THE ÖRESUND REGION – SIX YEARS WITH THE BRIDGE

Richard Ek

The Department of Service Management

Lund University, Campus Helsingborg

Box 882

S-251 08 Helsingborg

Sweden

Towards a New Nordic Regionalism? Conference arranged by the

Nordic Network of the Regional Studies Association in Balestrand,

Norway, 4-5 May 2006

First Draft

Introduction

In July 2000 the bridge between Copenhagen and Malmö in the south of Sweden was inaugurated. The bridge was a prerequisite of the realization of the Öresund region, a cross-border region politically delimited to include Sjælland and Bornholm in Denmark and the Swedish county Skåne (figure 1). Of course, the vision of an integrated Öresund region goes way back in time (a hundred years, fifty years, fifteen years, depending on the criteria emphasized)[1] but it has all the time been a mutual understanding among the region-building actors that the Öresund region would really ’exist’ first when a fixed link was materialized in Öresund. The 1st of July 2000 was the day when the region stepped out into the real world, leaving visions, dreams and romantic notions of bridges behind (SDS 2000.07.01). Since that day the rate of the regional integration has been discussed as if regional integration could be measured on a scale or indexed (there is actually an ‘Öresund integration index’). Even if the regional integration, beginning with the inauguration of the Öresund Bridge, often has been argued to be a fundamental, even paradigmatic societal change,[2] the discussion the six last years has been narrowly instrumental and technocratic in character. Even simplistic. How fast forward goes the integration? Not fast enough!

In this paper I argue that one way to characterize the public discourse on and region building practices in the now six-year-old Öresund region is through the concept of simplicity. The Öresund region process is to a high degree regarded by its advocates as simple in the sense of not being complicated or complex (but not in any way in the sense of being gullible or feeble-minded). It is regarded as a difficult process, as the region builders are up against sinewy national institutions and regulations as well as intangible national cultural differences. It is regarded as a heterogeneous process as it involves a multitude of different actors (even if the actors that set the tone are quite few) from local football clubs to the Chambers of Commerce. But still, the integration process is regarded as simple, imagined as similar to an organic process and possible to fulfil through an almost causal formula: ‘better infrastructure, communications and transportation → higher mobility and interaction → regional integration’. Here, the simplicity of the discourse of the Öresund region is discussed based on two aspects of region building. Firstly, that the integration is regarded as politically simple, since there is no disagreement among the politicians about the regional idea per se. This means that the Öresund region is not considered to be a political project, an apprehension with political and democratic consequences that will be discussed below. Secondly, the geographical imagination of the Öresund region is simplistic (perhaps also starry-eyed) in the sense that it is not sensitive towards its intra-regional political geographies. As a consequence, intra-regional tensions are not addressed and handled in a thorough way and are instead ‘popping up’ as (geographically based) disputes around specific projects and co-operations.

The paper is divided into five sections, including this introduction. Next section consists of a recapitulation of the Öresund integration process so far, that is, from year 2000 until today (spring of 2006). Without trying to answer whether the integration is a failure so far or not, this section will through “snapshots” discuss and comment different “integration variables” highlighted in the public discourse. In the third section, the Öresund region as a political project that do not seem to be regarded as political by the leading region-building actors (many of them political organizations) is discussed (integration regarded as politically simple). Following Slavoj Žižek’s discussion on the ‘post-political’, I argue in this section that the Öresund region (and maybe other cross-border regions as well) are managed by management technologies rather than governed by a political polity. This gliding from polity to management at the same time constitutes a tendency towards political simplicity. In the fourth section, the argument that integration seems to be regarded as geographically simple is presented. The dominant geographical imagination about regions in Europe today gives a simplified picture of Europe’s political and economic geographies, emphasizing centripetal ‘forces’ on the behalf of centrifugal ones. Since the complexity of the Öresund region is not addressed in the region-building process, conflicts and disagreements rise instead around specific issues in the process of the managing of the region. One such example is highlighted in the section, the organization of hosting the America’s Cup in Malmö in July and August 2005. Finally, in the conclusion, a rather bleak picture of the democratic potential of regions, at least the Öresund region, is put forward.

Snapshots[3] From a Region’s First Years

The Öresund region is a quite well researched cross-border region, especially prior to the inauguration of the bridge.[4] In public discourse, the ‘Öresund-talk’ increased to a crescendo in the summer 2000 when the bridge was officially declared opened under celebratory conditions (primarily adapted to look good on the TV-screen since the main target was ’30 seconds on CNN’, but nevertheless with a good public influx). Thereafter, a kind of devotional hangover seemed to seize the regional project and the region-building actors started to quietly observe the most tangible measure of ‘integration’ at hand at that moment: the number of vehicles that drove over the bridge (easily measured since it is a toll-bridge) and the number of people using the Öresund trains to travel to the other side. The owner of the bridge, the Öresund Consortium (owned jointly in its turn by the Swedish and Danish states) had made forecasts regarding the traffic flow after the opening of the bridge, and after some time it was evident that those forecasts had been far to optimistic. When the Öresund Consortium calculated that close to on average 12 000 vehicles should cross the bridge each day the first year (Öresundskonsortiet 1999), the actual traffic in 2001 was on average 7000 vehicles each day. Thereafter the traffic has increased each year and in 2005 the actual traffic had catched up with the traffic forecasts done six years before (and doubled in relation to the traffic in 2001 (SDS 2006.03.16)). At the same time, people who traveled by train increased from 4.2 million 2001 to X.X million 2005 (SDS 2005.07.01,). Even if less and less people travel by ferry over Öresund (primarily between Helsingborg and Helsingør in Northern Öresund) there is no doubt that the traffic has increased (SDS 2005.03.10).

