The Public Role of Public

THE PUBLIC ROLE OF PUBLIC

UNIVERSITIES: EXAMINING UCT’S

RESPONSE TO XENOPHOBIA

UC T’s immediate response to the xenophobia crisis in 2008 took the form of humanitarian aid designed to mitigatethe effects of the displacement of thousands of people by the violence. During the course of the crisis, UC T’scontribution increasingly came to reflect the particular expertise and strengths that reside within the university,manifested across a diversity of activities. Students and staff supported health related interventions and coordinateddonations, helped manage a humanitarian crisis, monitored adherence to internationally recognisedrights of refugees, and rendered psycho-social support in extraordinary circumstances. The benefits of promotinga culture of volunteerism amongst students were also highlighted by UCT’s response.

Background

On 19 May 2008 South Africans woke up to the horrifyingimage of a Mozambican man, Ernesto Nhamuave,engulfed in wild fire.

Upon investigation, it turned out that he had been set alight by fellow human beings. Adam Habib, Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the University of Johannesburg, has described Ernesto Nahmuave as the human face of South Africa’s orgy of xenophobic violence.

He died in the Ramaphosa informal settlement when a group of South Africans beat him, doused him with petroland burnt him alive. Ernesto was one of the 65 or more foreign nationals who would die in the following days in an outbreak of xenophobicviolence in Gauteng. Thousands more fled theirhomes with literally nothing except the clothes on theirbacks. By the end of the week, the violence had spreadlike wildfire throughout the country. This unprecedentedviolation of ”others’” rights in South Africa bordered on

human catastrophe and caught the government, publicinstitutions and individuals by surprise – people did notknow how to respond.Many South Africans volunteered their time and energyto help the displaced people. The University of CapeTown, home to 2 308 students from the rest of Africa, didreact to the crisis, but in a manner that suggested thatUCT was grappling with appropriate ways of translatingits commitment to being an engaged university intoconcrete action.

UCT’s ‘first response’ to the xenophobiacrisis

UCT’s immediate response to the xenophobia crisis inCape Town took the form of humanitarian aid designedto mitigate the effects of the displacement of thousandsof people by the violence. Prof. Martin Hall, then DeputyVice-Chancellor at UCT and co-chair of the UCT CrisisResponse Committee that was set up to co-ordinate thesupport of the UCT community, described UCT’s response

as follows:

It became clear on about the Wednesday that therewas a rapidly emerging crisis in Cape Town. On Fridayevening UCT was told that there were 200 peopledisplaced in buses. UCT’s initial reaction was to findaccommodation for these people. So the first response

was to find 200 mattresses which the residences didmagnificently and very quickly. At first we thought wewould need the Sports Centre. But soon after that wewere advised that the network of church halls andcommunity centres would be able to cope with the

flood of displaced victims. So the people who wethought were coming to us were diverted into whateventually turned out to be a network of over 100 communitysites. So we then sent the mattresses that we collectedto the church. We were informed that the mostimmediate role we could play was providing transportfor people who had been forced to leave their homes.

So we deployed the Jammie Shuttles and moved about2 000 people in the course of the weekend. Staff andstudents were also mobilised to provide relief in the formof blankets, clothing and food. SHAWCO volunteersconveyed the goods to various distribution points thathad been set up by non-governmental organisations(NGOs) and the churches.

During the course of the weekend and the next weekUCT’s contribution increasingly came to reflect its particularsets of expertise and strengths that reside withinuniversities.

Firstly students were mobilised to assist in various ways. InUCT’s case the capacity to do this quickly and effectivelywas due to the volunteer infrastructure established bySHAWCO, a community development organisation runby students of UCT. Secondly the resources of medicalpersonnel were speedily galvanised through theHealth Sciences Faculty. The third set of resources waslocated in the Refugee Rights Project, attached to theLaw Faculty. Staff from the clinic had been working withrefugees for years and, as a result, had the infrastructureand relationships to respond to the cases of human rightsabuses and provide advice on protocols for dealingwith refugees. And fourthly the Department of SocialDevelopment mobilised its resources to offer counsellingservices.

Whilst it is recognised that many other departments inUCT organised seminars on xenophobia, or introduceddiscussions on xenophobia into formal teaching programmes,this case profile focuses on the interventionsof SHAWCO, the Refugee Rights Project and the Departmentof Social Development. These initiatives werenominated by the faculties and student society representativeson the Social Responsiveness Working Groupfor inclusion in the 2008 Social Responsiveness Report.

Representatives from these units were also representedon the Vice-Chancellor’s Crisis Response Committee.

The case profile will also reflect critically on the nature ofthe institution-wide response with a view to identifying

challenges with respect to the role of public universities inresponding to major humanitarian crises.

SHAWCO: supporting health related interventionsand co-ordinating donations

SHAWCO Health is the SHAWCO sector run by HealthSciences students who provide six-weekly evening clinicsand one-monthly paediatric clinics to seven disadvantagedcommunities in the Cape Metropolitan area.

