Self-Enforcing Clientelism

Chappell Lawson / Kenneth F. Greene
Associate Professor / Associate Professor
Massachusetts Institute of Technology / University of Texas at Austin
/

Draft

April 30, 2012

Abstract

Recent research on clientelism focuses on deliberate exchanges between mercenary voters and strategic political brokers. In this “instrumentalist” view, machine politicsis only sustainablewhere patrons can monitor voters’ actions – a situation that does not apply in many places known for clientelism. In this paper, we build a different theory of clientelism around the norm of reciprocity. If exchangesrely on clients’ feelings of obligation to return favors to their patrons, then clientelismcan be self-enforcing and persist despite ballot secrecy. To support this argument, we draw on ethnographic reports, survey data, and experiments from a variety of countries, as well as split-sample experiments embedded in two new surveys on Mexico specifically designed to test our predictions. Our findings have implications for voting behavior, party organization, andthe types of public policiesthat may diminish clientelism.

1. Introduction

Political scientists have long been interested in relationships in which leaders exchange selective benefits for political allegiance.[1] In developing countries, scholars typically group these relationships under the rubric of “clientelism”; followers are known as clients, leaders as patrons, and intermediaries as brokers. In the United States, analysts have referred to these same three groups as “constituents”, “bosses”, and “precinct captains”; the relationships among them are known as “machine politics” (Ostrogorski 1910, Gosnell 1937, Allswang 1977, Cox and Kousser 1981, Erie 1988). Despite extensive research in both contexts, however, political scientists have not produced a consensus on how such relationships are maintained.

Recenttheory argues that voters only comply with political brokers’ wishes if they believe that their vote choices are monitored and that they can thus be sanctioned if they fail to support the machine.This instrumentalist approach focuses on deliberate exchanges between voters who seek to extract tangible benefits and strategic political brokers who want to deliver votes to the politicians they serve as cheaply as possible (Dal Bó 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b; Nichter 2008; Stokes 2005).Such arguments emphasize the degree to which careful surveillance – or at least the credible threat of such surveillance (Chandra 2007) – ensures that constituents follow-through on their part of the clientelist bargain.

Yet this instrumentalist approach has not fully resolved the problem of voter compliance, especially where ballot secrecy is well established. When clientelist exchanges are asynchronous (i.e. brokers distribute benefits before an election in hopes of generating support on Election Day), clients may “defect” from the agreement after receiving their payoff (Stokes 2005). To diminish the incentive to renege, patrons not only must be able to monitor voters’ choices, either at the time they cast their ballots or after the fact, but they must be able to sanction individual voters who defect. Without identifying individual defectors, brokers cannot know which voters to sanction by withdrawing benefits in subsequent elections. Clientelism would then break down for one of two reasons. If brokerspaysupporters and opponents alike, then the disincentive for voting against the machine disappears. In addition, clientelism may proveunsustainably costly (Dal Bó 2007). If brokers inadvertently sanction supporters, they would create spurned voters who would not support the machine in the future under any standard punishment-path strategy.[2] Sanctioning groups of voters would only hasten clientelism’s demise because a machine that loses once in a constituency would withdraw benefits from some supporters who, in response, may not renew their support for the machine (see Levine and Pesendorfer 1995; also see Finan and Schecter 2009).[3]

Brokers can overcome these problems in some contexts. Some countries use partisan ballots, effectively eliminating ballot secrecy or permit party operatives in polling places, conveying the perception of monitoring even when voting is secret (see Kitschelt and Rozenas 2011). In other places, operatives use more clever tactics to violate the secret ballot and overcome the problem of asynchronous exchange. For instance,in Mexico, brokers are rumored to have asked voters to photograph their marked ballot using cell phones.In Italy, operatives from the Christian Democratic Party reportedly distributed left shoes to its clients before elections with the promise of delivering the right shoes if it won (Chubb 1982). In many settings, however, parties and candidates have limited capacity to monitor voters’ choices, allowing instrumentally motivated voters to “take the money and run” and ultimately underminingmachine politics.