Nevertheless, from the start different voices in the public discourse has argued that the bridge is not used as effective as it could be. Being a toll bridge after all, it can cost up to 25 Euro to drive a car single journey over the Öresund Bridge. But, as the argument goes, if the bridge was free to use, the integration process should be sped up. Here, the financial agreement between the Danish state and Swedish state regarding the bridge, its repayment conditions, etc. has been pointed out as an immanent problem (with a clear state-level dimension, as the two central states are accused of preventing growth on a (trans-) regional scale) (KvP 2004.10.09, SDS 2005.06.29). The central – regional conflict dimension is explicit in other areas as well. Actually, the region’s first six years is in a sense a declaration of the tough persistence of national institutions. The governments of Sweden and Denmark have been in constant negotiations around issues like how the trans-border commuter should be taxed (in the country he or she lives in or works in) and differences in social security systems and labor-market policies (SDS 2002.06.17). This where issues which were supposed to be solved quite easily back in 1999-2000, and some steps towards a harmonization between the two national systems has been taken,[5] but a lot of big issue remain to be solved. In the frustration that has turned up, the region-building actors blame the Danish and Swedish governments (SDS 2003.03.30, 2004.09.30, 2004.10.02) while the two national governments blame each other.

Besides that the financial issues between Denmark and Sweden have been unexpectedly difficult to solve, region-building actors has generally lamented over that politicians on state level have not engaged sufficiently in the whereabouts of the Öresund region (SDS 2004.09.16). A special Öresund Minister has been called for repeatedly (Metro Øresund 2005.09.06). In Sweden, the geographical distance between Skåne and Stockholm has been put forward as a reason for this, and in Denmark has the territorial and administrative structural reform that was initiated a couple of years ago (and will be implemented in January 2007) drawn political interest away from the Öresund cooperation project (BT 2004.06.27). But not only some politicians seem to be not interested in the Öresund region. Quite a small part of the region’s companies showed initially an explicit interest in Öresund cooperation (SDS 2001.05.02). But nevertheless, the interest has increased, however from a low level, and for instance the number of Swedish owned companies in Denmark are higher than ever (SDS 2003.12.22). In a survey made in 2005, about half of the companies that was questioned responded that the bridge had had a positive influence on theirs businesses (SDS 2005.07.02a). Whether the increased interaction and cooperation (if that is what defines integration) between companies in Skåne and Sjælland are primarily a result of regional factors and imperatives or rather a general internationalization of business can be discussed in length.[6] Of course, the region-building actors use whatever statistical results, success stories and arguments at hand that are useful for them, which is hardly surprising. But interpreting tendencies in the region in a specific way that favors an already established image (‘we have integration, but not in a pace quick enough’) and blocking other interpretations (‘increased interaction is not necessarily the same as integration’) seems to me to be a good way to create a discourse of regional integration that is simplistic in its character.

However, the established image of the integration process (‘we have integration, but it should go faster’) held by region-building actors is not as coherent as it may seem at first glance. For some debaters, the integration was a utopia (due to familiar arguments as to high toll-bridge fees) while other has argued that there is a silent bottom-up integration (SDS 2005.07.02b). The Swedish ambassador in Denmark argued for instance that the integration goes on but that the ‘development will take longer time’[7] (2005.07.01b). In this reasoning, as in the public discourse in general, integration is given a process meaning (integration as something that ‘goes on’) and is at the same time imagined as some kind of end-station (when the integration is ‘complete’). Whatever defines ‘complete integration’ is a source of interpretation, but to Ilmar Reepalu, the chairman of the city executive board in Malmö, it is the day when the traffic over the Öresund Bridge between Malmö and Copenhagen is as intensive as on the freeways between Malmö and Lund and between Copenhagen and Helsingør (SDS 2004.12.24). Again, regional integration is on an equal footing with interaction in a region (the region as an absolute space, a container of society, in itself a simplistic characterization of space).

