the self-defining subject (reason) and the subject embodied as object.]
[Alford (1991) uses Kohut and Lacan to examine the views of the self in Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rawls, and Rousseau – who are all but Plato “state-of-nature” theorists and so are theoretically concerned with that state of nature which is“human nature” (see epigraph at beginning). That is, Alford wants to show that their account of the self is based on purportedly empirical yet troubling assumptions about the self. In demonstrating that these theorists build their conception of the self on troublesome empirical assumption as to the nature of human nature, Alford hopes to counteract the traditional claim that these social-political theorists/philosophers view the self as an abstract metaphysical entity (and the accompanying view that would deem their concepts of self as fraudulent when it comes to human nature).]
The same point can be made by noting that in constructing the self the methods we use to explain the self are not independent ofhow much we value the self. If we value abstract social political principles and then derive the self from these principle as social-political theorists do, then we do not value the self for it-self (this is true as much for Sandel and Rawls). However if we value the self first of all for it-self, and not as derivative from ‘higher’ principles, then we do well to start with Kohut who is very concerned about the possibility of establishing the self as an autonomous person (recognizing that from birth onward the individual is not autonomous but dispersed in its self-objects and therefore faces the challenge of becoming autonomous). Even so as we will see that this is not easy going for if, as Lacan claims, the subjective/unconscious is a kind of “text” then it is not the self that uses language (expression) but language that uses the self (that is, Lacan de-centers the self by deriving it from the “language”). But if this is so, then there is no autonomy possible at all, since the depth of the self (subjectivity/unconscious) is always already a construction in language (the self is always lost in its signifiers). In fact, Lacan suggests that any attempt to rescue the self (outside its constituting language) is merely a project in bad faith (mauvaifoi). I don’t want to follow Lacan here however. I don’t want to deconstruct the self in language/text; rather I want to construct the “real self”in deconstructing the texts (expressions) that the self (social-political theorists and philosophers) tells about its self. And I want to deconstruct or critically understandthese texts and I will do so by using the writings of Charles Taylor, Heinz Kohut, and Herbert Fingarette.
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Kohut, H. (1984). How does analysis cure? (A. Goldberg, Ed). Chicago: ChicagoUniversity Press.
Kohut, H. (1977). The restoration of the self. NY: International U Press.
Kohut, H. (1985). Self psychology and the humanities. (C. Strozier, Ed). NY: W. W. Norton.
Lacan, J. (1977) Ecrits (A. Sheridan, Trans.). NY: W. W. Norton.
Lacan, J. (1968) Speech and language in psychoanalysis (A.Wildon, Ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U Press.
Sandel, M. (1982). Liberalism and the limits of justice. Cambridge: Cambridge U Press.
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice.Cambridge: Harvard U Press.
Walkup, J. (1987). Introduction: Special issue “Reflections on the self”. Social Research, 54, 3-9.
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Social theory of the self
Social political theorist of course do not deny the existence of the self, and can agree that it is valuable, but they also point out that for every claim made about the self there is always an opposite claim to be made. (That is, “psychology” is here highly unreliable.) In fact, it is very difficult to tests these counter claims: there is virtually no way to test “human nature”. But then social-political theorists go on to argue that fortunately we do not need to know much about the self, what we need to know about is institutions, traditions, etc., (collectivities). Thus, social theorists argue that we merely need a rudimentary conception of self: for example, as “stimulus-response mechanisms” that yield predictions about the economic behavior of consumers and producers; or selves as “strategic mechanisms”, “bureaucratic mechanisms”, etc. All these reductionist models are an attempt to have the kinds of selves that serve the social-political order.
Historically, social-political thinkers have been always concerned with “human nature”, and from two directions.
1. The direction of Plato, namely to raise the question of the “good” and how to conceive of a society that can nurture the good in people.
2. The direction from modernity, namely to raise the question of the “bad” and how society can control the bad in people so as to make peaceful coexistence (society) possible.
Today we see these alternatives as a little naïve as though there where such a thing as “human nature”. Indeed, perhaps, there is no such fixed human nature.
Of course, those who hold this position do not claim that it is pointless to talk about human attributes such as desire, hubris, love, feelings, ambition, lust, greed, envy,hatred, rage, aggression, sympathy, emptiness, meaninglessness, purpose, etc. To write about the self on this view is to write of these attributes, or constellations of attributes, of the self. Since, the self may change over time and be different in different societies and cultures, we have to determine how these attributes and their constellations vary in time and over cultures. What is usually meant by the self in this context is then the pattern or constellation of attributes in a particular time and location. And of course all this may indeed be very relevant to social-political theory.For example, if hatred can be attributed to a people then this makes all the difference as to how one conceives of a political order than can control such hatred. Or, if we attributed to people a basic goodness, then presumably this could affect the manner in which we construct a social order to reflect this goodness. But note how difficult it is to “test” any, and all, such conjectures.