In recent work, some instrumentalist scholars have recognized this problemand attempted to grapple with it systematically (Piattoni 2001: 7, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 8, Magaloni 2006, Kitschelt and Rozenas 2011).For instance, Stokes (2005, 2007)argues that the monitoring problem is mitigated by local brokers who are deeply embedded in their communities and can guess at how their clients vote. Unfortunately, this key claim has not been testes systematically. However, research in experimental psychology showsthat people are surprisingly bad at detecting when others are lying, even when they are trained to do so (Grohol 1999, Kohnken 1987, Kraut and Poe 1980).[4] In addition, clientelism persists in many places where well-organized political machines do not operate.[5]Thus, difficulties in monitoring and sanctioning voters continue to pose a serious challenge to instrumentalist theories of clientelism.

Given the theoretical and practical problems with enforcement of the clientelist bargainthrough external monitoring, we propose thatmachine politics can be supported by a psychological mechanismrooted in norms of reciprocity. Specifically, we argue that the receipt of gifts, favors, services, or protectioncreates feelings of obligation among voters, who then spontaneously supporttheir political patrons. Under such circumstances, clientelism is self-enforcing.

This norms-based approach to clientelism has roots in certain ethnographic studiesfrom anthropology, sociology, and political sciencethat emphasize the embeddedness of relationships between patrons and clientsand the “moral economy” of exchanges between the two (Boissevain 1966, Wolf 1969, Powell 1970, Scott 1972, Lemarchand and Legg 1972, Johnson 1974, Scott 1976, Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981, Lomnitz 1982 , Chubb 1982, Komito 1984, Roniger and Günes-Ayata 1994, Gay 1994, Fox 1994, Auyero 2001, Calvo and Murillo 2004, Gay 2006, Krishna 2007, Schaffer and Schedler 2007).These largely descriptive studies have routinely emphasized norms of reciprocity as the basis for clientelist exchanges, but they lack a plausible psychological micro-foundation that is as conceptually well-grounded as the instrumentalist underpinnings of principal-agent models of vote-buying.

We show that norms of reciprocity create a separate foundation for machine politics. The sense of obligation that brokers create through the provision of selective benefits can help politicians build clientelist networks even in the context of ballot secrecy. One implication is that clientelism may be much more entrenched than existing analyses would lead us to believe and will not necessarily disappear rapidly once ballot secrecy is enforced, as long as politicians have access to discretionary resources. Rather, purging clientelism from political life may require a normative component – specifically, that citizens reject on principle the exchange of votes for selective benefits because they feel a greater obligation to vote their conscience, to obey the law, and to support democratic institutions.

Our argument also hasramifications for party organization. Because machine politics can persist in the absence of active monitoring, politicians may not need the large-scale, deeply embedded organizations that would otherwise be required to monitor and sanction voters (Gyrzmala-Busse 2005; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b; Stokes 2005, 2007).Rather, they can secure election by earning voters’ loyalty, somewhat akin to the way that politicians generategratitude through constituency serviceand pork-barrel politics.

The next section of this paperprovides a systematic rationale for the “norms-of-obligation” interpretation of clientelism. We caution that the instrumentalist and norms-based approaches contrasted here are not synonyms for “rational choice” and “cultural” approaches. There is nothing inherently cultural about discharging one’s debts through acts of political support.The third section discussesobservable implications of this approach and compares them to those of instrumentalist models; this sectiondraws on ethnographic studies, surveys, and experiments, as well as on two new surveys from Mexico. The concluding section returns to theimplications of our findings for electoral behavior, party organization, and public policy.

2. Reciprocity and Obligation in Clientelist Exchange

Our approach is based on the notion that powerful instincts ofreciprocity cause people to feel indebted to those who provide them with benefits of more than token significance. When the recipient cannot discharge this debt of obligation materially, patron-client relationships may emerge. Of course, not all such debts generate clientelism. After detailing the psychological foundation for reciprocity, we generate more specific hypotheses about the conditions under which feelings of obligation promote clientelism.