At the same time, within the public discourse of regional integration in Öresund, the cultural differences between the two countries have been highlighted (especially in connection to the bridge’s birthday). When the bridge was three years old Danish academics and journalists argued that they where quite indifferent towards the bridge (SDS 2003.06.20, 2003.06.22). According to Tine Eiby, journalist on the Danish Weekendavisen (SDS 2003.06.20):

For the citizens in Copenhagen, the bridge has primarily meant that they are meeting Swedish-speaking people everywhere in the central parts of the Danish capital. The retail trade is enthusiastic. But generally you have to admit that people in Copenhagen speak about the Swedish visitors with a slight irritation. And it hurts me, because I know exactly how it feels. I recognize it from my own shopping in Örkelljunga. You notice how the locals sigh at us Danes. And thinks something like: “Here they come again. Having vacation all the time and keeps their money tight”[8]

In a similar vein, ethnologist Orvar Löfgren argues that the flow of one-day tourists can be more irritating than integrating (SDS 2003.06.11). To him, the increased interaction increases the need to stereotype the other (on the other side of Öresund). Since Swedes and Danes are quite alike, it is the small differences that are important (like ‘the Danes wears jogging suit when they are visiting the local pub’). Nevertheless, the small stereotyped differences works self-reassuring (Swedes dress themselves better, we do not wear jogging suit when on the local pub).

Apart from legal and cultural differences in the Öresund, the increased interaction does have material and constant consequences. The Öresund Consortium work actively to get people to live and work on different sides of the sound. Integration in this sense seems to imply a constant crossing of the sound in people’s everyday life (wake up, bring children to school, go to work, shop something on the way back home after work, drive the children to sport activities etc.). The Öresund should be crossed at least twice each day in a plausible time-geographical diagram (and not just something you do from time to time, visit to a concert etc.). The Öresund Consortium therefore for instance help real estate agents to sell real estates in Skåne to Danes (SDS 2006.03.19a), and even if the house prizes in Malmö has increased by 78% from year 2000 to 2006, they are still much cheaper then the house prizes in the Copenhagen area. As a consequence, the migration from Sjælland to Skåne has increased fivefold between 2000-2006 (SDS 2006.03.19b) and between 2004 and 2006 the number of Danish income-tax return forms sent to habitants in Skåne increased from 6 000 to 16 000 (SDS 2006.04.11[9]).

However, even this seemingly more tangible integration variable (migration) can be discussed whether it implies a genuine regional integration. As a Danish couple answered about the thought of and possibility to move to Malmö: “If we should be honest, we should not be interested if it was not for the nearness to Copenhagen and the much lower house prizes”[10] (SDS 2006.03.19c). Among the questions asked about housing in Scania by Danes, a majority seems to be about how close the house or apartment is to the freeway and the train station back to Copenhagen (ibid.). But on the other hand, in the visions of the Öresund region it is very much imagined and presented as a traffic- and infrastructure region, a regional monotopia constituted by functional non-places of transport and communication.[11]

From Polity to Management, Towards the Post-Political Cross-Border Region.

The history of the social production of the Öresund region revolves around (besides the focalization on the fixed link) the establishment of region-building organizations, inter-organizational co-operations through networks and the implementation of projects that in some sense promote regional integration. Actually, a distinction between organizations, networks and projects has not always been easy to make, as several organizations are formed as networks and as projects has metamorphosed into organizations/networks. As has been stated elsewhere,[12] the inter-organizational structure, or maze, of new and old[13] actors working to create an Öresund cross-border region is clearly adapted to fulfill the conditions for funding from the EU, primarily from the INTERREG programmes. To just give one example of the organizational maze, or haze (particularly from a democratic point of view, see below), the branding project “Birth of a Region” was initiated by the Öresund Committee[14] in April 1997 (together with at least 15 private, public and quasi-public organizations) in collaboration with the London-based marketing/branding company Wolff-Ohlins.[15] The project was financed partly by INTERREG IIA funding. Two years later, a brand-book was presented to the public (on the theme the “Human Capital”). At the same time, Wolff-Ohlins recommended that a more tangible regional identity should be anchored among the public, and a network-based organization, Öresund Identity Network, was established in order to work towards that goal in the year 2000.

At the same time, even if the amount of organizations, networks and projects can be seen as staggering,[16] the really important and active organizations are quite few, maybe around 20 or so [check who is linked to whom on the Internet]. If these organizations are studied a bit further, it is quickly revealed that they are connected to each other not just by co-operation but by being represented in each other boards, advisory boards etc. A study of the individuals involved discloses that the organizational core of the regional integration process revolves around quite a few leading politicians and civil servants (Ek 2003: 38-41). This close involvement and centralization increases the isomorphic mechanisms working in this organizational field[17] and crystallizes a self-acclaimed regional elite (Lovering 1995 & 1999) that all know each other, professionally as well as in a personal sense. An important contributory cause to the establishment of these tight organizational and personal ties was the many conferences in the 1990’s. To Christian Tangkjær, these, at least a hundred region-building conferences and workshops (on themes like “When vision becomes reality” and “Challenge: Öresund”) could be described as a “travelling road show” (Tangkjær 2000). These numerous conferences are to P. O. Berg another indication that the Öresund region to a high degree was evoked and incanted, a sort of social alchemy that brought the region to “life” (Berg 2000: 82).