Philosophy has historically also felt the need to conceptualize an entity called the self and it is easy to understand why. David Hume held that the self is necessary to explain how disparate impressionsare held together meaningfully. Thus, his notion of self was as a bundle of perceptions (impressions) that are held together unconsciously by ‘resemblance”, “succession”, and “causation” was deemed to be the mechanical processes of association. Immanuel Kant’s reply to David Hume’s conception of the self was that if our impression were really so loosely held together, we would never have any genuine insight into the connectedness of things nor would we have any unitary consciousness. To have a unity of perception is to postulate a condition for its possibility and this condition Kant claimed was the “transcendental subject” who experiences the connectedness of life according to universal laws of understanding.
Today, we see that Kant’s moved too quickly from his correct insight that the unity of consciousness requires rules of connection (identified with the self as rules of understanding) to the false conclusion that these must be transcendent reality-constitutive rules rather than say empirical/conventional ones.
While Hume and Kant were concerned with epistemology and metaphysics, and not with social-political or psychological concerns, their two positions (empiricism and idealism/intellectualism) frame most contemporary discussions of the self. I too find myself somewhere between Hume and Kant, in that the SELF is the way we organize our desires and ideals (Hume) particularly as these pertain to how we use other people in support of our sense/direction of self (Kant). The latter way of framing the question reflects my reliance on HeinzKohut.
My sense of selfdoes not distinguish between self, ego, “I”, me, subject, or individual, even as I recognize that these words indicate different ways of talking about the self.For example, we will see that Lacan distinguishes between ego (as defense) and subject (self), and I will distinguish between individual (given) and person (achievement). These distinctions are important but not theoretically fundamental (perhaps?). Generally, I deem the self to be the individual, subject, and object of psychological and social-political theory. But this cannot be all. For in our everyday Western sense of self we not only deem the self to be the “permanent subject of various states of consciousness/impressions” (Hume), but we also deem the self capable of giving “direction to itself and to control itself” (Kant). Even if psychoanalytical theory has shed some doubt on this capacity of self-directedness and self-control (Kohut points our how difficult these are to achieve, and Lacan denies them altogether as an illusion/self-deception, nevertheless we cannot ignore this notion of “agency” (as Taylor argues) on risk that we are no longer talking about the real self.
The sociological view of the self (breadth)
At the heart of the sociological view of the self is the concept of the “social self”, namely, the “ability to see oneself as one sees others”. In other words, to be able to make an object of oneself in the way that other people are “objects” to us. While this view of the self is there in all philosophy whether Hume, Adam Smith, or Kant, what sociologists have added to this conception of the social self is that the means whereby we see ourselves, the means whereby we become objects to ourselves, is through the reactions of other people to our self. It is this social self that Cooley has called the “looking-glass self”.
This concept of the “looking-glass self” has three parts:
1. how we imagine how we appear to others,
2. how we imagine others judge us, and
3. pride or mortification as a consequence of how we imagine others judge us.
Cooley however recognized that 2, above, is not really captured in the concept of the “looking-glass self”. That is, how we imagine other people judge us, is more a constructive process than what the concept of “looking-glass” self allows for.
We can better capture point 2, above, (how we imagine other people judge us), using a metaphor of “living in each other’s minds”. Thus what makes human conduct unique is that is it oriented towards the reactions of others. It is in this potential social conflict, in which we all live the minds of others, that the “human nature” of the individual may acquire its most characteristic human trait. As Erving Goffman notes in his “dramaturgical model” (as a version of the “looking-glass self”) this living in the minds of other has a great conventionalizing effect in relating our conduct and, indeed, in our “self”, as being dependent on others.
This idea that the judgments that other people make of us is the important factor in determining our sense of self, is not merely false. In fact, this is also part of the claim put forward by Lacan and Kohut. Nor is this view superficial, in the sense of lacking depth. In fact, the idea that we imagine how others judge us has a degree of depth. Rather, the problem with this sociological view is that it cannot explain the notable exception. It can explain why people conform, but it cannot explain why (say, Ghandi, or Luther) donot conform. Here we need to appeal not just to the social/others but also to the psychological/individual. Thus, if the self can be wholly explained by way of the roles the individual plays in relationship to others (e.g., husband, lover, employee, etc.), then we trivialize those who do not play their expected role. Role theory needs a theory of psychological depth. We do not only need to explain how it that by convention, through other people’s judgments, become selves, we also need to explain the nature of the role we play in relation to others, how we resist and desire others more than any convention account can tell us (properly playing the role of husband does not explain my inability to feel intimate with my spouse). At the same time, sociological theory is important for it can help to explain how the self lacks autonomy (we are chronically conforming to other peoples’ expectations) and how our role-prescribed relations with other people lack intimacy (it is not part of the role we have been assigned by others that we be intimate). Hence, sociological theory is both too strong and not strong enough to establish a self.