Reciprocity is a fundamental element of human social interaction. Norms of reciprocity are recognized at a very young age (Harris 1970, Dreman and Greenbaum 1973, Birch and Billman 1986) and, although cultural differences can influence the expression of these norms (Herrmann et al. 2008, Gächter and Herrmann 2008), the concept and practice of reciprocity are essentially universal (Heinrich et al. 2005). Thiscomponent of human nature appears to beevolutionarily “hard-wired” (Hammerstein 2003, Gintis et al. 2003, Berg et al. 1995, Ornstein 1980, Trivers 1971, Simmel and Wolff 1950). Recent research in genetics and neuroscience even identifiessome of the specific alleles and biological pathways that underlie reciprocal exchange (McCabe et al. 2001, Sanfey et al. 2003, de Quervain et al. 2004, Cesarini et al. 2008, Fowler et al. 2008).

Instincts of reciprocity can powerfully influence behavior (see Fehr and Fischbacher 2002, Elster 1989: 192-214; Dawes and Thaler 1988: 195). For instance, experimental research shows that people often treat others fairly even when they face an incentive to do otherwise (McCabe et al. 1996, McCabe et al. 2003, Berg et al. 1995).Several years ago, two leading behavioral economists remarked that, “the obligation to reciprocate is so strong that we take it for granted” (Carmichael and MacLeod 1997: 502). Scholars from various disciplines have now documented the roleof reciprocity in a wide range of social activities, but it has not yet been used as the basis for understanding political clientelism.[6]

Instincts of reciprocity lead people to feel indebted to those who provide them with gifts, services, favors, or protection (Mauss 1990, Sherry 1983). Among individuals of similar status, such obligations are often discharged by providing a good of comparable worth to the original “gift”.[7] But not all recipients have the wherewithal to pay their patrons back in kind.Patron-client relationships may emerge when recipients discharge their debt by according the giver greater social status, esteem, or loyalty (Weinstein et al. 1969, Bienenstock and Bianchi 2004). This exchange creates a status hierarchy among previous equals (Rao 2001, Aragon 1996, Bartlett 1980).[8]

In the political sphere, recipients typically reciprocate patronage through outward manifestations of allegiance and shows of solidarity (Forster 1963; Scott 1972, Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984) – such as voting for a particular candidate, attending rallies, volunteering on a campaign, contributing their energy to projects sponsored by patrons, or joining protests when urged to do so (Harik 2004: 81-110, 147-62, Cambanis 2006, Radnitz 2010). Status hierarchy has long been the core of clientelism as conceptualized by scholars in anthropology and sociology. As Lomnitz puts it (1988: 47):

Loyalty in unbalanced exchange relations is the basis for political support…The patron provides security of employment, political protection, and dependability in unexpected circumstances of need in exchange for loyalty, expressed through personal commitment to the patron in labor, political support, and ideological allegiance.

Political clientelism becomes establishedwhen it is clear to both sides that recipients can never repay benefitsin kind, turning one groupinto perpetual recipients of material goods, services, favors, or protection and the other group into perpetualproviders. As Scott characterizes it, the “patron is in a position to supply unilaterally goods and services which the potential client and hisfamily need for their survival and well-being” (1972: 93).

A key question concerns the conditions under which feelings of obligation become activated in service of clientelism, and thus why scholars observe variation in the extent of machine politics across individuals, communities, and countries (even where politicians have similar levels of access to discretionary resources). We underscoretwoimportant limitations on the power of obligation to activate clientelist relations.

First, not all gifts automatically activate instincts of reciprocity. Token items (e.g., a pen bearing a party logo) may be taken as a gesture of introduction or courtesy, rather than as the “quid” in a quid pro quo. Likewise, items distributed to everyone who happens to be on a street corner at a particular moment could be interpreted similarly as materials meant to attract attention or to announce a candidate’s presence, rather than as part of an exchange relationship. The same holds if the benefits distributed are interpreted by recipients as repayments for past good behavior or as entitlements rather than gifts.Selective benefits offered by political machines may also be insufficient to generate clientelist support if the obligation they createis not deemed “worth” a vote (or some other demonstration of adhesion).The “going rate” for a votelikely varies across voters with different levels of resources.