On the evening of 23 May 2008, a member of theSHAWCO Health Steering Committee received a phonecall from one of the volunteer doctors who was helpingout at the Caledon Street Police Station in the city to askwhether SHAWCO volunteers could assist with handingout blankets, food, and clothes to the thousands ofpeople who had been displaced by the violence andhad congregated at the police station. A decision wasmade to advertise the need through SHAWCO’s regularcommunication channels. The communication indicatedthat volunteers would help as individuals, not undera SHAWCO umbrella, since SHAWCO could not takeresponsibility for the safety of volunteers in this situation.A bulk sms was sent out at 22h45 to the over 300 studentson the SHAWCO health database, requesting their help.

On Saturday morning an emergency meeting was calledfor SHAWCO Health Steering Committee members andother SHAWCO leaders from the SHAWCO EducationSector on the university’s main campus to decide howSHAWCO could help. It was decided that SHAWCOHealth would focus on health-related activities, whileSHAWCO Education, with the aid of SHAWCO staff anddrivers, would co-ordinate the collection and distributionof large amounts of food, clothing and hygiene productsto the different sites of refuge. This enabled a largeportion of the UCT community to get involved personallyand practically. A decision was also made that SHAWCOwould not use its branded vehicles to take relief itemsinto the communities that SHAWCO traditionally serves.

SHAWCO has struggled to change its brand from awelfare organisation to a development organisationover the last 14 years, with communities still expectingfree handouts of food and clothing. We did not wantcommunities to feel that we had double standards,

but we did want to contribute in some way to anunprecedented crisis. A further decision was made thatSHAWCO Health would not suspend any of its normalservices – a move which could potentially have generated xenophobia where none had existed previously

by making our normal communities feel marginalisedduring the crisis (De Wit & Lewin, 2008).

On the Saturday night (24 May), SHAWCO Health leadersmet with members of the Treatment Action Campaign(TAC), AIDS Law Project (ALP), AIDS & Rights Alliance forSouthern Africa (ARASA), Medicins sans Frontiers (MSF)and individual doctors to discuss a concerted health response.A decision was made to run a health assessmentacross all known sites on Sunday morning, utilising a rapidneeds assessment tool developed by MSF, the site detailsaccumulated by the TAC, and volunteers mobilised bySHAWCO Health.

Ansms was sent out at 21:30 on Saturday night askingfor volunteers to report at 08:00 the next morning.Despite the last-minute call and early wake-up, 20volunteers arrived at the SHAWCO Offices the nextmorning. The volunteers from the Faculty of Health Sciencesincluded medical and health and rehabilitationstudents. The volunteers were trained by MSF and giveninstructions on security issues. Four students were pairedup with doctors and the rest worked in student-pairs.A total of 18 sites had been identified for the teams tovisit that day – they came back with over 33 havingbeen assessed (as a team would go into an area, thepolice would take them to more sites which had notas yet requested help from the civil society coalition).SHAWCO volunteers wore SHAWCO Health shirts sothat they would be identified as relief workers. Throughthis identification, SHAWCO became the link betweenthe civil society coalition and various church groupswho were hosting internally displaced people. By theMonday after the crisis exploded the churches wererunning an online database of all the sites which theywere supporting. SHAWCO Health was able to feedinformation into these sites, as well as to incorporatehealth-specific questions, needs and information so thatthe overall response could be more effective (De Wit &Lewin, 2008).

By Sunday afternoon (25 May), over 33 sites had been assessedand information from all those sites captured andassessed to report to various role-players in the response.The assessment included information on, inter alia, numbersof men, women and children, shelter, food provision,health needs, health services and safety. This was the firstdata obtained regarding the extent of the crisis situation.Up until this point the City of Cape Town had no ideaof the scale and complexity of the situation (how manypeople were involved, their living circumstances andhealth concerns). The framework developed on this daywas later adopted by Disaster Management as a basisfor monitoring all the sites. Subsequently modificationswere made by the Civil Society Coalition to include questionson the provision of health services in the area, visitsof health officials, and access to first aid at the sites.

On Monday, 26 May, in a meeting between city andprovincial health leaders and representatives of the CivilSociety Coalition (CSC), it was agreed that daily healthassessments would be run by health officials across theeight health sub-districts in the Cape Metro area, andthe results of these assessments would be sent to theCSC along with requests for volunteers aimed at specificinterventions. While waiting for the information from thehealth services to come through, UCT’s Faculty of HealthSciences and SHAWCO Health, in partnership with theTAC/ALP/ARASA-convened alliance, began puttingtogether a database of students and staff members whowere willing to help with health-specific interventions.

It was a very effective use of the faculty’s communicationsystems and SHAWCO’s long-standing ability toco-ordinate volunteers (De Wit & Lewin, 2008).

