Auton 1
Nolan Auton
Dr. Nancy Williams
PHIL 205
12 December 2014
The Rights of Nonhuman Animals[U1]
When considering the lives of nonhuman animals, it is often argued that human lives are of far more value. Nonhuman animals are treated as if they are not actually alive, in that they are mercilessly tortured and slaughtered for their flesh, or their physical resources are used to shoulder the burden, so that human lives can be made more convenient. This use of nonhuman animals with no regard for their physical or psychological state is characteristic of using them as a mere means to an end. In this paper, I will attempt to argue that nonhuman animals ought to receive the same basic rights and equal treatment, towards their lives, as humans. These basic rights include a right to life, which would eliminate premature slaughter for flesh, and a right for nonhuman animals to distance themselves from suffering.
In order to qualify nonhuman animals as having these basic rights, it is imperative that they be considered what Tom Regan calls a “subject-of-a-life.” In order to be considered a subject-of-a-life, an animal, human or nonhuman, must be aware of the world and what happens to them. If an animal is aware of both of these criteria, then an animal must be concerned with what happens to them, in that they must care about their well-being. When humans are subject to this analysis, a conclusion is very easily drawn. This conclusion argues that humans are subjects-of-a-life, in that they are aware of the world and what happens to them, as well as being concerned about what happens to them. The argument that nonhuman animals are subjects-to-a-life is not one that is as easily accepted. In his piece “Animal Rights,” Tom Regan argues that nonhuman animals ought to be considered subjects-of-a-life through multiple arguments of commonality, thus giving nonhuman animals similar rights to humans. The commonalities that Regan argues are common sense, common language, common behavior, common bodies, common systems, and common origins. Regan confirms these commonalities first by observing his pet dog. Regan is credited with saying that “there is somebody there,” especially in the mind of his dog. This notion of a presence in the mind of his dog covers the common sense portion of his argument. Because Regan is able to understand the feelings or wants of his dog through barks, howls, or whimpers, he justifies that humans and nonhuman animals share a common language or mutual understanding of one another. In my personal experience with my dog, I can display angry faces or gestures when my dog has misbehaved, and my dog will tuck her tail and cower away, knowing that I am not pleased with her behavior.My dog’s fear of my anger goes to enforce that nonhuman animals care about what is happening to them, much like humans care. Regan argues that nonhuman animals, most notably dogs, can be trained much like a child, linking humans and nonhuman animals in a behavioral aspect.One teaches a child to use a toilet much like they teach a kitten to use a litter box or a dog to be housetrained. Because humans and nonhuman animals share similar modes of sensory perception in our nervous systems, the common systems argument can be validated. Since nonhuman animals and humans perceive stimuli in the same way, then they must be aware of the world around them and aware of what is happening to them. The common origins portion of Regan’s argument is pulled from the work performed by Darwin. If Darwin’s theory of common origin can be accepted by both scientists and philosophers, then Regan’s stance on common origins remains solid. With all the commonalities argued by Regan being deemed as plausible, then it is nearly impossible to deny nonhuman animals of being subjects-of-a-life and that they have undeniable rights that are similar to those of humans.
The torture, slaughter, and exploitation of physical resources of nonhuman animals for the sole benefit of humans makes nonhuman animals a mere means to humans’ ends. A mere means to an end is defined as anything that is exploited and benefits a certain group or groups. Paola Cavalieri argues throughout her piece, “Are Human Rights Human?,” and Kantian thinking, that nonhuman animals should not be considered mere means to an end.Cavalieri supports her claim through a series of examples. She first states that one cannot detest racism and condone speciesism, for they are very similar. This means that nonhuman animals cannot be mere means just because they are nonhuman. Nonhuman animals cannot be used as a mere means to an end because they are not rational and cannot reflect morally upon their behavior. Cavalieri argues that all nonhuman animals are capable of being provided with rights to protect them from being used as mere means to an end, much like mentally handicapped humans and small children are protected. All of this means that no nonhuman animals can be used as a mere means to an end without going against the principles that have been set to protect humans.
A possible objection to this argument would be that nonhuman animals are not rational beings and have no way of morally reflecting upon their actions, therefore rendering them a suitable victim of being a mere means to an end.
Mentally challenged humans and small children are not rational and are unable to morally reflect upon their actions, and yet they are not used as mere means to an end. If one believes that nonhuman animals are okay to use as a mere means to an end, then they are agreeing to a double standard. Also, mentally challenged humans and small children have rights that protect them from falling prey to being used as a mere means to an end. If these protective rights can be bestowed upon the mentally handicapped and the young, then by default it must be given to nonhuman animals. Also, take for example John Pilley’s dog, Chaser. Chaser has a vocabulary of over one thousand words. In a NOVA scienceNow program, Chaser’s memory and decision making ability were studied. Chaser was asked to bring various toys to the experimenter of which she had prior knowledge. Chaser was then asked to retrieve a toy that she had never seen before. Chaser was able to make a rational decision with inference skills to retrieve the new toy (NOVA). This provides evidence that nonhuman animals could have the capability of rationalization.
After considering how the lives of nonhuman animals are viewed compared to the lives of humans, one may discover inequality. This inequality is found both in the way these nonhuman animals are treated and how they are deprived of basic rights that humans possess. Humans and nonhuman animals share many commonalities that solidify the arguments presented in this paper. If we are to make an exception for ourselves in these situations, then we should make the same exception for nonhuman animals, especially when they live lives that are very similar to the lives of humans.
Works Cited
Cavalieri, Paola. "Are Human Rights Human?"The Animal Ethics Reader. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2003. 30-34. Print.
How Smart Are Dogs?Perf. Neil DeGrasse Tyson.How Smart Are Dogs?NOVA ScienceNow, 9 Feb. 2011. Web.
Regan, Tom. "Saying and Doing."Empty Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. 42-74. Print.
[U1]Grade: 97