Second, obligations stemming from reciprocity, do not necessarily propel citizens to become clients when all factors are taken into account (Klosko 1990). Apersonmay feel an obligation to her family to accept groceries from a political party in return for her vote, and this exchange may in turn generate an obligation to vote for that party. However,that new obligation may conflict with some existing obligation, such as the personal conviction that she should to vote herconscienceor(where selling one’s vote is illegal) themoral obligation to obey the law. Thus, factors likethe intensity of a voter’s attachment to competing parties, the degree to which she has imbibed civic norms, herrespect for the law, and support for representative institutionscould affect the extentand durabilityof clientelism.Just as instrumentally motivated clients do not automatically support the machine when they have competing reasons to choose another party,[9] voters motivated by feelings of obligation will only become captured clients under specific circumstances, as we detail below.

3. Observable Implications of the Reciprocity and Instrumentalist Approaches

Both instrumental and normative motivations for clientelism may be present within a given system, and machine politics will presumably be most durable when both mechanisms operate. In some cases, both approaches make similar predictions.For instance, both predict that clientelism would deteriorate when politicians run out of discretionary resources to distribute.However,the two approaches doyield a number of different predictions, presented in Table 1, which can be used as the basis for more systematic comparison. This comparison helps “locate” our norms-based approach in relation to the now-dominant literature on clientelism and yields testable hypotheses.

[Table 1 about here]

The key difference between the two approaches concerns the importance of monitoring voters’ actions. If instrumental models are correct, machine politics is limited to contexts in which patrons can credibly threaten to reward or punish their followers for non-compliance (Dal Bó 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b; Nichter 2008; Stokes 2005). By contrast, clientelism based on reciprocity may persist even where voters do not believe that they are monitored.

The two approaches also yield competing predictions about retrospective voting. In the instrumental view, voters care exclusivelyabout prospective costs and benefits (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007b: 25, 342; Lyne 2007; Stokes 2005). Although their perceptions of what benefits they may receive in the future are likely informed by what they have received in the past, instrumentally motivated voters care only about how today’s interactions condition their future stream of benefits.Clients motivated by obligation, however,may demonstrate loyalty to leaders who did right by them in the past, regardless of what they stand to gain in the future. That is, their actions today may be motivated by repaying a past favor rather than as part of a calculation about what they expect to receive in the future. They may thus cast their ballots based on purelyretrospective considerations (see Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, Fiorina 1981, Cain et al. 1987).Intriguingly, they may even seek to reciprocate perceived injuriesand injustices by voting against politicians who failed to deliver when expected to do so. This phenomenon, known as “altruistic punishment,” can even lead citizens to turn against patrons when doing so diminishes the chances of receiving clientelist benefits in the future(Fehr and Gächter 2000, Fehr and Gächter 2002, de Quervain et al. 2004).

Political attitudes also play a key role in the reciprocity approach to clientelism. Instrumentalist approaches generally discount citizens’ attitudes because such attitudes do not affect the costs and benefits of supporting the machine. In the norms-based approach, however, civic valuescreate conflicting obligations that should make voters less likely to participate in clientelist arrangements or follow through on a clientelist bargain once it is struck. Civic-minded voters should thus be more likely to see clientelist exchanges as illegitimate, to reject proffered benefits, and to perceive a value conflict between clientelist and civic obligations.

Finally, the reciprocity framework predicts that the provision of benefits by politicians induces feelings of indebtedness among recipients to support the politicians in question. As the value of a particular benefit rises in the mind of the recipient, he should become a more reliable client. Instrumentally minded voters clearly also assess the value of a proffered benefit such that voters evaluate whether a given good is “worth” their vote. To the extent that the two perspectives differ on this point, they predict differences in how voters react to two benefits of similar monetary value. For the strictest of instrumentalists, two such benefits should elicit similar responses, whereas in the reciprocity framework, they may elicit widely varying feelings of obligation. For instance, a needed “just in time” service such as a free visit to a doctor for a sick child may elicit more obligation than a cash payment that could purchase such a visit.