As per the agreement, the details of the individuals willingto help were sent to the health authorities. By the Thursday

of that week (29 May), not having heard anythingfrom the health authorities in this time, the CSC decidedit was necessary to run another rapid site assessment ofthe more than 70 sites that were now logged on the centraldatabase. SHAWCO volunteers from upper campusformed part of the group who ran these assessments, asSHAWCO’s health students were continuing their curriculum

work in the hospitals during the weekdays.

From the information gathered through the rapid needsassessment, SHAWCO Health could identify which siteshad:

• no access to health care facilities;

• large numbers of people;

• a large proportion of children under the age of 5;

and/or

• signs of diarrhoea and scabies outbreaks.

Although the plan was not to set up parallel health systems,it had become clear from the data gathered thatmany people were either too scared to access the normalhealth care facilities or had actually been harassedby local citizens on attempting to access these facilities.SHAWCO Health therefore identified eight sites most inneed of extra health services and began to arrange fortheir mobile clinics and teams of students and doctors togo out and run weekend and evening clinics.

Once again, SHAWCO Health was able to make use ofthe faculty’s bulk sms system to advertise the clinics toall the health sciences students. This enabled SHAWCOHealth to have access to students who would not normallybe in the SHAWCO communication network andboosted clinic attendance (De Wit & Lewin, 2008).

SHAWCO Health also developed and distributed materialsto help site co-ordinators identify and treat diarrhoea,scabies and TB outbreaks, as well as information on medical‘red flags’ – what to refer, how quickly, and to where.None of this kind of information had been distributed duringthe first week of the crisis. This was later added to by aleading paediatrician and academic who put in specialnotes on how to care for newborns, nutrition, and handlingof specific childhood illnesses. These resources willbe kept on file for any similar crises which might arise inthe future. Over the space of the week, SHAWCO Healthran nine clinics at eight different sites around Cape Town,treating over 600 people (in addition to the six normalevening clinics on Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays).A later clinic was run by volunteer doctors using one ofSHAWCO Health’s fully equipped mobile clinics and theSHAWCO dispensary for the hundreds of asylum seekersstaying under the Eastern Boulevard Bridge (the studentswere at this time writing end of block exams).

The manner in which the Faculty of Health Sciencesand SHAWCO Health worked together to respond tothe crisis serves as a wonderful model for how studentorganisations and more ‘institutional’ bodies can worktogether extremely effectively. Each did what they dobest and supported each other, which led to a highly efficient health response from the UCT community (DeWit & Lewin, 2008).

Refugee Rights Project: helping to managea humanitarian crisis and monitoring

adherence to internationally recognisedrights of refugees

On the morning of Friday 23 May, the Refugee RightsProject fielded calls from countless of its fear-strickenclients who were afraid to leave their homes as well asfrom others who were confronted by perpetrators ofviolence. The Refugee Rights Project staff immediately intervenedby liaising with the South African Police Serviceto assist those affected to reach places of safety.

Later that day nearly 250 refugees arrived at the officesof the Refugee Rights Project at the Law Facultyseeking assistance. With severely traumatised clientswho obviously needed emergency relief, the RefugeeRights Project had to step outside their traditional role ofattorneys to manage a humanitarian crisis. With the assistanceof the Rondebosch Police, initially at the policestation and later at Rondebosch United CongregationChurch, they managed to place 1 057 refugees in sheltersin and around Cape Town with the Jammie Shuttleproviding the much needed transportation.

On Saturday morning the project staff logged all thedisplaced people that were assisted by them with theCape Town disaster management team. Many membersof the UCT community (staff and students) came to theassistance of the project staff.

It soon came to the attention of the Refugee RightsProject that refugees who were housed at communityhalls, church halls and mosques were being moved bygovernment to the Youngsfield Military Base as well asother distant and relatively remote places such as Soetwaterand Silverstroom. Within hours it became apparentthat refugees’ rights were being violated by the militarypersonnel and other officials at these sites.

The Refugee Rights Project immediately intervenedby liaising extensively with the military personnel atthe base, explaining the refugees’ right to freedom ofmovement, amongst others. This intervention directly resultedin these rights being respected and in the mediagaining access (Khan, 2008).

Other legal issues immediately identified and addressedby the project were the forced and undignified taggingof the refugees at these sites and the attempted unlawfulregistration of people not already documented. It waspointed out to the Minister of Home Affairs (in a series ofcorrespondence), under whose ostensible authority thiswas being done, that the authority she claimed for the

procedure did in fact not empower such registration andthat the offensive questions on these registration formshad no basis in law. This led to the minister retracting theinitial unlawful registration and relying rather on powersin terms of the Immigration Act to grant residence for theundocumented migrants for a six-month period. Supportand assistance from the entire Cape Bar and the project

staff during this time was very forthcoming and highlyappreciated.

At the same time refugees were demanding a presencefrom the office of the United Nations High Commissionerin Cape Town (UNHCR). Project staff convinced UNHCRstaff to come to Cape Town and establish a presence forthe duration of the crisis. In addition they also facilitatedmany meetings with civil society and the UNHCRprotection unit.